

CONTRIBUTION OF
YĀMUNĀCĀRYA
TO VIŚIṢṬĀDVAITA

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by
Dr. M. Narasimhachāry, M.A. Ph.D.

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॥ श्रीः ॥

जयन्ति यामुनाचार्यसूक्तिप्रत्यग्रपुष्पसन्दर्भाः।
यन्निगमागमगन्धैः लुलितं मनो रसिकरङ्गस्य॥

FOREWORD

I have great pleasure in writing a Foreword to this study of 'Yāmuna's Contribution to the Viśiṣṭādvaita' by my former student Dr. M. Narasimhachary. The Preface sets forth the background of the author and his work. Dr. Narasimhachary attended my M.A. classes in the Sanskrit Department of the University of Madras and passed in the First Class in 1961. From 1961 to 1963 he worked under me as a University Research Scholar and from 1963 to 1965, as a Junior Fellow of the U.G.C., when he prepared the present Thesis on which he took his Doctorate Degree in 1967.

During his student days, Dr. Narasimhachary impressed me with his grounding in Sanskrit and later when he did his research work, with his enthusiasm and ability in the pursuit of the subject of his specialisation. In giving him first the *Āgamaprāmāṇya* of Yāmuna, I had set him on a field of study on which I had made some preliminary investigations. The study of the evolution of the ideas of the *Śarīra-śarīri-bhāva*, *Śeṣa-śeṣi-bhāva*, *Prapatti* and the role of *Śrī* as a Mediator—which became the sheet-anchor of the school of *Viśiṣṭādvaita*—, had interested me and as there had been on this, comparatively, a meagre amount of work and even what was published has been mostly inaccessible, e.g., the English translation of part of the *Siddhitraya* by Prof. Ramanujachariar and K. Srinivasachariar, I thought the gap could be filled by undertaking a detailed study and exposition of Yāmuna's *Gītārthasaṅgraha* and *Siddhitraya* in addition to the *Āgamaprāmāṇya* and the *Stotras*. As in the fields of other subjects, here also, the rise to fame and popularity of the later masters had resulted in the desuetude of the contributions of the earlier formative periods, the texts of these periods having become either lost or only partially preserved. It may be hoped that the growth of interest in the study of the earlier phases will lead to the discovery of the manuscripts of these treatises and that, along with the author of the present work who is continuing his studies in this field, others interested in and devoted to this school of thought would exert themselves in the task of discovering the more ancient texts and re-constructing the early history of the school more fully. The author's new critical edition of the *Āgamaprāmāṇya* for the

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Gaekwad Oriental Series and the present exhaustive exposition of Yāmūnāchārya will, I am sure, contribute to this reconstruction. Comparative and critical study of a branch of Sanskrit literature comprehends an adequate study of the concerned branch in its *sampradāya*; effort in this direction by the author was rendered fruitful by the kind cooperation of one of our distinguished Paṇḍits and traditional exponents of *Viśiṣṭādvaita*, Sri Uttamur Viraraghavachariar, at whose feet the author was able to sit for some time.

The appearance of this work in the series of publications brought out by the Prof. M. Rangacharya Memorial Trust associated with one of our respected Sanskrit Professors and pioneers in *Viśiṣṭādvaita* studies, is a happy augury for the further fruitful endeavours in the scholarly field of the young author.

10-4-1971
Madras.

V. RAGHAVAN

VII

PREFACE

In the following pages, an attempt is made, for the first time, at presenting a detailed account of the pre-Rāmānuja phase of the school of philosophy which came to be known as *Viśiṣṭādvaita*, as far as it can be known from the available works of Yāmūnācārya, the most important of all the Śrīvaiṣṇava teachers that preceded Rāmānuja.

Yāmūnācārya, known in Tamil as *Ālavandār* (meaning, one who came to rule, protect or save), is believed to be Rāmānuja's grand-teacher (*paramācārya*). Although Yāmūna's predecessor and grandfather, Nāthamuni, also wrote in Sanskrit works like the *Yogarāhasya* and the *Nyāyatattva*, we do not have any of them. It is therefore with Yāmūna that our knowledge of this school of thought in Sanskrit should commence. Yāmūna wrote the *Catusślokī* (*Śrīstuti*), the *Stotraratna*, the *Gitārthasaṅgraha*, the *Āgamaprāmāṇya*, the *Siddhitraya*, the *Puruṣanirṇaya* and the *Kāśmīrāgamaprāmāṇya*, of which the last two are not available. It may be true that Yāmūna himself derived the chief tenets of his philosophy from the works of Nāthamuni, but we cannot say more on this, unless we have at least one work of Nāthamuni.

The great position that Rāmānuja attained as the *Bhāṣyakāra* of this school led to the comparative neglect of the contributions of this founder of the school, Yāmūna. Even in modern works on Indian philosophy, e.g., *The History of Indian Philosophy* (Vol. III) by Dr. S.N. Dasgupta, or even *The Philosophy of Viśiṣṭādvaita* by Prof. P.N. Srinivasachari, no special efforts have been made to present the important philosophical tenets of this great Pre-Rāmānuja writer. It must be mentioned in this context that an English translation of and notes on the *Ātma* and *Īśvarasiddhis* of Yāmūna's *Siddhitraya* had been published by Prof. R. Ramanujachariar and K. Srinivasachariar in the *Journal of the Annamalai University*. A similar but more detailed study of Yāmūna's *Gitārthasaṅgraha* had been published by Paṇḍitarāja D.T. Tatachariar in the *Journal of Sri Venkateswara Oriental Institute*. But the gap in the field for a specialised study of Yāmūna had still been there. It may also be noted that Dr. S.N. Dasgupta criticises Yāmūna

for not having put forward what he calls "new ideas" of philosophy (HIP, Vol. III, p. 155). He further states that Yāmuna had not said anything regarding the means of release, the state of release, etc. But the fact is that Yāmuna's *sāstraic* work, the *Siddhitraya*, is incomplete in all the three parts, and as such we are not in a position to say that Yāmuna had not dealt with the topics in question. It is for this reason that my Professor, Dr. V. Raghavan, proposed that I should take up a detailed study of Yāmuna's works for my Doctoral work.

The scope and nature of the work is to study in detail each extant work of Yāmuna. We have thus studied not only the texts and presented the discussions in them, but have also brought together the views of Yāmuna and the main tenets of his school as they got crystallised in later terminology. When Yāmuna wrote, the doctrines of Buddhism, Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, Mīmāṃsā and Advaita were holding the field, and the credit goes to Yāmuna for having tackled those schools and established his own school of theistic Vedāntic thought. Yāmuna had the task of presenting a codified system of a philosophy and religion which had one foot in the *Upaniṣads* and another in the *Āgama*. The *Siddhitraya*, as already mentioned, has not been preserved intact and portions of all the three parts have been lost. Although we are thereby handicapped in our attempts at presenting a complete account of Yāmuna's discussions and contributions, we have, by correlating all the extant material, tried to fulfil our objectives in this Thesis. For the missing portions of the *Siddhitraya*, we have used citations and allusions to these in the works of Sudarśanasūri and Vedānta Deśika. With the help of references made by Vedānta Deśika in some of his works, we have tried to outline the nature and scope of the *Puruṣanirṇaya* of Yāmuna, which is no longer available. The English translations of the *Siddhitraya* and the *Gitārthasaṅgraha* referred to already, as also the two Sanskrit commentaries on the *Siddhitraya* by Paṇḍitaratna Uttamur T. Viraraghavacharyasvamin (1942) and of P.B. Annangaracharyasvamin of Vadtal (1954), have been quite helpful to me in understanding many a knotty and crucial passage in Yāmuna's work.

In the section devoted to a study of the *Catuśśloki* of our author, we have traced the concept of *Śakti* from its earliest

beginnings in literature, to its final form in the later Vaiṣṇava literature, especially the *Pāñcarātrāgamas*. What we now find missing in Yāmuna's works, can be assessed and understood from Rāmānuja's works like the *Srībhāṣya* and the *Vedārthasaṅgraha*, because Rāmānuja often bases his own arguments and ideas on those of Yāmuna. In the earlier part of this Thesis, we have tried to present a historical account of the predecessors of Yāmuna, and of Yāmuna and his works.

It is a great pleasure and privilege to record my sense of deep gratitude to my Professor, Dr. V. Raghavan, for his setting me on this important work — *The Contribution of Yāmuna to the Viśiṣṭādvaita* — which is an untrodden field, and also for his kind supervision, guidance and help at every step in my humble work. I deem it a rare fortune to have worked under him. He not only furnished me with the plan of the work and guided me, but discussed all the important points and read the whole Thesis. But for his kind help, this Thesis of mine could never have assumed this shape. It was again through him that I came into touch with the Prof. M. Rangacharya Memorial Trust, under whose auspices I had the good fortune of delivering three lectures on Yāmuna and his Philosophy, in 1969. Consequent on this, the scholarly son of the late Prof. Rangacharya, Prof. M.R. Sampathkumaran, evinced great interest in my work and at the suggestion of my Professor, kindly took up my Thesis for publication under the aegis of the above Trust. Thus I own it to my Professor that the work I did under him received the attention of scholars and the general public, particularly in this part of the country, interested in this branch of philosophy. Also it is through him that I came into touch with co-workers in this and allied fields working in foreign countries, especially the United States. My close association, especially with Dr. H. Daniel Smith of the Syracuse University, has been of particular help to me as I had the opportunity of going through a number of *Pāñcarātrāgama* texts—which happened to be his own chosen filed—which enabled me to understand and appreciate the case for the *āgama* presented by Yāmuna in his *Āgamaprāmāṇya*. For all these and for his continued interest in me and my work, and also for the valuable Foreword which he has kindly given to this publication, I am profoundly indebted to my *Guru*.

I will be failing in my duty if I do not record my deep sense of gratitude to Paṇḍitaratna Tarkārṇava Uttamur T. Viraraghavacharyasvamin, Madras, who was kind enough to allow me to read with him the texts of the *Āgamaprāmāṇya* and the *Siddhitraya*. Yāmuna, it must be pointed out, is by no means an easy writer. The above two works of his are full of *śāstraic* discussions and are at times, turgid. But for the lucid interpretations offered by Sri Viraraghavacharyasvamin, I could not have studied Yāmuna and accomplished my objective. It may be mentioned that the *Siddhitraya* is not part of the traditional series of texts which the *Viśiṣṭādvaita* paṇḍits read or teach; and as such I am all the more sensible of the kindness of Paṇḍit Viraraghavachariar.

I feel it a great pleasure to express my sincere thanks to Prof. M.R. Sampathkumaran who offered a number of suggestions regarding this work of mine and its publication and also enlightened me on certain topics and points of traditional significance. In a work of this nature, in a field in which there has not been much work done by earlier scholars, errors are bound to exist. I shall be glad to receive suggestions from all quarters which will help me to improve my presentation in the next edition of this work or in my further studies in this field.

I am thankful to the authorities of the University of Madras, for offering me a studentship for two years and also the necessary facilities to carry on my research work in the Sanskrit Department of the University and for the permission that they gave for the publication of this Thesis. I am also thankful to the University Grants Commission, New Delhi, for having offered me a Junior Fellowship for a period of two years. My thanks are also due to the Curators of the Government Oriental Manuscripts Library, Madras, and the Adyar Library and Research Centre, Madras, for having permitted me to consult some rare and unpublished manuscripts.

Madras,
April, 1971.

M. NARASIMHACHARY

PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION

Subsequent to the publication of the First Edition, a lot of work has been done on Yāmuna by scholars of the East and West. Prof. J.A.B. Van Buitenin's English Translation of the *Āgamaprāmāṇya* (Madras, 1971), the present writer's Critical Edition and Study of the same text (Baroda, 1976), and *Yāmuna's Vedānta and Pāñcarātra : Integrating the Classical and the Popular* by Walter G. Neevel, Jr. (Harward, 1977) are some of the noteworthy publications in this area.

All the copies of the First Edition of this work having been exhausted in a short span of time, there has been a growing demand for it from scholars all over the world. Unable to bring out another Edition, the authorities of the Prof. M. Rangacharya Memorial Trust, Madras, gave me the clearance to have it published on my own. This was sometime around 1980. I have been, all along, studying and teaching Yāmuna. Many scholars of the West used to come to me to read Yāmuna in original. The need for a Second Edition was more acutely felt. I tried to publish it but my efforts did not take any shape partly due to the financial constraints, and partly due to my foreign assignment in Malaysia during the years 1982-84.

It is heartening to place on record, in this connection, my sincere love and grateful thanks to my valued friend, Prof. C.V. Seshacharyulu of Hyderabad who has been watching me and my work since the past three decades. He has very kindly offered to bring out the Second Edition under the illustrious banner of his prestigious SRI JAYALAKSHMI PUBLICATIONS. I have no words to express my sincere and heartfelt thanks to him for this noble gesture.

Since the present work happens to be the Doctoral Thesis I submitted to the University of Madras, I have not made any drastic changes in the text. The last chapter, however is an exception. In this, I developed the concept of Yāmuna's pioneering

work, and also tried to present another dimension of his work from the viewpoint of his masterful “niryāhas” for some important stanzas of the *Divya Prabandha*. Although Yāmuna did not leave any work in Tamil to the posterity, his ingenious interpretations of some of the Pāsurams bring in immense joy to the religious-minded Śrīvaiṣṇava scholars.

I now feel it my duty to answer the criticism levelled against my assessment of Yāmuna's work, by Eric J. Lott in his masterly treatise, *God and the Universe in the Vedantic Theology of Rāmānuja* (pp. 33-34). Regarding the delineation of the *śārīra-śārīri-bhāva*, according to the critic, I have “over-stated my case” in favour of Yāmuna. Well, each scholar has his own way of understanding a concept, and Eric J. Lott is right in his own way of understanding and assessing a given situation. Yāmuna uses the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka passages* (V.7) “yasya prthivī śārīram, yasya āpaḥ śārīram..” etc. where the Lord is described as the *ātman* in relation to everything in the universe, which becomes his body (*śārīra*). Of special significance is the text “Ya ātmani tiṣṭhan”, “Yasya ātmā śārīram” etc. which Rāmānuja explains (Śrībhāṣya I.2.19) as the *Mādhyandina* reading, while Kāṇva text has “yo vijñāne tiṣṭhan, yasya vijñānam śārīram” etc. Although the word “vijñānam” here means the “ātman” (the *jīva*), Rāmānuja has throughout chosen the *Mādhyandina* reading, following Yāmuna. This, according to me, is quite significant. Moreover, in the concerned chapter (VII) I stated that the “śārīra-śārīri” concept has been “traced out” by me from the works of Yāmuna. “Tracing out” means “trying to find the beginnings,” or “to identify” in a sketchy fashion. It does not, by any stretch of imagination, mean “presentation in a fully developed form”. My next sentence clearly reads : “This concept finds fuller expression and consummation in Rāmānuja's Philosophy”. Thus, I see there is no substance in Eric. J. Lot's comment, that I have made taller claim for Yāmuna's originality than what was really due to him. Nobody can underestimate Rāmānuja's

position as the great master-builder and the chief architect of the Viśiṣṭādvaita, and particularly his *development* of the *śārīra-śārīri-bhāva*. At the same time, ignoring what Yāmuna has stated in his works, to the extent they are available, is unwarranted and unjustified.

In fine, I would like to thank my genuine well-wisher and *nirhetuka suhṛt* Dr. S.B. Raghunathacharya, Vice-Chancellor, Rashtriya Sanskrit Vidyapeetha (Deemed University), Tirupathi, who has always been enthusing and encouraging me to bring out the second Edition of this work. He along with Prof. C.V. Seshacharyulu has been a constant and unfailing source of great inspiration and guidance to me in my academic activities.

Finally, I would like to thank once again Prof. C.V. Seshacharyulu for all that he has done to bring out this second Edition in a very short span of time. I also wish to convey my thanks to M/s. Sri Kalanjali Graphics, Hyderabad, for their neat and prompt printing.

M. NARASIMHACHARY

Madras,
February, 1998

PUBLISHER'S NOTE

It is a matter of immense pleasure for us that we are now able to bring out "The Contribution of Śrī Yāmunācārya to Viśiṣṭādvaita" which was the Doctoral Thesis of our good friend, Dr. M. Narasimhachary. Although this happens to be the Second Edition, we are sure that on all counts, it is second to none. We do hope that this publication fulfils a long felt desideratum by scholars of the East and West, who, for the past three decades have been eagerly awaiting its emergence. Needless to say, this work for the first time, embodies an authoritative and comprehensive assessment of all the available works of Śrī Yāmunācārya, the grand-teacher and path-finder of the great Rāmānuja. We are particularly pleased that by the Grace of God, our desire to bring out this Book in a way that it satisfies both the eye and the mind of the discerning readers, is more than realised through this Publication.

Dr. Narasimhachary is a multi-faceted scholar with an admirable mastery not only in Telugu and Sanskrit, but also in Tamil. Prof. V.S. Venkataraghavacharya and Dr. V. Raghavan were his Gurus in so far as his Sanskrit studies are concerned at the Post-graduate and Doctoral levels. He had the good fortune of studying the works of Yāmuna in the traditional method at the feet of "Abhinavadeśika", "Tarkārṇava", "Paṇḍitaratna", Sri U.Ve. Uttamur Viraraghavacharya Swamin. Quite early in his life, he had the necessary inspiration and training in composing verses in Telugu and Sanskrit, from stalwarts like Prof. Iyunni Viraraghavacharya, Prof. Manāpraggada Seshasayi and "Kaviratna", "Hayagrīvopāsaka", Sri Gudimella Ramanujacharya Swamin. Dr. Narasimhachary has also been assisting many Western scholars in their Indological Studies for quite a long time. Of special mention is the help he rendered to Prof. H. Daniel Smith of the Syracuse University, New York, U.S.A., in his researches in the field of Pañcarātra Āgamas.

We consider it a matter of great fortune that we are now able to place this prestigious and pioneering book in the hands of scholars.

We are thankful to Dr. Narasimhachary for the readiness with which he has consented to our bringing out this Edition.

We are also thankful to M/s. Odin Press and M/s Kalanjali Graphics, Hyderabad, for the neatness and promptness with which they have printed this book.

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CHAPTER I

THE PRE-RĀMĀNUJA AGE

The philosophy of *Viśiṣṭādvaita* before Śrī Rāmānujācārya bears the indelible impression of the great saints and scholars who, from time to time, inspired people by their teachings and writings. The *Viśiṣṭādvaita* school has three important phases: the *śāstraic* texts in Sanskrit which owe their authority to the *Vedas*, the *Āgamas* in Sanskrit (which again are two-fold—the *Vaikhānasa* and the *Pañcarātra*) and the *Psalms of the Āzhvārs*, forming a large literature by itself, reflecting a high state of devotion of the saints that sang them to the Lord as Nārāyaṇa. The *Āzhvārs* drank deep of the love of God and burst into rapturous utterances which assumed the beautiful form of songs. These songs go by the name of *Nālāyira Divya Prabandha*, meaning the “Four thousand Verses of Divine Composition”. The *Āzhvārs* did not engage themselves in scholarly polemic in favour of their own line of thought.

The age of the *Āzhvārs* is the same as that of other sages and scholars who contributed by their own line of approach to the general spiritual renaissance of the country, as for example, Śrī Śaṅkārācārya with his monistic philosophy (*Advaita*). This situation demanded a scholastic approach also, as different

schools were contending with one another at that time. The devotional outpourings in the local languages had to be provided now with a solid scholastic basis. This gave rise to the line of *Ācāryas* who wrote a series of expositions in Sanskrit in support of their school. Śrī Nāthamuni appeared as the pioneer who wrote Sanskrit works systematizing the Śrīvaiṣṇava philosophy in the South : the *Yogarāhasya* and the *Nyāyatattva*, neither of which is unfortunately available now.

Of all the teachers who preceded Rāmānuja, Śrī Yāmūnācārya is the most important. The task of supporting the *Viśiṣṭādvaita* from the scholarly aspect, which was first undertaken by Nāthamuni, now acquired new impetus at the hands of Yāmuna, who wrote seven works in Sanskrit covering the religious as well as the philosophic aspects¹: the *Śrīstuti* or the *Catuśśloki*, the *Stotratatna*, the *Gītārthasaṅgraha*, the *Āgamaprāmāṇya*, the *Siddhitrāya*, the *Kāśmīrāgamaprāmāṇya* and the *Puruṣanirṇaya*, also known as the *Mahāpuruṣanirṇaya*.² Of these, the last two are mere names to us. Mention should be made here of the fact that the authorship of the work *Kāśmīrāgamaprāmāṇya* is open to doubt. There is no reference to this work as that of Yāmuna either in the *Rahasyatrayasāra* of Veṅkaṭanātha (popularly known as Vedānta Deśika) or in works like the *Prapannāmṛta*. The *Rahasyatrayasāra* enumerates the works of Yāmuna as eight in number (p.41: āha eṭṭu), without referring to the *Kāśmīrāgamaprāmāṇya* which indeed may form a strong proof against Yāmuna's authorship of the work (Deśika

1. Cf. TMK. V. 136 :

"nāthopajñāṁ pravṛttaṁ bahubhirupacitaṁ yāmuneṣu prabandhaiḥ
trātaṁ saṁnyag yatīndrairidamakhilataṁ mahākarsaṇaṁ darśanaṁ naḥ"

2. Cf. the following opening verse of Veṅkaṭanātha's *Gītārthasaṅgraharakṣā*, which is a commentary on Yāmuna's *GS*. :

"mānatvaṁ bhagavanmatasya mahataḥ pūrnas tathā nirṇayas
tīrassiddhaya ātma-saṁvidakṣiṇāna-tattvāśrayaḥ
gītārthasya ca saṅgrahasstutiyugaṁ śrīśrīsayorityamūn
yadgranthān anusandadhe yatipatis taṁ yāmuneṣu numah."

Veṅkaṭanātha refers to Yāmuna's *Puruṣanirṇaya* in his *NS*. ch. III, p. 225; *Saccaritrarakṣā*, p. 46; *N.P.* p. 148; *Stotratatnabhāṣya*, p. 49; and the *Gītārthasaṅgraharakṣā*, p. 3. See below for the two lost works of Yāmuna.

counts the three *Siddhis* of the *Siddhitrāya* separately and hence the number eight). But inasmuch as Yāmuna himself refers to this work in his *Āgamaprāmāṇya*³ in a way that is suggestive of its being his own composition, and since there is no proof to the contrary, we may take it for granted that its author is Yāmuna himself, until it is proved otherwise.

The *Ācāryas* had to clear their path of the rival schools of thought, both *Vedic* and non-*Vedic*. Among the *Vedic* schools, the *Advaita* and the *Mīmāṃsā*, and among the non-*Vedic*, Buddhism and Materialism offered them the toughest fight.

Thus, the period prior to Rāmānuja was a testing one so far as the *Viśiṣṭādvaita* is concerned. However, the task of Rāmānuja was rendered easy by his predecessor Yāmūnācārya, who had already tackled the tenets of rival schools, especially the monistic, which was looming large at that time. The completion and promotion of the cause of the *Viśiṣṭādvaita* as a regular system of philosophy was left in the hands of Rāmānuja,⁴ who succeeded in his mission creditably well, as is borne out by his *opus magnum*, the *Śrībhāṣya* (commentary on the *Brahmasūtra* of Bādarāyaṇa) and its allied literature. The extent of Yāmuna's influence on Rāmānuja will be dealt with in a separate chapter of the present work.

3. See Dr. Raghavan's Presidential Address, p. 2 : "Proceedings and Transactions of the All India Oriental Conference", Twentyfirst Session, Srinagar (1964).

Cf. the following from the *ĀP*. :

"sarvaṁ caitat puruṣanirṇaye nipuṭataramupapāditamiti neha
prastūyate" (p. 45).

"yathā caikāyanaśākhāyā apauruṣeyatvaṁ tathā
kāśmīrāgamaprāmāṇya eva prapañcitamiti neha prastūyate" (p. 85).

Here, the way in which Yāmuna refers to the *Kāśmīrāgama-prāmāṇya* is similar to his reference to the *Puruṣanirṇaya*, which is decidedly his own composition.

4. Cf. foot-note 1 above

Also vide *PA*. ch. 116, p. 454, verses 52-55, where Rāmānuja is said to have undertaken the task of promoting the *Viśiṣṭādvaita* religion and philosophy, in accordance with the intentions of Yāmūnācārya.

CHAPTER II

TEACHERS THAT PRECEDED YĀMUNĀCĀRYA

The exact state of the *Viśiṣṭādvaita* philosophy before Yāmuna is not known to us because of the fact that although there were some works by his time, they have not come to light.

In the list of teachers traditionally recited by the Śrīvaiṣṇavas, barring the divine teachers, we have the following mentioned in the pre-Yāmuna age : Śaṭhakopa (known in Tamil as Nammāzhvār), Nāthamuni, Puṇḍarikākāṣa (Uyyakkoṇḍār) and Śrīrāmamiśra (Maṇakkālnambi). Of these, Nammāzhvār is the celebrated Tamil saint and hence it is Nāthamuni who forms the first Śrīvaiṣṇava teacher (*ācārya*) of the South, who wrote works in Sanskrit.

Śrīraṅganāthamuni,⁵ popularly known as Nāthamuni, and perhaps otherwise called Śrīnātha,⁶ was a native of Vīraṇārāyaṇapura, a village in the South Arcot District, located near Chidambaram. This village is now known as Kāṭṭumannārguḍi. He lived in the last quarter of the ninth and the major part of the tenth century A.D. He had a son named Īśvara and a daughter too.⁷

He was a great scholar, philosopher, musician⁸ and *yogin*,⁹ all in one.¹⁰

5. Cf. Veṅkaṭanātha's commentary on the *SR.* of Yāmuna : "Śrīraṅganātha iti nāmadheyam" (p. 27) and "Śrīraṅganātha iti tvannāmadhāriṇam" (p. 94).

6. T.A. Gopīnātha Rau, in his "Sir Subrahmanya Aiyar Lectures on the History of Śrīvaiṣṇavas", (p. 30), says that Nāthamuni was also called Śrīnātha, on the evidence of some inscriptional data, which, however, he does not furnish.

7. *Vide PA.* ch. 108, p. 417, śl. 71.

8. *Ibid.* p. 413, ff.

9. *Ibid.* p. 416, śls 56-57. It is said that Nāthamuni was practising the *yoga* consisting of eight accessories (*aṣṭāṅga*), which it is said, procured *mokṣa* easily. This chapter (108) describes the transmission of this *yoga* from Nāthamuni to his disciple, Kurukānātha. Cf. also ch. 110, śl. 15, in this connection. It is further recorded (ch. 114, śl. 50 ff.) that Yāmuna could not meet Kurukānātha at an appointed hour to receive this efficacious *yoga* from him and that it thus became extinct.

10. Yāmuna in his *SR.* (śls. 1, 2 and 3) and the *Āgamaprāmāṇya* (the concluding verses) glorifies Nāthamuni as a great devotee of the Lord. Also see Veṅkaṭanātha's commentary on śl. 2 of the *SR.* p. 28.

We have recently noticed a work entitled *Nāthamuniprapannatvasamarthana*¹¹ also called *Nāthamunivijaya*.¹² The author, Deśikasudhī, tries in this work to prove that Nāthamuni, in spite of his great *yogic* powers and full-fledged devotion to the Lord, considered and practised independent *prapatti* or Surrender as the only means of attaining salvation,¹³ rather than *bhakti* or devotion, which he viewed as an end in itself, but not as a means.¹⁴ The author of this work bases his arguments mainly on the statements made by Veṅkaṭanātha in some of his works like the *Stotraratnabhāṣya*, the *Gītārthasaṅgraharakṣā*, the *Nikṣeparakṣā*, the *Gadyabhāṣya* and the *Tātparyacandrikā*. No reference to, or quotation from any of Nāthamuni's own compositions is found in this work.

One hagiological work states the Nāthamuni was a contemporary of Nammāzhvār, the famous Tamil saint, or of his disciple Madhurakavi Āzhvār,¹⁵ and that he had a direct vision of the Three Realities (the "*tattvatraya*", viz., Cit, Acit and Īśvara) by means of his *yogic* powers.¹⁶ Alternatively, it is stated

11. This is a paper manuscript deposited in the Government Oriental Manuscripts Library, Madras, under R. No. 1362. This is in *Grantha* characters and consists of 14 folios (27 pages).

12. Cf. the concluding stanza of the above work, p. 27 :

"deśikadāsenāsau śiṣyeṇa śrīmadanṇayāryāpām
nāthamunivijayanāmā kṛtirabhirāmā kṛtā satām prītyai."

13. *Ibid.*, p. 1 :

"satyām samagrabhaktau samādhikaśaktau salālaso muktau
prāyuṅkta yaḥ prapattim vipratipattim vihanavasau nāthaḥ."

"iha khalu nikhilamunivara(ni)karasamadhikaniravadhikaparika-
rasamagrabhaktiko 'pi bhagvān nāthamunirapi soḍhakālavilambaḥ
svatantraprapattimavalalamba iti samīcīnasaṁpradāyasaṁśaṅgināḥ
saṅgirante".

14. *Ibid.*, p. 27.

"tadevaṁ nāthamuneḥ sādhanabhaktiniṣṭhatve
'nanyasiddhasādhaka-leśābhāvāt, prabalavipulabādhāsattvācca,
nāthamuniḥ svatantraprapatti-niṣṭhaḥ, phalabhaktiniṣṭhaśca; na
sādhanabhaktiniṣṭha iti niṣkaṇṭako ghaṇṭāpathaḥ".

15. Cf. *PA.* ch. 107, p. 408, ff.

16. *Ibid.* śl. 50. This fact is corroborated by Yāmuna in his *ĀP.* (p. 87) by the phrase - "svayogamahimapratyakṣatattvatrayaḥ".

that he meditated on the composition of Madhurakavi on Nammāzhvār and that this led to a vision of the *Āzhvār* wherein he was taught the works of all the *Āzhvārs*. He was led to make a search for them on hearing a decad of the *Tiruvāymozhi* (V.5) wherein the Lord is addressed as *Ārāvamudu* or "Nectar that never satiates" and which refers to the thousand verses of which it forms a part.

Nāthamuni is thus accredited with the honour of having collected nearly four thousand of the floating psalms of the *Āzhvārs* and compiled them into their present form. To him also goes the credit of having, for the first time, set this *Prabandha* (the collection of the songs of the *Āzhvārs*) to music¹⁷ and introduced its recitation as an integral part of the Śrīvaiṣṇava temple-worship in the South.¹⁸

The works of Nāthamuni, as we have already noted, are the *Yogarahasya*—a treatise on *yoga*, and the *Nyāyatattva*—a treatise on the Nyāya system of thought.¹⁹ None of these works is available now, though quotations from the second are made by Venkaṭanātha, the most brilliant luminary in the history of the post-Rāmānuja Śrīvaiṣṇavism. However, Sri T.K.V. Desikachar claims that his father, Sri Krishnamacharya "received" the text of the *Yogarahasya* from Nāthamuni himself, which is published in the quarterly *Darśanam* (Vol. 1 no. 1, Feb. 1991 onwards) serially by the Krishnamacharya-Yoga Mandiram, Madras. From

17. The *Guruparamparā* tradition, as well as the *RTS*. of Deśika, support the view that Nāthamuni set the Tamil *prabandha* to music. See p. 65, the verse "kāḷam valāmburiyanna" etc. (Publication of the *Rahasyatrayapracārasabhā*, Madras).

18. *Vide PA*. ch. 107, p. 413.

19. *PA*. is the only work which records that Nāthamuni wrote the *Puruṣanirṇaya*. This is obviously an error. See. ch. 108, p. 416, śl. 44:

"śāstram nyāyatattvākhyam tathā puruṣanirṇayam/ dhīmān yogarahasyam ca trīṇyētānyakarottadā".

But the *RTS*. of Deśika (p. 39) clearly states that the works of Nāthamuni are two in number: the *Nyāyatattva* and the *Yogarahasya*. The *Puruṣanirṇaya* to which Deśika very rarely refers, is that of Yāmuna. See f.n. 2, above.

the references made to it, the *Nyāyatattva* appears to have been the first work in the field to interpret Nyāya according to the Śrīvaiṣṇava line of thought. Venkaṭanātha states that the *Nyāyatattva* criticises and controverts the *Nyāyasūtra* of Gautama.²⁰ He quotes metrical as well as prose passages from the *Nyāyatattva* nearly twenty times in the *Nyāyasiddhāñjana*²¹ and thrice in his *Nyāyapariśuddhi*.²² He refers by name to the *pādas* or sections of this text—*prameya*, *pramāṭr*, *karaṇa* and *jñāna*, and also to several *adhikaraṇas* or sub-sections of each of these *pādas*. We can, by this, understand that the *Nyāyatattva* was a very large work in verse as well as prose, consisting of the four above-mentioned sections and several sub-sections. The *Nyāyatattva* is referred to as *śāstra* in the *Siddhitraya*.²³ Sudarśanasūri, the commentator on Rāmānuja's Śrībhāṣya, attributes three *ślokas* that appear in the *Śrībhāṣya* to Nāthamuni.²⁴ The verses quoted by Rāmānuja are:

"jñānarūpaṁ param brahma tannivartyaṁ mṛṣātmakaṁ
ajñānaṁ cet tiraskuryāt kaḥ prabhustannivartakah (ne)?
jñānaṁ brahmeti vijñānamasti cet syāt prameyatā
brahmaṇo 'nanubhūtitvaṁ tvaḍuktyaiva prasajyate
jñānaṁ brahmeti cet jñānamajñānasya nivartakaṁ
brahmavat tatprakāśatvāt tadapi hyanivartakaṁ"

Obviously, the *ślokas* quoted above must have formed part of the *Nyāyatattva*. Tradition reveals that the text of the *Nyāyatattva* opens with the following verse:

20. Cf. *NP*. p. 87:

"bhagavannāthamunibhir nyāyatattvasamāhvayā
ayadhīryākṣapādādīn nyabandhi nyāyapaddhatiḥ"

21. See pp. 194-196, 199, 205, 237, 238, 241, 243-244, 256-258, 261-264.

22. See pp. 130, 132, 172.

23. Cf. *ĀS*. p. 65: "...yathārthakhyātisamarthanena ca śāstra itī na vyāvartyate..." See also the verse, "yo vetti..." etc., quoted below where the term "śāstra" occurs.

Some of the sections (*adhikaraṇas*) of the *Nyāyatattva* are also referred to by Yāmuna in his *ST*: "sukhaduḥkhādhikaraṇa" (p. 145), "prathamādhikaraṇa" (pp. 151, 208), "bhrāntyadhikaraṇa" (p. 194), etc.

24. Sudarśanasūri introduces these verses with the remark: "ātra nāthamunibhiruktān ślokānāha". *Vide Śrībhāṣya* with Sudarśana's commentary, Vol. I, Samputa 2, p. 1.

"yo vetti yugapat sarvaṁ pratyakṣeṇa sadā svataḥ
taṁ prapāmya hariṁ śāstraṁ nyāyatattvaṁ pracakṣmahe"²⁵

In the *Nyāyasiddhāñjana*, it is further stated that the *Ātmasiddhi* (one of the three *Siddhis* comprising the *Siddhitraya* of Yāmuna) is itself a digest of the *Nyāyatattva*.²⁶

In the light of this we understand that the *Nyāyatattva* put forth a Vedāntic system of logic, refuting the classical *Nyāya* expounded by Gautama and others.²⁷ It is also clear from the three couplets quoted above that this work also refutes the *Advaitic* concepts of the Brahman, *māyā* and *mokṣa*.

Yāmuna makes several references to his grandfather²⁸ Nāthamuni and his distinguished disciples in his own works.²⁹

Nāthamuni was followed by Puṇḍarikākṣa and he, by Śrīrāmamiśra.³⁰ No works are attributed to these teachers. Venkaṭanātha, in his works like the *Nyāyasiddhāñjana* and the *Nyāyapariśuddhi*, refers to *Ṣaḍarthasaṅkṣepa*³¹ of one

25. Venkaṭanātha, the most informative of all the post-Rāmānuja writers of the Viśiṣṭādvaita school, refers to the first line of this verse in his commentary on Rāmānuja's ŚG p-11.

26. *Vide* p. 243 : "nyāyatattvasāstraprakaraṇaṁ hi ātmasiddhiḥ".

27. *Vide* NP p. 86 :

"yathāvasthitanyāyānugrhītaṁ vedaṁ , vedānumataṁ ca nyāyamanusarāmaḥ, na punar nyāyamātram".

28. *Vide* SR. śl. 55b : "pitāmahaṁ nāthamuniṁ vilokya" etc.

29. *Ibid.* śls. 1, 2 and 3 and also the last two stanzas of the *ĀP*.

Prapannāmṛta mentions that Nāthamuni's disciples were eleven in number of whom five were most prominent : Padmākṣa, Kurukānātha, Melaiyagattāzhvār, Kīzhaiyagattāzhvār and Śrīkṣṇalakṣmīnātha. See ch. 109, p. 419.

Deśika, in his *RTS*. (p. 41) says that Nāthamuni's disciples were eight in number.

30. See *PA*. ch. 110, p. 426 ff., for the life-accounts of these ācāryas.

31. *NS*. pp. 210, 233, etc; *NP* pp. 152, 153, etc.

Śrīrāmamiśra, but this author is not the same as Yāmuna's teacher, as he is also said to have commented upon the *Vedārthasaṅgraha* of Rāmānuja,³² which proves his later date.

Tradition bears evidence to the fact that it is Śrīrāmamiśra that was responsible for the final spiritual transformation of Yāmuna, who, it is said, was given to worldly pleasures brought by his administrative office, and that he also took Yāmuna to Śrīraṅgaṁ for this purpose.³³

32. *NS*. p. 261.

33. *Vide* *PA*. ch. 112, p. 438

CHAPTER III

YĀMUNA AND HIS PREDECESSORS

Śrīrāmamiśra was followed by Yāmunācārya. Since the works of Nāthamuni, the first Śrīvaiṣṇava author in the South have not come down to us, Yāmuna may, for all practical purposes, be regarded as the earliest Śrīvaiṣṇava teacher with whom the study of later Vaiṣṇava theology should commence.

Yāmuna, called in Tamil "Ālavandār", occupies a unique place among the Śrīvaiṣṇava teachers and accordingly, he, along with his grandfather Nāthamuni, had been accorded the central position in the galaxy of teachers.³⁴ He was Rāmānuja's teacher³⁵ (*paramācārya*) and all the compositions of Rāmānuja bear clear evidence of the great influence of Yāmuna's works. At a time when the *Advaita* philosophy was enjoining wide popularity and unquestioned authority and when the *śāstraic* teachings of Nāthamuni were just nascent, Yāmuna had to play a vital role in promoting the cause of the Śrīvaiṣṇava religion and philosophy through scholarly expositions in Sanskrit. He achieved phenomenal success in this task. An exposition and assessment of Yāmuna's contribution of *Viśiṣṭādvaita* forms the subject of our present effort.

34. Vide : "lakṣmīnāthasamārambhān pāthyāmunamadhyamān
asmācāryaparyantān vande guruparamparām"

This verse is attributed to Kūreśa (Kūrattāzhvār), the foremost disciple of Rāmānuja. It is quoted in the PA. ch. 116, śl. 88.

35. Rāmānuja's teacher who studied under Yāmuna was Mahāpūrṇa.

Yāmuna, like his grandfather Nāthamuni, lived in Viranārāyaṇapura. Hagiological works like the *Divyāsūricarita* and the *Prapannāmṛta*, with slight differences in detail, bear testimony to the prodigious scholarship of Yāmuna even as a young boy.³⁶ They also mention of his having come into contact with the

36. We refer our readers in this connection to hagiological works like the DSC. and the PA. for detailed accounts of Yāmuna's life. There came into existence quite a large number of works on Yāmuna's life in Sanskrit as well as the local languages, especially regarding his early life. These accounts being too well-known, we do not undertake to reproduce them here. But the chief incidents of Yāmuna's life may briefly be stated as follows : Yāmuna was not born in the life-time of Nāthamuni, his grandfather, or even in that of his disciple, Puṇḍarikākṣa. Yāmuna, even as a young boy, defeated a renowned paṇḍit by name Ākṣiyāzhvān (Vidvajjanakolāhala) belonging to the court of the Chola King of his times. The Queen called Yāmuna "Ālavandār" (one that had come to protect, i.e., a saviour), on the same occasion. Yāmuna became a Chief and was deeply immersed in the pleasures that were consequent to a life of position and self. Śrīrāmamiśra, Nāthamuni's grand-disciple, who wanted to convert Yāmuna from this life to that of a *saṁnyāsin* to which he was destined, could, with great difficulty, gain Yāmuna's audience. He told Yāmuna that the predecessors of the latter had deposited patrimony with him, to be handed over to Yāmuna. He then taught him the *Bhagavadgītā* and could succeed in converting him slowly to the path of detachment and renunciation. The conversion became complete and full-fledged when Śrīrāmamiśra took Yāmuna to Śrīraṅgam and showed him the lotus-feet of Raṅganātha, exhorting him that those feet were verily the patrimony that the predecessors of Yāmuna had left with him. Compare in this connection śl. 6b of Yāmuna's SR. which has a reference to this 'Kuladhanam' :

"stoṣyāmi naḥ kuladhanam kuladaivatam tat
pādāravindam aravinda - vilocanasya"

The following works may be consulted for detailed accounts of Yāmuna's life :

I. SANSKRIT

1. Divyāsūricarita
2. Prapannāmṛta
3. Yāmunācāryacaritra
4. Divyasumanogunavaijayantī
5. Nāthamunivijayacampū

II. TAMIL

1. Guruparamparāprabhāva (in MANIPRĀVAḤA)

III. TELUGU

1. Ācāryasūktimuktāvali (ch. 4)
2. Āmuktamālyada (ch. 4)
3. Paramabhāgavatavilāsamu (ch. 1)
4. Paramayogivilāsamu¹ (ch. 8)
5. Paramayogivilāsamu² (ch. 5)
6. Yāmunavijayavilāsamu (5 chs.)
7. Yāmunācāryacaritramu (one ch.)

Chola King of his times.³⁷ His Tamil name "Ālavandār"³⁸ is said to refer to his having held some administrative office. It is said that Śrīrāmamiśra was responsible for the final spiritual turn in Yāmuna's secular life, and taught him the *Bhagavadgītā*³⁹ before he took him to Śrīraṅgaṁ where Śrī Rāṅganātha is the presiding Deity. No specific autobiographical or historical references could be gathered from Yāmuna's own works, excepting a few facts relating to his own ancestry.⁴⁰

Traditional accounts also mention that Yāmuna had two or four sons.⁴¹ They also say that he was born in 918 A.D. and breathed his last in 1038 A.D.⁴²

37. Cf. in this connection the following statement of Yāmuna's SS. śl. 19b, p. 274 : "yathā colanrpassamrād advitiyo 'dya bhūtale". The words in italics might be taken as supporting the above tradition.

38. PA. ch. 111. śl. 98 renders this term as "rakṣāgataguruḥ". Also cf. *ibid.* śl. 99 ff.

See Prof. R. Ramanujachari, *Proceedings and Transactions of the AIOC., 1st Session, 1955*, (p. 397) : "To this day a locality in Gangaikondapuram goes by the name of Ālavandārmeḍu".

39. This GS. of Yāmuna, which we are going to examine in a succeeding chapter, might be taken as incorporating the traditional interpretation of the *Gītā*, which Yāmuna received from Śrīrāmamiśra. Venkaṭanātha bears full evidence to the fact that Śrīrāmamiśra taught the *Gītā* to Yāmuna. See his commentary on the concluding stanza of GS. (p. 16) : Śrīrāmamiśrasakāśāt bahuśāstravidbhir asmābhir bahuśaḥ śrutasya bhagavadgītārtha-prapañcasya.... etc.

See PA Ch. 112, p. 437. for an account of Yāmuna's conversion to the holy order of ascetics. Cf. in addition, the following memorial stanza dedicated to Śrīrāmamiśra :

"ayatnato yāmunamātmadāsaṁ . alarkapatrārpanaṇiṣkrayeṇa
yaḥ kṛitavān āsthitayauvarājyaṁ namāmi taṁ rāmamameyasattvaṁ"

40. See SR. śls. 61 and 65, starting with "janitvāhaṁ vaṁśe" and "akṛtrimatvaccaraṇāravinda" respectively.

The disciples of Yāmuna, according to the RTS. (p. 42), were fifteen in number.

41. Vide PA. ch. 111, śls. 109-110, were Yāmuna is said to have had only two sons. The "Local Records of Brown", Vol. 60, pp. 506-509, under Serial No. 150, furnishing the chronology of the Śrīvaiṣṇava teachers, supports the view that Yāmuna had four sons. Their names are also given as Iśvarabhaṭṭa, Govindamuni, Nāthamuni and Raṅgarāja. Deśika in his RTS. (p. 41), says that Yāmuna had only one son.

42. T.A. Gopinātha Rau however, does not accept these dates. See his "Lectures on the History of Śrīvaiṣṇavas", etc., p. 31.

Yāmuna passed away in Śrīraṅgaṁ. Rāmānuja was a younger contemporary of Yāmuna. But according to the traditional accounts, these two great men could never meet and converse. It is said that Rāmānuja could pay his respects only to Yāmuna's dead body. Vide PA. ch. 116. śl. 46, ff., in this connection.

CHAPTER IV

YĀMUNA'S WORKS : DETAILED EXAMINATION

It may be recalled that the extant works of Yāmuna are five in number : the *Śrīstuti* or the *Catuśślokī*, the *Stotraratna*, the *Gītārthasaṅgraha*, the *Āgamaprāmāṇya* and the *Siddhitraya*.⁴³

We have recently noticed a short work entitled *Nāmamauktikamālā*⁴⁴ attributed to our author. As its very name indicates, there is no philosophy in it. It enumerates one hundred and twenty names of Viṣṇu in twenty stanzas. No other writer is known to have ever referred to this as the work of Yāmuna, and in all probability, this might not have been Yāmuna's composition. We have, however, given the text of this short work in the Appendix to the present thesis.⁴⁵

The Two Lost Works

The two works of Yāmuna which we are not yet able to recover are the *Kāśmīrāgamaprāmāṇya*⁴⁶ and the *Puruṣanirṇaya*, or the *Mahāpuruṣanirṇaya*. References to these are made by Yāmuna himself in his *Āgamaprāmāṇya*.

The *Kāśmīrāgamaprāmāṇya*, it is said, establishes the revealed character (*apauruṣeyatva*) of the *Ekāyanaśākhā*, which the *Pāñcarātrins* claim as the source of their *Āgama* literature. The very fact that a separate work had to be written upholding

43. See p. 2 above.

44. This is a palm-leaf manuscript in Telugu characters deposited in the Govt. Oriental Mss. Library under R. No. 174 (1). The same work also appears on paper in the above Library in the same script, under D.No. 8933.

45. See Appendix II.

46. See pp. 2-3 above regarding its authorship.

the validity of the *Ekāyana* indicates that this *sākhā*, like the *Pāñcarātrāgamas*, was also doubted in respect of its authenticity. This *Ekāyana* is itself affiliated to the White (*Śukla*) *Yajurveda*. Yāmuna alludes to this *Ekāyana* at least thrice in his *Āgamaprāmāṇya*. It may be interesting to note that Nāgeśa, a late writer, identified this *Ekāyanaśākhā* with the *Kāṇva* recension of the *Śukla Yajurveda*, in his work entitled *Kāṇvaśākhāmahimasaṅgraha*.⁴⁷ Pandit Bhagavad Datta, however, thinks that such an identification is wrong on the ground that the *Jayākhya Samhitā* (ch. 20, śls. 262 and 269) treats the *Ekāyana* separately from the four *Vedas*.⁴⁸ The *Chāndogya* passage where reference to the *Ekāyana* occurs first,⁴⁹ also distinguishes the *Ekāyana* from the *Vedas*.

Pandit Bhagavad Datta further tells us that the *Ekāyanaśākhā* might have been a scripture on *bhakti*, and consisted of some *mantras* from the *Vedas*, some *Brāhmaṇa* portions and other matters, quite independently. Among the *Vedas*, *Yajurveda* might have formed a large part of its content. He cites the *Sāttvata Samhitā* (ch.25, śl. 94) to support his statement. He also quotes from the same source (ch. 25, śls. 8 and 53) that the *mantras* found there, viz., “*Om namo brahmaṇe*” and “*Ajasya nābhau*”, do not originally belong to the *Ekāyana* and that the latter *mantra* is actually found in the *Rgveda* (10-82-6).⁵⁰

In another place⁵¹ however, Pandit Datta, quoting from the *Jayākhya Samhitā* (ch. 1. śls. 109, 111, 115 and 116), admits that

47. This is a paper manuscript of the Govt. Oriental Mss. Library, in Devanāgarī script, under R. No. 2389. The author quotes passages from works like the *Mahābhārata*, the *Bhāgavata*, the *Viṣṇupurāṇa*, the *Harivaṃśa* and the *Pāñcarātrāgamas*, in support of his view. The synonymy of the *Ekāyana* is given by the author (p. 2) :

“*iyam śuddhayajuśśākhā prathametyabhidhiyate
mūlaśākheti cāpyuktā tathā caikāyanīti ca
ayātayāmayajuśā tathā mokṣaikāsādhikā
ityādyanekanāmāni santyasyāstatra tatra vai*”

48. Vide VVI. (Part I) p. 237

49. Ibid. Cf. *Chāndogya* VII-1-2 : “*Rgvedam bhagavo*

‘*dhyemi.....ekāyanam*’.

50. Vide VVI., p. 238.

51. Ibid. pp. 168-69.

the *Pāñcarātrāgama* should have had some special relation with the *Kāṇvaśākhā*. The verses from the *Jayākhya* numbered above, indicate that the followers of the *Pāñcarātra* mainly adopt the *Kāṇvaśākhā* for their rituals and also that many of the *Pāñcarātra ācāryas* belong to it.

The *Puruṣanirṇaya*, says Yāmuna, is devoted to establishing Nārāyaṇa's supremacy over other deities.

It is only Vedānta Deśika who rarely refers to this work of Yāmuna. He does not quote any passage from it. With the very meagre information available purely from the few references made by Deśika we can arrive at the following general conclusions regarding the nature of this text.

1. *Nyāyasiddhāntajana* : ch. III. p. 225 :

“*atharvaśiraśśvetāśvatarādinām nirvāhaḥ puruṣanirṇaye
prapañcitah, śrībhāṣyakāraśca vedārthasaṅgraha-bhāṣyādiṣu*”.

2. *Nyāyapariśuddhi* : p. 148 :

“*Yasmin kalpe tu yat prokṭam purāṇam brahmaṇā purā|
tasya tasya tu mātmyam tatsvarūpeṇa varṇyate||
agneśśivaśca mātmyam
draṣṭavyametadakhilam spaṣṭam puruṣanirṇaye*”

3. *Saccaritrarakṣā* : ch I. p. 46 :

“*na kevalam bhagavadrāmāṇujamunibhireva
mahopaniṣadupāttā, api tu tatparamācāryair bhagavadyāmuna-
munibhirapi puruṣanirṇaye samupāttā*”.

4. *Stotraratnabhāṣya* : śl. 14, p. 49 :

“*evam saṁhāryatva-saṁhartṛtva-rakṣyatva-rakṣakatva -
janyatva-janakatva - adhiṣṭheyatvādhiṣṭhātṛtvādivaidhar-
myavargair uktaiśca puruṣanirṇayādiṣu prapañcitair hetubhiḥ
tvadanyeṣu kvacidapi svātantryaśāṅkā ca na syādi.....*”

5. *Gītārthasaṅgraharakṣā* : śl. 1, pp. 3-4 :

“*nārāyaṇaḥ param brahma iti viśeṣatassāmānyataśca
vyapadeśadvayam ; anena avibhaktikepi nārāyaṇānuvākavākye*

pūrvāparavākyacchāyānusārāt śākhāntarasavisarjanīya-
paṭhanācca vyastatvaṃ vyañjitaṃ; tena ca sarvaparavidyopās-
yaviśeṣanirdhāraṇārthatayā kevalaparatatvapratipādana-
paraṇārāyaṇānuvākasidha evāśya śāstrasya viśayaḥ,
tadvibhūtitvena 'viśvamevedaṃ puruṣaḥ' (*Tai.Nā*) itivat samān-
ādhikaraṇatayā tatrāmnātānām brahmaśivendrādīnaṃ
nāraśabdārthānāmihāpi 'brahmāṇamiśaṃ' (*Gītā* : XI-15)
ityādibhistadvibhūtyekadeśāśrayatvaṃ pratipādyata iti
khyāpitaṃ; utkaṃ ca stotre : 'svābhāvika.....vipruṣaste' (śl.11)
iti; *sarvitsiddhau* ca advitiyaśrutivyākhyāne ca darśitaṃ :
'yathā colanrpaḥvipruṣaḥ' (p. 274) iti; *puruṣanirṇaye*
caitatprapañco grāhyaḥ"

It appears from these statements that the *Puruṣanirṇaya* establishes the supremacy of Nārāyaṇa on the strength of various authoritative texts (mainly the *Upaniṣads*), reinforced by reasonings.

The first of the above references mentions that *Upaniṣads* like the *Atharvaśīras* and the *Śvetāśvatara*, which are full of statements glorifying Śiva or Rudra as the Prime Cause of the creation etc. of the universe and also as the sole object of meditation, are all interpreted in the *Puruṣanirṇaya* in such a way that there is no contradiction with other *Upaniṣadic* statements which glorify Nārāyaṇa as the Supreme Lord. The *Vedārthasaṅgraha* and the *Śrībhāṣya*, to which Deśika himself draws our attention (see statement no. 1 above), indicate or perhaps give in detail the way in which Yāmuna himself had interpreted these texts.

The second of the above statements tells us that the *Puruṣanirṇaya*, following the *Matsya Purāṇa*, classifies the *purāṇas* into the *sāttvika*, *rājasa* and *tāmasa types* and gives primary significance to the statements of the *sāttvika-purāṇas* like the *Viṣṇupurāṇa*, regarding the supremacy of the Deity. It is clear that the *Viṣṇu* and such other *purāṇas* coming under the *sāttvika* category glorify Nārāyaṇa's supremacy in unmistakable terms.

The third statement of Deśika reveals that Yāmuna employed statements of the *Mahopaniṣad* like "eko ha vai nārāyaṇa āsit na brahmā neśānaḥ"⁵² in his *Puruṣanirṇaya*, to prove that Nārāyaṇa is the Supreme Godhead. Nārāyaṇa existed prior to the cosmic creation to the exclusion of all other deities like Brahmā and Rudra, and this prior existence determines His prime causal character and consequently, His supremacy.

The fourth of the above statements makes it clear that the sovereignty of Nārāyaṇa had been established in the *Puruṣanirṇaya* on the following grounds: that He is the Destroyer, Protector and Originator of all beings and that all the beings are conversely destroyed, protected and originated and supported by Him alone. This clearly determines the superiority of Viṣṇu to others.

The last of the above references tells us that in the *Puruṣanirṇaya*, the author proved the sovereignty of Nārāyaṇa on the evidence of the *Upaniṣadic* texts as well as the *Gītā* on the ground that all other deities including Brahmā, Śiva and Indra, are but mere drops in the unbounded ocean of His glory.

We have to content ourselves with the relevant portions of the *Stotraratna* and the *Āgamaprāmāṇya* where Yāmuna deals with the question of the supremacy of Viṣṇu.

(a) The Śrīstuti

The shortest of all the extant works of Yāmuna is the *Śrīstuti*. It is in four *ślokas* from which it derives its popular name *Catuśśloki*. Though short, this work has its own importance in the South Indian *Śrīvaiṣṇava* religious literature because the author here explains the vital position of Lakṣmī as the Consort of Lord Nārāyaṇa and the Mediator between Him and His devotees. This work also happens to be the first of its kind in the *Śrīvaiṣṇava stuti*-literature of the South of the later period. It has a lucid commentary by Verikāṭanātha,⁵³ and the ideas regarding Lakṣmī in the *Śrīvaiṣṇava* theology that have been developed by later writers go ultimately to this hymn of Yāmuna.

52. Vide *Mahopaniṣad* : I. These form the opening words of the *Upaniṣad*.

53. There is a commentary on the hymn in *maṇipravāla* style by Periyavāccān Pillai.

The *Catuśślokī* should be viewed as a prelude to the next work of Yāmuna, viz., the *Stotraratna*, because it is as holding the vital position as Mediator of Divine Grace that Lakṣmī is praised as the Supreme in this hymn. In the *Stotraratna*, the Lord, between whom and the devotees Lakṣmī acts as the Mediator, is the subject of a philosophical *stotra*. Therein Viṣṇu is described as the source of even Lakṣmī's greatness.⁵⁴

As explained by Venkaṭanātha in the introductory verse to his commentary on the *Catuśślokī*, Lakṣmī in constant companionship with Lord Nārāyaṇa, exerts a helpful influence on Him and allays the fears of all devotees in approaching Him, like a beloved mother.⁵⁵ The supremacy of Viṣṇu had, no doubt, been established in the *Brahmasūtra* itself, but the present attempt of the author, according to Venkaṭanātha, is to establish the same in association with His Consort also.⁵⁶

The Power or *Śakti* of Lord Viṣṇu and already been identified with Śrī or Lakṣmī in the older literature. In fact, the concept of Divine Power as a goddess in association with a Deity, or independently, is as old as the *R̥gveda*.

The Concept of *Śakti*

The concept of a Supreme Being with spouse and offspring looks indeed anthropomorphic, but the conception is to be understood in a symbolic way to understand its philosophical implication. It is to the *R̥gveda* that we have again to go for the origin of the conception of the power of the Supreme Being conceived as a female Deity, that is, as different forms of *Śakti*.

The *R̥gveda* employs terms like "*śakti*", "*māyā*" and "*śacī*" (in plural) to denote Divine Power.⁵⁷ One hymn⁵⁸ tries to fuse

54. Vide *SR*. śl. 12 : "kaśśrīśśriyaḥ", etc., and śl. 45 : "śriyaḥ śriyaḥ" etc.

55. Vide introductory part of the commentary on *CS*., p. 13 : "śriyaḥ tatsadhrīcīm tadupasadanatrāsaśamanīm".

56. *Ibid*.

57. Cf. I. 109.3 : "pitṛnām śaktiḥ". Also Cf. IV. 22.8 and X. 88.10. Cf. III. 53.2 : "...girā śacī vaḥ". III. 53.8 : "māyāḥ...kṛpānaḥ" and VI. 47.18 : "indro māyābhiḥ...."

58. Vide *SDP*, p. 12.

all the different "*śacīs*" (powers) of Indra into a single Supreme Goddess called "*Śacī*". She is expressly named "Indrāṇī", i.e., Indra's consort, in other ṛks.⁵⁹ There was a conscious effort on the part of the Vedic seers to unite all the minor gods into one Supreme God, Prajāpati or Viśvakarman, and all the female deities like Dhiṣaṇā and Sarasvatī into one Supreme Goddess called "Vāk".⁶⁰ Such a comprehensive conception of a Mother Goddess we see in the *Āmbhrṇī Sūkta*⁶¹ where Vāk declares Herself as being at the root of the powers of all the gods, the prosperity and riches of the land and the intellect of the wise, thus foreshadowing the later Śakti-trinity of Pārvatī, Lakṣmī and Sarasvatī. The *Atharvaveda* faintly suggests the wifely relation of Vāk with Prajāpati, who is now styled "Parameṣṭhīn".⁶² Sarasvatī, invoked both as a river and goddess, and the river Sindhu are glorified as "*ambitamā*" and "*māṛtamā*" (most benign) respectively.⁶³ It is this motherly aspect that forms the basis of the motherhood characteristic of goddesses like Umā and Śrī in later literature.⁶⁴ Even male gods like Agni and Indra are conceived of as both father and mother.⁶⁵

The most natural conception of father and mother finds expression in the Dual Divinity of Heaven and Earth (*Dyāvā-Prthivī*).⁶⁶ Aditi, a full-fledged Vedic goddess, is very often invoked and sought for all-round welfare and also for release from bondage and sin, an idea which becomes the forerunner of the later conception of mokṣa.⁶⁷ Each Vedic god has a consort of his

59. *Ibid*. p. 12. Cf. *R̥gveda* I. 82.5,6; III. 53.4, ff; I. 22, 12, etc. Cf. I. 56.4 where the term "Devī Taviṣī" or "Goddess of Might" occurs.

60. *SDP*, p. 29.

61. Cf. *R̥gveda* X. 10.125. See also *MWV*, p. 313

Cf. *Atharva Veda* XIX. 9.3, where "vāk" is called "Devī Parameṣṭhīnī".

62. Vide *SDP* p. 30.

63. Cf. *R̥gveda* II. 41. 16 and III. 33.3.

64. Vide *SDP*, p. 40.

65. Cf. *R̥gveda* VI. 1.5 : ".....tvam pitā mātā"; VIII. 98.11 : "tvam hi naḥ pitā vaso, tvam mātā śatakrato babhūvitha'.... See also V. Raghavan, "The Vedas and Bhakti", *Vedanta Kesari*, Madras, Dec. 1955, p. 332.

66. Vide *MW*, p. 215.

67. Vide *MWV*, p. 311. Also cf. *R̥gveda* X. 36. 3; X. 100 and X. 101.

own and these consorts are collectively called *Devapatnīs* or *Gnās*.⁶⁸ In the creation-hymn, "*nāsdāsīt.....*", the one Supreme Being is said to have been breathing without air by Its own inherent Power, "*svadhā*".⁶⁹

The Power or *Śakti* of the *Samhitā* literature is referred to as *ikṣaṇa* or *abhidhyāna* in the *Upaniṣadic* terminology. Accordingly, the *Upaniṣads* describe the Highest Being as immersed in *ikṣaṇa* (reflection or thought) in the first phase of cosmic creation,⁷⁰ which "*ikṣaṇa*" is the same as the "power of creative desire". It is the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* that expressly makes *Śakti* the Lord's Consort for the world-evolution in the familiar terms of husband and wife.⁷¹ The *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad* describes *Śakti* as belonging to God Himself and as "hidden in His own qualities".⁷² The Supreme Lord, by virtue of His *Śakti*, takes diverse complexions, although devoid of any such features, in essence.⁷³ In VI. 8, this *Upaniṣad* says more expressly that the Supreme Being has *Śakti* or Potency that is supreme and at the same time manifold.⁷⁴ In the earlier context referred to above (IV.1), the dynamic aspect of the Supreme is so described that we could see the equation of *Śakti* with *ajā*, *māyā* and *prakṛti* (IV. 5).

68. *Ibid.*, p. 313. Also cf. *Rgveda* V. 46. 7-8; "*devānām patnīḥ*" and "*uta gnāḥ*".

69. *Rgveda* X. 11.129: "*nāsdāsīt.....ānīdavātām svadhayā tadekaṁ*", etc.

70. Cf. *Chāndogya* VI. 2. 3: "*tadaikṣata bahu syām prajāyeya*". See also *Taittirīya* II. 6.

71. MWV. p. 6; cf. *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* 1. 4. 3: "*sa haitāvānāsa yathā strīpumānsau sampariṣvaktāu.....tataḥ patiṣca patnī ca abhavatām*".

72. ŚDP, p. 49. Cf. *Śvetāśvatara* 1.3: "*devātmaśaktiṁ svaguṇair nigūḍhām*".

73. Cf. *Śvetāśvatara* IV. 1: "*eko varṇaḥ bahudhā śaktiyogāt*".

74. *Ibid.* VI. 8: "*parāśya śaktir vividhaiva śrūyate*".

The different aspects of the *Rgvedic* female deities may be said to get fused into one full-fledged Goddess of Power in the *Ambhr̥ṇī Sūkta* and into another of plenty in the *Śrīsūkta* in the *Rgveda Khilas* (Supplementary Hymns).⁷⁵ The *Taittirīya Āraṇyaka* speaks of the Supreme Being as having two Consorts, *Hri* and *Lakṣmī*.⁷⁶ This *Lakṣmī* is sometimes designated *Śraddhā* and God is sometimes said to owe his glory to Her in such statements as: "*śraddhayā devo devatvamaśnute*".⁷⁷ The concept of *Puruṣa* and *Prakṛti*, already seen in the *Upaniṣads*, became the basic philosophical position of the *Sāṃkhya* school, in which all evolution is ascribed to *Prakṛti*. This motherly aspect of the Godhead which emphasises the creative aspect, includes also the aspect of love and affection towards the beings; this latter aspect finds full expression in the *Śrīsūkta*.

The *Śrīsūkta* presents the picture of *Śrī* or *Lakṣmī* as the goddess of beauty, plenty and prosperity and as the Ruler and Mother of the Universe.⁷⁸ She is further described as the repository of qualities like magnanimity (*audārya*)⁷⁹ and is invoked to bestow prosperity and dispel poverty and ignorance.⁸⁰ It may be noted that the expression "*tām padmanemim śaraṇamaham prapadye*"⁸¹ supplies the germ for the evolution of the Doctrine of Surrender of the *Śrīvaiṣṇava* school. It is this motherly aspect of God that forms the cardinal doctrine of *Śrī* in the *Śrīvaiṣṇava* theology. The concept of Godhood becomes fully realised only when the love aspect of it is fully recognised.⁸²

75. MW. p. 2.

76. *Taittirīya Āraṇyaka* III. 13. 2: "*hrīṣca te lakṣmīṣca patnyau*".

77. *Taittirīya Samhitā* I. 111. 2,9. Raṅganāthamuni of about the 12th cen. A.D., the *Vaiṣṇava* commentator on the *Śrīsūkta*, identifies goddesses like *Śraddhā*, *Medhā* and *Bhūmi* with *Śrī*. See the *Śrīsūkta* with his commentary, pp. 1-9 (published at Pudukkottai).

78. Cf. "*Īśvarīm sarvabhūtānām*" (*rk-9*); "*mātaram padmamālīnīm*" (*rk-11*) and "*mātaram śrīyam*" (*rk-12*).

79. *Ibid.* "*devajustām udārām*" (*rk-5*).

80. *Ibid.* "*māyāntarāyāśca bāhyā alakṣmīḥ*" (*rk-6*).

81. *Ibid.* *rk-5*. Cf. also *Durgā Sūkta* of the *Rgveda Khila* X. 127.12 where again "*śaraṇamaham prapadye*" occurs:

"*tāmagnivarnām tapasā jvalantiṁ vairocantiṁ karmaphaleṣu justām | Durgām devīm śaraṇamaham prapadye sutarasi tarase namaḥ*".

82. Vide "*Mazdāism in the Light of Viṣṇuism*" by A. Govindācārya, p. 52.

The *R̥gvedic* Śakti acquires a personal form and name in the *Kenopaniṣad* as "Umā of golden hue". It is rightly observed that "She forms the assuaging common ground, a bridge between Śiva and Viṣṇu, being described as the sister of the latter and spouse of the former"⁸³ in the *Mahābhārata* and the *Purāṇas*.

The worship of Śakti as a separate cult had a greater development in Śaivism, especially in the Tāntric schools. Śakti came to be viewed in different ways by different schools of thought, but in all these interpretations, the difference is one of terminology, but not of essence. The different interpretations are facilitated by the fact that energy or śakti can be treated as either identical with or separate from the possessor thereof.⁸⁴

The Siddhānta school of Śaivism of South India, which maintains three main and eternal categories, viz., *Pati* (Lord Śiva), *paśu* (the bound self), and *Pāśa* (the bond) speaks of Śakti as inseparable from the Lord.⁸⁵ Śiva and Śakti are compared here to the sun and his radiance.⁸⁶ However, the idea of husband and wife is read into this doctrine⁸⁷ and accordingly, Śakti is made the spouse of Śiva. The importance Śakti claims in this school may be gauged from the fact that the entire world of name and form is attributed to Śakti, which is both conscious and infinite.⁸⁸ Though essentially one, Śakti is viewed as infinite with reference to the various objects, and is also said to form the very body of Śiva. Regarding cosmic creation, Śiva is conceived as the efficient cause, Māyā as the material cause and Śakti, which is diverse as *icchā* (will), *jñāna* (knowledge), *kriyā* (action) etc., as the instrumental cause. In spite of its importance in this doctrine, Śakti is prevented from becoming predominant as in Śāktism by subordinating it always to Śiva, the Supreme Being, as an instrument in the process of world-evolution. It is also mentioned that Śakti is an attribute of Śiva, the substrate.⁸⁹ Evolution of the world is said to take place only when the Lord wills it.⁹⁰

83. Vide MW, p. 5 and IP II., p. 734.

84. Vide introduction to ŚAN., p. 17.

85. See ŚS., p. 107.

86. TVC., p. lxxxii.

87. ŚS., p. 107.

88. Ibid. p. 45.

89. ŚS., fn., p. 54.

90. LDC., p. 351 ff.

The Spanda or the Pratyabhijñā school of Kashmir Śaivism represented by authors like Vasugupta and Abhinavagupta, also treats Śakti on similar lines. Here Śiva is the only ultimate and the highest principle characterised by Perfect Selfhood (*paripūrṇa-ahantā*) and absolute freedom (*svātantrya*).⁹¹ He is of the form of Light (*prakāśa*) and in the dynamic aspect as a Creator, He is called *vimarśa* or *spanda* (meaning, the throbbing or spontaneous vibration of *cit* or *caitanya*).⁹² This *vimarśa* is designated as His śakti, and these two aspects, viz., *vimarśa* and *Prakāśa* represent the twin forms of the Lord.⁹³ It may be noted that the *īkṣaṇa* of the *Upaniṣads*⁹⁴ becomes the *vimarśa* of this school.⁹⁵

Mālinivijayottaravārtika, the source-book of this school, says that there is absolutely no distinction between Śakti and Śiva.⁹⁶ In the later period, the element of Bliss (*ānanda*) also found a place in this concept of Śakti.⁹⁷ God, who creates the universe by His own wonderful and inherent power (*śakti*), with the help of no extraneous factor like *karman* or *māyā*, Himself appears as the *jīvas* on one hand and as the objects of their enjoyment on the other.⁹⁸ The Power of the Lord gets manifested in the form of the universe, and this manifestation, called technically *ābhāsa* or *ābhāsana*, is real but not illusory as held by the Advaitins.⁹⁹ The Śakti of the immutable Śiva has five

91. ŚDP., p. 65.

92. LDC., p. 367

93. MW, p. 4.

94. See p. 20. above.

95. MWV, p. 6. Also cf. *Introduction to Tantrasāstra* by Sir John Woodroffe, p. 5.

96. ŚDP., p. 63. Cf. the following quoted there :

"śaktiśca no śaktimato vibhinnā, tenaiti no bhedamiyaṃ prthaktvaṃ amārttāyāṃ na ca śaktirasti, tena svarūpaṃ na hi śaktyayuktaṃ"

97. Ibid., p. 65.

98. IP, II. p. 733.

99. See LDC., pp. 357-58. Also see the following quoted there, as from the *Pratyabhijñāhṛdaya*, p.3: "cideva bhagavatī, svacchatantrarūpā, tattadanantajagadātmanā sphurati". Also cf. the statement : "durghaṭasampādanasamarthaḥ śaktiviśeṣaḥ".

important phases—*cit*, *ānanda*, *icchā*, *jñāna* and *kriyā*, which evolve the five transcendental *tattvas* of this school, viz., Śiva, Śakti, Sadāśiva, Īśvara and Sadvidyā respectively.¹⁰⁰

The Śākta school, as its very name implies, makes Śakti more prominent and powerful than Śiva Himself. Apart from Śakti, Śiva is said have no independent existence at all.¹⁰¹ The philosophical heights to which the Śāktas have exalted Śakti in this system can well be understood from a statement of the *Kubjikā Tantra* (ch. I) that "it is not Brahmā, Viṣṇu or Śiva that create, sustain and destroy, but Brāhmī, Vaiṣṇavī and Rudrāṇī; their husbands are but as dead bodies".¹⁰² Śakti is only *Brahman* conceived in Its motherly aspect (*ambikā*) as the Creatrix and Nourisher of the Universe.¹⁰³ The *Vāyaviya Samhitā* of the *Śivapurāṇa* (Uttara V-15) refers to the motherly aspect of Umā or Pārvatī by the expressive term, *prasavadharminī*.¹⁰⁴ The relation that subsists between Śiva and Śakti is one of identity and the one cannot even be conceived to exist without the other, just as fire cannot be conceived without the quality of burning.¹⁰⁵

Śakti, held by the followers of this school as Divine, is glorified as Pure Consciousness (*caitanya*) and Supreme Power (*Parāśakti*).¹⁰⁶ Though formless in the absolute sense, Śakti assumes many visible forms for facilitating the meditational purposes of Her devotees.¹⁰⁷ Śakti, which is three-fold as *icchā*, *jñāna* and *kriyā*,¹⁰⁸ is not only the creative principle but the

100. AG., p. 240 ff.

101. LDC., p. 437. Also cf. SL., śl. 1: "śivaśśaktyā yuktaḥ" etc.

102. Quoted in *Introduction to Tantrasāstra*. fn., p. 10. Cf. YT., I. 16b : "śivapretasamārūḍhām" etc.

103. Vide *Introduction to Tantrasāstra*, p. 5.

104. ŚDP., p. 43.

105. ŚIL., p. 22, where the following is quoted as from the *Līngapurāṇa* : "umāśaṅkarayor bhedo nāstyeva paramārthataḥ". The following is also quoted here as from the commentary on the *Tattvapraśāsa* : "seyaṁ parā śaktiḥ.....parameśvarādabhinnā"

106. *Ibid.* p. 9.

107. *Ibid.* p. 86.

108. IP. II. p. 735.

destructive principle as well.¹⁰⁹ The *Niruttara Tantra* emphasises that correct knowledge regarding the Power of Śakti is indispensable for one desirous of *mokṣa*.¹¹⁰

The Liṅgāyata or the Virāśaiva school which adopts the philosophy and terminology of Kashmir Śaivism to a large extent, holds Śiva, the Supreme Being, to be of the form of Light (*prakāśa*). He possesses *vimarsā* or self-consciousness. This is but His Śakti which is three-fold is *icchā*, *jñāna* and *kriyā*.¹¹¹ Through it, He directly perceives the world.¹¹² He is the Enjoyer (*bhoktr*) and everything else is for His enjoyment (*bhogyā*).¹¹³

The Śakti which inheres in the Lord by the reflex relation of identify,¹¹⁴ is called His *dharmacārīṇī* (co-performer of His functions), since It acts according to His will.¹¹⁵ In this supreme state, Śakti is identified with *suddha*-(or pure) *māyā*, with no contamination of *tamas* in it, being conditioned by *sattva* alone.¹¹⁶

Śakti, the Divine Will with its locus fixed in Śiva, the Absolute Truth, is integrally associated with Him.¹¹⁷ This association, called technically *samavāya*, gets a special designation, *sāmarasya*, in this system.¹¹⁸ Śakti, though conceived here as all-in-all from the cosmological, theological and epistemological standpoints, is always held subordinate to Śiva.¹¹⁹ The *vimarsā-śakti* of the Lord is variously designated *caitanya*, *spanda*, *mahāśattā*, *parā vāk*, *parānanda*, etc.¹²⁰ This system also came to be known as *Śaktiviśiṣṭādvaita*, because of this conception of Śiva as characterised and distinguished (*viśiṣṭa*) by His own Śakti.¹²¹

109. ŚIL., p. 20.

110. I.P., II. p. 736. Cf. "śaktijñānaṁ vinā devi nirvāṇaṁ naiva jāyate", quoted there.

111. LDC., p. 432.

112. *Ibid.* 431.

113. *Ibid.* p. 434.

114. *Ibid.* pp. 430, 434. On p. 437 is the following quotation, as from the *Siddhāntaśikhāmaṇi* :

"sāmarasyābhedalakṣaṇatādātmyasambandhena vartamānā".

115. ŚDP., p. 204.

116. *Ibid.* pp. 205-206.

117. VW, p. 9.

118. LDC., p. 436.

119. VW, p. 22.

120. LDC., p. 435.

121. *Ibid.* p. 437.

The *Śivādvaita* of Śrīkaṇṭha makes Śakti the very essence of Śivatattva. Śiva the Supreme Lord and Śakti, which is identified with Umā, are inseparable from each other¹²² and there is no difference between them, even as between the moon and her rays.¹²³ Śrīkaṇṭha exalts Śakti to the greatest heights by holding it to form the very source of the qualities, glory and existence of Śiva.¹²⁴ The entire world consisting of sentient and insentient entities is due to the transformation of *Cit-Śakti*, which is same as the *Brahman* which is of the form of bliss.¹²⁵ There are no two different entities as Śiva and Śakti. Śiva qualified by Śakti is the only reality.¹²⁶

The *Pāñcarātrāgamas*, too, do not differ much from the concepts of Śakti sketched above. They speak of the absolute identity of Śakti and the Śaktimat, identified with Lakṣmī and Viṣṇu respectively.¹²⁷ The *Jayākhya Samhitā* refers to four types of Power (*śakti*)—Lakṣmī, Kīrti, Jayā and Māyā,¹²⁸ ever united with Viṣṇu. Of these four, Lakṣmī alone is the most intimately

122. *ŚIL.* pp. 57-58.

123. See *ibid.* for a quotation from *Śivapurāṇa* : “nānāyorantaram vidyāt candracandrikayoriva”.

124. *ŚĀ.*, p. 181. Also see *ŚIL.* p. 58 for the following : “svābhāviki paramaśaktiḥ, parabrahmaśśivasya svarūpaṁ ca guṇaśca”.

125. See Introduction to *ŚAN.*, p. 17.

Also see *ibid.* p. 57 : “atra ānandamayarūpā cicchaktiḥ paramātmā śiva eva, na tato bhidyate”. Cf. *ibid.* “.....śakteḥ śivābhedaḥ prasādhitaḥ” (p. 58) : “.....evam svarūpābhinnāyā eva cicchakteḥ”, etc. (p. 61), and “even ca brahmacicchakteḥ sakalacetanācetanaprapaṇcākaratvaṁ tasyā eva brahmasvarūpatvaṁ tādīyasakalagūṇa-gaṇarūpatvaṁ brahmaṇo nirvikāratvamīti arthacatuṣṭayamācāryair abhyupagataṁ; nirgūṇaṁ niṣprapaṇcāṁ jivābhinnam śuddhādvaitarūpaṁ brahmeti teṣāṁ paramasiddhāntaḥ” (p. 62).

126. Cf. *ibid.*, translation, p.4.

127. *ŚIL.*, p. 108. Cf. *Ah. S.* IV. 78a : “vyāpakāvatisaṁśleṣāt ekaṁ tattvamivoditau”. Also cf. *ibid.* VI.3 :

“naiva śaktyā vinā kaścit śaktimānasti kāraṇaṁ na ca śaktimatā śaktir vinaikāpyavatiṣṭhate”.

128. *ŚIL.*, p. 98.

Cf. *JS.* VI. 77a : “lakṣmīḥ kīrtir jayā māyā devyastasyāśritāḥ” etc.

related to Him, as rays to the sun and waves to the ocean.¹²⁹ The *Hayaśīrṣa Samhitā* speaks of the same inseparability of Lakṣmī and Viṣṇu, employing the Sāṁkhya terminology of *Prakṛti* and *Puruṣa*.¹³⁰ The *Ahīrbudhnya Samhitā* also believes in the essential identity of Śakti and the possessor thereof.¹³¹ It also mentions that Śakti and its possessor can be treated as two different entities.¹³² The entire world consisting of sentient and insentient entities is only the manifestation of the Divine Power.¹³³

Lakṣmī, the prime cause of all cosmic activities,¹³⁴ is called here the Universal Mother.¹³⁵ In Śrīvaiṣṇava theology, the personality and adjuncts of divine beings are designated as *vibhūti* or glory, classified as those which are eternal (*nitya*) and those intended for sport (*līlā*), the former to be seen in the Highest Heaven, and the latter, in the manifestations elsewhere. Lakṣmī is said to have these two glories (*vibhūti*s) under Her control.¹³⁶

129. *ŚIL.*, p. 99. Cf. *JS.*, VI-78 :

“sūryasya raśmayo yadvat ūrmayaścāmbudheriva sarvaiśvaryaprabhāveṇa kaṁalā śrīpatestatthā”.

The analogy of the moon and her beams is also employed to show the relation of Lakṣmī and Viṣṇu. Cf. *Ah. S.* “jyotsneva himadīdhiteḥ” (III. 5a) and “.....śītarāśmeriva jyotsnā” (IX. 3b).

130. Vide the following verse from the *HS.* (op. cit) :

“śrīdevī prakṛtiḥ proktā, keśavaḥ puruṣaśmṛtaḥ na viṣṇunā vinā devī, na hariḥ padmajām vinā”

131. Vide *Ah. S.* (op. cit) : “yā sā śaktir jagaddhetuḥ kathitā samavayīni” and “ātmabhūtā hi yā śaktiḥ parasya brahmaṇo mune”.

132. *ŚIL.*, p. 105. Cf. *Ah. S.* V. 29a : “śakteḥ śaktimato bhedād vāsudeva itiryate”.

133. Cf. *Ah. S.* III. 6a : “svātantryarūpā sā viṣṇoḥ praspurattā jaganmayī”. *Ibid.* LX. 8b : “śuddhāśuddhasvarūpā sā viṣṇuśaktirjaganmayī”.

134. *Ibid.* XLIX. 32b : “.....mahālakṣmīḥ.....sarvakāraṇakāraṇaṁ”; also *ibid.* XXXVI. 56-59.

135. *Ibid.* XXXVI. 60b : “.....sarvasya jananiṁ lakṣmīm”.

136. Vide *Ah. S.* XLIX. 33 : “.....sā hi sarvagatiḥ parā ; tadājñayaiva carataścandrasūryau vihāyasi”; also *śls.* 55-57.

This *Samhitā* is important since it is here that we meet with statements which characterise and distinguish the theological conception of the Śrīvaiṣṇavas regarding Lakṣmī. She is spoken of as dispelling the sins of the devotees and bringing in all-round welfare, a conception that forms the basis of the idea of her mediation between the devotee and the Deity, technically, called *puruṣakāra*.¹³⁷ The Doctrine of Surrender (*prapatti*) to Lakṣmī is also found here.¹³⁸ Goddesses like Umā and Sarasvatī are spoken of as the different modes of Lakṣmī's glory.¹³⁹ The inseparable relation of Lakṣmī with Viṣṇu is expressed by the specific term, *taddharmadharminī*.¹⁴⁰ The gracious and redemptive aspects of Lakṣmī are brought out by interpreting the term "Śrī" in different ways—as the destroyer of all sin, benefactor of the universe, the solace of all devotees and the denizen of the Highest Heaven.¹⁴¹

The reason why Divine Power is designated Lakṣmī is stated to be that it manifests itself as the world.¹⁴² The twofold division of this Power as *kriyā* (action) and *bhūti* (becoming) corresponds to the instrumental and the material cause of the universe.¹⁴³ Though these *Āgamas* personify Śakti as Śrī or Lakṣmī and make Her the Lord's Spouse, She also seems to have been viewed as an aspect of the Lord and not as a separate individual in texts which declare that Śakti is related to the Lord as an attribute is to its substance.¹⁴⁴ Thus, in these *Āgamas*, Śakti almost usurps the place of the Godhead, being in one aspect of itself both the instrumental (*kriyā*) and the material (*bhūti*) causes of the world.¹⁴⁵ It is not difficult to imagine that it is only

137. *Ibid.* 58a : "duritaughanivāraṇa" ; also śls. 59, 60.

138. *Cf. ibid.* the last lines of ślokaś 55, 57, and 56, which read "praśādaṁ prapaṇṇe mayi tvaṁ kuruṣva".

139. *Ibid.* śls. 62, ff.

140. *Ibid.* LI. 58a : tasyānapāyini śaktirdevī taddharmadharminī" also see *ibid.* LX. 3a : "yatra sā śaktisamśabdyā viṣṇostaddharmadharminī". Also *cf. ibid.* śls. 59-60, 71a.

141. *Ibid.* LI. 61b-62a : "śrīpati nikhilān doṣān śrīpati ca guṇairjagat śrīyate cākhillairnityaṁ śrayate ca param padam"

142. *Ibid.* III. 9a : "jagattayā lakṣyamāṇā sā lakṣmīriti gīyate".

143. *IP*, II. p. 689.

144. *Cf. Ah. S. IV and Lakṣmītantra* II. 2 ff. See HCD., p. 103

145. *Ibid.*

to preserve the immutable and transcendental character of the Lord that Śrī came to be spoken of as a principle eternally distinct from the Lord. Dr. Schrader observes: "In spite of frequent assurances as to the real identity of Lakṣmī and Viṣṇu, the two are actually regarded as different. Even in the *pralaya*, they do not completely coalesce, but become only, 'at it were', a single principle."¹⁴⁶ Still, the dualism is, strictly speaking, a makeshift for preserving the transcendent character of Viṣṇu. Lakṣmī alone acts, but everything She does is the mere expression of the Lord's wishes".¹⁴⁷

The concept of Śakti held by the *Vaikhāṇasāgamas* too is similar to the concepts traced above. Śrī is here said to be the very glory of Viṣṇu. She is eternal, ever blissful and is of the form of Primordial Nature. She is specifically called here Śakti, and is said to function according to the will of Lord Viṣṇu.¹⁴⁸

The *Viṣṇupurāṇa* describes the entire universe as a visible manifestation of the Power (*śakti*) of the Supreme Brahman.¹⁴⁹ This Śakti is classified as *parā* (belonging to God), *aparā* (that of the creatures) and *avidyā* (the veiling power)¹⁵⁰ and names like Āryā and Durgā are also applied to it.¹⁵¹ Here, Śrī, with whom Śakti is identified, is glorified as the "Supreme Mother-Goddess" and "the Great Cosmic Mother".¹⁵² Her benign nature is beautifully depicted by the expressive and specific epithets, *vedagarbhā*, *devagarbhā*, *yajñagarbhā*¹⁵³ and the like. In about 34 verses, She is glorified as the repository of all auspicious qualities, the most prominent of which is mercy. It is this quality

146. *Ah. S.*, IV. 78a.

147. Introduction *Ah. S.*, p. 30.

148. *VK.*, paṭala 86, pp. 493-94:

"tadviṣṇorvibhūtiḥ, śrīḥ, sā ca nityā ādyantarahitā.....viṣṇoḥ saṅkalpānurūpā nityānandamayī, mūlaprakṛtirūpā śaktiḥ".

149. *Cf. VP*, I. 22-54 : "parasya brahmaṇasśaktistathedamakhilam jagat". Also see *ŚIL.*, p. 73.

150. *VP*, VI. 6. 61 : "viṣṇuśaktiḥ parā proktā kṣetrajñākhyā tathāparā avidyā karmasamjñānyā tṛtiyā śaktirīṣyate".

151. *Cf. IB*, V. 1. 82.

152. *Cf. ibid.* VIII. 15, 28 : "jaganmātā" and V. 2. 7-12 : "jagaddhātṛi".

153. See *ŚDP*, p. 42.

of hers that is said to be the source of all-round universal prosperity. Here Śrī is viewed not only as the Deity of plenty and prosperity but as the very embodiment of all branches of knowledge, including the knowledge of the Self (*ātma-vidyā*), leading to emancipation (*vimuktiphaladāyini*). She is also said to be ever united inseparably with Her Lord and as possessed of eternity and omnipresence like Him.¹⁵⁴

The *Mārkaṇḍeya Purāṇa* calls Sarasvatī (with whom Lakṣmī has been identified in the *Viṣṇupurāṇa*) the Śakti of Lord Viṣṇu and Universal Mother (*jagaddhātṛi*, literally the supporter of the universe). Lakṣmī is also called Ambikā which again indicates Her motherly character.¹⁵⁵ Śakti, the Power of the Lord, is said to create the universe, and when properly propitiated, to grant release to true devotees.¹⁵⁶ This *Purāṇa* calls *Māyā* the *Vaiṣṇavī Śakti* and views it as the cause of both bondage and release.¹⁵⁷

The *Bhāgavata* depicts the Lord (who is identified with Kṛṣṇa) as combining in Himself all sorts of Śakti like *Vidyā* and *Avidyā*.¹⁵⁸ He is also said to create, maintain and destroy the world by His own Power, styled here also *Māyā*. This Power is elsewhere identified with Lakṣmī, His Consort, called *Ramā*.¹⁵⁹ God is also viewed as both united with and dissociated from His Śakti; in the latter case, the creative aspect is dormant and imbedded within the Supreme Being Himself.¹⁶⁰

154. Cf. VP. I. 8-15 :

“nityaiva sājaganmātā viṣṇośśrīranapāyini
yathā sarvagato viṣṇustathaiveyaṁ dvijottama”.

155. Vide *Mār. Pu.* LXXXIV. 1 ff. Cf. *ŚDP*, p. 42.

156. Cf. *Mār. Pu. op. cit.* :

“tayā viśrjyate viśvaṁ jagadetaccarācaram
saiśa prasannā varadā nṛṇāṁ bhavati muktaye”

157. Cf. *ibid. op. cit.* :

“sā vidyā paramā mukteḥ hetubhūtā sanātani
saṁsārabandhahetuśca saiva sarveśvareśvarī”

158. See *ŚIL.*, P. 114.

Cf. *Bhā. Pu.* IV. 9. 16 :

Yasmin viruddhagatayo hyaniśaṁ patanti
vidyādayo vividhaśaktaya ānupūrvyā”

159. Cf. *Bhā. Pu. op. cit.* : III. 9. 23 : “eṣa prapannavarado
ramayātmaśaktiḥ.....”

160. Cf. *ibid. op. cit.* : IV. 12. 6 : “yuktaṁ virahitaṁ śaktyā
guṇamayyātmamāyayā”

All the ideas traced above in the earlier literature on Śrī, find a succinct philosophical statement in the *Catuśślokī* of Yāmuna, which forms the bedrock of all later expositions of the concept of Lakṣmī.

Yāmuna presents Śrī here as the Mistress of the Universe, the repository of all glorious attributes of which Mercy is the most predominant, the sole source of universal prosperity and the inseparable and devoted Consort of the Supreme Lord, Viṣṇu.

Yāmuna first explains the two aspects of Śrī, that which abides by the Lord and shares all the quantities, attributes and other paraphernalia associated with Him (*nitya-vibhūti*) and the other, Her dynamic aspect, through which She becomes responsible for the evolution of the universe, through the workings of *māyā* or *prakṛti* (*līlā-vibhūti*). All sentient beings, including the higher orders of divinity, come under Her endless manifestations, even the highest of them being only subordinate to Her. Being the source of the entire creation, not only is Her glory unbounded and beyond description, but She is also the fountain-head of all the beauty of creation.

In the second stanza, Yāmuna lays stress on the redemptive aspect of Śrī as the Universal Mother and refers to Her unbounded Mercy and Love in saving the souls who submit themselves to Her in utter surrender.

The next verse describes Śrī in Her protective aspect. It is as the result of the display of Her benevolent powers that all creation flourishes and prospers. Conversely, decay noticed in the creation sets in when the influence of Her benevolence is absent.¹⁶¹ Stress is further laid on Her gracious features by declaring that the material and spiritual status of humanity is solely dependent upon that grace, either directly or indirectly.

The fourth and the final *śloka* says that Lakṣmī, though functionally distinguishable from the Supreme Being, is philosophically part and parcel of Him. Right from the transcendental aspect of the Supreme Lord, down to His manifestation on the

161. According to Periyavāccān Piḷḷai, the reference here is to what happens during the cosmic dissolution or *praḷaya*.

mundane earth, there is no aspect of His that is not associated with Śrī. That is to say, all His different aspects are expressions of sublimity, beauty and love.

The two main schools of Śrīvaiṣṇavism, viz., the Vāḍagalai and the Teṅgalai or the Northern and the Southern Schools, represented by Venkaṭanātha and Pillai Lokācārya respectively, entertain divergent views regarding the exact nature and position of Lakṣmī. Thus, the Vāḍagalais hold Śrī to be essentially of the same nature as Her Lord, infinite and uncreate, and as constituting the godhead together with Him. She can also mediate between Him and the devotee because of Her close association with the former. The Teṅgalais, on the other hand, consider Her as essentially belonging to the category of the individual selves (*jīvas*). Though finite, She has the power to assume magnitude, unlike the *jīvas*, and can thus mediate between God and man. This is one of the eighteen doctrinal differences (*aṣṭādaśabhedas*) existing between the Northern and the Southern Schools of Viśiṣṭādvaita. (For a detailed account of these differences, see Appendix II to Two Great Acharyas - Vedānta Desika and Manavala Mamuni by Dr. V. Varadachari. Prof. M. Rangacharya Memorial Trust, Madras, 1983).

In the course of his commentary on the first verse of the *Catuśśloki*, Venkaṭanātha refers to many views regarding the exact nature of Lakṣmī and refutes them in accordance with his own line of thought.

The *prima facie* views may be stated as follows :

1. Some identify Lakṣmī with the inert material Nature (*prakṛti*) to be superintended or acted upon by the Lord, who is the Designer-architect of the universe. In their view, Lakṣmī is not a sentient being at all.

2. Others identify Her with certain qualities of God like *sattā* (existence), *ahantā* (egoity) and *vidyā* (knowledge). In their view, Lakṣmī does not have a personality of Her own.

3. A third view is that the Lord, qualified by *sattā* (existence) etc., is Himself called Śrī or Lakṣmī.

4. Another view is that the Supreme Being, associated with an eternal and different body in the form of Śrī, is styled Lakṣmī.

5. Another school opines that the Lord, of His own accord, takes up occasionally a female form for the sake of enjoyment and is designated Śrī.¹⁶² The adherents of this school corroborate this by referring to the *jaganmohinī* manifestation¹⁶³ of the Lord (*daityamohana-bhūmikāparigraha*).

6. Still others maintain that part of the original form of the Lord Himself, for the sake of enjoyment, become possessed of a different ego, assumes a permanent female form and is termed Śrī. Such an opinion accounts for the references to Śrī found in some texts as both one with and different from the Lord on one hand, and as a distinct sentient being on the other.

7. Yet another opinion holds that the aspect of the *Brahman* which is utilised for world-creation, is itself possessed by a separate ego and is called Śrī. This possession by a different ego is said to take place either by its own nature (*svabhāva*) or its capacity to transform (*pariṇatīśakti*), or due to the presence of a delimiting adjunct (*upādhibheda*).

8. A further view referred to is that the part of the *Brahman* which is delimited by a particular adjunct (*upādhi*), is called Śrī and is, as such, different from the Lord.

9. Still others qualify the above view, when they say that "transformation into a manifestation" (*avatārapariṇāma*) itself acts as an *upādhi* upon the *Brahman* and that such a delimited *Brahman* is styled Lakṣmī.

10. Some texts mention that half of the Lord's transcendental body is composed of Lakṣmī. Some take this as indicating that (a) the Lord and His consort Lakṣmī must have only one body (*vigrahaikya*), or that (b) their original nature is only one but not manifold (*svarūpaikya*), or that (c) they are both different and non-different from each other.

162. Cf. p. 15 of Deśika's commentary on *Catuśśloki* : "svayameva bhogārthaṁ parigrhītakādācitkakāntāvigrahaḥ".

163. Of the several manifestations of Lord Viṣṇu, the *jaganmohinī* is one in which the Lord appears as the most entrancing female on the occasion of the churning of the milky ocean. Requested to arbitrate between the *Devas* and *Asuras*, the Mohinī apportions *amṛta* or nectar in favour of the former.

11. Another view is that Cosmic Illusion or *Māyā*, which is itself unreal, veils the essential nature of the pure and unqualified *Brahman*. When it veils the *Brahman* united with a particular superimposed form, the *Māyā* is termed *Śrī*.

All these views may roughly be brought under three groups: those that speak of Lakṣmī as insentient; those which hold Her to be of the form of the qualities (*guṇas*) of the *Brahman*; and those which maintain that She is part and parcel of the original nature of the *Brahman* Himself. Veṅkaṭanātha refutes all the above views.

The first and the second views which identify Lakṣmī with the material Nature (*prakṛti*) and with the qualities like *sattā* and *ahantā* of the Lord are entirely wrong, because the very texts from which they derive their inspiration describe *Śrī* as a sentient being. In clear and unmistakable terms, the sentient character of *Śrī* has been indicated by Yāmuna in the verse by the two terms, "*te*" and "*tvām*", and also by the address, "*bhagavati*",¹⁶⁴ which is possible only in the case of Lakṣmī being a sentient being. As regards terms like *sattā* and *ahantā* applied to *Śrī* in some texts, they should be understood as referring to Her internal and close relation with the Lord. The fact that Lakṣmī is entirely different from the material *prakṛti*, is shown by the terms, "*te*" and "*yavanikā*", where *prakṛti* as *māyā* is compared to a curtain. In some texts, however, we find terms like *prakṛti* employed to refer to *Śrī*, but this is no proof of the identity between the two. For then, Vāsudeva, who is also referred to by the term *prakṛti*, will have to be identified with it, which, however, is absurd.

As regards the next three views (nos. 3,4 and 5) which maintain that Lakṣmī is a part of the Lord Himself under certain conditions, but not different from Him, Deśika states that they stand refuted by the very texts on which they purport to be based,

164. Cf. CŚ. śl. 1 :

"kāntaste puruṣottamaḥ phaṇipatiśśāyāsanaṁ vāhanaṁ
vedātmā vihageśvaro yavanikā māyā jaganmohini
brahmeśādisuravrajassadayitastvaddāsādāṣiṅgaṇaḥ
śrīrityeva ca nāma te bhagavati brūmaḥ kathaṁ tvām vayam"

which expressly declare *Śrī* as a being perpetually different from Bhagavān. Above all, there is a Vedic text, which in clear and unmistakable terms pinpoints the difference of form subsisting between the Lord and Lakṣmī, His Consort: "hriṣca te lakṣmīśca patnyau".¹⁶⁵ This fact has been referred to by the author of the *stuti* by the phrase, "kāntaste" ('your beloved Lord'), which clearly marks the difference between Lakṣmī and Viṣṇu.

Referring to the next view (no.6) that a part of the *Brahman* Himself, when possessed by a separate ego gets the designation "*Śrī*", Deśika takes serious exception to it as it lacks the support of all proofs, which, on the contrary, declare that the original nature of the Lord being partless (*svarūpato niravayavaṁ*), does not admit of any partition in it.

The next opinion (no. 7) which is more or less similar to the preceding one, is also rejected on the ground that the *Brahmasūtra* itself maintains that the *Brahman* does not undergo any transformation (*pariṇāma*) in His essential nature.

The succeeding view (no.8), which speaks of a delimiting adjunct (*upādhi*) acting upon the *Brahman*, is also unsound due to the following reasons: No adjunct can act upon the *Brahman* since He is impartite. As Yāmuna has already explained in his *Āgamaprāmāṇya*,¹⁶⁶ the question of a delimiting adjunct comes only in the case of a thing that has parts. Even if such a thing were admitted, there crop up many inconsistencies. If the delimiting adjunct, viz., the body which conditions the *Brahman*, comes into contact with the part that it conditions, releasing the parts already delimited by it, then there is the cessation of the *bhoktr* (experiencer) so far as the earlier conditioning is concerned and there is no continuity to run through the successive conditioning. The net result is that one is landed on the Buddhist position of flux.

165. *Taittirīya Āraṇyaka*, III. 13. 2.

166. "Yadapi viyati parimānamiha nidarśitaṁ, tadapi vimarśaniyameva; parimāṇaṁ hi nāma deśāvacchedaḥ iyatā parito bhāvaveṣṭanamiti yāvat ; na ca nabhasi tadastīti kathamiva tadiha nidarśanatayā nirdīśyate?" (ĀP p. 4).

Passing on to the next view (no. 9), which considers that "transformation into an *avatāra*" is itself an *upādhi* for the *Brahman*, the commentator repudiates it on the strength of authoritative texts which speak of Lakṣmī as possessing an eternal body, etc. This is clearly shown by Yāmuna by the phrase "*kāntaste*", consisting of the two terms "*kāntaḥ*" and "*te*" (meaning 'your Consort'), with two different Case-terminations. Citing other texts, Deśika asserts that Śrī is an eternally and entirely separate being from Nārāyaṇa.

Further, Lakṣmī is quite distinct from and superior to all other beings, human as well as divine, that are bound by *karman*. This is shown by Yāmuna by describing Brahmā and other divine orders with their consorts as attending upon Śrī.

Regarding the question whether Śrī and Viṣṇu have one body or not (no. 10), it is answered that the oneness of bodies (*vigrahaikya*) spoken of in some texts can be accounted for, as due to the mutual desire and agreement of the Divine Couple (*ubhayecchā*). Identity of form (*svarūpaikya*), however, cannot be postulated, since such a postulation goes against *śruti*-statements that Lakṣmī and Viṣṇu are two different personalities but not one in essence. It may be argued that two Beings are not necessary, since the same God can Himself perform all cosmic functions. But it has already been mentioned that the Vedic text, "*hrīṣca te lakṣmīṣca patnyau*"¹⁶⁷ points out the difference of form subsisting between the Lord and His Consort. All other texts which speak of their oneness will have to be interpreted in conformity with this *śruti*. If, according to the principle of economy, it is argued that the Lord and His Consort are identical in form, then it may be further asked why on the same principle, the Lord and the individual souls could not become identical. This results in the unity of souls, which is decidedly opposed to the cardinal tenets of the *Viśiṣṭādvaita* philosophy. Unity of souls is refuted in the *Śrībhāṣya* and such other texts. Even on the view that there exists between the Lord and Śrī, *bhedābheda* (difference-cum-non-difference), it is clear that they both cannot be identical. Even if there be some *smṛti*-texts which speak of the unity (*aikya*) of Lakṣmī and Nārāyaṇa, the term "unity", will

167. *Taittirīya Āraṇyaka* III. 13. 2.

have to be taken in a secondary sense, as in statements like "*rāmasugrīvayoraikyam*,"¹⁶⁸ where reference is made to the identity between two friends like Rāma and Sugrīva.¹⁶⁹

Referring to the next opinion (no. 11) which equates Lakṣmī with *māyā*, Deśika rejects it summarily on the ground that the school which speaks of an unqualified *Brahman* and His being veiled by *māyā*, etc. (i.e. the *Advaita*), is not acceptable, as has been shown elsewhere. All this has been kept in mind and indicated by Yāmuna when he states that *māyā* deludes the entire world other than the Divine Couple ("*yavanikā māyā jaganmohinī*").¹⁷⁰ Continuing, Deśika states that a curtain in general obstructs normal vision; but *māyā*, compared to a curtain in the verse, fails to obstruct Lakṣmī's vision because the entire activity of *māyā* is under the control of Lakṣmī Herself.¹⁷¹ Even in the case of the Eternals (*nitya*), the Liberated (*mukta*) and the Lord, who are not bound by their past acts (*karman*), *māyā* fails to exert any influence. There are, however, some *smṛti*-passages, especially those in co-ordinate predication (*sāmānādhikaraṇya*), which identify Lakṣmī with other goddesses bound by *karman*. But this does not indicate that even Lakṣmī's vision, like that of other goddesses, is obscured by *māyā*. Texts which speak of Lakṣmī as on par with Sarasvatī and other goddesses will have to be interpreted as speaking of the manifold glory of Śrī.

All such unwarranted opinions are set aside by Yāmuna when he says that even Brahmā and other divine beings, along with their spouses,¹⁷² are only subservient to Lakṣmī. It is further pointed out that the view entertained by some that Brahmā and other gods partake of the essential form of the Lord is mistaken. Equally wrong is the conception that the consorts of these subordinate gods are parts of the form of Lakṣmī.

168. Vide *Rāmāyaṇa*, V. 35.52a : "*rāmasugrīvayoraikyam devyevam samajāyata*"

169. See p. 16 of the commentary on CŚ.

170. C. *ibid.* : *māyāyāḥ prastutadāmpativyatiriktajagan-mohanatvoktyā*."

171. *Ibid.* : "*tadadhīnasarvavyāpārāyā māyāyāḥ*"

172. CŚ. 1 : "*sadayitastvaddāsādāsigaṇaḥ*"

Reference is next made to another school, which, while accepting that the Lord and Śrī are two different personalities, is not in favour of the latter's complete supremacy with reference to the two *vibhūti*s.¹⁷³ This school bases itself on some Purāṇic statements that the glory of Lakṣmī includes only the female principle in the universe. The votaries of the school, therefore, contend that Brahmā and other male gods cannot be held subservient to Lakṣmī.

Venkaṭanātha meets this objection by declaring that all beings in the universe, human or divine, are eternally subservient to the Lord and consequently to His Consort Śrī also. The point may be stretched that Śrī, Herself being the servant of the Lord, might not be approached and that there is no question of others being subservient to Her. For this, the reply is given that the Consort is nowhere called the servant of the Lord, either in the *Vedas* or elsewhere. Even granted that the Consort is subservient to the Lord, there is nothing wrong in others being subordinate to the former. Even among the human beings who are primarily subservient to the Lord, one is found subordinate to the other. Moreover, the two *vibhūti*s are intended for the enjoyment of the Divine Couple; and so, there is nothing wrong in stating that Brahmā and other gods serve both the Lord and His Spouse without any distinction. This has been illustrated on the analogy of sacrificial offerings which are intended for two deities at one and the same time. This fact that all beings, divine as well as human, are subordinate to the Dual Divinity, is further corroborated by citing the authority of a text,¹⁷⁴ which interprets the three constituent elements of the syllable, *Om*, viz., 'a', 'u' and 'm', as standing for the Lord, His Consort Lakṣmī and the individual selves respectively, the last of whom, viz., the souls, stand subordinate to the first and the second.

173. See p. 27 above for an explanation of the term "*vibhūti*".

174. Raṅganāthamuni, the commentator on the *Śrīsūkta*, quotes the following, ascribing it to the *Kaṭhaśruti* : p. 59 : "akāreṇocyate viṣṇus sarvalokeśvaro hariḥ, uddhṛtā viṣṇunā lakṣmīrukāreṇocyate tathā, makāraṣṭu tayordāsa iti praṇavalakṣaṇam". However, such a text is not found. The first half of the last line is quoted by Deśika.

The question would naturally arise whether the position of Lakṣmī extends to the other consorts of Viṣṇu like Bhūmi and Nīlā, spoken of in some texts. Deśika says that we are not concerned with it since all the female principle in the world is included in the personality of Lakṣmī and all that is male in that of Viṣṇu.

Concluding his commentary on the first verse, Deśika observes that some people confused by the adherents of various schools of thought, come to the drastic conclusion that the real nature of Lakṣmī is beyond all possible explanation. But the present elucidation of Lakṣmī's nature sets aside all such opinions. Still there are others who maintain that Lakṣmī's nature is indefinable either as existent (*sat*) or non-existent (*asat*). To them, Deśika replies that the very school which employs such terminology and tenaciously harbours such views, namely the Advaita, has already been refuted in other works of Viśiṣṭādvaita.

In the second verse¹⁷⁵ Yāmuna praises Lakṣmī who combines in Herself the qualities of unlimited greatness and easy accessibility (*mahattvasaṅgatasaulabhyaguṇayoga*).¹⁷⁶ The glory of Lakṣmī is said to be so vast as not to be adequately comprehended even by Her Omniscient Consort, Himself of unlimited glory. The commentator argues that the inability on the part of the Omniscient Lord to assess Lakṣmī's greatness does not undermine His Omniscience. The two terms '*dāsa*' and '*prapanna*', are also employed by the author so as to stress the importance of the two closely connected acts of servitude and surrender in lessening the fear of a man while approaching Lakṣmī.

The question now arises as to whether one's surrender to Śrī does not contradict or reduce the value of one's surrender to Viṣṇu. Deśika replies in the negative and refers his readers

175. Cf. CS' śl. 2 :

"yasyāste mahimānamātmāna ivaitvadvallabhopi prabhur
nālamātumiyattayā niravadhiṁ nityānukūlaṁ svataḥ
tām tvām dāsa iti parapanna iti ca stoṣyāmyaham nirbhayo
lokaikēśvari lokanāthadayite dānte dayām te vidan"

176. See p. 17 of the commentary on the above.

to the introductory part of his own commentary on the *Śaraṇāgati Gadya* of Rāmānuja,¹⁷⁷ where he had examined the issue.

The *prima facie* view is that surrender to Lakṣmī is not necessary because the Lord Himself, if properly resorted to, bestows upon the devotee all that could be attained by surrendering to Lakṣmī. In answer to this, it is said that at the outset one does not know that surrender to the Lord is possible at all. If, however, one is aware of its possibility, then one would utilise it directly for one's one *mokṣa*, without aspiring for the intermediary *Lakṣmī-prapatti*. If, on the other hand, one does not know that *prapatti* is accomplishable, then no question of one's resorting to it as a means would arise.

Another argument advanced is that the difficulty regarding *prapatti* lies only in knowing the meaning of the texts enjoining it and that once the meaning of those texts is ascertained, then it becomes easy for anybody to apply it for attaining *mokṣa*. Venkaṭanātha answers that though *prapatti* is easy to perform, as it does not involve any difficult ancillaries, even if there is the slightest deviation on one's part like lack of conviction in the saviourship of God (*mahāviśvāsa*), that itself is enough to render *prapatti* an impossible task. It is because of this that texts speak of the means of release, viz., *prapatti*, as both easy and difficult. When a man surrenders to God, he should constantly and continuously have a sincere desire to attain Him, a strong and positive conviction that He and He alone is the saviour, coupled with the negative decision that there is no saviour other than He. It is for the attainment of such a steadfast and uninterruptedly devoted attitude of mind that Lakṣmī is first resorted to. So, surrender to Lakṣmī is to be understood as the first phase of the surrender to Viṣṇu, and there is thus no mutual conflict between these two *prapattis*.

A further point which Yāmuna brings out in this verse is that though the Lord is all-causal and all-powerful, yet He is not inclined to do anything against the wishes of His Consort Lakṣmī, which means that She is the active or dynamic aspect of the Supreme. The necessity of resorting to the intermediary

177. Vide Deśika's commentary on ŚG. p. '98.

principle of Lakṣmī is shown by Yāmuna on the ground that She possesses qualities of compassion and easy accessibility, which are required to induce *prapatti*.¹⁷⁸ In this verse, the glory of Lakṣmī, in its vastness, is also said to be on par with that of Viṣṇu.¹⁷⁹

Deśika, in this connection, objects to the interpretation offered by some to the cosmogonic hymn of the *R̥gveda*, "nāsadāsīt...",¹⁸⁰ that the term 'svadhā' which occurs in it, refers to Lakṣmī, it being one of Her names mentioned in the *Mahābhārata* and such other texts. They argue that the whole passage declares that the *Brahman* actually breathes or is sustained by Lakṣmī.¹⁸¹ This is quite illogical, says Deśika, because the *Brahman*, who has so far been described as the source of the entire world-existence, cannot now be stated to depend upon somebody else for His own breathing. Therefore, the term 'svadhā' of the *ṛk* is to be explained etymologically either as "the *Brahman*'s own existence" (*sva-dhā=svasattā*), or as "His capacity or power to sustain the universe Himself", (*svakīyaṁ viśvadhāraṇasāmarthyam*).¹⁸² This explanation has the support of the *Śrībhāṣya* too, says Deśika. Even granting that the term 'svadhā' means Lakṣmī, the passage quoted above should only be taken as presenting the picture of the Supreme Being, Viṣṇu, in close association with His Consort,¹⁸³ or as emphasising the love He has for Her.¹⁸⁴ That is to say, the above passage depicts the Supreme Being predominantly in His dynamic aspect.

178. "dānte dayāṁ te vidan" (CŚ. 2)

179. *Ibid* : "yasyāste mahimānam ātmana iva tvadvallabhopi...." etc.

180. *R̥gveda* X. 11. 129 : "nāsadāsīno sadāsīt...ānīdavātām svadhayā tadekaṁ"

181. See p. 18, commentary on CŚ. : "tadadhīnaprāpanatvaṁ brahmaṇa iti"

182. Commentary, p. 18.

183. *Ibid* : "sahayogavivakṣā"

184. *Ibid* : "premapāratantrye tātparyam"

Quoting other texts which speak of the Lord's greatness being only due to His association with Lakṣmī, Deśika states that they should also be explained in such a way that the supremacy of the Lord is unimpaired.¹⁸⁵

The comparison made between Lakṣmī and Viṣṇu in terms of unlimited glory noted earlier,¹⁸⁶ gives rise to another school which speaks of their total similarity (*atyantasāmya*). But this "similarity" will have to be interpreted with due regard to the wife-husband-relation accepted in general. If such a distinction in terms of "husband" and "wife" were not shown between the Lord and Lakṣmī, then the texts which speak of approaching the Lord (*abhigamana*)¹⁸⁷ through Lakṣmī's mediation would cease to have any practical significance.

The commentator then makes an important observation regarding the function of Lakṣmī in the scheme of release. Even though the Lord is the dispenser of rewards to a devotee, Lakṣmī has Her own role to play, which is twofold : She shields the *jīvas* from the Lord's wrath when He frowns at their folly, and when He is in a good disposition, She promptly intensifies His love and mercy for them.¹⁸⁸ Those who hold Viṣṇu and Lakṣmī as totally similar to each other, will find it extremely difficult to explain as to how these two can form a couple at all, because some sort of difference is necessary to make the "wife-husband" relation feasible.

In the next verse¹⁸⁹ Yāmuna, according to Deśika, dwells on Lakṣmī's being the goal of all human endeavour. The author

185. *Ibid.* p. 19.

186. *CS.* 2 : "yasyāste mahimānamātmana iva" etc.

187. The remaining four observances are : *upādāna*, *ijyā*, *svādhyāya* and *yoga*.

Cf. *PS.* Caryāpāda, ch. XIII. śl. 3 :

ādyam karmābhigamanamupādānamataḥ param
ijyā ca paścāt svādhyāyastato yogastataḥ param.

188. Cf. p. 16, commentary on *CS.* 2 :

asti karmārhapthalade patyau kṛtyadvayam śriyaḥ
nigrahād vāraṇam kāle sandhukṣaṇamanugrahe.

189. *CS.* 2 : "īśattvatkaruṇānirīkṣaṇasudhāsandhukṣaṇād rakṣyate
naṣṭam prīkṣaṇaḥ tadābhataḥ tribhuvanam saṅpratyanantodayam
śreyo nahyaravindalocanamanahkāntāprasādādṛte
saṅkṣiptakṣaravaiṣṇavādhyasū nṛṇāṃ sambhāvyate karhicit".

here uses the term, '*manahkāntā*' as an epithet of Lakṣmī, which indicates that there is identity of thought and action between the two in bestowing upon their devotees all that they desire.¹⁹⁰ In the first verse, Viṣṇu had been described as Lakṣmī's Consort (*kāntaste puruṣottamaḥ*) and here Lakṣmī is described as Viṣṇu's Consort (*aravindalocana-manahkāntā*). These two statements when read together, indicate that as regards all actions, there is complete unison and agreement between the two,¹⁹¹ which means that the harmonious blending of the two aspects of the Supreme Being ensures the good of creation.

This *śloka* further suggests that the status of the higher order of beings like Indra and Brahmā is also the result of Lakṣmī's grace. Deśika argues that since Lakṣmī, who is at the root of the prosperity of other gods is Herself dependent upon Viṣṇu for Her own glory, the overwhelming supremacy of Viṣṇu becomes self-evident.¹⁹² It is further understood from the verse that the grace of Lakṣmī is at the root of the material as well as the spiritual advancement of all beings, including the attainment of *mokṣa*. The material prosperity attained by men after worshipping Indra and such other deities should therefore be understood as due mainly to Her grace and those gods merely stand as mediators.¹⁹³ The word "*karhicit*" ('ever') in the verse also points out that the mercy (*prasāda*) of Lakṣmī does not wear away by the passage of time like that of Indra and other divine beings.

A critic now puts a pertinent question as to how Lakṣmī could be spoken of as bestowing *mokṣa* because it is an established fact that the Lord alone is the bestower of it. The statement of this verse that "without the grace of Lakṣmī, men cannot attain *mokṣa*", he argues, should therefore be taken as a mere eulogy (*prasāmsāmātraparam*)¹⁹⁴. Quoting from the

190. See p. 20 of the commentary on the above; "sarvāpekṣitādāne tayossāmarthyam".

191. *Ibid.* "parasparānukūlatayā sarvatra vyāpāre sāmasyam".

192. *Ibid.* p. 21 : "brahmādinām yadāyattam vaibhavam yasya
sā svayam

tasya kaimutyanirdhāryamīśvaratvam
śriyaḥpateḥ"

193. *Ibid.*

194. *Ibid.*

Sāttvata Samhitā, the *Viṣṇu* and the *Brahma Purāṇas*, Deśika answers that Lakṣmī sets the *jīvas* free from the grip of the three qualities, *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*, which are responsible for transmigration. She bestows upon them the qualities of the self like devotion and detachment, which help one to attain *mukti* and therefore Her importance cannot be underestimated in the scheme of *mokṣa*. She acts as the mediator between the Lord the benefactor and the devotee, the beneficiary,¹⁹⁵ a fact admitted by all. Opinion may, however, differ among thinkers, as to whether the determination to confer *mokṣa* in the form of complete realisation of the Godhead (*paripūrṇānubhava-pradānasankalpa*)¹⁹⁶ upon the devotee belongs originally to the Lord alone, or both to Him and His Consort. But on either ground, there could be no doubt regarding the vital position of Lakṣmī in the scheme of release.

In the fourth and final verse¹⁹⁷ Yāmuna says that Lakṣmī is always closely associated with Her Lord in all varieties of His manifestations and that She too is the goal of all human beings, like Him. This verse thus presents Lakṣmī in Her redemptive aspect as Universal Mother. This close union of Śrī with the Lord enables the erring humanity to approach Him without any fear. Deśika here observes that attainment of the Lord tastes all the more sweet when Lakṣmī is united with Him, like milk to which sugar has been added.¹⁹⁸

There are three types of texts : those which speak of Lakṣmī as all-pervasive like Viṣṇu Himself; those which hold Her

195. *Ibid* : "mokṣaprade bhagavati mumukṣūṇāṁ ghaṭakatayaīṣā tiṣṭhatīti sarvasammatam".

196. *Ibid*.

197. *CS*. 4 : "śāntānantamahāvibhūti paramaṁ yadbrahma
rūpaṁ hareḥ
mūrtiṁ brahma tato'pi tat priyataraṁ rūpaṁ
yadatyadbhutaṁ
yānyanyāni yathāsukhaṁ viharato rūpāni sarvāni
tān-
yāhussvairanurūparūpavibhavair gāḍhopagūḍhāni
te"

198. See p. 22 of the commentary on the above : "śarkarānvitadugdhanayāya"

as dwelling only in some auspicious things (*prasastapadārthamātravāsitaṁ*), and those which attribute subtlety (*sūkṣmatva*) to Her form. Deśika who believes in the essential pervasiveness of Lakṣmī, tries to reconcile the second and the third types of texts with his own line of approach. Statements that Śrī dwells in auspicious things alone, can be explained as speaking of Her special attachment (*abhimānaviśeṣa*) towards those objects. The next problem is to account for the texts which mention Śrī as monadic in form. As we have already noted, it is a disputed point whether Śrī is subtle or all-pervasive in form.¹⁹⁹

Deśika who represents the Vaḍagalai school, criticises the Teṅgalai school which holds Lakṣmī to be finite in form. The latter school maintains that though finite, Lakṣmī possesses the power of expansion (*vikāśakaśakti*) by virtue of which She might, in a sense, be described as "*vibhu*" or expansive. The argument, according to Deśika, is decidedly unorthodox.²⁰⁰ The Southern school, while maintaining that the Lord is infinite, also holds that He could become finite by virtue of His wonderful power to accomplish even the most difficult things (*aghaṭitaghaṭanāsāmarthyam*).²⁰¹ The followers of this school, likewise, argue that Lakṣmī too possesses similar powers and that She too could become infinite, though She might originally be a *jīva*. Deśika objects to this view by saying that the Lord becomes finite only when He ensouls a body and the finiteness is thus not natural with Him. But in the case of Lakṣmī, no such reason can be attributed to Her becoming infinite. Moreover, if each and everything is said to possess such powers, there would be no end to it, and even the *Sarvādvaita* and the *Bhedābheda* systems of philosophy could be justified, just on the same consideration. Some people attribute this power of expansion to the very nature of Lakṣmī. This is dismissed by saying that such a power of manifoldness should also extend to individual selves (*jīvas*) and that there is no reason as to why such a power should rest only with Śrī.

199. See p. 32 above.

200. The Teṅgalai school, however, claims that it represents the pure orthodox tradition from Rāmānuja through Kūreśvara, Naṇḍīyar, Nambillai and others.

201. See p. 22 of the commentary.

At this stage, a new objection against the statement of Lakṣmī's being ever associated with Her Lord is taken up for consideration. This statement, according to the objector, is of a general character, and as such, cannot serve any specific purpose like *stuti*. It would have been a piece of *stuti* to say that Śrī always dwells upon the body of the Lord as a special distinction conferred by the Lord Himself upon Her, as He is mythologically known to have conferred such distinctions upon His devotees like Śeṣa and Garuḍa, by allowing them to serve Him in particular capacities. Thus, in the case of Lakṣmī too, God should be assumed to have given her the privilege of dwelling upon His body. This criticism from the Teṅgalai standpoint is that Śrī is also one of the general attendants on the Lord, and that, as such, She cannot be 'vibhu' like the Lord.

The objector further examines the possibilities of interpreting the term "*anurūpa*"²⁰² occurring in this verse and concludes that on no ground can Lakṣmī be said to compare with Her Lord. Lakṣmī being finite, She cannot be said to compare with the Lord by virtue of Her being an aspect of His glory, for this is common even to the other sentient and insentient entities of the universe. It cannot also be said that the nature of Lakṣmī corresponds with that of the Lord by reason of Her possessing beginningless omniscience like Him, because this characteristic is found even among other Eternal Beings, who are dependent upon the Lord. Thirdly, it cannot be said that the nature of Lakṣmī corresponds to that of Her Lord on the ground that She is all-pervasive like Him, for then, She cannot be included under any one of the two possible categories, viz., the *jīva* and the Lord (*Īśvara*): if She is a *jīva*, She must then be finite, and if She is the sovereign, She must needs be separate from the Lord, because the scriptures assert that the Lord is "*advitīya*"²⁰³ ("one without a second") i.e., that there is none either equal or superior to Him. If She were a separate and independent sovereign like the Lord, both of them being perfectly equal in all respects, they could not form a couple.

202. "āhussvairanurūparūpavibhavaṁ"

203. Vide *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* : VI-2-1 : "sadeva somya idamagra āsit ekameva advitīyaṁ brahma".

The objector points out that because of this difficulty, texts which speak of Lakṣmī as pervasive should be interpreted as referring merely to Her association with the innumerable manifestations (*vigraha*) of the Lord on earth. He concludes that because of these considerations, the statement that "Lakṣmī compares with the Lord" of this verse, does not carry any special significance.²⁰⁴

Deśika replies that the statement of Lakṣmī's similarity with the Lord is itself specific in character, bringing out the speciality of the Goddess. A *stuti* or eulogy can be made even by attributes of a general nature, provided they have a special significance and something to distinguish. Thus, for instance, Viṣṇu can be said to be praised by the Eternals and the Liberated alike, even though omniscience and such other attributes are common for them.

Dealing with all these divergent views about Śrī, Deśika formulates three conceptions of Lakṣmī as held by some thinkers. These are briefly given below.

The first conception of Śrī is that held by the adherents of the Teṅgalai school that Lakṣmī is *anū* and dependent upon the Lord, but by virtue of Her expansive power, differs from the *jīvas*. In answer to the question as to how Lakṣmī differs from the Eternal Beings (*nitya*) who are also *jīvas*, they say that the form as well as the attributes of the Eternals are both limited in extent, whereas in the case of Lakṣmī, though Her essential form is unexcelled (*niratisāya*), Her attributes are but limited in character (*sātiśāya*), She being dependent upon the Supreme Being. So Lakṣmī, though a *jīva*, can correspond with the Her Consort, through the all-pervasiveness of her original nature (*svarūpavibhūta*).

The second conception of Śrī set forth by Deśika as held by some, is that She is a category different from the three well-known ones : *Cit*, *Acit* and *Īśvara*. It cannot be contended that because there is no express statement of Śrī being a further fourth category, She is to be brought under one of the three. Being

204. Briefly, the Teṅgalais deny *vibhūta* to Lakṣmī, arguing that the *śrutis* attribute it exclusively to the Lord and that there is no logical necessity either, for positing it in regard to Lakṣmī.

cetana, She is different from *acit*; being *vibhu*, different from the *jīva*; and being dependent, different from *Īśvara*.²⁰⁵ There is however, no contradiction in such a conception, and this view will adopt the poetic analogy of the gem and its lustre and that of the flower and its fragrance, etc. (*ratnaprabhānyāya*, *puṣpaparimalanyāya*) to show the intimacy between the Lord and Lakṣmī and the way in which although She is dependent on the Lord, His glory depends upon Her.

The third view is that Śrī belongs to the category of *Īśvara* because of the express declaration that She is the Mistress of the Lord's two *vibhūtis*: the *nitya* and the *līlā*. The difference between Her and the Lord, on this view, is this: all beings including Lakṣmī are subservient to the Lord, whereas all beings other than the Lord are subservient to Lakṣmī.²⁰⁶ As regards the correspondence of natures between the Lord and Lakṣmī, the characterisation of the *Brahman* as the sole cause of the creation, maintenance and dissolution of the universe is said to be found only with the Lord but not Lakṣmī. That is why it is said that He is the Supreme Sovereign and that there is none either equal or superior to Him.²⁰⁷

Deśika observes that these three views do not differ much from one another and that disagreement arises when the actual name '*jīva*' is applied Lakṣmī. He further explains that in all these views, there is agreement on the point that Śrī is dependent upon the will of Viṣṇu for Her own glory. Since the Vedic texts declare that there is none superior to the Lord,²⁰⁸ Deśika remarks that all these views regarding Lakṣmī become justified only by establishing the over-all supremacy of Viṣṇu. So even on the view that Lakṣmī is a *jīva*, She can still be said to become the goal of all human desire and endeavour. The correspondence

205. Cf. p. 23 of the commentary: "cetanatvāt acidanyatvam; vibhutvājīvanatvam; pāratantryādīśvarānyatvam ca".

206. *Ibid.* p. 23: "sarvaśeṣitvādikam bhāgavataḥ; asyāstu taditarasārvaśeṣitvādikamiti".

207. *Ibid.*: "sarveśvaratvam samādhikadaridratvam ca".

208. *Taittirīya Āraṇyaka* X. 1. 2: "na tasyeśa kaścana".

in form does not contradict the diversity of functions.²⁰⁹ Some maintain that the Supreme Being is engaged in various world-activities purely for the pleasure of His Consort and that, as such, there could be nothing wrong in stating that Lakṣmī is closely associated with Him. Texts which speak of the Lord as more important than Śrī are to be understood as reflecting the common opinion that the female principle is ever subordinate and next in importance to the male.

Before concluding, Deśika makes a very cryptic reference to the view held by Rāṅganāthamuni in his commentary upon the *Śrīsūkta*. The view of Rāṅganātha referred to by Deśika, which, along with the three views of Śrī mentioned above, becomes the fourth, is that attribution of qualities like Lordship (*sarvabhūteśvaratva*) to both the Lord and Lakṣmī does not come into the sphere of contradiction at all, because these qualities can exist in them by their mutual consent.²¹⁰ Deśika gives expression to a further fifth view on Śrī, which, on the authority of Nārāyaṇamuni, the author of the *Puruṣakāramīmāṃsā*, as we shall presently see, is what actually Deśika himself subscribes to.²¹¹ Śrī is as pervasive as the Lord. She yet becomes subordinate to Him. This subordination is voluntary but not obligatory, because it takes place by the free will, either of Śrī, or of Her Consort.

In conclusion, Deśika says that Lakṣmī in this hymn of Yāmuna has been shown as corresponding to the Lord in terms of Lordship (*svāmitva*), easy accessibility (*saulabhya*), bestowship of mokṣa (*phaladatva*) and Herself being the goal of all human endeavour (*phalatva*).²¹²

* * *

209. Commentary p. 24: "ākārasāmye'pi kvacid vyāpāro bhidyate".

210. See p. 24 of the commentary: "atra sarvabhūteśvaratvādivacanasāmyāt asyā guṇabhāva ubhayecchāprayukta iti kecidāhuḥ", etc. Cf. Rāṅganātha's commentary on the *Śrīsūkta*, p. 48: "evam sarvabhūteśvaratva", etc.

211. We shall presently examine the *Puruṣakāramīmāṃsā*.

212. The *ānūrūpya* or correspondence thus expounded is not acceptable to the Teṅgali school save in respect of *saulabhya*. Periyavāccānpillai in his commentary refers to *ānūrūpya* only in the *vigrahas* or forms of Lakṣmī during the incarnations of the Lord.

The influence of the *Catuśślokī* was so pronounced upon the later writers that following it as a model, there arose more detailed statements in the form of *stotras* about the personality and position of Lakṣmī, the chief among them being the passage at the beginning of the *Śaraṇāgatigadya* referring to Śrī, of Rāmānuja, the *Śrīstava* of Śrīvatsāṅkamiśra, referred to in Tamil as “Kūrattāzhvān”, the *Śrīguṇaratnakośa* of Parāśarabhaṭṭa, his son, and the *Śrīstuti* of Venkaṭanātha.

Rāmānuja describes Śrī as the Mother of the Universe and as ever abiding by the Supreme Being, Nārāyaṇa.²¹³ The greatness of Śrī is unbounded like that of the Lord.²¹⁴ Rāmānuja here stresses the importance of surrender to Lakṣmī (*prapatti*), which may be taken as the first specific statement of a Śrīvaiṣṇava teacher regarding *prapatti* to Śrī, forming the basis of more detailed statements on the point by later writers.²¹⁵

Śrīvatsāṅka, his disciple, in a eulogium of eleven verses, describes Śrī as stimulating and guiding the Supreme Being, Viṣṇu in His creative and other activities regarding the universe.²¹⁶ She is the Universal Mother, full of affection for the beings,²¹⁷ and it is Her grace that forms the source of all-round prosperity for those beings.²¹⁸ Her glory is again conceived to be incomprehensible even by the Omniscient Lord.²¹⁹ The faculty of learning is but the result of Her favour.²²⁰ She is also said to bring about activity and beauty to the creation by Her mere will.²²¹

213. *ŚG* : “akhilajaganmātaram, asmanmātaram”

214. *Ibid* :

“bhagvannārāyaṇābhīmatānūrūpa....anavadhikātiśayāsāṅkhyeya....” etc.

Cf. VS, p. 158 : “.....aiśvaryaśīlādyanavadhikamahimamahiṣī” etc.

215. *ŚG* : “asmanmātaram aśaranyāśaranyāṁ ananyaśaraṇaḥ śaraṇamahimāṁ prapadye”

216. *Śrīstava* : śl. 1 : “yasyā vīkṣya mukhaṁ tadingitaparādhīno vidhatte” “khilam”.

217. *Ibid*, śl. 2 : “samastalokajanānīm”

218. Vide *Śrīstava*, śls. 6 and 7.

219. *Ibid* : śl. 8. *Cf. also CS*. 2 ; “yasyāste mahimānam.”

220. *Śrīstava*, śl. 9.

221. *Ibid*, śl. 10.

The *Śrīguṇaratnakośa*, a work in sixty-one verses by Parāśarabhaṭṭa, Śrīvatsāṅka's son is, as the very title indicates, devoted to an elaborate and detailed exposition of the nature and qualities of Śrī.

The author explains the glory of Lakṣmī at length, called the Mother of the Universe.²²² Here again, as in the previous work,²²³ the Supreme Person Viṣṇu is said to derive His impetus in creating the world, etc., from His Consort, Lakṣmī.²²⁴ The grace of Lakṣmī yields all-sided prosperity for the creation.²²⁵ In fact, the entire cosmic activity of the Lord in the form of creation, sustenance and dissolution, is Her own display.²²⁶ By reason of Her intimate association with the Lord,²²⁷ the author declares that without Her, the Lord could not attain his own glory.²²⁸ The concept of Motherhood which applies to the dynamic aspect of the Supreme Person, brings out all the other ideas flowing from it, the chief among them being benevolence, forgiveness, compassion (grace) and magnanimity.²²⁹ Mediation of the Mother Śrī is necessary for the devotees, of whom the Father, Viṣṇu, is a stern judge. This idea has been effectively brought out in a verse, where Śrī is depicted as pleading with the Lord for His mercy on behalf of humanity, on the ground that there is none in the creation free from faults.²³⁰ The author ultimately emphasises the importance of *śaraṇāgati* or utter surrender to Śrī,²³¹ and calls Her in that spirit of resignation, the Mother, Father and all-in-all of all the beings.²³²

222. Vide *Śrīguṇaratnakośa*, śl. 14: “asmajjanāni”; śl. 28 : “mātaḥ”; śls. 51-52: “janani”, etc.

223. *Ibid*, śl. 1.

224. See note 216 above.

225. *Cf. Śrīguṇaratnakośa*, śls. 15 to 18.

226. *Ib.* śls. 19,20,54

227. *Ib.* śls. 55

228. *Ib.* śls. 9,28,29,31

229. *Ib.* śls. 50-53; 57-58

230. *Ibid*, śl. 52, which is worth quoting in full :

“piteva tvatpreyān janani paripūrṇāgāsi jane

hitasrotovṛtṭyā bhavati ca kadācit kaluṣadhiḥ

kimetat? nirdoṣaḥ ka iha jagatīti tvamucitaiḥ

upāyair vismārya svajanayasi mātā tadasi naḥ”

231. *Ibid.* : śl. 60.

232. *Ibid* : śl. 61 : “tvamāmbā pitā sarvaṁ ca tvaṁ” etc.

Vedānta Deśika, following his predecessors, devotes his *Śrīstuti* of twenty-five stanzas, to a further delineation of the personality and position of Lakṣmī. She as the World-Mother, is full of various auspicious attributes like *vātsalya*²³³ and *dayā*²³⁴—motherly concern or affection for the beings and compassion. Her nature is as supreme and inscrutable as that of the Lord Himself.²³⁵ Creation, etc. of the universe are for the pleasure of both Śrī and Her Consort, Viṣṇu.²³⁶

With the above corpus of ideas come in doctrinal statements to the effect that the Supreme Godhead is constituted of both Viṣṇu and Lakṣmī.²³⁷ Śrī is ever associated with Him,²³⁸ and Her favour is the source of prosperity for the beings in this world as well as in the hereafter.²³⁹ The concept of Śrī as associated with Viṣṇu attains its fullness, when Deśika finds in those deities the Mother as well as the Father of the entire creation.²⁴⁰

We have already noticed that Deśika refers to some of the views by Raṅganāthamuni regarding Lakṣmī²⁴¹. Raṅganātha's commentary on the *Śrīsūkta* offers an authoritative exposition of the concept of Śrī according to the Viśiṣṭādvaitic school of thought.

Quoting extensively from Vedic hymns like those on *śraddhā* and *medhā*, Raṅganātha stresses that like Her Consort Nārāyaṇa, Śrī too is the Creator of the universe, the repository

233. Vide *Śrīstuti* of Deśika : śl. 21.

234. *Ibid* : śl. 28.

235. *Ibid* : śls. 5 and 6.

236. *Ibid* : śl. 7.

237. *Ibid* : śl. 5. Also cf. *ibid* : śl. 9 : "bhāvārūḍhau bhāgavati yuvām daīpatī daivatām naḥ". Also cf. the opening verse of *Rahasyatrayasāra*: "vṛṇīmahe ca tatradīyau daīpatī jagatām patī".

238. Cf. *Śrīstuti* of Deśika : śl. 10.

239. *Ibid*. śls. 14 to 22 and 24.

240. *Ibid*. śl. 23: "mātā devi tvamasi, bhagavān vāsudevaḥ pitā me".

241. See pp. xxxiv, xxxviii and xxxix of the *Śrīsūkta*, with the commentary of Raṅganāthamuni, edited with Introduction and Translation by A. Śrīnivāsa Rāghavan of Pudukkottai. There has been however some controversy as to whether the author of the commentary was Nañjiyar or Nārāyaṇamuni or some later writer.

of all virtues and the source of the material and spiritual well-being of the creation. Commenting on the ninth *ṛk* of the *Śrīsūkta*, where Śrī is called the sovereign of the entire creation,²⁴² the author enters into a detailed discussion on the concept of Śrī, refuting the views held by other schools. He concludes that terms like *śraddhā*²⁴³ and *viṣṇupatnī*,²⁴⁴ including the term "Śrī" found in the *śruti*-texts unmistakably refer to Lakṣmī.²⁴⁵ The Lord and His Spouse are both engaged in saving the souls and their activity is likened to a sacrifice.²⁴⁶ Both are equally essential for the welfare of the creation. Elaborate quotations in support of this statement are made from the *Ahīrbudhnya Saṁhitā* and the *Lakṣmī Tantra*. It is concluded that Lakṣmī is on par with the Lord in all aspects and that they both together are the Masters and Saviours of the world.

Some of the discussions are on questions like Śrī's independent and supreme character. It is asked whether Her having attributes like independence and supremacy in common with the Lord is not contradicted by *śrutis* which hold that the *Brahman* is without a second (*advitīya*). Raṅganātha replies in the negative. Contradiction arises only when two separate Masters are posited for this world, who entertain dissimilar views and vie with each other for supremacy. Since here Śrī and Viṣṇu are said to form a couple, no such contradiction arises. Some texts speak of the Lord as the sole sovereign of the world and some others, that Lakṣmī is the sovereign. Since both these texts are quite valid, they should be reconciled by declaring that the universe has but a single sovereign in the form of the couple of Lakṣmī-Nārāyaṇa, which is of the same mind and intention.

Raṅganātha who holds Lakṣmī co-eval with the Lord, asserts that the two have complete identity even regarding creation and such other cosmic activities. The power of Lakṣmī extends only to the *jīvas*, but not to the Lord. Likewise, the power of the Lord extends only to the beings other than Śrī. So,

242. Cf. *Śrīsūkta*, *ṛk*-9 : "Īśvarīm sarvabhūtānām".

243. *Yajur. Aṣṭa*: II praśna: 8 *anu*: 64-66: "śradhayāgnissamidhyate".

244. *Yajus. Saṁhitā* : IV-4-12.

245. Commentary on the *Śrīsūkta*, p. 45.

246. *Ibid* : p. 59.

the glories of both of them are not impaired, though they are, for this reason, inscrutable. Śloka 2 of Yāmuna's *Catuśśloki* and śloka 12 of the *Stotraratna* are cited as authorities in this connection.²⁴⁷ Though Lakṣmī and Viṣṇu are both independent of each other regarding their status, one is still subordinate to the other, and this is only voluntary but not obligatory.²⁴⁸

The text of the *Taittirīya* "na tasyeśe kaścana,"²⁴⁹ is explained in conformity with the concept of Śrī sketched above. Some explain this to mean that as the Lord has none superior to Him, Lakṣmī should only be subordinate to Him. Raṅganātha rejects this interpretation and states that the text in question negates the possibility of any person being equal or superior to the Lord for the very reason that he is endowed with such a Consort as Lakṣmī.²⁵⁰

Reference is then made to a passage attributed to the *Kaṭhaśruti*²⁵¹ to explain the relation of the *jīvas* being subservient to Śrī and Viṣṇu, the Masters of the universe.²⁵²

All the corpus of ideas about Lakṣmī expressed so far in the earlier works of the *ācāryas* became a literature by itself, and there appeared separate treatises on the concept of Lakṣmī, like the one we notice now, viz., the *Puruṣakāramīmāṃsā*.²⁵³ As the very name implies, this work discusses and determines the

247. *Ibid* : p. 47 (Cf. CS. 2 : "yasyāste", and SR. 12 : "svābhāvikānavadhika." etc.).

248. *Ibid* : p. 51 : "svatantrayorapi tayoranyonyecchayā patipatnībhāva iti", etc.

249. *Taittirīya Āraṇyaka* : X. 1: 2.

250. *SS*. p. 51 : "evamvidhapatnyādiviśiṣṭatvena sadṛśaḥ kaścidanyo nāsti".

251. *Ibid*. p. 59 : "akāreṇocyate viṣṇuh....." etc. See note 174 above.

252. *Ibid*. p. 52 : "ataḥ dāṃpatyossarvabhūteśvaratvādivacanasāmyam siddham", and also p. 60.

253. This is an unpublished palm-leaf manuscript in Grantha characters, deposited in the Govt. Oriental Mss. Library, Madras, under R. No. 606. It is a very short work in six leaves. It has also a very large commentary called "*Maṇḍīpikā*" by Śrīśaileśa, which is also in Grantha script and on palm-leaves, under R. No. 3147, deposited in the above library. This work, along with its commentary has recently formed the subject of a Doctoral Thesis prepared under the guidance of the present writer and has been awarded the degree (University of Madras, 1993).

position of Lakṣmī as the Mediator, technically called the *puruṣakāra*, between God and man, in the light of earlier works. The author, Nārāyaṇamuni,²⁵⁴ quotes very often the views expressed by Deśika regarding the position of Lakṣmī in his compositions like the commentaries on the *Catuśśloki* and the *Śaraṇagātigadya*, the *Tattvaṭīkā*, the *Tātparyacandrikā*, and *Nyāyasiddhāṅjana*, the *Nikṣeparakṣā*, the *Paramatabhaṅga* and the *Rahasyatrayasāra*. In addition to these, references are also made to works like the *Brahmasūtra*, the *Śrībhāṣya*, the *Prapannapārijāta*, and *Nyāyakuliśa*, the *Culuka*, the *Rahasyaratnāvali* and the *Śrīvacanabhūṣaṇa* of Pīḷai Lokācārya. The author also quotes from the *stotras* on Śrī made by Śrīvatsāṅkamiśra, Parāśarabhaṭṭa and Deśika.

The author, in this work, undertakes to discuss the point whether Lakṣmī, like Viṣṇu could be the Mistress of the universe or not.²⁵⁵

The cosmic functions of the Lord like creation, maintenance, dissolution and emancipation are intended to please His Consort Śrī, who is the Mother of the entire universe.²⁵⁶ The *śruti*-texts and the *Brahmasūtra*, according to the author, describe Viṣṇu as the prime cause of the creation and as the direct bestower of Mokṣa and also declare that the act of surrender (*prapatti*) to Him is the means of release.²⁵⁷ There are texts which speak of Lakṣmī on par with the Lord in all respects. On the authority of these texts, some say that Śrī, like the Lord, forms

Other works of this type are the *Śrītattvasiddhāṅjana* of Vedānta Rāmānuja, which is published, and the *Lakṣmīpupāyavadīpa* of Veṅkātārya, an unpublished work on palm-leaves in Grantha script, available in the above library under D. No. 5358. Also see M. Narasimhachary, "Definitions of the term *Puruṣakāra*", *The Journal of Oriental Research*, Madras, 1992. pp. 174-178

254. Vide the concluding stanza of the *Puruṣa*. M. folio 6b :

"nārāyaṇena muninā śrīvatsāṅkavipaścītā
saiṣa puruṣakārasya mīmāṃsā nirmītā mitā"

255. *Puruṣa*. M. : folio 1a : "patnyāḥ pativadiṣatvaṃ asti neti nirūpyate".

256. *Ibid*. the opening stanza :

"svatantrasvecchayā sṛṣṭisthitisaṃhāramokṣaṇaiḥ
yatsamakṣam kṛṇātiśaḥ tām bhaje lokamātaram"

257. *Ibid* : "śrīpatir jagato hetuḥ prapattavyo mumukṣubhiḥ
sākṣānmokṣapradāceti śrūtisūtrādiṣu sthitam".

the cause of the creation, the direct bestower of emancipation, and that *prapatti* to Her is the means thereof.²⁵⁸ Now it has been suggested that Deśika subscribed to this latter view. But Nārāyaṇamuni, after examining Deśika's compositions like the commentaries on the *Catuśślokī*, the *Śaraṇāgatigadya*, the *Nyāyasiddhāṇjana*, etc., declares that according to Deśika, Viṣṇu alone is the prime cause of the universe and that He is to be resorted to for *mokṣa*. He, along with His Consort, becomes the goal as well as the saviour of humanity.²⁵⁹

The question whether Śrī could become the prime cause of creation is discussed at length and the conclusion arrived at is that nowhere is Śrī stated to be so. The *Upaniṣadic* text, "*tadaikṣata*",²⁶⁰ which presents the picture of the *Brahman* in His creative aspect, does not refer to Śrī. She is not known to be immanent in all the beings, like the Lord. Her function as a Mediator (*puruṣakāra*) starts only at the stage of *prapatti* by the beings. The qualities that characterise a mediator, viz., affection and absence of cruelty or bias, however, are present in Her, as some of Her epithets like "*niravadyā*" would indicate.²⁶¹ Śrī cannot become the cause of the world because She, like the *jīva*, is subordinate to and dependent upon the Lord. She has many characteristics in common with the individual souls.²⁶² The *Brahman*, who is characterised by supremacy, independence,

258. *Ibid* : "kāraṇam jagato lakṣmīḥ prapattavyā śaraṇavat sāṅgān mokṣapradātṛ ca pātisāmyāgamādibhiḥ trayyanta deśikasyāyaṁ siddhānta itī kecana".

259. Vide *Puruṣa. M* : folio 1a :
"śrīśa eva jagaddhetuḥ prapattavyaśca muktaye rakṣakaśca śrīyā sārddham prāpyaśceti vipaścitaḥ".

260. Cf. *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* VI. 2. 3 : "tadaikṣata bahu syām" etc.

261. *ŚG.*, the opening part : "niravadyām devadevadvīyamahiṣīm", etc.

262. *Puruṣa. M.* folio 2a : "lakṣmyām neśvaralakṣmāsti vidyate jīvalakṣaṇām"; and

"ādheyatvavidheyatvaśeṣatvānūtvasaṁyutam
cetanatvamahantvaṁ vā jīvalakṣmāṣṭadhoditam".

pervasiveness and such other features and who is also the Consort of Lakṣmī, could alone be the source of the creation.²⁶³ Some argue that since the attributes of the *Brahman* like 'satyaṁ', 'jñānaṁ' and 'anantaṁ' mentioned in the *Upaniṣads*²⁶⁴ are traced in Lakṣmī, the term "*Brahman*" should also refer to Her.²⁶⁵ But this is a wrong conclusion, says Nārāyaṇamuni. The *Brahman*, on the authority of many texts, is also known to be unsurpassed in perfection by His form as well as attributes.²⁶⁶ Though Śrī is pervasive and eternal, being the Mistress of the Creation, She is but limited when compared to the Supreme, by Her functions as well as qualities.²⁶⁷ But yet She compares with the Lord because of Her control over the two *vibhūti*s.²⁶⁸

The author refers to Deśika's interpretation of the term '*svadhā*' of the *Rgvedic* hymn '*ānīdavātāṁ*'²⁶⁹ in the course of his commentary on the *Catuśślokī* and states that here too, Śrī is not said, even from the opposite point of view, to form the prime source of creation. In his *Nyāyasiddhāṇjana*, Deśika says that though Lakṣmī shares the attributes of the Eternal Beings like

263. Cf. *Puruṣa. M.* folio 2a :
"kāraṇatvādīlakṣmāṇi brahmatvaśrīpatitvavat
patimātrāśrayāṇīti lakṣaṇābhijñānirṇayaḥ".

Also *ibid* : 2b :
"hetutvādi brahmalakṣma patimātrasya nobhayoḥ".

264. *Taittirīya Upaniṣad* II.1.1. : "satyaṁ jñānaṁ anantaṁ brahma".

265. Vide *Puruṣa. M.* folio 2a :
"satyajñānādivākyoktabrahmalakṣaṇayogataḥ
śrīrapi brahmaśabdārtha itī kecinna sādhu tat"

266. *Ibid* : folio 2b :
"svarūpeṇānavadhikātiśayaṁ sat guṇairapi
tadanantaṁ brahma vedyāṁ tat prāpyaṁ ceti bhāṣaṇāt"

267. *Ibid* : "vibhūti nityā ca sā 'thāpi paricchinnaiva vastutaḥ
vyāpārataśca guṇato nyūnātvaṁ patyapekṣayā"

268. *Ibid* : "vibhūtidvayaśeṣitvāmātreṇaśvaratā samā"

269. Cf. *Rgveda* X. 11. 129 ; *Puruṣa. M.* folio 2b and p. 18 of Deśika's commentary on *CŚ*.

"knowledge" and "bliss", She is yet on par with the Lord, being the Mother of those beings, of whom the Lord is the Father.²⁷⁰

Referring again to Deśika's commentary on the *Catuśślokī*, the author states that the personalities of the Lord and Śrī are distinct and that texts which speak of their unity of form should be understood metaphorically.²⁷¹ Reference is also made to the method of interpreting terms like 'sattā' and 'ahantā', found in some texts, in conformity with the distinction of form subsisting between the Lord and His spouse.²⁷²

Regarding the act of surrender to Śrī, Nārāyaṇamuni, quoting Deśika, states that She, like Her consort, is essential for *mokṣa*. The desire to confer *mokṣa* upon the beings however, may be attributed either to the Supreme Person or to both Him and His Consort.²⁷³ Lakṣmī bestows all rewards on the devotees either directly or through the Lord.²⁷⁴ She is the direct means of the first three human ends, viz., *dharma*, *artha* and *kāma*. But regarding the fourth, viz., *mokṣa*, She effects it through the Lord.²⁷⁵ Nārāyaṇamuni observes that there is no doubt regarding Lakṣmī's being the Mediator (*puruṣakāra*) and the eternal associate of the Lord. An additional point introduced is that one

270. *Puruṣa. M.* folio 3a :

"muktavat paramaṁ sāmyaṁ jñānānandādibhir guṇaiḥ
pitṛtvāyaissāmyamātraṁ muktavyāvṛttamīritaṁ
tatroktaṁ janakatvaṁ hi pitṛtvaṁ śrītaḍīśayoḥ"

271. *Ibid* : folio 3b.

272. *Ibid*.

273. *Ibid* : folio 4b : "sāmyapradānasaṅkalpastvīśasyaivāthavobhayoḥ"

274. *Ibid* : "sākṣāt paramparāto vā lakṣmīssarvaphalapradā"

275. *Ibid*. folio 4b :

"Īśadvārā bandhahāneḥ, dharmādessādhanam svayaṁ"

should also surrender to Śrī.²⁷⁶ The author says that a proper understanding of the *Nyāyasiddhāṅjana* (of Deśika) would reveal that since Viṣṇu is the inner controller of all other deities like Aditi, Bhūmi and even Śrī, He alone could be the cause of the universe. He, along with His Consort, forms the goal of all human endeavour.²⁷⁷ Śrī is associated with Viṣṇu as an attribute is with its substrate. The Lord, who first does not have any active desire to save the *jīvas*, comes to have it only by the association with Śrī.²⁷⁸ The author points out that the Lord, in association with Śrī alone, is characterised by the texts as the means (*upāya*) as well as the goal (*upeya*).²⁷⁹ It is observed that recourse to Śrī as Mediator is quite in conformity with the Vedic and the *smṛti*-declarations, tradition, our wordly experience and also the sayings of the teachers.²⁸⁰ In as much as the Lord is said to control or favour the beings only at the instance of Śrī and that, too, for Her pleasure, it is to be deduced that she is quite distinct from and superior to the ordinary human and such other beings.²⁸¹ Lordship posited with Śrī does not contradict that of Viṣṇu. The relation that subsists between them is the same as that between the Sun and his radiance, one adding to the glory of the other.²⁸² These views are also supported by quotations from the *stutis* on Śrī by Śrīvatsāṅkamaśra, Parāśarabhaṭṭa and Deśika.

276. *Ibid* : "śrīpatyaikaprapannatvaṁ mumukṣoḥ pratyapādi ca", and "viśeṣaṇatayā nyāsaṁviśayaṁvamiḥādihikam"

277. *Ibid* : folio 5a : "śrīśastasmāt sarvahetussevyassarvamu-mukṣubhiḥ | rakṣakaśca śrīyā sārddham prāpyaśceti satāṁ matam"

278. *Ibid*: folio 5b: "viśīnaṣṭi tadāpi śrīḥ guṇavigrahavatprabhum
bharasvī kāarahitaṁ rakṣāsāṅkalpavarjitam
guṇādikamiheṣṭam hi śaraṇasya viśeṣaṇam"

279. *Ibid* : "vibhuḥ patnyā guṇādyaiśca viśiṣṭo viśayotra naḥ
svāmyupāya upeyaśca svarūpādisamarpaṇe"

280. *Ibid* : folios 5b-6a :

"arthasvabhāvānuṣṭhānalokadṛṣṭigurūktibhiḥ
śrutyā smṛtyā ca saṁsiddham ghaṭakārthāvalambanam"

281. *Ibid* : folio 6a :

"yadicchayaiva yatprītyai śāsanam nigradhādi ca
tatra nigrāhyaajātiyavisajātiyatāmātiḥ"

282. *Ibid*. : "eketarasamastānām svaniṣṭhaikārthatāsthitaiḥ
dviṣṭhe tadanyaśeṣitve dvairāyādibhayotthitam
prabhādhikyaprakāreṇa mitho 'tiśayadāyinoḥ".

Nārāyaṇamuni also briefly enumerates the five concepts of Śrī detailed by Deśika at the end of his commentary on the *Catuśśloki*. The last of these views, which holds that Śrī is pervasive and subordinate to the Lord only by the free will of Her own Self or of Her Consort and that this subordination is only voluntary but not obligatory, is what actually Deśika subscribes to, says Nārāyaṇamuni. This conclusion is arrived at by him on the ground that it is the general practice of writers to state their own views at the end. Here, too, Deśika has arranged the concepts of Śrī in an increasing order of importance, stating his own opinion at the end.²⁸³

In fine, Nārāyaṇamuni, in a spirit of synthesis which characterises all noble thinkers, tries to reconcile the differences that became more prominent and particular between the Teṅgali and the Veṅgalai schools of Śrīvaiṣṇavism, represented by Piḷḷai Lokācārya and Vedānta Deśika respectively. Nārāyaṇamuni says that apparent contradictions are bound to occur in authoritative works like the *Śrīvacanabhūṣaṇa* and the *Rahasyatrayasāra*. But they are to be reconciled by taking their ultimate intention into consideration. Similarly, there is apparent contradiction regarding the supreme importance of *prapatti* between Rāmānuja's *Śaraṇāgatigadya* and his commentary on the *Caramaśloka* of the *Bhagavadgītā*. Nārāyaṇamuni suggests that all such contradictions are only apparent and that they do no longer exist when the intention or *tātparya* of those texts is taken into consideration, just as the two *Mīmāṃsā Śāstras*, inspite of their broad disagreement, are said to form a single unitary whole, '*ekasāstra*', from the viewpoint of their ultimate intention.²⁸⁴

* * *

We have seen how the concept of Śakti as eternally associated with Supreme Being, gradually and naturally transformed itself into the Śrīvaiṣṇava *theism* which equates the

283. *Ibid* : 6b : "pūrvapūrvopamardena pakṣāṇāmupavarṇanāt";
"yatra pūrvopamardena nānāpakṣāḥ prakīrtitāḥ
tatra sarvatra caramaḥ saṅgrāhya iti niścayaḥ"

284. *Puruṣa M.* folio 6b.

supreme Godhead with the Dual Divinity of Lakṣmī-Nārāyaṇa.²⁸⁵ Such a transition is the result of the redemptive necessity that naturally follows the divine nature of compassion (*dayā*).²⁸⁶ This Dual Divinity characterises the Fatherhood and Motherhood of the Lord, ensuring the hope of universal salvation.²⁸⁷ Īśvara symbolizes justice and Lakṣmī, the most exalted quality of His, viz., *dayā* or mercy. She also symbolizes the love of God for man and *vice versa*.²⁸⁸ By this concept of Dual Divinity, Viṣṇu is enabled to become the material and the efficient causes of the universe, since Lakṣmī, His Consort, has already been viewed in a similar manner.²⁸⁹ These two forms of the Supreme Godhead are philosophically inseparable, though functionally distinguishable.²⁹⁰ The Lord, who is a stern judge and ruler of the world with His strict and unexceptional law of *karman*, is now dominated by the love of Śrī.²⁹¹ The Lord rules by law and Lakṣmī by love, and the world can hope for salvation in the perfect equilibrium of these two factors.²⁹² Śrī is the *svāminī* and the *puruṣakāra* (mediator) of man. She wins the Lord by Her natural sweetness and beauty as *dayā*, and converts the sinner by love as his mother and thus mediates between them.²⁹³ Etymologically, too, the term, 'Śrī' is said to effect a successful compromise between them by changing the Lord into a saviour or *śaraṇya* by timely intercession and necessary mediation.²⁹⁴

* * *

285. Vide *PV*. p. 165

286. *Ibid*.

287. *Ibid*. p. 386.

288. *LR*. p. 247.

289. *IP*. II. p. 689.

290. Cf. Deśika's commentary on the *CS*. p. 24 : "ākārasāmye'pi kvacit vyāpāro bhidyate". Cf. *PV*. p. 165.

291. *PV*. p. 166.

292. *Ibid*.

293. *Ibid*. p. 387. Cf. *Śrīvacanabhūṣaṇa* (I.13) : "cetanānāi arulāle tiruttum; Īśvarānāi azhagāle tiruttum" quoted in *PV* on page no. 167.

294. *PV*. p. 387.

(b) *The Stotraratna*

The *Stotraratna* popularly called the *Ālavandārstotra*, is a hymn on the Lord in sixty-five stanzas. Although a hymn of religious and devotional importance, this work abounds in many philosophical statements. It may be noted that there are also similar works in the early Jaina, Advaita, and Kāśmīr Śaiva schools of thought, which clothe theological and philosophical ideas in poetic utterances. The *Stotraratna* has the doctrine of surrender (*prapatti*) as its main theme. All the verses of this hymn powerfully bring out the agony of the human soul trying to reach the plane of divine existence, and we can also find the author here at his best as a poet. It has been recorded traditionally that Rāmānuja got attracted to Yāmuna after listening to this hymn, especially the verse “*svābhāvika....*”²⁹⁵

As already noticed,²⁹⁶ the *Stotraratna* forms the sequel of the *Catuśślokī*. In the *Catuśślokī* Lakṣmī has been described as the supreme, and this only adds to the glory of Viṣṇu, Her Consort,²⁹⁷ to the establishment of which the present work is devoted.

There is a Tamil commentary by Periyavāccān Pillai as well as a Sanskrit one by Vedānta Deśika. This hymn, according to Deśika, not only brings out the essential teaching of the *Vedāntas*, viz., that Lord Nārāyaṇa Himself is the means (*upāya*), the end (*sādhya*), and the goal (*prāpya*) of all human endeavour,²⁹⁸ but also impiles the significance of the *Dvayamantra* (the Twin-mantra)²⁹⁹ held in high esteem by the Śrīvaiṣṇavas. He, accordingly makes a topic-wise analysis of the whole hymn.

295. SR. s'l. 11. :

“svābhāvikanāvadāhikāśāyeśitṛtvaṁ
nārāyaṇa! tvayi na mṛṣyati vaidikaḥ kaḥ?
brahmāśivaśśatamakhaḥparamasvarāḍi-
tyete'pi yasya mahimānāvavipruṣaste”

Vide PA ch. IX, p. 22, for the above account.

296. See p. 18 ante.

297. Cf. SR. śl. 12 : “kaśśrīśśriyaḥ”; and śl. 45 : “śrīyaśśriyaṁ”.

298. Vide Deśika's commentary on CS. p. 24: “sādhyaṁ
prāpyamupāyaṁ ca stotre saṁdarsayiṣyati”

299. The *Dvaya-mantra* is : “śrīmannārāyaṇacaraṇau śaraṇaṁ
prapadye, śrīmate nārāyaṇāya namaḥ”.

In verses 1 to 5, the author salutes those imparted to him spiritual knowledge and in the next verse (6) he briefly refers to the Lord who is the means as well as the goal of all humanity and also undertakes to compose the *stotra*. In the succeeding verse (7), he commences the *stotra* and brings out succinctly the supremacy of Viṣṇu. In the next two verses (8,9) he justifies his daring effort and says that this effort alone is fit for him. Verses 10 to 21 expatiate upon the supremacy (*paratva*) as well as easy accessibility (*saṁlabhya*) of the Lord before whom the poet bows down in all humility. The Lord is thus proved to be the *śaraṇa*—the saviour of humanity.

In the next stanza (22), Yāmuna gives expression to his single and whole-hearted Surrender (*śaraṇāgati*) to the Lord which incidentally brings out the meaning of the first part of the *Dvaya*. In verses 23 to 27, he elaborates the above idea and in the next two stanzas (28-29), he states that even simple acts of service to the Lord like offering salutations, are highly efficacious. In stanzas 30 to 46, he clarifies the significance of the two terms of the *Dvaya*-formula in the Dative Case, viz., ‘*śrīmate*’ and ‘*nārāyaṇāya*’, and also hints at the significance of the term ‘*namaḥ*’ occurring in the same *mantra*. In the succeeding verse (47), the author suggests that what he desires is the highest human end, and this he does through utter self-abnegation. In verses 48 to 51, he declares that one who takes to the path of Surrender will get all the obstacles in his way cleared through divine mercy (*dayā*), the most conspicuous of all the qualities of the Lord. In the next two verses, the author makes the declaration of his being an eternal and unconditioned servant of God and desires to have that servitude alone as his end.

In stanzas 54 to 57, Yāmuna prays to God to bestow upon him what is good in this world and remove all that is evil, he being solely intent on serving Him. In the next verse (58), he emphasises what has already been said in verses 47 to 51. The next stanza expresses the firm conviction that the Lord Himself would fulfil the undertaking of a one-pointed devotee. In the following stanza (60), the author refers to the characteristics of the Supreme on one hand and to those of his own self on the

other by contrast and entrusts his entire burden to Him and feels relieved. In verses 61-62, he emphasises that *prapatti* is the only means of attaining the Highest.

In the succeeding verse (63), the author gives expression to his conviction that the Lord would forgive all his faults, taking into consideration the merit acquired by him, even in his previous births, if it be not found in the present. In the next verse again, he pleads for the Lord's mercy. In the final *śloka*, the author says that the most important consideration which may persuade the Lord to protect him is that he is the grandson of Nāthamuni and comes of a proper lineage of teachers devoted to the Lord.

Deśika observes that the teaching regarding the efficacy of Surrender (*śaraṇāgati* or *prapatti*) in achieving salvation conveyed by this hymn has also been exemplified by the very life of its author, Yāmuna.

The following are the theological and doctrinal ideas which Yāmuna brings out in this hymn:

The supremacy and Lordship of Viṣṇu are natural and unexcelled, the purport of all the Vedic texts³⁰⁰ and inscrutable even to the higher orders of divine beings like Brahmā and Śiva.³⁰¹ Viṣṇu becomes the prime cause of creation, maintenance, destruction, etc., of the universe, by His mere will (*saṅkalpa*).³⁰² He is the inner controller (*niyantrī*), the master (*svāmin*) and at the same time, the friend (*suhṛt*) of all beings, full of concern for them (*vatsalatva*).³⁰³ The other gods mentioned in the *Nārāyaṇa Anuvāka*, like Brahmā, Śiva and Indra, and even the Liberated Beings, are mere drops of the ocean-like glory of Viṣṇu.³⁰⁴ The

300. SR. : śl. 6 and 11a.

301. Ibid : śl. 7.

302. Ibid : śl. 10a, b :

"nāvekṣase yadi tato bhuvanānyamūni
nālam prabho bhavitumeva kutaḥ pravṛttiḥ"

303. Ibid : śl. 10c, d :

"evam nisargasuhṛdi tvayi sarvajantoḥ
svāmin! na citramidamāśritavatsalatvam"

304. Ibid : śl. 11c, d :

"brahmā śivaśśatamakhaḥ paramasvarāḍi-
tyete'pi yasya mahimāṇavavipruṣaste"

distinction of Viṣṇu over other deities like Śiva and Brahmā lies in His being the source of even Lakṣmī's glory as Her Beloved Consort, His being the promoter of the quality of *sattva* (serenity) which helps achieve liberation and His being of the same characteristics as possessing the lotus-eyes specially mentioned in the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* (*puṇḍarīkanāyana*).³⁰⁵ He is the Highest Person, a fragment of whose unbounded splendour gets manifested as the wonderful cosmos of sentient and insentient entities.³⁰⁶ *Purāṇic* episodes are also put forth as evidence to support Viṣṇu's supremacy over the rest of the gods by emphasising that He alone protected and blessed them on many an occasion. The entire universe rests in Him and emerges out of Him. He pervades it by an infinitesimal part of His aspect and projects and dissolves it playfully with the least exertion which go to prove His sovereignty beyond all doubt.³⁰⁷

The supremacy of Nārāyaṇa cannot be comprehended by the ignorant, who, evidently in the terminology of the *Bhagavadgītā*, are called 'āśura' or demoniac, with distorted visions.³⁰⁸ This sovereignty of the Lord is clear from a number of factors—His unbounded compassion, beatific form and benevolent activities, borne out by genuine *sāttvic* texts³⁰⁹ and teachings

305. Vide *Chāndogya* : I. 6. 8: "tasya yathā kapyāsaṁ
puṇḍarīkamevamakṣiṇī". Cf. SR. śl. 12b : "kaḥ puṇḍarīkanāyanaḥ".
The point which Yāmuna has in mind is that no other deity is called
"puṇḍarīkanāyana".

306. Cf. SR. śl. 12c, d :

"kasyāyutāyutaśataikakalāmśakāmśe
viśvaṁ vicitracidacitpravibhāgavṛttam"

307. Vide SR : śls. 13 and 14.

308. Ibid : śl. 15d : "naivāsura prakṛtayaḥ prabhavanti bodddhum"

Cf. *Bhagavadgītā* Ch. IX : śls. 11 and 12 :

"avajānanti mām mūḍhā mānuṣīm tanumāśritam
param bhāvamajānanto mama bhūtamāheśvaram
moghāśā moghakarmāṇo moghajñānā vicetasah
rākṣasīmāsurīm caiva prakṛtiṁ mohinīm śṛitāḥ"

Cf. Ch. XVI śls. 18-20

309. SR. śl. 15b : ".....sāttvikatayā prabalaiśca śāstraiḥ"

For a classification of texts as *sāttvika*, *rājasa* and *tāmasa*, see
Matsya Purāṇa Ch. LIII : 67-69.

of the God-minded seers.³¹⁰ It is only the one-pointed devotees that realise this supremacy of the Lord, even if it be hidden by Him through His own *māyā* or variegated Power.³¹¹ His Lordship is also evident from the fact that He pervades and controls each and everything in the cosmos, the material Nature (*pradhāna*), the individual souls (*puruṣa*), the three qualities *sattva* (serenity), *rajas* (activity) and *tamas* (inertia), etc.³¹²

This supremacy is at the same time, characterised by easy accessibility, as the Lord is known to have innumerable auspicious qualities like power, generosity, mercy, straightforwardness, purity, sweetness of speech and acts, and equanimity.³¹³ The creation, maintenance, dissolution and the subsequent release from transmigratory existence effected by the Lord are only for the good of humanity.³¹⁴ The *Vedas* and other authoritative texts incorporate His mandates.³¹⁵ He is beyond the purview of mind and speech,³¹⁶ and love for Him attains its acme when one surrenders at His feet with unswerving conviction and self-abnegation.³¹⁷ The helpless human soul can only be saved by the overwhelming mercy of the Almighty.³¹⁸ The Lord the Saviour

310. *SR.* śl. 15c : “prakhyātadaivaparamārthavidāṃ mataiśca”

311. *Ibid* : śl. 16c : “māyābalena bhavatāpi nigūhyamānaṃ”

312. *Ibid* : śl. 17c, d :

“guṇāḥ pradhānaṃ puruṣaḥ paraṃ padaṃ
parāparaṃ brahma ca te vibhūtayah”

313. *Ibid* : śl. 18 :

“vaśī vadānyo guṇavān rjuśśuciḥ
mṛdur dayālur madhurassthirassamaḥ
kṛtī kṛtajñastvamasi svabhāvataḥ
samastakalyāṇaguṇāmṛtodadhiḥ”

314. *Ibid* : śl. 20.

315. *Ibid* : śl. 20c, d :

bhavanti līlā vidhyaśca vaidikāḥ
tvadīyagāmbhīramano 'nusāriṇaḥ”

316. *Ibid* : śl. 21a : “namo namo vānmanasātibhūmaye”

317. *Ibid* : śl. 22 : “na dharmaniṣṭho 'smi na cātmavedī
na bhaktimān tvaccaraṇāravinde
akiñcano 'nanyagatīśśaraṇya!
tvātpādamūlaṃ śaraṇam prapadye”

Note the words in italics. Also cf. śl. 23.

318. Vide śls. 23-27.

and the individual soul the saved, are mutually complementary, the latter being in need of the Lord's grace and also necessary for bringing into display, or for fulfilling His qualities of grace and affection.³¹⁹

Śrī abides by Him permanently. Her form, nature and activities are all in conformity with those of Her Spouse, by which She pleases Him every moment.³²⁰ She is the source of the prosperity of the entire creation.³²¹ The Highest Abode of the Divine Couple, Vaikuṇṭha, consists of the Eternal Beings (*nitya*), chief of whom are Ananta, Garuḍa and Viṣvaksena, serving the Lord and His consort in different capacities, out of pure love and one-pointed devotion.³²² The glorious qualities of the Lord all the more intensify the burning love of the devotee who pays his obeisance and prays to the Lord, to bless him with the pleasure of permanent and unconditional servitude, which makes him an *ekāntin*—a one-pointed devotee.³²³ The compassionate Lord could overlook the shortcomings of the helpless devotee and save him.³²⁴

One should entrust oneself to the Lord without caring for other things that stand in one's way, like the physical body, qualities, worldly relations and so on.³²⁵ All one has, including

319. *Ibid* : śls. 24, 50 and 51.

320. *Ibid* : śl. 38c, d : “guṇena rūpeṇa vilāsaceṣṭitaiḥ
sadā tavaivocitayā tava śrīyā”

Cf. CS Sl. 4 “*Śāntananta* etc. see p. 43 above.

321. *SR* : śl. 37c : “jagat samastaṃ yadapāṅgasamśrayaṃ”

322. *Ibid* : śls. 39-45.

323. *Ibid* : śls. 46-47 d : “bhavantamevānucaran nirantaraṃ
praśāntaniśśeṣamanorathāntaraḥ
kadāhamaikāntikanityakinkaraḥ
praharsayisyāmi sanāthajīvitam” :
“tava parijanabhāvaṃ kāmaya
kānavṛttaḥ”

The terms in italics may be noted, which bring out the śrivaishṇava conceptions of one pointed devotion, love and servitude to the Lord.

324. *Ibid* : śls. 48-49.

325. *Ibid* : śls. 52, 53 and 57. Śloka 57 might be quoted :
na dehaṃ na prāṇaṃ na ca sukhamāśeṣābhilaṣitaṃ
na cātmānaṃ nānyat kimapi tava śeṣatvavibhavāt
bahirbhūtaṃ nātha ! kṣaṇamapi sahe, yātu śatadhā
vināśaṃ tat, satyaṃ madhumathana ! vijñāpanamidam”

Note the stress on *śeṣatva* to the Lord.

one's own self, is for the service (*kainkarya*) of the Lord³²⁶ and the only thing for which one should pray to God is *bhakti* or loving devotion, which leads to one-pointed realisation of the Supreme, and unflinching servitude to Him.³²⁷ Equally efficacious is the contact with the Lord's devotees, whose favour is to be aspired for.³²⁸ One should also abhor the contact with the non-devotees of the Lord.³²⁹ The noble qualities of God like mercy, friendship and love will save one from sin and misconduct, and put one in the right path.³³⁰ For a real devotee, the Lord alone appears as the father, mother, wife, children, friends and all that one cherishes as near and dear.³³¹ The Lord will Himself take care of one who surrenders to Him.³³² The fact that the Lord's compassion is unreserved, is evidently borne out by His incarnations as Rāma and Kṛṣṇa.³³³ So, even a lesser degree of merit in a devotee, however sinful he might otherwise be, will invoke the Lord's mercy and save him. Even if such a fragment of merit is absent in him, the Lord will at least take into account his descent from a line of His own devotees and will thus save

326. See note 323.

327. *Ibid* : śl. 54 : "avabodhitavāṇimāṁ yathā
māyī nityaṁ bhavadīyatām svayam
kṛpayāivamananyabhogyatām
bhagavan ! bhaktimāpi prayaccha me"

328. *Ibid* : śls. 55a, b and 56 : "tava dāsyasukhaikasāginām
bhavaneṣvastvāpi kīṭajanma me" ;
"sakṛttvadākāravilokanāśayā
tṛṇikṛtānuttamamuktibhuktibhiḥ
mahātmabhirmāmavalokyatām naya
kṣaṇe'pi te yadviraho 'tidussahaḥ"

329. *Ibid* : śl. 55c, d : "itarāvasatheṣu māsma bhū
dāpi me janma caturmukhātmanā"

330. *Ibid* : śls. 58 and 59.

Note 59d : "tvamevaivaṁbhūtaṁ dharanidhara, me śikṣaya manah"

331. *Ibid*: śl. 60: "pitā tvaṁ mātā tvaṁ dayita ! tanayastvaṁ priyasuhṛt
tvameva, tvaṁ sarvaṁ gururasi gatiścāsi jagatām
tvadīyastvadbhṛtyastava pariṇastvadgātiraham
prapannaścaivaṁ satyāhamāpi tavaivāsmi hi bharaḥ"

The words in italics may be noted for their specific declaration of the idea of *prapatti* which is also sometimes called *nyāsa* and *bharanyāsa*. This verse also stresses on loving service not only to God but also to His devotees.

332. Cf. śl. 22 : "na dharmaṇiṣṭho 'smi" etc. with śl. 60 quoted above.

333. *Ibid* : śl. 63.

him. This only emphasises the extremely compassionate character of the Lord.³³⁴

Thus, though couched in the form of a literary and devotional hymn, the *Stotraratna* brings out all the cardinal doctrines and philosophical ideas of Viśiṣṭādvaita, especially regarding *prapatti* or Surrender. It is these expressions and ideas of this pre-Rāmānuja writer that came to be stated clearly and elaborately in the works of later writers like Rāmānuja,³³⁵ Parāśarabhaṭṭa and Deśika. This hymn is thus of great significance, being the nucleus of the concept of the Supreme Being and the Doctrine of Surrender to Him.

The importance of this *Stotra* is amply borne out by the fact that Periyavāccān Piḷḷai and Deśika have written commentaries upon it, bringing out all the philosophical and doctrinal ideas imbedded in it. What Yāmuna says in a poetic way, these commentators explain philosophically and formulate in an analytical way, in the terminology of their traditions. The Śrīvaiṣṇavas always cherish this hymn and accord it an important place among the authoritative doctrinal texts of their school.

Deśika also codifies his interpretations in the form of mnemonic verses of *kārikās*. Some of the important ideas which he expatiates upon and formulates are :

334. *Ibid* : śls. 61 and 65.

335. The Vaikuṇṭha Gadya of Rāmānuja is mainly based on and inspired by this work of Yāmuna and a close comparison of these two works would reveal this fact. The opening verse of the *Gadya* is itself clear evidence for this (see p. 141 of the Kāñcī edn.) :

"yāmunāryasudhāmbhodhimavagāhya yathāmati
ādāya bhaktiyogākhyāṁ ratnaṁ saṁdarśayāmyaham"

This verse reveals that Rāmānuja viewed the *Stotraratna* as a work bringing out the concept of *Bhakti* also.

Though Rāmānuja does not quote any passage from the *Stotraratna* in his *Śrībhāṣya*, Sudarśanasūri, the commentator on the *Śrībhāṣya*, (p. 3 of the Mysore edn. in Telugu letters) quotes a line from it :

".....jagadudbhavasthiti-
prapāśaśārasāravimocanādayaḥ" śl. 20a, b.

The supremacy of Nārāyaṇa is co-existent with easy accessibility. He is the Prime Cause of the universe (*kāraṇa*), the Inner Controller of everything (*niyantr*), the natural well-wisher, (*nisargasuhṛt*) and the Master of all beings (*svāmin*), with great concern for them (*vatsala*).³³⁶

The major discussion is on the supremacy of Viṣṇu over other deities.

According to the Śrīvaiṣṇava theology, Viṣṇu is the Supreme Being, Brahmā, Śiva and other orders of divinity being bound by their own *karman*. Their glories are therefore limited in extent and impermanent in character. The liberated souls (*muktas*) are free from the grip of the *karman* and are thus superior to the rest of the divine beings. Of these *muktas*, it is said that they could create all things and move freely in all the dominions by their mere will (*saṅkalpa*). But this is no indication of their supremacy, since the display of their power is only limited in extent, being dependent upon God's Will (*parecchā*). The *Brahmasūtra*³³⁷ clearly states that the power and glory of the liberated beings is but limited to factors other than cosmic functions like creation, maintenance and destruction.

The sovereignty of Nārāyaṇa is evident from many *śruti* and *smṛti* texts. The term 'Nārāyaṇa' occurring in verse 11 of this *Stotra*³³⁸ indicates that terms like 'sat', 'asat', 'Brahmā' and 'Hiraṇyagarbha', found in different cosmogonic texts, and the term 'mahāpuruṣa' employed in Upaniṣads like the *Subāla*, the *Maitrāyaṇīya* and the *Mahopaniṣad*, only point to Nārāyaṇa, the Supreme Lord. This view is quite in conformity with the *Nārāyaṇa Anuvāka*, which has, as its sole purport, the establishment of the sovereignty of Nārāyaṇa. The term 'Nārāyaṇa' further indicates the four topics discussed in the four sections of the *Brahmasūtra*, viz., that Nārāyaṇa is the ultimate

336. Vide commentary on verse 10, p. 36 :

"kāraṇatvaṁ niyantrtvaṁ suhṛttvaṁ svāmitā hareḥ
vātsalyamiti pañcaite kaṇṭhoktā iha sadguṇāḥ"

337. Vide *Brahma Sūtra* : IV. iv. 17 : "jagadvyāpāravarjaṁ
prakaraṇāt, asannihitavāca".

338. See "nārāyaṇa! tvayi na mṛṣyati vaidikaḥ kaḥ?" [śl. 11b].

cause (*kāraṇatva*), that there are no proofs contradictory to this (*nirbādhatva*), that He is the means (*upāyatva*) and that He is the goal (*prāpyatva*) of all human endeavour.³³⁹

The statement of the *Nārāyaṇa Anuvāka*, "sa Brahmā sa Śivaḥ Sendraḥ"³⁴⁰ with the terms "Brahmā" "Śiva" and "Indra" in co-ordinate predication, points out that Brahmā, Śiva and others are all different aspects of one and the same Deity, Nārāyaṇa. It also suggests that the relation between Him and these deities is the one that subsists between a soul and its body (*śarīra-śarīribhāva*).³⁴¹ This explanation thus sets aside other views which either identify all the three gods of the Trinity—Brahmā, Viṣṇu and Śiva—or make them all equal in status, or even hold that the Supreme Being is someone other than these three. The passage quoted above, it should be noted, mentions Śiva and Brahmā, along with Indra, who is generally known as a lesser deity. Indra's another name, 'śatamakha',³⁴² makes it clear that his status was wrought by his own *karman* and that it is hence not natural with him, as with Viṣṇu. This section on Nārāyaṇa further supplies us the clue that all texts which apparently enjoin meditation on Śiva and other deities as the source of world-creation, should only be construed as enjoining that meditation on Viṣṇu, who happens to be their inner self.³⁴³ It is therefore proper to interpret terms like 'Hiraṇyagarbha',³⁴⁴ 'Rudra'³⁴⁵ and 'Indra'³⁴⁶ that appear in different cosmogonic

339. See commentary on śl. 11 above.

340. Vide *Mahānārāyaṇa Upaniṣad* : 11-13. *Taittirīya Āraṇyaka*: X-11-2, however, reads : "sa brahmā sa śivaḥ, sa hariḥ, sendraḥ"

341. Vide commentary on SR. śl. 11.

342. Vide SR. śl. 11c : "brahmā śivaśśatamakhaḥ", etc.

343. Vide *Taittirīya Āraṇyaka*, X-11-1 and *Mahānārāyaṇa Upaniṣad* : 11-4 : "nārāyaṇaḥ paraṁ brahma" and "ātmā nārāyaṇaḥ paraḥ".

344. *R̥gveda* X-121-1 : "hiraṇyagarbhassamavartatāgre"

345. *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad* III-2 : "eka eva rudraḥ na dvitīyā tasthe"

346. *R̥gveda* VI-47-18 : "indro māyābhiḥ pururūpa īyate"

passages, in their etymological sense (*yoga*), to mean Viṣṇu, as opposed to their conventional sense (*rūḍhi*), by which they would denote particular gods bearing those designations.³⁴⁷

It may be objected that the term "*hiranyagarbha*" of the passage, "*hiranyagarbhassamavartatāgre*",³⁴⁸ should only be taken in its conventional sense, by which it refers to the four-faced Brahmā.³⁴⁹ The reason behind such a contention is that the term "Prajāpati",³⁵⁰ which is a significant designation of the creator-god, also occurs in the same passage. His other designations like "*dhātṛ*"³⁵¹ and "*vidhātṛ*"³⁵² also favour this opinion.³⁵³ But this contention is contradicted by the passage "*eko ha vai nārāyaṇa āsīt na brahmā neśānaḥ*"³⁵⁴ which negates the pre-cosmic existence of Brahmā along with that of Śiva (called "Īśāna"). Moreover, a proper interpretation of texts like "*yamantassamudre*",³⁵⁵ "*yadekamavyaktaṁ*"³⁵⁶ "*sarve nimeṣā jajñire vidyutaḥ puruṣādadhī*",³⁵⁷ "*sa āpaḥ pradughe ubhe ime*"³⁵⁸ and "*ya enaṁ viduramṛtāste bhavanti*",³⁵⁹ will bring out the chief characteristics of Nārāyaṇa, like His ocean abode,³⁶⁰

347. See commentary on SR : śl. 11, p. 39.

348. See note 344.

349. Vide commentary on SR : śl. 11, p. 39.

350. Vide *Vājasaneyi Samhitā* : 31-19 : "prajāpatiṣcarati garbhe antaḥ"

351. *R̥gveda* : X-190-3 : "sūryācandramasau dhātā yathāpūrvama-kalpayat"

352. *Taittirīya Āraṇyaka* : X-1-4 : "sa no bandhur janitā sa vidhātā"

353. See commentary on SR, p. 40.

354. *Mahopaniṣad* : I. These form the opening lines.

355. *Taittirīya Āraṇyaka* : X-1-1.

356. *Ibid.*

357. *Ibid.* : X-1-2.

358. *Ibid.*

359. *Ibid.* : X-1-3.

360. Viṣṇu is said to have the milky ocean as His abode, in the *Purāṇas*.

His ultra-mundane existence, His hue of lightning, His being the source of this wonderful cosmic creation and His being the means of release for the entire humanity, says Deśika. It may be noted that these characteristics are found only with Nārāyaṇa but not with other deities, and are enough to establish the supremacy of the former. Brahmā, conventionally denoted by the term 'prajāpati', is on the authority of many texts, known to be subordinate to and controlled by Nārāyaṇa. He is also known to be influenced by his own acts (*karman*), good or bad. It is, therefore, proper to take terms like 'prajāpati' and 'dhātṛ' etymologically, so that they denote 'Nārāyaṇa' ultimately.

Another factor that proves Nārāyaṇa's transcendent character is that He is the Consort of Lakṣmī, the goddess of beauty and plenty. The text "*hrīṣca te lakṣmīṣca patnyau*"³⁶¹ supports this view in unmistakable terms. In the light of this, the term 'prajāpati'³⁶² of the cosmogonic texts loses its conventional significance and refers only to Nārāyaṇa, through etymology. The *Mahābhārata* too employs the term 'prajāpati' to denote Viṣṇu.³⁶³ It is this supremacy of Nārāyaṇa that is clearly paraphrased in the passage, "*patim viśvasya ātmeśvaram*".³⁶⁴

Some may contend that the *Puruṣasūkta* itself could not be taken as glorifying Nārāyaṇa³⁶⁵ on the ground that the term '*puruṣa*' may denote even an ordinary human being, who is other than Nārāyaṇa. But Deśika says that the term '*puruṣa*' should be here understood in the special sense of Supreme Being—*parama puruṣa*, who is the source of the world-creation. The fact that the *Puruṣasūkta* is devoted to deify Nārāyaṇa is evident from the *Pāñcarātra* scriptures, the *Mahābhārata* and a number of *smṛti*-texts. The *Subāla* and the *Taittirīya Upaniṣads* adopt the

361. *Taittirīya Āraṇyaka* : III-13-2.

362. *Vājasaneyi Samhitā* : 31-19 : "prajāpatiṣcarati garbhe antaḥ"

363. See commentary on SR : śl. 12, p. 40.

364. *Taittirīya Āraṇyaka* : X-11-1.

365. Commentary on SR. pp. 40-41.

terminology of the *Puruṣasūkta* and imply thereby that Nārāyaṇa alone is glorified by this *Sūkta*. Even the *Śvetāśvatara* which employs the term 'puruṣa' with reference to Rudra, also called 'Śāmbhu', 'Śiva' and 'Maheśvara', adopts the terminology of the *Puruṣasūkta* as "vedāhametaṁ puruṣaṁ mahāntaṁ"³⁶⁶ and should therefore be taken as ultimately glorifying Nārāyaṇa who dwells in everybody as the Inner Self.

Some people identify the *puruṣa* described in the *Puruṣasūkta* as possessing the colour of the Sun (*ādityavarṇa*), with the *puruṣa* in the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*, possessing the colour of the lightning³⁶⁷ (*vidyudvarṇa*). This *puruṣa* is also said to reside in the Sun (*ādityamaṇḍala*) and he, according to these critics, could only be Āditya, the Sun-god. They thus conclude that the purport of the *Puruṣasūkta* is the glorification of the Sun, but not of Nārāyaṇa.³⁶⁸ Another point that lends support to this view, according to the advocates of this view, is that there is a separate *Purāṇa* bearing the name of Āditya, the Sun-god, viz., *Āditya Purāṇa*.

But all these arguments, says Deśika, deserve to be dismissed on account of the fact that the *Puruṣa* of the *Chāndogya* is one that possesses lotus-eyes, *Puṇḍarikākṣa*,³⁶⁹ a feature that is found only with Nārāyaṇa, and not with any other deity. The abode of Viṣṇu, on the authority of many texts, is known to be located in the Sun.³⁷⁰ As regards the Sun-god, he is not known to be supreme. On the other hand, he is said to have been born out of the Lord's eye³⁷¹ and as being brought into

366. *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad* : III-8. Vide *Taittirīya Āraṇyaka* : III-12-7.

367. Commentary on *SR* : p. 42.

368. *Ibid* : "ataḥ puruṣasūktamādityaparam"

369. Vide *SR*. śl. 12b : "kaḥ puṇḍarīkanayanāḥ"

Cf. *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* : I. 6. 8 : "tasya yathā kapyāsaṁ puṇḍarikamevamakṣiṇī". See commentary on *SR*. p. 42.

370. Cf. *Sāvitṛīkalpa* : "dhyeyassadā savitṛmaṇḍalamadhyavartī" etc.

371. *R̥gveda* : X-90-13 : "cakṣossūryo ajāyata".

Cf. also *ibid* : VIII-44-16 : "agnir mūrdhā cakṣuṣī candrasūryau"

existence by the Supreme in every *kalpa*, along with Candra, the moon-god.³⁷² The supremacy of Āditya is also negated by the *Kāthopaniṣad*—"na tatra sūryo bhāti".³⁷³ As regards the *Āditya Purāṇa* it does not belong to the *sāttvika* group of *Purāṇas* and is therefore to be rejected where it postulates something contradictory.³⁷⁴ It is thus clear that the deity glorified by the *Puruṣasūkta* is Nārāyaṇa alone.

Another point in favour of Viṣṇu's supremacy is that He alone initiates *sattva*, the quality of serenity in the beings, which is helpful in achieving *mukti*. Brahmā, the creator-god and Śiva, the destroyer-god, on the other hand, are said to promote the qualities of *rajas* (activity) and *tamas* (inertia) respectively, which result in ignorance and bondage.³⁷⁵ The Supremacy of Viṣṇu can also be understood by His luxurious dress, ornaments and paraphernalia, says Deśika. He is well-known as bedecked in a royal fashion—His saffron-coloured raiment,³⁷⁶ gold ornaments, crown, conch, disc, mace, sword, etc., which factors clearly bring out His sovereignty over Śiva and Brahmā, who do not have such features to their credit. His close association with Lakṣmī, the goddess of plenty, also lends support to this point.³⁷⁷

This all-evident supremacy of Viṣṇu is not comprehended by those who are incapable of interpreting the Vedic texts properly. They get confused in explaining the terms, 'puruṣa' and 'Īśvara', with or without the prefixes, 'mahat' and 'parama', and misinterpret that Nārāyaṇa is inferior to Śiva in status.³⁷⁸ Of special significance is the term, 'puruṣottama', applied to Nārāyaṇa which shows Him as the supreme (*uttama*) of all the beings (*puruṣa*).

372. *R̥gveda*: X-190-3 : "sūryācandramasau dhātā yathāpūrvamakalpayat".

373. V-15.

374. For a classification of the Purāṇic texts as *sāttvika*, *rājasa*, *tāmasa* etc., see the *Matsya Purāṇa* : Ch. LIII, śls. 67-69.

375. Vide commentary on *SR* : pp. 41-42.

376. Cf. *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* : IV-3-6 : "tasya mähārajataṁ vāsaḥ"

377. See commentary on *SR* : p. 73.

378. See commentary on *SR*. p. 43 : "brahmaṇaḥ pituḥ brahmaṇaḥ putrasya ca nikarṣotkarṣau manyante".

The *Bhagavadgītā* defines *Puruṣottama* as one that surpassed the perishable (*kṣara*) and the imperishable (*akṣara*), the Highest Self (*paramātmā*) and the eternal Lord, pervading and sustaining the universe. The *Gītā* further states that Viṣṇu is celebrated in the *śruti* and the *smṛti*-texts as the Supreme Person (*puruṣottama*).³⁷⁹ This definition thus sets aside the view maintained by some, that the term "*puruṣottama*" refers to Viṣṇu merely conventionally. This term may be taken as a *tatpuruṣa*-compound either of the fifth, or the sixth, or even the seventh case.³⁸⁰

Even the principles of *Mīmāṃsā* exegesis are in favour of this interpretation offered by the *Gītā* for the term "*puruṣottama*". *Samākhyā* or derivation, according to the *Mīmāṃsā*, is the last of the six methods of determining the relative strength of Vedic texts.³⁸¹ The preceding five are: *śruti*—direct enunciation, *liṅga*—indication, *vākya*—subsidiary statement, *prakaraṇa*—context and *sthāna*—order or sequence. Each succeeding item of these six is considered weaker than the preceding one, because it conveys its sense in a more remote way, that is, through the medium of the preceding ones. *Samākhyā* thus occupies only the last place in determining the relative strength of passages. Viṣṇu's Supremacy is established, says Deśika, not merely on the strength of *samākhyā*, viz., "*puruṣottama*", but on that of more powerful means like the *śruti* and the *liṅga*, as evidenced from the statement of the *Gītā*.³⁸²

Viṣṇu is well-known as the Supreme Being (*mahāpuruṣa*), and He is thus different from all the individual selves. If mere

379. Vide *Bhagavadgītā* XV. śls. 16-18. Deśika's *Tātparyacandrikā* under śl. 18 discusses the grammar of 'puruṣottama' and concludes that the term is *yoga-rūḍha*. Cf. also commentary on *SR*, p. 43.

380. Vide commentary on *SR* : śl. 13, p. 43.

Cf. *Bhagavadgītā* XV. śl. 18 :

"yasmāt kṣaramātīto 'haṁ akṣarādapi cottamaḥ
ato 'smi loke vede ca prathitaḥ puruṣottamaḥ"

381. *PM*. III. iii. 16 :

"śrutiliṅgavākyaaprakaraṇasthānasmākhyānām samavāye
pāraḍaurbalyamarthaviprakarṣāt".

382. Vide *Bhagavadgītā*: XV. śls. 16-18

samākhyā (designation) were the criterion, then even terms like "*Īśvara*" and "*Indra*" would have established the supremacy of particular deities denoted by those terms conventionally.³⁸³ But in the light of this interpretation of the term "*puruṣottama*", supported by *śruti* and *liṅga*, the supremacy of Viṣṇu over Śiva, Indra and others becomes firmly established. The other designations of Viṣṇu like Keśava, Vāsudeva and Nārāyaṇa, too, afford such an interpretation.³⁸⁴

It is Viṣṇu that supports the entire universe consisting of all beings, including Śiva and Brahmā, by an infinitesimal part of His unlimited glory.³⁸⁵ The *Puruṣasūkta* and the *Gītā* are in full support of this.³⁸⁶ All that exists in this world, the material Nature (*pradhāna*), its three qualities of *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*, the individual souls (*puruṣa*), the highest abode (*paraṁ padam*), etc., are all various aspects of that vast glory.³⁸⁷ This view thus repudiates the *Sāṅkhya* conception that the three ingredients, *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*, in equilibrium are called *prakṛti*. According to the Viśiṣṭādvaitin, these are distinct from matter and are qualities thereof. This is indicated by verse 17 of this *Stotra*, where the qualities *sattva*, etc., are mentioned separately from the *prakṛti*.

Equally wrong is the conception that *prakṛti* could transform itself into an abode called *akṣara* and that it is the place of enjoyment for the Lord, the liberated and the eternally

383. Vide commentary on *SR*. śl. 12, p. 43.

384. *Ibid*.

385. *SR*. śl. 12c : "kasyāyutāyutaśataikakalāmśakāmśe" etc.

386. Vide *Taittirīya Āraṇyaka*: III. 12. 1: "puruṣa evedaṁ sarvaṁ"
Bhagavadgītā X. śl. 41b: "tattadeva.....mama tejo'mśasambhavam"

Ibid : śl. 42 : "athavā bahunaitena kiṁ jñātena tavārjuna
viṣṭabhyāhamidaṁ kṛtsnamekāmśena sthito jagat"

Ibid : XI. 7a : "ihaikasthaṁ jagat kṛtsnaṁ paśyādya sacarācaram"

Ibid : śl. 15 : "paśyāmi devāṁstava deva dehe", etc.

387. Vide *SR*. śl. 17c, d : "guṇaḥ pradhānaṁ puruṣaḥ paraṁ padam
parāt paraṁ brahma ca te vibhūtaḥ"

liberated selves. This is suggested by the mention made of the Highest Abode (*param padam*) as distinct from *prakṛti* in the verse referred to above. Another point clarified by Deśika is that this *aprākṛta* Highest Abode is not the result of a transformation of either the Lord's form or of His sixfold perfections (*ṣaḍguṇya*) such as Knowledge and Power, as contended by some.³⁸⁸ This abode, on the authority of many *śruti* and *smṛti*-texts, is known to be different from the form as well as the qualities of the Lord. If the form or the attributes of the Supreme be admitted to manifest themselves as the Highest Abode, then there will be the contradiction of *śrutis* which declare the Lord to be immutable.³⁸⁹

The next point explained by Deśika is that the qualities of the Lord are separate from the form of the Lord, but not identical therewith, as claimed by some.³⁹⁰

The next point is that creation is mutually complementary between the Lord and the beings.³⁹¹ The opponent's argument is that since the Lord is full of bliss, He would not create for His own pleasure (*svārtha*). Creation could not also be explained as for the benefit of the beings (*parārtha*), because of the fact that these beings are not happy. Deśika says that the cosmic activities of the Lord are for the benefit of the Creator, that is, His own Self, and also of the created beings. The virtues of the Lord are enjoyed by His devotees and are thus purposeful. The fact that creation is for the benefit of the beings (*parārtha*) is supported by *śrutis* such as "*sarvaṁ ha paśyaḥ paśyati sarvamāpnoti sarvaśaḥ*".³⁹² The entire universe of sentient and insentient entities is conceived as the body of the Lord, and from this point of view, creation of the universe could also be explained to be in the interests of the Lord Himself (*svārtha*).³⁹³

388. Vide commentary on *SR*. p. 55.

389. *Ibid*.

390. Vide commentary on *SR*. p. 58.

391. *Ibid* : p. 59.

392. *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* VII-26-2; also *Muṇḍaka* VII-11.

393. Vide commentary on *SR* : p. 59.

Another point discussed is whether the liberated souls, who are said to achieve extreme similarity (*paramasāmya*) with Viṣṇu, could themselves carry on the creative and other activities of the universe or not. The conclusion arrived at is that these souls cannot carry on these cosmic functions.³⁹⁴ The identity spoken of in texts should be explained as based on the "body-and-soul" relation (*śarīrātmabhāva*) subsisting between these beings and the Lord.³⁹⁵ This identity can also be taken in a secondary sense as when two friends like Rāma and Sugrīva are said to be one.³⁹⁶ The liberated selves or the eternal ones are nowhere said to be the souls of all beings, as the Lord is said to be. If they are held to be so, then they should also be said to possess the power of creative desire (*saṅkalpaśakti*) like the *Brahman* to become many, which power, however, they do not possess.³⁹⁷

The next discussion is on *prapatti* or *śaraṇāgati*. *Prapatti* or the path of surrender is open for one who is unable to follow the paths of action, knowledge and devotion (*karmayoga*, *jñānayoga* and *bhaktiyoga*) and who has no other way of salvation.³⁹⁸ A correct understanding of the scriptural texts leads

394. *Ibid* : pp. 59-60.

395. *Ibid*. p. 59. Deśika quotes from the *Paramasāṁhitā*, passages that posit identity between the Lord and the liberated beings :

"kena rūpeṇa bhidyante muktāstava śarīriṇaḥ
etadācākṣva me deva guhyād guhyataram param
ahameva bhavantyete na bhedastatra kaścana
yathāhaṁ viharāmyevam tathā muktāśca dehinaḥ" [I : 68-69]

396. Vide commentary on *SR* : p. 59.

Cf. *Rāmāyaṇa* : V. 35, 52a : "rāmasugrīvayoraikyam devyevam samajāyata"

397. This "*saṅkalpa*" of the *Brahman* is referred to in the *Chāndogya* : "tadaikṣata bahu syām prajāyeya" [VI. ii. 3]
Vide commentary on *SR* : p. 60.

398. Cf. *SR*. śl. 22 :

"na dharmanisṭho 'smi na cātmavedī
na bhaktimān tvaccaraṇāravinde
akiñcano 'nanyagatiśśaraṇya!
tvatpādamūlam śaraṇam prapadye"

one to the path of selfless action (*karmayoga*). This in turn, makes one conquer one's mind and meditate on the pure self, which results in self-realisation (*jñānayoga*). This self-realisation can be attained even through *karmayoga* directly. One who has reached this stage is entitled to *bhaktiyoga* or the path of devotion, which culminates in salvation. Even in the case of a man who does not practise *karmayoga* in the present birth, the *karmayoga* of his previous births may qualify him to undertake *jñānayoga*. Even if both these *yogas* or 'disciplines' be absent, the *bhaktiyoga* of the preceding births will be enough to effect salvation.³⁹⁹ It is to the exclusion of all these three paths that *Surrender* (*prapatti* or *śaraṇāgati* or *nyāsa*) is to be practised. This discipline of *prapatti* is supported by the *śruti*-text, "mumukṣurvai śaraṇamāhaṁ prapadye".⁴⁰⁰ The term "śaraṇa" which can be interpreted as a "house", a "saviour" or the "means", should here be taken in the last sense, viz., that of the means (*upāya*).⁴⁰¹

Deśika records the definitions offered by older texts to *prapatti* and reconciles their apparent differences. The generally accepted definitions of *prapatti* are :

(a) *Prapatti* is a state of mind praying to the Lord that He alone should become the means of saving the devotee, associated with the realisation that he is utterly helpless, sinful and without any other hope of salvation.⁴⁰²

399. See commentary on *SR*, p. 61. This explains why after negating *dharmaṇiṣṭhā*, *ātma-jñāna* and *bhakti* are also denied.

400. *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad* : VI. 18.

401. Cf. *AS*. ch. 37. : śl. 29b-30a :

"upāye grharakṣitrośśabdaśśaraṇamityayaṁ
vartate sāmpratam tveṣa upāyārthaikavācakaḥ"

Vide commentary on *SR*. : p. 62.

402. Vide Deśika's commentary on *SR*, p. 62, where he quotes the following from *AS*. ch. 37 : śl. 30b-31 :

"ahamasmyaparādhānāmālayo 'kiñcano 'gatiḥ
tvamevopāyabhūto me bhaveti prārthanāmatih
śaraṇāgatirityuktā sā deve 'smin prayujyātām"

(b) *Prapatti* is a state of prayerfulness of mind, associated with the firm conviction that the Lord alone is the Saviour and that there is no other way of attaining Him, except by such surrender.⁴⁰³

The path of surrender is glorified by texts to be highly efficacious and powerful in dispelling all sins, and in bringing about all that one desires, including *mokṣa*.

Regarding the accessories (*aṅgas*) of *prapatti*, some say that they are six, while others maintain that they are only five in number.⁴⁰⁴ These accessories are : (i) a positive mental attitude of resolve to keep oneself always in consonance with the Lord's Will (*ānukūlyasya saṅkalpaḥ*), (ii) a negative attitude of avoiding everything that is against His will (*prātikūlyasya varjanam*), (iii) a supreme faith that the Lord will protect the devotee (*rakṣiṣyatīti viśvāsaḥ*), (iv) seeking Him as a Saviour (*gopīrtvavaraṇam*), (v) utter resignation or laying the entire burden of one's self at His feet (*ātmanikṣepa*) and (vi) a sense of complete meekness and helplessness (*kārpaṇya*).⁴⁰⁵ The *Ahīrbudhnya Saṁhitā* speaks of another accessory of *prapatti*, which is characterised by complete absence of desire in fruit.⁴⁰⁶

403. See Deśika's commentary on *SR*. p. 62, where he attributes the following to one Bharatamuni :

"ananyasādhye svābhīṣṭe mahāviśvāsapūrvakam
tadekopāyatā yācñā prapattiśśaraṇāgatiḥ"

404. *Ibid*.

405. Vide *Ah*. S. ch. 37, śl. 28-29a :

"ānukūlyasya saṅkalpaḥprātikūlyasya varjanam
rakṣiṣyatīti viśvāsaḥ gopīrtvavaraṇam tathā
ātmanikṣepakārpaṇye ṣaḍvidhā śaraṇāgatiḥ"

406. *Ibid* : ch. 52, śls. 14-15a :

"śāśvatī mama saṁsiddhiriyam prahvibhavāmi yat
puruṣam paramuddiśya na me siddhirito 'nyathā
ityaṅgamuditaḥ śreṣṭham phalepsā tadvirodhinī"

See commentary on *SR*. p. 62

Eternal subordination to the Supreme is the only fruit aspired for. This accessory, according to Deśika, is strictly confined to that *prapatti* which is calculated to achieve only the highest good, viz., the Supreme Lord, but no other fruit. Deśika says that verse 22 of the *Stotraratna*⁴⁰⁷ is a clear statement of the Doctrine and the essentials of *śaraṇāgati*, and identifies all the above-mentioned six accessories in it.⁴⁰⁸

Whatever the definitions of *prapatti* be, the main requisite is that one should completely entrust one's cares and responsibilities to the Lord (*bharanyāsa*) in a sense of prayer (*prārthanā*).⁴⁰⁹ There are some texts which say that *prapatti* is an accessory of *bhakti*, but such statements are applicable to the particular stage reached by an aspirant or a qualified devotee.⁴¹⁰

Some may argue that those who know the Reality (*tattva*) need not do *prapatti* of the type of complete resignation (*bharanyāsa*) at all.⁴¹¹ But this view is controverted by texts which ordain *prapatti*. There is still another view that *prapatti* is nothing more than one's awareness of one's relation of the Lord (*sambandha*).⁴¹² This view is opposed not only to texts on *prapatti* but also to our ordinary experience. Thus, for instance, a servant

407. Cf. "na dharmaniṣṭho 'smi", etc.

408. Vide commentary on SR. p. 62. The Teṅgalai school does not admit *aṅgas* or accessories to *prapatti*. To them *prapatti* is not *upāya*, but an *adhikāri*viśeṣaṇa.

409. *Ibid.* p. 63 : "prārthanānvito hi bharanyāsaḥ prapattih". Such an attitude, according to the Southern School, is in consonance with the relation between the self and the Lord, while even *bhakti-yoga*, with its stress on individual effort and the Lord's response thereto, is not so.

410. *Ibid.*

411. Commentary on SR. śl. 53, p. 82. Periyavāccān Piḷḷai in his commentary on this verse points out that even the offering of the self to the Lord is improper in that it implies that the self has not belonged to the Lord and is being offered to him.

412. *Ibid.* : "sambandhajñānamātrameva prapattiriti vādaśca ata eva nirasto lokaviruddhaśca".

might be aware of his connection with his master, but he need not necessarily have surrendered to him. Similarly, an enemy who is forced to surrender, might not at all think that he is a servant of the man to whom he had surrendered.⁴¹³

This *Stotraratna* of Yāmuna and the commentary on it by Deśika are thus, of substantial value in understanding the Viśiṣṭādvaita conception of the Supreme Being as associated with His Consort Lakṣmī and the nature and evolution of the Doctrine of Surrender to Him.

These ideas, according to the followers of this school, were already present in the *Bhagavadgītā*, one of the texts of the *Prasthānatraya*. Naturally, Yāmuna interpreted the *Gītā* from the view-point of a Viśiṣṭādvaitin—in a small compendium of thirty-two stanzas in the *anuṣṭubh* metre called the *Gītārthasaṅgraha*. To a study of this, we shall now devote the next section.

* * *

(c) The *Gītārthasaṅgraha*

The *Gītārthasaṅgraha*, as the very name implies, is an epitome of the teaching of the *Bhagavadgītā*, which is the essence of all the *Upaniṣads*.⁴¹⁴ The *Gītā* is treated here from the standpoint of a Viśiṣṭādvaitin. Tradition records the Yāmuna was taught the *Bhagavadgītā* by his predecessor, Śrīrāmamiśra, in his attempts to attract the former to the path of renunciation.⁴¹⁵ It is therefore proper to suppose that the brief references made by Yāmuna here to the important topics dealt with in the *Gītā*, incorporate in a synthetic and systematic manner, the traditional

413. *Ibid.* : "aprapanne'pi sambandhabuddhir dāsepi dṛśyate amitre gatyabhāvena prapannepi na dāsyadhīh"

414. Note the colophonic readings of all the eighteen chapters of the *Bhagavadgītā* : "iti śrīmadbhagavadgītāsu upaniṣatsu...." etc. Also cf. Deśika's introductory remarks in his commentary on GS., p. 1 : "tadetadubhayaṁ sarvopaniṣatsārasaṅkalanātmikāyāṁ bhagavadgītāyāṁ", etc.

415. Cf. PA. ch. 112, p. 437.

interpretation of the *Gītā*, which he had received from his teacher.⁴¹⁶

This work influenced the later writers of this school, of whom Rāmānuja is the foremost. Rāmānuja's commentary on the *Bhagavadgītā* was inspired and guided by this work of Yāmuna, which is quoted as an authority. The validity and importance of this text can also be gauged from the fact that it had been commented upon by Vedāntadeśika, bringing out the latest points of philosophical and doctrinal value, in a detailed and analytical way. This commentary is called the *Gītārthasaṅgraharakṣā*.

Out of the thirty-two *anuṣṭubh* verses comprising the text of the *Gītārthasaṅgraha*,⁴¹⁷ the first one brings out the main theme or the subject dealt with in the *Gītā*, as a whole. The second, third and fourth stanzas presuppose a division of all the eighteen chapters of the *Gītā* into three sections of six chapters each, a *ṣaṭka*, and mention the major theme dealt with in each *ṣaṭka*. The succeeding eighteen verses enumerate the topics dealt with in each of the eighteen chapters. The concluding ten verses are supplementary in nature, explaining the connotation, significance and other details of the three *yogas* (i.e., the *karma*, the *jñāna* and the *bhakti*), the obligatory (*nitya*) and the occasional (*naimittika*) acts, *parabhakti*, a supreme state of devotion, the characterisation of and instructions to a man of knowledge (*jñānin*) who is an exclusive devotee of the Lord regarding his code of conduct, etc.

416. Deśika expressly states that Yāmuna's *GS*. incorporates the instruction he received from Śrīrāmamiśra, when commenting upon the colophonic words of the last verse, p. 16 : "itthameva sattvaniṣṭhasaṃpradāyaparaṃparāgatassamicino Gītārthaḥ, sa ca iṣa svayogamahimaculukitaparamapurūṣavibhūtiyugaḥ bhagavannāthamuni-niyogānuvartīśrīmadrāmamiśrasakāśād bhuṣāstravidbhiraśmābhir bahuṣaśśrutasya bhagavadgītārthaprapaṇcasya saṅgraha iti".

417. An English translation of this work with an Introduction and study by Sri D.T. Tatacharya appeared in the *Journal of Sri Venkatesvara Oriental Institute*, Vols. XII. Nos. 1 & 2, XIII, Nos. 1 & 2, and XIV, No. 1.

The central theme of the *Gītā*, which the author consistently refers to as a *sāstra*,⁴¹⁸ that is, an Upaniṣad, a text of instructional value, is a delineation and glorification of Nārāyaṇa, the Supreme Being. This *sāstra* explains that the Supreme Being can be realised only through loving devotion to Him (*bhakti*). Such loving devotion can be acquired and cultivated by the following factors : a sincere performance of duties pertaining to one's station in life (*svadharma*) gives correct knowledge (*jñāna*) regarding one's self that it is ever subordinate to the Lord; this produces a sense of detachment (*vairāgya*) from all things other than the Supreme Being.⁴¹⁹ This results in *Bhakti*. Thus, according to Yāmuna, *bhakti* becomes the *sādhya*, and all others, *sādhana*s.

The first six chapters (*ṣaṭka*) of the *Gītā* are devoted to an exposition and commendation of the two paths of discipline, that of action (*karman*) and of knowledge (*jñāna*). These two courses of discipline aim at mental concentration, and their main purpose is knowledge of the self or self-realisation (*ātmanubhūti*).⁴²⁰

The next six chapters deal elaborately with the *bhaktiyoga* or the path of devotion, which, as has already been stated,⁴²¹ results from selfless action and self-knowledge (*karman* and *jñāna*). *Bhaktiyoga* helps to foster an unbroken stream of realisation of the real nature of the *Bhagavān*, the Adorable, who is the repository of six perfections (*bhaga*), like Knowledge (*jñāna*), Power (*śakti*), Strength (*bala*) and Lordship (*aīśvarya*).⁴²²

418. Cf. *GS*. śl. 1b : ".....gītāśāstre samīritaḥ"; śl. 5b : ".....śāstrāvatarāṇaṃ kṛtaṃ"; śl. 22b : ".....śāstrasārārtha ucyaṭe"; and śl. 32b : ".....tatpradhānamidaṃ śāstraṃ". Cf. also *Brahmasūtra* I. i. 3 : "śāstrayonitvāt". See Deśika's commentary on *GS*. p. 3.

419. *GS*. śl. 1 :

"svadharmañjñānavairāgyasādhyaḥ bhaktyekagocaraḥ
nārāyaṇaḥ paraṃ brahma gītāśāstre samīritaḥ"

420. *Ibid* : śl. 2 :

"jñānakarmātmike niṣṭhe yogalakṣye susaṃskṛte
ātmanubhūtisiddhyarthe pūrvaṣaṭkena codite"

421. *Ibid* : śl. 1a .

422. Vide *GS*. śl. 3 :

"madhyame bhagavattattvayāthātmyāvāptisiddhaye
jñānakarmābhinirvartyo bhaktiyogaḥ prakīrtitaḥ"

The third *śaṭka*, being of general character, enters into further details regarding the subjects already dealt with in the preceding two *śaṭkas*, like the distinguishing features of the inert material Nature in the unmanifest condition (*pradhāna*), the sentient individual soul (*puruṣa*), the entire world of matter in its manifest condition (*vyakta*), the Supreme Lord (*Sarveśvara*), the triple path of action (*Karma*) knowledge (*dhī*) and devotion (*bhakti*).⁴²³

So far, the author has enumerated the topics dealt with in the entire text of the *Bhagavadgītā*, dividing it broadly into three sections of six chapters each. The next verse (5) and the following seventeen verses enumerate the topics treated in each of the eighteen chapters of the *Gītā* in a more detailed manner.

The fifth stanza⁴²⁴ says that the *Gītā*, as a *sāstra*, had been imparted to Arjuna who had a mistaken notion of right and wrong (*dharmādharmadhī*), due to misplaced affection and misplaced compassion. The point to be noted here is that the *Gītā* was imparted to Arjuna, only when he had surrendered to the Lord in all sincerity.⁴²⁵

Arjuna had a wrong notion of things so far as the real nature of the self is concerned and also, on the lower plane, of the righteous and unrighteous nature of war. The second chapter of the *Gītā* aims at dispelling this misconception. To achieve this objective, it deals with two *yogas*—one of the eternal self, and the other of action done with detachment from all fruits—the ‘Sāṅkhya’ and the ‘Yoga’. This chapter also explains how these two *yogas* result in a steady knowledge (*sthitaprajñā*). This is what the sixth verse of the *Saṅgraha* mentions.⁴²⁶

423. *Ibid* : śl. 4 :

“pradhānapuruṣavyaktasarveśvaravivecanam
karma dhīr bhaktirityādih pūrvaśeṣo ’ntimoditah”

424. *Ibid*. śl. 5 :

“asthānasnebhakāruṇyadharmādharmadhiyākulaṁ
pārthaṁ prapannamuddiśya śāstrāvatarāṇaṁ kṛtam”

425. Vide the *Bhagavadgītā* : II, 7d :

“śiṣyaste ’haṁ sādhi mām ’tvām prapannam”

426. Cf. *GS*. śl. 6:

“nityātmāsāṅgakarmehāgocarā sāṅkhyayogadhiḥ
dvitiye sthitadhīlakṣyā proktā tanmohaśāntaye”

It may be noted that verses 12 to 38 of the second chapter of the *Gītā* deal with ‘Sāṅkhya’, or the eternal nature of the self, verses 39 to 53 with ‘Yoga’ or detached action, and verses 54 to 72, with the way of achieving the “steady knowledge”.

The third chapter of the *Gītā* emphasises the importance and inevitability of doing things in a spirit of non-attachment (*asakti*) to the accruing fruits, keeping in view the good of the common people (*lokasaṅgraha*). Acts can be performed by transferring the agency either to the three *guṇas* of *Prakṛti*, viz., *sattva*, *rajas* and *taṁas*, or to the Supreme Lord Himself. This is what the next verse of the *Saṅgraha* states.⁴²⁷

Accordingly, the first nineteen verses of the third chapter of the *Gītā* stress the need of doing action without attachment.⁴²⁸ That this detached action is to be done by the wise for the good of the world is stated in verse 20 and explained in verses 21 to 26. Ascription of agency to the qualities is mentioned in verses 27 to 29, and that to the Lord in verses 30 to 43.⁴²⁹

In the succeeding stanza⁴³⁰ Yāmuna mentions that the fourth chapter of the *Gītā* speaks of the real nature of the Lord in His incarnations (verses 5 to 15).⁴³¹ This chapter also explains

427. *Ibid*. śl. 7 :

“asaktyā lokarakṣāyai guṇeṣvāropya kartṛtām
sarveśvare vā nyasyoktā tṛtiye karmakāryatā”

428. Cf. *Bhagavadgītā* : III. 19 :

“tasmādasaktassatataṁ kāryaṁ karma samācara
asakto hyācāraṁ karma paramāpnoti pūruṣaḥ”

429. *Ibid* : śl. 30 :

“mayi sarvāṇi karmāṇi samnyasyādhyātmacetasā
nirāśīr nirmamo bhūtvā yuddhyasva vigatajvaraḥ”

Also cf. *ibid* : śls. 31 and 32.

430. Vide *GS*. śl. 8 :

“prasaṅgāt svasvabhāvoktiḥ karmaṇo ’karmatā ’sya ca
bhedā jñānasya mātmyaṁ caturthādhyāya ucyaṭe”

431. Cf. *Bhagavadgītā* : IV. 5-6 :

“bahūni me vyatītāni janmāni tava cārjuna
tānyahaṁ veda sarvāṇi na tvam vettha parantapa
ajo ’pi sannavyayātmā bhūtānāmīśvaro ’pi san
prakṛtiṁ svāmadhiṣṭhāya sambhavāmyātmamāyayā”
Also cf. *ibid* : śls. 7 and 8.

the way how 'action' could become 'knowledge' (*akarma*) (16 to 24) and speaks of its varieties (25 to 32). It also emphasises the superiority of knowledge (*jñāna*) to all varieties of action (33 to 42).⁴³²

The fifth chapter reveals that the path of detached action (*karmayoga*) is easier to perform and that it also yields results in a shorter span of time than that of knowledge (*jñānayoga*).⁴³³ The ways and means of achieving this *karmayoga* (8 to 19), as also the methods of attaining self-realisation (20 to 29), are explained in this chapter. This is the teaching of the ninth verse of the *Gītārthasaṅgraha*.⁴³⁴ It may also be noted that this marks the end of the first *ṣaṭka*.

The tenth verse of the *Saṅgraha*⁴³⁵ points out that the sixth chapter of the *Gītā* is devoted to the method of practising *yoga* (1 to 28).⁴³⁶ This chapter further classifies *yogins* into four types (9 to 32) and explains the way of achieving this *yoga* (35-36).⁴³⁷

432. Cf. *ibid* : śl. 33 :

"śreyān dravyamayād yajñāt jñānayajñaḥ parantapa
sarvaṁ karmākhilam pārtha jñāne parisamāpyate"

433. See *ibid* : V. 1 to 7, especially śls. 3 and 6 :

"jñeyassa.....sukhaṁ bandhāt pramucyate", and
"saṁnyāsastu.....na cireṇādhigacchati"

434. Vide GS. śl. 9 :

"karmayogasya saukaryaṁ śaighryaṁ kāścana tadvidhāḥ
brahmajñānaprakāśa pañcamādhyāya ucyaṭe"

435. *Ibid* : śl. 10 :

"yogābhyāsavidhir yogī caturdhā, yogasādhanaṁ
yogasiddhisvayogasya pāramyaṁ ṣaṣṭha ucyaṭe"

436. Cf. *Bhagavadgītā* : VI. 10 :

"yogī yuñjita satataṁ ātmānaṁ rahasi sthitaḥ
ekākī yatacittātmā nirāśīraparigrahaḥ"

437. *Ibid* : śl. 29 :

"sarvabhūtaśtamaṁ sarvabhūtāni cātmani
ikṣate yogayuktātmā sarvatra samadarśanaḥ"

Also cf. *ibid* : śl. 35b : "abhyāseṇa tu kaunteya vairāgyeṇa ca
grhyate"

The actual results that follow this *yoga*-performance are also referred to (37-46)⁴³⁸. The supreme character of the *yoga* pertaining to the Lord, in the form of devoted worship, is also brought out in this chapter (47).⁴³⁹

In the succeeding stanza,⁴⁴⁰ Yāmuna says that the seventh chapter of the *Gītā* is devoted to an exposition of the reality about the Lord's own nature (1 to 12),⁴⁴¹ that it is hidden from the ordinary human beings by material Nature (called *prakṛti* or *māyā*) consisting of the three *guṇas*—*sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas* (13 to 14a)⁴⁴² and that this *māyā* can be dispelled by the sole means of surrendering to Him (*śaraṇāgati*) (14b).⁴⁴³ This chapter also makes a four-fold classification of the devotion to the Lord (16)⁴⁴⁴ and emphasises the superiority of a man of wisdom (*jñānin*) (17 to 30).⁴⁴⁵

438. Cf. *ibid* : śl. 40, ff.

439. Cf. *ibid* : śl. 47 :

"yogināmapi sarveṣāṁ madgatenāntarātmanā
śraddhāvān bhajate yo mām sa me yuktatamo mataḥ"

440. Vide GS. śl. 11 :

"svayāthātmyaṁ prakṛtyā sya tirodhiśśaraṇāgatiḥ
bhaktibhedaḥ prabuddhasya śraīṣṭhyaṁ saptama ucyaṭe"

441. Cf. *Bhagavadgītā* : VII. 4, 5.

442. *Ibid* : śl. 13 :

"tribhir guṇamayairbhāvairbhissarvamidaṁ jagat
mohitaṁ nābhijānāti māmebhyaḥ paramavyayam"

śl. 14a : "daivī hyeṣā guṇamayī mama māyā duratyayā", and

śl. 25 : "nāhaṁ prakāśassarvasya yogamāyāsamāvṛtaḥ
mūḍho 'yaṁ nābhijānāti loko māmajamavyayaṁ"

443. *Ibid*. śl. 14b : "māmeva ye prapadyante māyāmetāṁ taranti
te"

Cf. 19a : "bahūnāṁ janmanāmante jñānavān mām prapadyate"

444. *ibid* : śl. 16 :

"caturvidhā bhajante mām janāssukṛtino 'rjuna
ārto jijñāsurarthārthī jñānī ca bharatarṣabha"

445. *Ibid* : śl. 17 : "teṣāṁ jñānī nityayukta ekbhaktir viśiṣyate"

Also Cf. 18a ".....jñānītvātmaiva me matam"

The eighth chapter of the *Gītā* deals with the distinction between things to be known (3, ff.)⁴⁴⁶ and the methods to be followed (6, ff.)⁴⁴⁷ by the devotees of the Lord, who had been classified in the preceding chapter as four-fold⁴⁴⁸—*ārta*, *jijñāsu*, *arthārthin* and *jñānin*, whose object is material gain, or self-realisation or the Lord Himself.⁴⁴⁹ This is the essence of the twelfth verse of the *Gītārthasāṅgraha*.⁴⁵⁰

The ninth chapter of the *Gītā* extols the glory of the Lord (4, ff.)⁴⁵¹ and refers to His transcendent and immutable character even while He takes up a human form, i.e., an incarnation (11, ff.)⁴⁵² This chapter also mentions the greatness of noble men—*mahātmans* (13, ff.)⁴⁵³ and deals with *bhaktiyoga* (22, ff.)⁴⁵⁴ This is what the thirteenth verse of the *Sāṅgraha*⁴⁵⁵ points out.

446. *Ibid* : VIII, 3 : “akṣaram brahma paramam....” etc.

447. *Ibid* : śl. 6 :

“yam yam vāpi smaran bhāvaṁ tyajatyante kalebaram
taṁ tamevāiti kaunteya sadā tadbhāvabhāvitah”

448. Vide f.n. 444. Strictly speaking, this is a three-fold classification, *ārta* and *arthārthin*, being one in essence. Cf. Rāmānuja's *bhāṣya* on the *Gītā* : VIII: 16, p. 218 (Kāñci edn). “ārtaḥ bhraṣṭaiśvaryah, punastatprāptikāmah ; arthārthi aprāptaiśvaryatayā aiśvaryaśāmah, tayor mukhabhedamātram ; aiśvarya viśayatayaikyādeka evādhikārah”.

449. Cf. Rāmānuja's *bhāṣya* on the *Gītā* : VII. 16 : “jijñāsuḥ prakṛtivyuktātmasvarūpā vāpticchuḥ; jñānamevāśya svarūpamiti jijñāsurityuktaḥ ; jñāni ca...bhagavaccheṣataikarasātmasvarūpavit prakṛtivyutakevalātmanyaparyavasyan bhagavantaṁ prepsuḥ bhagavantameva paramaprāpyaṁ manvānah”.

450. *Vide* : “aiśvaryaśārayāthātmyabhagavaccaraṇārthināṁ vedyopādeyabhāvanāmaṣṭame bheḍa ucyate”

451. Cf. *Bhagavadgītā* : IX. 4 : “mayā tatamidam sarvaṁ...” etc.

452. *Ibid* : śl. 11 : “avajānanti mām mūḍhā mānuṣīm tanumāśritam”, etc.

453. *Ibid* : IX. 13 :

“mahātmānastu mām pārtha daivīm prakṛtimāśritāḥ
bajantyananyamanaso jñātvā bhūtādīmavyayam”

454. *Ibid* : śl. 22 : “ananyāścintayanto mām”, etc.

śl. 26 : “patraṁ puṣpaṁ...bhaktyā prayacchati” etc.

śl. 29 : “samo'haṁ.....bhaktyā mayi te, teṣu cāpyahaṁ”

455. *Vide* : “svamāhātmyaṁ mānuṣyatve paratvaṁ ca mahātmānāṁ viśeṣo navame yogo bhaktirūpaḥ prakīrtitaḥ”

The next verse⁴⁵⁶ mentions that the tenth chapter of the *Gītā* deals elaborately with the innumerable virtues of the Lord (1 to 41) and His absolute control over the entire universe (42).⁴⁵⁷ This aims at producing and fostering devotion in man.

Chapter eleven of the *Gītā* points out that the Lord graced Arjuna with divine vision to enable him see His Cosmic Form (*viśvarūpa*) (8).⁴⁵⁸ This chapter brings out the great importance of *bhakti* by saying that even knowing (*vidi*) and attaining the Supreme (*prāpti*) could take place only through *bhakti* (54).⁴⁵⁹ This, in short, is the substance of the fifteenth stanza of the *Sāṅgraha*.⁴⁶⁰

The sixteenth verse of the *Gītārthasāṅgraha*⁴⁶¹ addresses itself to chapter twelve of the *Gītā*, which dwells upon the superior character of the path of Devotion (*bhakti*) and the means

456. Vide śl. 14 : “svakalyāṇaguṇānanyakṛtsnasvādhīnatāmātiḥ bhaktyutpattivivṛddhyarthā vistīrṇā daśamoditā”

457. Cf. *Bhagavadgītā* : X. 42 :

“athavā bahunaitena kiṁ jñātena tavārjuna
viṣṭabhyāhaṁ idam kṛtsnamekāṁśena sthito jagat”

458. *Ibid* : XI, 5 :

“paśya me pārtha rūpāṇi śataśo 'tha sahasraśaḥ
nānāvīdhāni divyāni nānāvarṇākṛtīni ca”

Ibid : śl. 8 :

“na tu mām śakṣyase draṣṭumanenaiva svacakṣuṣā
divyaṁ dadāmi te cakṣuḥ paśya me yogamāiśvaraṁ”

459. *Ibid* : XI. 54 :

“bhaktyā tvananyayā śakya ahamevaṁ vidho 'rjuna
jñātum draṣṭum ca tattvena praveṣṭum ca parantapa”

460. *Vide* : “ekādaśe svayāthātmyasākṣātkārāvalokanaṁ
dattam, uktaṁ vidiprāptyor bhaktyekopāyatā tathā”

Commenting upon the term “avalokanaṁ” of this verse, Deśika says (p.9): “avalokyate aneneti avalokanamiha divyaṁ cakṣuḥ”

461. *Vide* : “bhakteśśraiṣṭhyam, upāyoktiḥ aśaktasyātmaniṣṭhataṁ
tatprakāśtvatiprītīr bhakte dvādaśa ucyate”

of achieving it (9 and 10).⁴⁶² It also reveals that one incapable of practising *bhaktiyoga* could take up the path of Action (*karma*) and Knowledge (*jñānayoga*) and sets forth the accessories of *jñāna* (13, ff).⁴⁶³ This chapter also reveals that the Lord is extremely affectionate to one devoted to Himself⁴⁶⁴ (20).

Chapter 13, according to Yāmuna, reveals the real nature of the body, the means of realising the self (7, ff)⁴⁶⁵ which is shown to be distinct from the physical body (12, ff)⁴⁶⁶ and also the cause of bondage of the self in the body (21).⁴⁶⁷ This chapter further enumerates the distinguishing characteristics of the self (24).⁴⁶⁸ This, in a nutshell, is the teaching of the seventeenth *śloka* of the *Gītārthasaṅgraha*.⁴⁶⁹

462. Cf. *Bhagavadgītā* : XII, 9 and 10 :

“atha cittam samādhātum na śaknoṣi mayi sthiram
abhyāsayogena tato māmichhāptum dhanāñjaya
abhyāse 'pyasamartho'si matkarmaparamo bhava
madarthamāpi karmāṇi kurvan siddhimavāpsyasi”

463. *Ibid* : śl. 13 :

“adveṣṭā sarvabhūtānām maitraḥ karuṇa eva ca
nirmamo nirahaṅkāraśamaduḥkhasukhaḥ kṣamī”

464. *Ibid* : śl. 20 :

“ye tu dharmyāmṛtamidaṁ yathoktaṁ paryupāsate
śraddadhānā matparamā bhaktāste 'tīva me priyāḥ”

465. *Ibid*. XIII. 7 :

“amānitvamadaṁbhitvamahiṁsā kṣāntirārjavam
ācāryopāśanam śaucaṁ sthairyamātmavinigrahaḥ”

466. *Ibid* : śl. 12 :

“jñeyam yattat pravakṣyāmi yajñātvaṁṛtamaśnute
anādimat param brahma na sattannāsaducyate”

467. *Ibid* : śl. 21 :

“puruṣaḥ prakṛtistho hi bhuṅkte prakṛtijān guṇān
kāraṇam guṇasaṅgo 'sya sadasadyonijanmasu”

468. *Ibid* : śl. 24 :

“dhyānenātmani paśyanti kecidātmānamātmāna
anye sāṅkhyena yogena karmayogena cāpare”

469. Vide : “dehasvarūpamātmāptihetur ātmaviśodhanam
bandhahetur vivekaśca trayodaśa udīryate”

Chapter 14 explains how the qualities of the material Nature bind the soul, how they become the agents of action and also the way of getting clear of these qualities (26).⁴⁷⁰ The fact that the Lord alone forms the source of the three goals—*akṣara*, *aśvarya* and *bhagavatprāpti*, is also pointed out in this chapter. This is what Yāmuna refers to in the eighteenth verse of the text.⁴⁷¹

The fifteenth chapter of the *Gītā* speaks of the *Puruṣottama* or the Supreme Lord, as distinguished from what Yāmuna describes as *acinmiśra-cetana* and *viśuddha-cetana*, meaning thereby the *kṣara* and the *akṣara* of the *Gītā* (the embodied self as well as the released self), on the ground of His being the pervader, supporter and master of them.⁴⁷²

Chapter sixteen mentions that the injunctions of a *śāstra* should be observed by all, after classifying the thoughts and actions of men into the *daiva* (divine) and the *āśura* (demoniac) types. This has been done in order to strengthen man's understanding regarding the Highest Reality and the means he has to adopt to attain It. This is the summary of the twentieth stanza of the *Saṅgraha*.⁴⁷³

470. Cf. *Bhagavadgītā* : XIV. 26 :

“mām ca yo 'vyabhicāreṇa bhaktiyogena sevate
sa guṇān samatītyaitān brahmabhūyāya kalpate”

471. Vide *GS*. śl. 18 :

“guṇabandhavidhā teṣāṁ kartṛtvaṁ tennivartanam
gatitrayasvamūlatvaṁ caturdaśa udīryate”

472. *Ibid*. śl. 19 :

“acinmiśrād viśuddhācca cetanāt puruṣottamaḥ
Vyāpanād bharaṇāt svāmyād anyāḥ pañcadaśoditāḥ”

Cf. *Bhagavadgītā* : XV. 17 :

“uttamaḥ puruṣastvanyāḥ paramātmameyudāhṛtaḥ
yo lokatrayamāviśya bibhartavyaya īśvaraḥ”

473. Vide : “devāsuravibhāgoktipūrvikā śāstravaśyatā
tattvānuṣṭhānavijñānasthemne ṣoḍaśa ucyate”

Chapter 17 clarifies that all acts done against the sanctions of the *śāstra* become *āśura* or demoniac in character.⁴⁷⁴ Acts enjoined by the scriptures are of different types, according to the three qualities (*sāttvika*, *rājasa* and *tāmasa*). The chief characteristic or the symbol or the insignia of that which is *śāstraic* is said to be marked by the three syllables, 'om', 'tat' and 'sat'.⁴⁷⁵ This, in short, is the essence of the twenty-first verse of the *Saṅgraha*.⁴⁷⁶

The last chapter of the *Gītā* is said in the 22nd verse of the *Saṅgraha*⁴⁷⁷ to deal with the manner of ascribing the agency of acts to the Lord (14),⁴⁷⁸ the desirability of establishing one's own self in the quality of *sattva*, the evolution of one's own action and the most important teaching (*bhakti* and *prapatti*).⁴⁷⁹

The further verses (23 to 32) of the *Saṅgraha* are supplementary in nature, explaining the significance and connotation of the three *yogas*, the *paramabhakti*, the fruits they bring in, and the like.

By *Karmayoga* is meant performance of acts like penance, resorting to holy places, giving away things, sacrifices, etc.⁴⁸⁰ By *Jñānayoga* is meant meditation on the pure self with the mind under full control.⁴⁸¹ *Bhaktiyoga* is to be interpreted as concentration, etc. on the Lord and also on venerable persons with one-pointed love.⁴⁸²

474. Cf. *Gītā* : XVII, 5, ff : "asāstravīhitam ghoram..." etc.

475. *Ibid* : XVII, 23, ff.

476. Vide : "asāstramāsuram kṛtsnam śāstrīyam guṇataḥ prthak lakṣaṇam śāstrasiddhasya tridhā saptadaśoditam"

477. Vide : "Īśvare kartṛtābuddhissattvopādeyatāntime svakarmapariṇāmaśca śāstrasārārtha ucyate"

478. Cf. *Gītā* : XVIII, 14 :

"adhiṣṭhānam tathā kartā karaṇam ca prthagvidham vividhāśca prthak ceṣṭā daivam caivātra pañcamam"

479. śl. 64 of the *Gītā* : "sarvaguhyatamam bhūyaḥ..." etc., introduces this point, and śls. 65 : "manmanā bhava madbhaktaḥ...", and 66 : "sarvadharmān parityajya", explain it.

480. Vide GS. śl. 23a : "karmayogastapastīrthadānayaājñādi-sevanam"

481. *Ibid* : śl. 23b : "jñānayogo jitasvāntaiḥ parīsuddhātmani sthitiḥ"

482. *Ibid* : śl. 24a : "bhaktiyogaḥ paraikāntaprītyā dhyānādiṣu sthitiḥ"

It is also pointed out by Yāmuna that these three *yogas* can intermix to some degree. The obligatory and the occasional rites are associated with them to a little extent, and the performance of these rites should also be understood as a form of worshipping the Supreme.⁴⁸³ All these three *yogas* result in self-realisation through concentration.⁴⁸⁴ The understanding that one's own self is naturally subservient to the Supreme, arises in one free from the spell of ignorance, and this understanding takes one up to a superior state of Devotion, called technically *Parabhakti*, through which the Highest is attained.⁴⁸⁵ *Bhaktiyoga*, it is said, can bring in immense material prosperity, should the man practising it desire so. But if the realisation of the self alone happens to be his aim, *Bhaktiyoga*, along with the *Karma* and *Jñāna* *yogas*, will realise it. But, in either case, it is essential for the man to be a devotee of the Lord. If, however, the man is solely intent on attaining the Supreme Being forever, he would certainly attain his aim.⁴⁸⁶

The remaining four stanzas of the text (śls. 29-32) dwell upon and glorify the characteristics of a man of wisdom (*jñānin*) and also lay down instructions regarding his code of conduct.

The *jñānin* is characterised as one who is exclusively devoted to the Lord, and who has his very life sustained thereby. His devotion to the Lord will be so intense that for him *sukha* and *duḥkha* are his contact with and separation from the Lord respectively. He attains his original state as an individual self by engaging himself in various activities connected with the Lord, as for example, contemplating on Him, praising His glory, repeating His holy names, and saluting Him. He performs all

483. *Ibid* : śls. 24b-25a :

"trayāṇāmapi yogānām tribhiranyonyasaṅgamaḥ nityanaimittikānām ca parārādhana-rūpiṇam"

484. *Ibid* : śl. 25b : "ātma-dṛṣṭeḥ trayo'pyete yogadvāreṇa sādha-kāḥ"

485. *Ibid* : śl. 26 :

"nirastanikhilājñāno dṛṣṭvātmanam parānugam pratilabhya parām bhaktim tayaivāpnoti tatpadam"

486. *Ibid* : śls. 27 and 28.

acts, from the enjoined ones upto *bhakti*, out of mere disinterested love for the Supreme. He should also give up the notion that these various activities are the means (*upāya* or *sādhana*) to *mokṣa*. Rather, he should consider the Lord Himself as the means thereof.

The Lord can be attained by one who takes pleasure in serving Him exclusively and for all time. In conclusion, Yāmuna points out that the text of the *Bhagavadgītā* is mainly concerned with a man of the above description.⁴⁸⁷

(d) *The Āgamaprāmāṇya*

The next work under study, the *Āgamaprāmāṇya*, is devoted to establish the revealed character (*apauruṣeyatva*) of the *Pāñcarātra-āgama* literature. The fact that Yāmuna had to write this indicates that the *Pāñcarātra* was subjected to serious criticisms regarding its authenticity. The celebrated *Mīmāṃsaka*, *Kumārīlabhaṭṭa* condemned *Pāñcarātra* as non-Vedic⁴⁸⁸ and the commentary of Śaṅkarācārya on the *Pāñcarātrādhikaraṇa*⁴⁸⁹ pointed out the opposition between certain of its philosophical tenets and those of the *Vedānta*. So the situation demanded a thorough scholastic approach, and it is in reply to all such critics that Yāmuna wrote the *Āgamaprāmāṇya*.

In this work, Yāmuna answers the queries raised by the *Bhāṭṭas*, the *Prābhākaras* and *Advaitins* regarding the validity of *Pāñcarātra*. The *Naiyāyika*'s position with regard to *Āgama* is also introduced here; for all practical purposes, it is identical with that of the *Siddhāntin*. The *Siddhāntin*, although he claims

487. Vide GS. śls. 29-32 :

“jñānī tu paramaikāntī tadāyattātma-jīvanah
tatsaṁśleṣaviyogaikasukhaduḥkhas tadekadhiḥ
bhagavaddhyānayogoktivanandanastutikīrtanaiḥ
labdhātmā tadgataprāṇamanobuddhindriyakriyāḥ
nījakarmādi bhaktyantaṁ kuryāt prītyaiva kārītaḥ
upāyatām parityajya nyaset deve tu tāmabhiḥ
ekāntātyantadāsyai karatis tatpadmāpnuyāt
tatpradhānamidaṁ śāstramīti gītārthasaṅgrahaḥ”

488. See *Tantra Vārtika* pp. 114, 115.

489. See *Brahmasūtra* : II. ii. 42-45.

total validity for the *Āgamas* on the ground of their being the composition of an Omniscient and Supreme Creator-God, differs from the *Naiyāyika* in maintaining that the *Vedas* are impersonal in character (*apauruṣeya*), that is to say, that they were not composed by any person, human or divine. It may be noted that he, unlike the *Naiyāyika*, holds that the means of proving the existence of God is not Inference (*anumāna*) but *śruti* itself. These are the two main differences between the *Siddhāntin* and the *Naiyāyika*, so far as the validity of the *Āgamas* is concerned.

The following is a brief account of the arguments advanced by the critics of the *Pāñcarātra* school and their refutation by Yāmuna. Followers of this school claim authority for their *Āgamas in toto* on the ground that they are the direct utterances of Lord Vāsudeva. So, naturally, the *Mīmāṃsaka* (*Bhāṭṭa*), who upholds the sole authority of the *Veda* and who denies the existence of a Supreme Person, becomes the adversary whom Yāmuna has to tackle first.

The Bhāṭṭa-Mīmāṃsaka's Criticism

The *Mīmāṃsaka*, first of all, examines the source of these *Pāñcarātra-āgamas*.

The *Pāñcarātra*, like the *Āgama* of any other school speaks of a certain thing as the *summum bonum* of life and prescribes a number of rites like *dīkṣā* (Initiation) and *ārādhana* (worship) of the Lord as the means thereof. This cause-and-effect relationship between the rites and the resulting heaven, etc., cannot, according to the *Mīmāṃsaka*, be verified by any means of knowledge.

Ocular perception (*pratyakṣa*), however powerful it might be, has to obey its own natural laws, and so it cannot reveal the desired causal connection that subsists between these rites and heaven, etc. Here, the *Mīmāṃsaka* attacks the theory of the supremacy of a certain Person, advanced by the *Naiyāyikas* in support of the above argument. According to the *Mīmāṃsaka*, there does not exist any person possessing unlimited power,

knowledge, etc., who presides over this entire universe. Even if such a wide perception is accepted, he argues that it cannot be proved that that perception alone realised the desired causal connection between Initiation and heaven, etc. The Mīmāṃsaka thus rules out the possibility of *yogic pratyakṣa* being a means of understanding the above relation.

Inference (*anumāna*), likewise, is stated to be incapable of establishing the desired relationship between the means and the end, because the knowledge of invariable concomitance, which is the source of *anumāna*, is absent here. Nobody can know the invariable relationship that exists between Initiation and heaven, where heaven happens to lie beyond the scope of human perception.

The Mīmāṃsaka then observes that there is no Vedic statement (*āgama*) which preserves injunctions stating that Initiation is instrumental to heaven. *Āgamas* are of two types: those connected with human beings as their works and those for which there is no author at all. Of these, the first type of *āgamas* is not authoritative, since it is, after all, the composition of human beings who are subject to passions like love and hatred and are therefore, prone to err. As for the second type, there is no revealed text that is in favour of the desired causal connection. Thus the Mīmāṃsaka states that there is no text which can reveal the *sādhyasādhana* relation between the rites these *Āgamas* ordain, and the fruits that are said to accompany the performance of those rites.

Comparison (*upamāna*), the next means of knowledge, too, cannot reveal this relationship. Comparison takes place between two objects well-known. Since the original Vedic text is itself not known here, comparing another statement with it is highly impossible.

The next *pramāṇa* examined by the Mīmāṃsaka is circumstantial Presumption (*arthāpatti*). This is also found to be not helpful in establishing the desired relationship. 'Incompatibility' which forms the source of this *pramāṇa*, is absent in the present case. Again the *Āgamas* cannot stand comparison with *Manusmṛti* and such other works, in whose case *arthāpatti*-

pramāṇa is applied. Moreover, the aphorism "*api vā kartṛsāmānyāt...*"⁴⁹⁰ of Jaimini, which the Pāñcarātrins try to press into service to uphold the validity of their *Āgamas*, sanctions authority only to *smṛti*-works like those of Manu and others, but not to works like the *Pāñcarātrāgamas*. *Smṛtis* obtain validity only when the rites enjoined by them are performed by those who also perform the other Vedic rites, as for instance, the *sandhyāvandana* (saluting the Twilight). But the rites ordained by the *Pāñcarātra* works are not at all performed by those who carry out the Vedic rites. At the same time, those who follow these Tāntric practices are severely condemned by the Vedic people, and hence it is beyond all doubt that these *Āgamas* are non-Vedic.

The Mīmāṃsaka then states that the followers of these *Āgamas* who are called *Bhāgavatas*⁴⁹¹ are not Brahmins at all. They, no doubt, maintain knots of hair and other Brahmanical marks, but this is no indication of their true caste.⁴⁹² Such marks are found even on the bodies of the *sūdras*, who try to delude the people about their true nature.

The *Bhāgavatas* are also called *Sāttvatas*. This different terminology, however, cannot be explained as due to some social distinction of these people, on the analogy of the two terms, '*brāhmaṇa*' and '*parivrājaka*'. These *Sāttvatas*, along with *sudhanvā*, *ācārya* and others, are said to belong to a particular community called the *vaiśya-vrātya* community.⁴⁹³

490. PM. I. iii. 2 : "api vā kartṛsāmānyāt pramāṇamanumānaṁ syāt"

491. IP. I. p. 497 :

"The followers of the Pāñcarātra were apparently not allowed originally to adopt the Vedic forms of worship..."

492. PPM. p. 101 :

"Kumārila and Prabhākara alike, do not admit of such 'jātis' as 'brāhmaṇatva', 'kṣatriyatva' and the like, all of which cannot be perceived by the senses. What is meant by calling a man 'Brāhmaṇa' is not that he belongs to any such 'jāti', but only that he is descended from a particular line of ancestors. The purity of descent has to be accepted until there is sufficient proof to the contrary".

493. MS. X. 23 : "vaiśyāttu jāyate vrātyāt sudhanvā "cārya eva ca bhāruṣaśca nijaṅghaśca maitrassāttvata eva ca"

It is to this outcaste-community that the term *Sāttvata* conventionally refers. Etymology may, however, allow the term *Sāttvata*, to mean the devotee of the Lord, as opposed to the conventional sense. But the Mīmāṃsaka, citing the *rathakāranyāya*,⁴⁹⁴ states that when both the etymological and conventional significances are applicable in one and the same place, it is only the conventional sense that has to be preferred to the etymological. Thus, he states that here too, the term *Sāttvata* should be taken only in its conventional sense, referring to the particular *vaiśya-vrātya* community mentioned to above.

The Mīmāṃsaka then identifies these *Bhāgavatas* with *Sāttvatas* on the similarity of their activities, as for example, worshipping in temples for livelihood, administering Initiation, living by the food offered to the Lord (*naivedya*), performing sacraments like *garbhādhāna*—not in the familiar Vedic way, but in an entirely different and peculiar way—using the *nirmālaya* of the Lord, etc. Again, these *Bhāgavatas* are identified with *Devalakas*, on the evidence of many *smṛtis*, since they are found to trade in image-worship, which is spoken of as the means of livelihood for the *Devalakas*. So it is concluded that the Pañcarātra which is professed by these *Bhāgavatas* who are clearly outside the pale of the *Vedas*, cannot lay claims to any authority.

The Mīmāṃsaka then examines the internal evidence of these *Āgamas*. He takes up the statement found in one of these *Āgamas*: “*Śaṇḍilya* took to a study of these *Āgamas* being unable to achieve the highest good in all the four *Vedas*”. This, he says, discloses the nature of these texts, since it under-estimates the instrumentality of even the *Vedas* with regard to salvation.

Even on the side of instruction, the *Dīkṣā* (Initiation) that these *Āgamas* enjoin on a man to qualify him to worship the Lord, it is argued, is a clear mark of the non-Vedic character of these texts. *Upanayana*, the Vedic sacrament, is sufficient for this. But still, these *Āgamas* require *dīkṣā* over and above the general *upanayana*, and this is enough to indicate their non-Vedic nature.

494. PM. VI. i. 44-50.

Again, these *Āgama*-texts do not find a place in the well-recognised traditional list of the fourteen branches of knowledge (*vidyāsthāna*), consisting of the four *Vedas*, their six accessories, the *Mīmāṃsā*, the *Nyāya*, the *Purāṇa* and the *Dharmaśāstra*,⁴⁹⁵ accepted as authorities on matters of *Dharma*.

The Mīmāṃsaka, however, admits that the *Āgamas* enjoin worship of the Lord, which one may mistake for indicating their Vedic nature. These and similar other instances, he warns, should not be taken as indicating the true nature of these texts. They are merely hypocritical. This is so because, these texts, at a number of places, also pour down instructions regarding mundane practices like charming persons and exorcising evil spirits. Also “there is too much black magic and superstition”⁴⁹⁶ in them. These instructions are calculated only to delude the common people. They are not in keeping with the spirit of a text purporting to be based on the *Vedas*. Therefore, even a stray case of ordaining worship should rightly be regarded as hypocritical. The correct conclusion is that these *Āgamas* are not Vedic.

* * *

The *Vedas*, according to the Mīmāṃsaka, are *apauruṣeya*, without an author. The Naiyāyika, however, argues that even *Vedas* have an author, being the work of *Īśvara*, the Omniscient Lord, since they consist of sentences (*vākya*) which would ultimately point to an author. This author could not be human, since the *Vedas* deal with supra-mundane results like heaven which are outside the ken of human beings. The Mīmāṃsaka refutes this argument. According to him, this reasoning would ultimately result in the authorship of only a human being possessing a physical body and limited knowledge, but not in the desired authorship of an Omniscient Lord. It is well-known that physical body is only the result of the previous merit and demerit of a particular being. This position, therefore, does not apply to the divine authorship of the *Vedas*. If it would apply, it would directly affect the authoritative character of the *Vedas* themselves. *Dharma*, which lies beyond the scope of the ordinary

495. YS. I-3 :

“*purāṇanyāyamīmāṃsādharmasāstrāṅgamiśritāḥ
vedāssthānāni vidyānām dharmasya ca caturdaśa*”

496. IP. I. p. 499.

means of knowledge, cannot be revealed by *vākyas* composed by human beings.

Regarding creation and dissolution of this world, the Mīmāṃsaka is of the view that they are not instantaneous operations. "Prabhākara and Kumārila alike, deny absolutely the validity of the belief in the periodic creation and dissolution of all things. They accept a constant process of becoming and passing away..."⁴⁹⁷ Thus, for instance, the Prābhākara, "though he admits that the universe is made of constituent parts, and that as such it must have a beginning and an end in time, yet he finds no reason for believing that the universe, as a whole, had a beginning at any one point of time, or that it would all come to an end at any one point. Hence, if the constituent factors of the universe have a beginning, they must also cease one after the other; in fact, this is what is actually found to be the case in everyday experience".⁴⁹⁸ Creation of the earth, for instance, therefore, means a gradual but not simultaneous accumulation of mass, and dissolution, likewise, is a gradual reduction of it.

Continuing, the Mīmāṃsaka says that a Supreme Being need not at all be postulated to account for entities like the hills, the earth and the oceans which we see. We, the human beings (*jīvas*) who are intelligent, could ourselves produce these entities through sacrifices, and as such, no postulation of a divine agent is justified. It may be argued that a Supreme Person is to be assumed who can perceive the *apūrva* or the unseen merit that arises out of the performance of acts (sacrifices) and which the human beings cannot decidedly see. This argument, according to the Mīmāṃsaka, is only superficial. Human beings are not directly connected with the perception of the *apūrva*, which is only the instrumental cause of things. It is enough if they understand the efficacy of the rites they perform. They get a knowledge of the productive capacity (*śakti*) of those rites through a study of the Vedas. This they can do, since they are endowed with intelligence. This is supported by the critic by citing the analogy of a potter who only understands the efficiency

497. KM. p. 61.

498. PPM. p. 87. See *Śloka-vārtika*, Saṁbandhākṣepaparihāra, śls. 47, 68 and 113, where creation and dissolution of the universe are denied.

of the clay, the stick etc., but cannot have a direct perception of their productive capacity.

He then attacks the Naiyāyika's view that the entities obtaining in the world are liable to destruction on the ground that they consist of parts. All entities like the earth and the Sun, according to the Mīmāṃsaka, are eternal. The eternal character of these things is proved by the means of knowledge called Recognition (*pratyabhijñā*), which is a variety of ocular Perception (*pratyakṣa*) and hence, is more powerful and valid than Inference (*anumāna*). Recognition is of this type : "That earth (which the people of the past witnessed) is verily this (which I now see before me)" and "That Sun is verily this", etc. People who lived in the past must have had similar recognitions with regard to these and other entities, and people who live in future will also have similar recognitions. There is thus a continuity of knowledge regarding these things during all periods of time—past, present and future. This, argues the Mīmāṃsaka, proves that these entities are eternal.

Again, he criticises the Nyāya-theory that an agent for this universe can be inferred, who is possessed of qualities like lordship and omniscience and who, at the same time, is devoid of a physical body. Referring to worldly experience, he says that every entity that is produced points to an agent, a human being, who is found to be dependent, and to possess limited knowledge and a physical body. So the Creator of the world would necessarily have to be in possession of a physical body. If this is admitted, then it would naturally follow that his body is also liable to destruction like any other physical body, being composed of parts. So, the inference of a Supreme Being as Creator for this universe is quite untenable.⁴⁹⁹

The critic further argues that the knowledge of invariable concomitance (*vyāpti*), which is the very life of *anumāna*

499. PPM. p. 87 : "As the Naiyāyika bases his argument on the analogy of the carpenter supervising and guiding the making of wooden articles, and as this carpenter is a bodied being, the analogy, extended a little further, would prove this supervising 'God' also to be a bodied being ; but at the same time we know that no bodied being can exercise any intelligent control over such subtle things as the atoms, Dharma and Adharma".

(Inference), should not stop merely at pointing to an intelligent agent. All the particularities associated with the agent, like his possession of a physical body, limited knowledge, etc., which are understood along with invariable concomitance, should also be taken into account, without any exception.

He then launches his attack against the creative and other activities of the Supreme Person inferred by the Naiyāyika.⁵⁰⁰ An agent in general is found to be present at a particular place and do a bit of work at a particular time, with the necessary instruments, and with a view to achieving some fruit. When this is our practical experience, it is difficult for us to imagine an ultra-mundane God engaged in creating, maintaining and destroying the entire universe, without any appointed place and time, and that too, for no purpose at all, since it is declared that all the desires of that Creator-God are fully realised by Him. Even if it is admitted that there exists such a Lord who does all this, the motive behind His activities cannot be explained. It cannot be out of mere sport (*krīḍā*) that the Supreme Being is doing all this, since it is known that He is already happy, with all His desires realised. If to create is His nature which cannot be overcome, it only means that the Lord has no independence. He creates, maintains and destroys the universe restlessly, without a definite plan of His own, being impelled by His own irresistible nature to create. But if it is said that He creates the beings out of pure mercy, then the actual state of affairs obtaining in the creation proves the contrary. Many of the beings are not happy, and they should have been created happy, if the Creator were merciful. If

500. *KM.* pp. 62-63 : "Kumārila ridicules the idea of the existence of Prajāpati before creation of matter; without a body, how could he feel desire? If he possessed a body, then matter must have existed before his creative activity and there is no reason to deny then, the existence of other bodies. Nor is there any intelligible motive for creation; granted that, when the world exists, conditions are regulated by merit and demerit, originally there was no merit or demerit, and the creation of a world full of misery was inexcusable, for it is idle to argue that a creator could only produce a world in which there is sin and pain. Yet, if his action is conditioned, he cannot be omnipotent. If, again it is alleged that the creation was for his amusement, this contradicts the theory that he is perfectly happy, and would involve him in much wearisome toil".

the individual's past *karman* is itself held responsible for his misery, then again, the independence of the Creator-God gets impaired. So, the Mīmāṃsaka declares that there could be no person who creates the world⁵⁰¹ with a direct knowledge of *dharma* and *adharma* and who could also compose the *Vedas*.

He then examines the claim that the *Pāñcarātra*-texts are as valid as the *Vedas* themselves, on the ground that they both are the compositions of God. He reiterates his stand that the *Vedas* are not composed by any person, human or divine. Revealed as they are, their authority is unquestioned. They are eternal since their author is not at all remembered, while he deserves to be remembered. Such is not the case with works like the *Rāmāyaṇa* and the *Mahābhārata*, whose authors like Vālmīki and Vyāsa deserve to be remembered and are also remembered. Since such a remembrance of the author is absent in the case of *Vedas*, it is to be admitted without further hesitation that the *Vedas* are not written by anybody. The author of the *Pāñcarātra*-works, on the other hand, is known to be Vāsudeva. After an impartial consideration of these facts, one would be forced to admit that these *Āgamas* are not eternal or revealed, and that they do not deserve comparison with the eternal *Vedas* in respect of authority.

He then draws a distinction between the *Vedas* and the *Āgamas*. The chief characteristic of the *Vedas* is that they consist of sentences which have got a particular sequence (*krama*). The sentences cannot be changed of their sequence by persons that may, from time to time, repeat them. But in the case of the *Pāñcarātra*-texts, there being no such rigid sequence, people may

501. *Ibid.* p. 64 :

"Though the existence of a creator is denied, the Mīmāṃsā accepts without reserve the doctrine of the existence of the self or soul and Śābarasvāmī elaborates the case for its existence ; Prabhākara and Kumārila both develop the theme in close accordance with his view. The necessity of the existence of the self for the Mīmāṃsā rests on its fundamental assumption that the sacrifices are performed to secure, in many cases, a reward not in this life. There must, therefore, be an eternal entity, distinct from the body, the sense-organs, and cognitions, which is both the doer of actions and the reaper of their reward."

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effect changes in their sequence, at their own free will. This sequence is itself enough, argues the Mīmāṃsaka, to distinguish the *Vedas* from the *Pāñcarātra*.

He then turns his attention to the contention of the *Pāñcarātrins* that the author of their *Āgamas* is the Omniscient Lord and that His Omniscience is not due to any of the well-known means of knowledge but that it is quite natural with Him. The critic points out that it is quite unreasonable to say that a person could get knowledge even without a proper study of the *Vedas* and such other texts. Further, there is no Vedic statement⁵⁰² to the effect that the Supreme Being became Omniscient even without the well-known means of knowledge. Even if such a text is somehow traced,⁵⁰³ the Mīmāṃsaka suggests that it should only be explained as an *arthavāda*—explanatory passage. To be clear, since the Lord is, in many cases, known to possess knowledge, etc., invariably, He is figuratively said to possess knowledge etc., naturally. This is the way of explaining such texts as eulogistic passages. Thus, the significance of such texts is always to be understood as secondary but not primary. He further points out that even if such a Person with inborn knowledge, etc., is admitted to exist, there could still be nothing to the credit or advantage of the *Pāñcarātra* texts as such.

As a matter of fact, the Mīmāṃsaka does not accept a Supreme Being as such.⁵⁰⁴ God, according to him, is only that

502. But actually there is a Vedic text which speaks of the Lord's knowledge as natural. The Mīmāṃsaka in the next sentence, meets this objection also.

503. The Bhāṭṭa has, in his mind, the *Śvetāśvatara* text : “na tasya kāryam karam ca vidyate, svābhāvikī jñānabalakriyā ca” (III. 6), which states clearly that the Lord's Knowledge, Power, etc., are natural with Him but not due to any means.

504. Vide the following extracts from *KM* :

“The Mīmāṃsā, in both schools, is confident that there is no question of rewards coming from the deity to whom the offerings are made ; no deity is either eternal or omnipresent and there could be no assurance of it ever receiving the numerous offerings made by diverse votaries, apart from the difficulty of the deity conferring rewards.” (p. 74).

particular term of the authoritative Vedic text (such as “*agni*” in the *mantra* “*agnaye svāhā*”), which is itself understood to be the recipient of the offerings made in a sacrifice, in a particular context.⁵⁰⁵

Continuing the previous discussion that the author of the *Pāñcarātra* could not be Omniscient, the Mīmāṃsaka points out that even the Pāṣupata (*Śaiva*) holds that Śiva, the author of their own *Āgamas*, is the only Omniscient Being. Similar is the case with other religious schools. All promulgators of religions, however, cannot be admitted to be Omniscient because of the divergent views held by them regarding metaphysical issues. Thus, it is difficult to state who actually is Omniscient, since scriptural texts glorify, for instance, both Śiva and Vāsudeva as Omniscient. The Mīmāṃsaka therefore concludes that the *Pāñcarātra* could only be the work of some deceitful person bearing the name ‘Vāsudeva’. Another point of discredit to the *Pāñcarātra* is that Vāsudeva, in the *Purāṇas*, is stated to have deceived demons by teaching them the non-Vedic systems of thought, assuming the form of Māyāmohana⁵⁰⁶ and others. It is therefore proper to suppose that this *Pāñcarātra* too, which is

“Despite its emphatic denial of the existence of a Supreme Lord, the Sarvasiddhāntasaṅgraha (VIII. 40,41) treats the end of man as to be obtained by meditation upon, and worship of the Supreme Spirit which is manifested in each man, and authors such as Āpadeva and Laugākṣībhaṣkara declare that if the sacrifice is performed in honour of Govinda or the Creator Īśvara, it leads to the highest good, basing this assertion on the authority of the *Bhagavadgītā*.” (p. 76)

“It can hardly be assumed that these deities were not believed to be real by the founders of the Mīmāṃsā. And there is nothing to show that Jaimini did not accept their existence. But the later doctrine, as evinced in such works as *Devatāsvarūpavicāra* of Āpadeva, does not accept the validity of the descriptions of the deities given in the *Purāṇas* as showing the existence of such beings.” (p. 78).

505. *ĀP.* p. 79 : “na hi kācit jātyā devatā nāmāsti ; yaiva hi haviḥpratiyogitayā pramāṇabhūtā t śabdādavagamyate, sā tatra devateti hi vassiddhāntaḥ.”

506. *Cf. ibid.* p. 25 : “māyāmohanavigraheṇa hariṇā.....” etc. See *VP.* III. chs. 17-18 for this story.

his own teaching, was deliberately designed by him to delude the people. It is in consonance with this that we find the orthodox Vedic followers not observing the rites ordained by these particular *Āgamas*.

Even granted that the Lord too studied the *Vedas* like Manu and others with a teacher, there is no need to attribute any originality to Him. It is difficult to imagine that He could understand the meaning of the *Vedas* even without the required study under the guidance of some teacher.

Another reason to suppose that these *Āgamas* are non-Vedic is that they are refuted by other *smṛti*-works. The *Pāñcarātra*-works themselves draw a distinction between the Vedic and Tāntric practices regarding one and the same rite. This distinction would be meaningless if these *Āgamas* are really Vedic in character.

An assessment of all the reasonings put forth above, says the Mīmāṃsaka in fine, would only point to the non-Vedic character of the *Pāñcarātra* system, so much so that there is no other choice than to conclude that it is purely the invention of a deceitful man.

The Naiyāyika's Criticism

The Naiyāyika and his stand regarding the position of the *Pāñcarātra* are introduced by Yāmuna next. It has already been mentioned above that Yāmuna has much in common with the Naiyāyika regarding the existence of an *Īśvara*, the creation, etc., of the world by Him, His authorship regarding the *Pāñcarātrāgamas*, etc.

It has been argued by the Mīmāṃsaka that the *Pāñcarātra* cannot be compared with *Manusmṛti* and such other works. The Naiyāyika points out that it is *Manusmṛti* that cannot stand comparison with these *Āgamas* and not the other way. These *Āgamas* belong to the same class to which the *Vedas* belong. They both are derived from one and the same source, namely, the *anubhava* (experience or direct perception) of the Lord. So, there is no question of these texts themselves being based on the *Vedas* for their authority. Just as two different *smṛti*-passages ordaining

the *aṣṭakā* and *ācamana*-rites for instance, cannot be said to be mutually dependent, so with these *Āgamas* and the *Vedas*. Whatever reason one might advance in support of the contention that the *Vedas* are the only authority on matters of *dharma*, can equally be applied to the *Āgamas* too.

The *Vedas*, according to the Naiyāyika, are composed by *Īśvara*, the Supreme Lord. They consist of sentences (*vākya*) which unmistakably point to the authorship of some person, who possesses a direct knowledge of *dharma* and *adharma*, instrumental to world-creation. It cannot be stated that even while being in the form of sentences, the *Vedas* need not necessarily be composed by anybody. This extreme view might even lead one to conclude that smoke can come out even without fire, which however, is absurd.

It is the Lord alone that could directly perceive *dharma* and *adharma*, which form the instrumental cause of this world. He composed the *Vedas*, purely as a matter of mercy towards the individual selves (*jīvas*) projected by Himself, so that they might be of great help to them in achieving the objects they desired. It cannot be argued that no perception can visualise *dharma* and *adharma*. The position is that unless a person of excelling power is accepted, we cannot account for the entities found in this universe. A direct knowledge of the instrumental and material causes is the chief criterion of one's becoming the agent or author of a particular thing. *Dharma* and *adharma*, whose instrumentality to this world is accepted even by the Mīmāṃsaka, should necessarily be admitted to be perceived by the Lord, who could also compose the *Vedas*.

This may lead to the doubt whether or not entities like the earth and the hills are effects (*kārya*). The Naiyāyika, with the help of syllogisms, tries to infer that the earth, etc. are all effects. They have parts, which help us to deduce that those entities are also destructible by the persons that know their causes. It is also possible to infer origination and destruction for all entities on the ground that they vibrate while having a manifested form.

When once these arguments establish that the earth, etc. are effects, it naturally follows that a Supreme Being, capable of

perceiving *dharma* and *adharma* pertaining to those effects, is also accepted.⁵⁰⁷ The Naiyāyika infers an agent for all entities in this world with the help of syllogistic statements.

It might be contended that creation and dissolution, being mere acts, can independently produce the desired effects without reference to the agency of any ultra-mundane person. But practically, argues the Naiyāyika, we know that mere insentient objects cannot produce effects independent of a sentient agent. A chisel, for instance, cannot prepare a wooden article without being operated by a carpenter. Human beings of ordinary knowledge and power cannot perceive the *apūrva*—the unseen potency that results from the performance of acts. That is to say, the human beings cannot become the designers of certain entities. Therefore, an Omniscient Designer-Agent of the entire universe has to be presumed. As a corollary, it should also be admitted that qualities like omniscience, detachment (*vairāgya*) and lordship (*aiśvarya*) pertain to Him. This argument is corroborated by various *mantras*, *arthavāda*-passages and *Purāṇa*-statements.

The Naiyāyika argues that there is nothing special about the so-called *apauruṣeyatva* (revealed character) of the *Vedas*, as advocated by the Mīmāṃsakas. If this 'eternal character' of the *Vedas* belongs actually to the letters (*varṇa*) that go into their composition, then, the same is the case with the *Pāñcarātra*-texts, which also consist of letters. If this eternity, however, belongs to the words (*pada*) taken as a unit, even that would apply to these *Āgamas*. If as the next step, this eternity is attributed to the sequence (*ānupūrvī*) in which these words occur, this contention, declares the Naiyāyika, is wrong. Sequence, as such, cannot ascribe eternity to letters. It is quite clear that sequence is, after all, the result of human utterance (*uccāraṇa*). This utterance, in its turn, is not eternal because it exists so long as a man utters the words. So, sequence, which is based upon a short-lived utterance, will naturally be non-

507. Vide KM. p. 61 : "The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, accepting the doctrine of atoms on one hand and the periodical creation and destruction of the world on the other, had found it necessary to introduce the conception of a Creator, in order to secure in some measure a mode of bringing about the renewal and destruction of the combinations of the atoms and their connection with souls."

eternal. Thus, the theory of *apauruṣeyatva* of the *Vedas* advocated so zealously by the Mīmāṃsakas has nothing special in it, by which the *Vedas* might be claimed higher in status than the *Pāñcarātra*. The Naiyāyika concludes that both the *Vedas* and the *Āgamas* are equal in authority, being the compositions of one and the same *Īśvara*.

The Naiyāyika states that his arguments regarding the existence of a Superhuman Being are not mere logical speculations. They have the support of the *Upaniṣads*. Accordingly, the *Upaniṣads* state that there is *Īśvara*, the Supreme Being, and that He possesses qualities like Omniscience and Lordship. He created the universe and it is He that could compose the *Pāñcarātra* also. Since these *Āgamas* are the work of such a Person, it naturally follows, contends the logician, that their authority is unquestionable.

The Prābhākara Mīmāṃsaka does not admit the primary validity of *Upaniṣadic* statements, which speak of entities already existing (*siddha*, *bhūta* or *pariniṣṭhita-vastu*) like the *Brahman*. According to him, all Vedic passages, so as to gain validity, should be explained as supplementary statements (*arthavāda*) speaking of something connected with a 'thing to be accomplished' (*kārya*). This is so because sentences that speak of an already existing thing might be merely repetitive (*anuvāda*) or even might go wrong at times (*bādhita*).

Against such a view, the Naiyāyika argues that just as a sentence speaking of 'something to be done' (*kārya*) is held authoritative by the Prābhākara, so also, a sentence that speaks of an already existing entity (*siddha*) should be admitted as valid by him. Sentences which speak of existing things should not be divested of their due authority. As regards the contention that a sentence referring to already existent entities (*bhūtaparavākya*) is liable to defects, the Naiyāyika states that even a sentence devoted to the so-called *kārya* is subject to similar defects. A *kārya* like fetching of the faggots (*samidāharaṇa*) for instance, can also be revealed by other means of knowledge like perception (but not necessarily by verbal testimony or *śabda*), which the Prābhākara himself admits. This, says the Naiyāyika, proves that even a *kārya*-sentence might be repetitive in character (*anuvāda*).

In the injunction, "One desirous of Heaven should perform the fire-sacrifice", reference is made to the "fire-sacrifice" (*agnihotra*) which is an already existing entity (*siddha*), but not something to be established (*kārya*). The validity of such a sentence is admitted by the Prābhākara on the ground that these sentences are the only means of our knowledge regarding the instrumentality of the fire-sacrifices etc. towards heaven etc. The Naiyāyika states that even in the case of the Supreme Being, it is only the *Upaniṣads* that reveal His nature and there is no other *pramāṇa* that could be applied here. So it is to be admitted that even the *Upaniṣadic* texts are valid in their own right.

The logician affirms that having a physical body, limited knowledge, etc., which are generally found among human beings, cannot at all be attributed to the Supreme Person whose omniscience, etc., are glorified by many *Upaniṣads*. He thus concludes that the *Pañcarātra*-scriptures which owe their origination to such a Lord, have to be viewed as fully authoritative.

* * *

The Prābhākara Mīmāṃsaka's Criticism

It has already been observed that according to the Prābhākara, every Vedic statement, as a rule, should be connected with something to be accomplished through an act—a *kārya*, which is not revealed by other means of knowledge.

The connotation of words in general is to be arrived at solely by tracing their ultimate purport to a *kārya*. This is indeed, the process by which youngsters grasp the meaning of words not known to them. This, the Prābhākara illustrates by taking the stock-instance of the usage (*vyavahāra*) of elderly people. Thus, a youngster who stands near two elderly men, notices one of them bringing a cow when the other man utters the words 'Bring the cow' (*gām ānaya*), and concludes that the action of bringing the cow was the result of the former's understanding the intention of the latter, when he uttered the words. The youngster hears the man again say, 'Bring the horse' (*aśvaṃ ānaya*) and observes that as a result, a different animal is brought. When, again, the words 'Tie up the cow' (*gām badhāna*) are uttered, a different

activity takes place. Thus, by noticing different actions following different utterances (*vyavahāra*), the young boy understands what the words 'cow' and 'horse' really stand for. In all these cases, the denotation of different words, contends the Prābhākara, is invariably arrived at by connecting those words with the main theme, viz., the *kārya*,⁵⁰⁸ the activity of bringing, tying, etc. in the above instances.

Another point to be noted is that the *liṅ*—the optative and such suffixes in an injunction directly denote the *kārya*, whereas suffixes other than these denote other things connected with it, like the qualified aspirant (*adhikārin*) and the fruit (*phala*), in a supplementary sense.

It might be urged that even sentences which refer to matters of past (*bhūta-vastu*) like the birth of a son, become authoritative in their own right, without any reference to the so-called *kārya*. Thus, for instance, when a messenger tells a man, "A son is born to you", a bystander who does not know what

508. KM. pp. 39-40 : "The essential character of the word is, in the view of Jaimini, not mere denotation, but injunction, a view which clearly stands in close relation to the doctrine that the meaning of words is largely learned by the young from the observation of intercourse among the old : one addresses the other and the other acts as a result; on says "gām ānaya", the other brings the cow. Hence, as against the Vedānta, it is denied that the essence of Vedic texts lies in the making manifest of the sole existent Brahman, and asserted that, even when this seems to be the case, the real import of the text is an injunction to meditate on the Brahman. From this view Prabhākara proceeds to develop a conclusion, which is in harmony with the view of Śābarasvāmīn, that words themselves have no meaning, and obtain it only in sentences possessing injunctive clauses; "gām", by itself, is nothing but attains meaning when conjoined with "ānaya", the whole then signifying generically the genus 'cow' as connected with 'bringing'. This view in this school (of Prabhākara) obtains the name of the 'theory of signification in syntactical combination' (*anvitābhidhāna*), in opposition to the view of Kumārila, who admits that words possess a meaning independently of combination in injunctive sentences, and whose theory accepts, therefore, 'the combination of significant terms' (*abhihitānaya*). The two schools, however, are at one in holding that signification of words is a class-signification, as the theory of eternity of words demands."

actually the message is, notices that the listener feels glad only after hearing the above words. Further, the bystander, through indications like blooming of the face and horripilation exhibited by the listener, infers that the words uttered by the messenger should have conveyed to him the happy tidings of the birth of a son. This argument is unsound, says the *Prābhākara*, because gestures like blooming of the face and horripilation, though indicative of the pleasure of a man, need not necessarily arise from the knowledge of the birth of a son. Reasons for happiness are so manifold that it is practically impossible to decide whether the happiness exhibited by the listener of the sentence, "A son is born to you", is due only to the news conveyed by it or to something else. Proceeding on similar lines, says the *Prābhākara*, one can get at the meaning of other unknown words which are not found to have the *kārya* as their purport, and which are, however, employed in sentences belonging to the present tense.⁵⁰⁹ The *Prābhākara* also advances logical alternatives to assert that only those sentences that have a bearing on *kārya* are valid.

The *apūrva* that arises from the performance of certain acts attains a new name, *niyoga* (prompting), at the hands of *Prābhākara*, since it acts as an incentive to the prompted person (*niyojya*) and makes him put forth an exertion for accomplishing the action indicated by the verbal root. "This '*kārya*' or '*niyoga*' is expressed neither by the verbal root nor by the injunctive affix, nor by any other word in the sentence; but it is denoted by the sentence as a whole, all other necessary factors being expressed by the several words of the sentence individually. What the sentence as a whole expresses is this *niyoga* as related to the promoted person expressed by one of the words in the sentence (i.e., the word signifying the result, the person desiring which is the promoted person).... and there is no doubt that of all things made known by the sentence, the *niyoga* is the most important, for, even though the final result has all the appearance of the most important factor, yet it is the *niyoga* that is really such, because it is the direct and immediate cause of the result, and it is also the immediate effect of the action performed; and further,

509. Thus, for instance, the meaning of the word "*pika*" in the sentence "*pikaḥ kūjati*" should be obtained with the help of the next term "*kūjati*". Since "*kūjana*" is characteristic of a cuckoo-bird, the term "*pika*" is to be taken as standing for the cuckoo.

because the result also has to be regarded as subservient to the *niyoga*, in view of the fact that the result enters as one of the factors necessary for the making up of the full character of the *niyoga*. To explain, the *niyoga* cannot be a true *niyoga*, until there is a *niyojya*, the person to be prompted to exertion; without exertion there can be no *niyoga*, and again, without the agent there can be no exertion; nor can an agent put forth an exertion and be a *niyojya*, until he is entitled to the undertaking resulting from that exertion, and lastly, it is only the person desiring the result issuing from the undertaking that is entitled to its performance ; thus indirectly, through the agent, the result becomes a necessary factor in the *niyoga*, this relation between the *niyoga* and the result being similar to that between the master and servant ; without the servant the master cannot be a true 'master', and yet it is the master that is the more important person of the two".⁵¹⁰

All this is only in regard to sentences found in the Vedic texts. As regards the sentences spoken by human beings in this world the *Prābhākara* dismisses their primary authority summarily on the ground that they are inferential in nature. That is to say, that their authority is to be inferred on the ground of their being spoken by reliable persons (*āpta*).⁵¹¹

510. PPM. p. 163 ff.

511. Cf. KM., pp. 41-42 :

"*Prābhākara* holds that the only authoritative testimony of things beyond the reach of the senses and other means of proof, is the scripture (*sāstra*). Other words deal only with matters cognised by perception, inference, etc. and have no inherent cogency. If they give us true information, it is merely because we believe the speaker to be trustworthy. Thus, like the *Vaiśeṣika*, *Prābhākara* holds all cognition of this kind to be based on inference, the argument being 'this man says something ; he must know what he is talking about ; what he says, therefore, must be true'.....Thus the sole possibility of the validity of verbal testimony lies in the Veda, which has no author, and therefore, is not vitiated by doubts as to trustworthiness and ability of correct expression....."

In the light of this discussion, the *Prābhākara* declares that *Upaniṣadic* statements which speak of the *Brahman*, an established entity, should be explained in such a way that they are only *arthavāda*—or explanatory passages with regard to injunctions of *jñāna* and *upāsana*. To be clear, they should be taken as enjoining on one, the meditation of the *Omniscient* and *Blissful Self*.⁵¹² By this, one should not, however, be led to the conclusion that there is in fact, such a person possessed of omniscience and such other perfections.⁵¹³ Even non-existing phenomena can be spoken of as existing for purposes of meditation and such is the present one. So, statements that there exists an Omniscient God and so on, are not of primary significance and God is nothing but the fabrication of fanatics. Sacrifices etc., which an agent performs are ephemeral in nature and one might think that the agent might not get the legitimate fruit of his actions if his self were not eternal.⁵¹⁴ *Upaniṣadic* passages which speak of the eternity of the Self, therefore, should be taken as *arthavāda* or corroborative passages to the above fact, assuring the fruit of one's actions to one's own self to be realised in another world.

512. See fn. 595.

513. Cf. *PPM*. pp. 85-86 :

"The *Prābhākara*, like the *Bhāṭṭa*, denies a creator for the universe, who can also know everything : If it were true that certain factors of the universe are brought into existence by an ultra-mundane Supervisor of Dharma-Adharma, this could not be true for the entire universe, as a whole. For instance, the bodies of all men and animals are found to be produced by the functioning of the parents, and not by a supervening agency ; and this fact will enable us to infer the same with regard to the bodies of all animals, past and future also. The claim of the logicians that our Dharma and Adharma must have a Supervisor, with more intelligence than us, is also weak. Dharma-Adharma of the body....must always belong to the same intelligent being to whom the body belongs.....Hence the ultra-mundane 'God' can have no knowledge of Dharma and Adharma of the beings....and without such knowledge, he could not exercise any intelligent control over them; God could not perceive Dharma by His senses...nor by His mind as the mind cannot perceive..the..Dharma of beings which is outside God's body."

514. See fn. 501.

The *Prābhākara* thus asserts that there is no sentence in the *Veda* that refers to an already existent entity primarily and that everything should be connected with the *kārya*, so as to gain validity.

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The Advaitin's Criticism

The next important critic introduced by Yāmuna for refutation, is the Advaitin. The Advaitic view regarding the philosophical authenticity of the *Pāñcarātra-āgamas*, represented by Śaṅkarācārya in his commentary on the *Brahmasūtra* (II. ii. 42-45), is not in favour of these *āgamas*.

According to the Advaitin, the entire *pāñcarātrādhikaraṇa*, consisting of the four aphorisms, "*utpattayasambhavāt*", "*na ca kartuḥ karaṇam*", "*viññānādibhāve vā tadapratishedhaḥ*" and "*vipratishedhācca*" (*Brahmasūtra* : II. ii. 42-45), reflects the view of the author of the aphorisms, Bādarāyaṇa, that the *Pañcarātra* is non-Vedic in character. He, accordingly, interprets these *sūtras* in favour of his own line of thought.

The first aphorism, "*utpattayasambhavāt*", says the Advaitin, refutes the *Pāñcarātra* theory of origination (*utpatti*) of an individual self (*jīva*). The *Pañcarātra*, for instance, maintains that "from Vāsudeva, the Ultimate Reality, is born the Individual Self by name Śaṅkarṣaṇa ; from Śaṅkarṣaṇa is born the Mind called Pradyumna ; from Pradyumna again is born the Ego (*ahaṅkāra*) called Aniruddha".⁵¹⁵ This clearly indicates the non-Vedic character of these *āgama*-texts, because no orthodox text based on the *Vedas*, or even the *Vedas* themselves, speak of the origination (*utpatti*) or the birth of the individual self. The *jīva* is eternal. Even if a *jīva* is said to be born, it is only in a secondary sense that we have to understand this statement.⁵¹⁶

515. See Śaṅkara's commentary on *Brahmasūtra* under II. ii. 42: "*utpattayasambhavāt*". It may be added that Śaṅkara concedes that there are elements in the *Pāñcarātra* which are acceptable such as the teaching that Nārāyaṇa is the Supreme Reality, that He has manifested Himself in varied ways, and that He is to be worshipped through single-minded devotion.

516. See *AP*. p. 27.

The body which the *jīva* takes up at the time of his coming into this world is alone liable to birth. The *jīva*, by virtue of his dwelling in the physical body, merely comes into contact with the subtle elements (*mātra*). Moreover, the *Pāñcarātra*-texts say that mind (*manas*), an instrument, is born out of the agent (*kartr*). But we find, in our experience, that an instrument like an axe, for instance, is not born out of an agent like Devadatta. We cannot understand this statement of these *āgamas*, without the help of an illustration. There is also no Vedic text which supports this view.⁵¹⁷

The next target of attack from the Advaitin is the *Pāñcarātra-vyūha*-theory.⁵¹⁸ According to the Bhāgavatas, Vāsudeva, the Highest Being Himself assumes the different forms of Saṅkarṣaṇa, Pradyumna and Aniruddha, for the welfare of the universe. Criticising this view, the Advaitin says that if these four manifestations (*vyūha*) of the Supreme Being are mutually different and independent of one another, possessing common attributes and features, but are not one in essence, then the *Pāñcarātrins* commit the fallacy of admitting the plurality of God, which, however, contradicts their own *siddhānta*-view, viz., that Vāsudeva is the only Ultimate Reality. If, on the other hand, all these four manifestations are held to be one in essence, without any mutual distinction, this too is not acceptable. Saṅkarṣaṇa cannot be born out of Vāsudeva, nor can Pradyumna come out of Saṅkarṣaṇa, because there is no distinction between these different forms. But when an effect is born out of a cause, some sort of distinction must subsist between them, to render the cause-effect relation feasible, as in the case of clay and its product, a pot. In the absence of any distinction, the use of terms like "*kārya*" and "*kāraṇa*" becomes meaningless. But the *Pāñcarātrins* do not admit any distinction between the four *vyūha*-manifestations in respect of qualities like knowledge (*jñāna*) and lordship (*aiśvarya*) either collectively or individually. All these forms are *Vāsudevas* without any sort of distinction between them, hold the Bhāgavatas. There is also no restriction

517. Vide Śaṅkara's commentary on *Brahmasūtra* under II. ii. 43 : "na ca-kartuḥ karaṇam".

518. Vide *ibid* : II. ii. 44 : "vijñānādibhāve vā tadapratishedhaḥ"

to the number of forms that the Lord can assume ; they need not be *four* only, for according to the Bhāgavatas, the entire universe starting from the Supreme *Brahman* above, down to the blade of grass on earth, is but the *vyūha* (manifestation) of the *Brahman*.

Another charge levelled against the *Pāñcarātra* by the Advaitin is that there is mutual controversy over the relation that subsists between a *guṇa* (quality) and a *guṇin* (the qualified).⁵¹⁹ Thus, for instance, each of the qualities like *jñāna* and *aiśvarya* is itself considered as identical with Vāsudeva, the possessor thereof. Thus, these *āgamas* show no distinction between a quality and its possessor. Lastly, the Advaitin points out that the *Pāñcarātra*-texts put forth non-Vedic teaching, as is evident from the statement found in one of these *āgamas* : "Śāṇḍilya took to a study of these *āgamas* being unable to get at the highest good (human end) from all the four *Vedas*". No text which purports to be based on the *Vedas* will dare to underestimate the *Vedas* in this manner, says the Advaitin.

The Siddhānta

The following is a brief exposition of the *Siddhānta* or the conclusion arrived at by Yāmuna in reply to the arguments advanced by his critics.

At the very outset, Yāmuna makes the following inferential statement : "The *Pāñcarātra tantra* is authoritative like the Vedic sentences ordaining *jyotiṣṭoma*, etc., on the ground that it is, like the Vedic sentences, based upon knowledge which is free from all defects". He, with all his logical skill, proves that no error can be pointed out in the above statement either with regard to the subject (*pakṣa*) or the probans (*hetu*), through any means of knowledge, such as perception, inference or verbal testimony. He investigates the possibility of any fallacy being pointed out in the above inferential statement and concludes that it is perfect in all respects.

519. Cf. Śaṅkara's commentary on *Brahmasūtra* : II. ii. 45 : "vipratishedhacca"

It had earlier been contended by the opponents that the validity of the *Pāñcarātra* scriptures cannot be accepted on the ground that they were composed by Vāsudeva, a deceitful person.⁵²⁰ Defending the cause of the *Pāñcarātra*-texts against the onslaught of the Mīmāṃsaka, Yāmuna questions him as to how he would ward off the invalidity for the *Vedas* that can arise on the ground that they too consist of sentences like the texts of human authorship. The Mīmāṃsaka would reply that the *Vedas* are impersonal in character (*apauruṣeya*) and that their validity is therefore unquestionable. In the same vein, Yāmuna declares that the *Pāñcarātra* is the direct utterance of the omniscient and merciful Vāsudeva, the Lord of the universe and that for that very reason, its validity becomes unquestionable.

Clarifying his point, Yāmuna states that the validity of words is intrinsic (*svataḥ prāmāṇya*).⁵²¹ Their validity gets impaired only when the people that utter them have defects like deceit and ignorance. Until it is proved beyond doubt that the man who uttered certain words is not dependable regarding the genuineness of the words uttered by him, no person is justified in doubting their validity. Since the author of the *Pāñcarātra-āgamas* is one that is glorified in the *Upaniṣads* as omniscient and merciful, there is no room for any conjecture that He had evil designs in His mind in composing these *āgamas*.

The crux of the problem to which the argument then turns is whether statements speaking of an already existent entity (*bhūta* or *siddha-vastu*) are authoritative or not. The Mīmāṃsakas, as we have already seen, do not admit of any primary validity for such statements. According to them, all statements should be connected with "something to be done" (*kārya*), if their validity is to be admitted. Accordingly, the statement, "You have got a son" (*putraste jātaḥ*), is explained by them as not primarily valid, on the ground that gestures of happiness which the listener of the above statement is said to

520. See p. 108 above.

521. It may be noted that for the Sāṅkhyas, validity and invalidity of statements are both intrinsic; for the Naiyāyikas, both are extrinsic; for the Buddhists, invalidity is intrinsic and validity extrinsic, and for the Vedāntins, validity is intrinsic and invalidity extrinsic.

exhibit, need not necessarily make a third man infer that they proceed from the happy tidings of a child-birth. Reasons for happiness might be many, past, present and future, and as such, the exact cause for the happiness of the man to whom the above statement is addressed, cannot be specified.

This contention of the Mīmāṃsakas is turned down by the author as preposterous. The third man who listens to the above sentence addressed to another man, is still able to conclude through the signs of happiness, exhibited by him, that he heard the happy news of child's birth. The way in which he arrives at such a conclusion is this: He sees the man, soon after listening to the news, making arrangements for the *jātakarman*-sacrament for the new-born babe. The third man, who himself had had the occasion to perform such a sacrament when a son was born to his own self, quickly comes to the conclusion that the news heard by the man in question, must only be regarding the birth of a child. Since activity regarding the *jātakarman* performance is noticed in the listener only after his listening to the sentence but not before, it is proper to think that it must have been due only to the news of a child's birth.

It may be contended that the 'happy' news of child-birth and the performance of *jātakarman* need not have a cause-and-effect relation on the ground that even those who cannot afford are seen to do it, with displeasure. But this argument cannot stand to reason, says Yāmuna. Even as listening to the statement "*gām ānaya*", is taken by the Mīmāṃsakas as the cause of the activity of bringing a cow on the ground that the activity of bringing is found to take place only when the statement has been made, so also it is proper to admit that the activity of the *jātakarman*-performance must have proceeded from the act of listening to the news of child-birth.

Yāmuna states that there is no justification whatsoever for the Prābhākara's contention that all words have their sole purport in '*kārya*'. In statements like "*gām ānaya*" and "*aśvaṃ ānaya*" the terms '*gauḥ*' (cow) and '*aśvaḥ*' (horse), should be explained in their own individual capacity, without connecting them with the so-called '*kārya*', points out the author. He says that it is possible to interpret terms in conjunction with factors

other than the *kārya* also. Pointing out that the Prābhākara's dictum that all connotations of words should be arrived at only in relation to a *kārya* is based upon a wrong conception of the connotation of words, Yāmuna says that this rule cannot be applied to the suffix, "*liṅ*". To explain, the optative suffix, "*liṅ*", conveys the *kārya* proper in a sentence. 'As such, how can it be said to convey its sense in relation to a *kārya*, while it itself indicates the *kārya*?' asks Yāmuna. So, the proper way of arriving at the significance of words should be untainted by any preconceived notion either in favour of a *kārya* or a *siddha*. One has to admit that a word conveys its sense in relation to such other thing which is required to complete the sense which is expected (*ākāṅkṣita*), which is compatible (*yogya*) and which is supplied by a word uttered proximate to it (*āsanna*). So, there should be no special attachment to a '*Kārya*' or a '*siddha-vastu*'. '*Kārya*' should only be taken as a subsidiary, but not the sole cause in arriving at the connotation of words. When its function is over, it is no longer helpful.

Yāmuna then turns to the contention of the Prābhākara that the statements made by human beings cannot be taken as valid as and when they are uttered, and that their validity can be arrived at, only after inferring the reliability of the person who made these statements, because of the fact that human speech is always open to defects like deceit and ignorance.⁵²² Yāmuna states that it is true that in a few cases, where persons are liable to have defects, the statements made by them do not attain validity. But this does not mean that words lose their denotative power which is quite natural with them. So, a listener who has

522. Vide KM. p. 42 : "There is an obvious difficulty in this reasoning of Prabhākara when it is remembered that Prabhākara....insists on the self-evidence of cognitions, from which it would seem to follow that the assertions of any man are *prima facie* valid, until sublated by better evidence. Kumārila, who is always anxious to accommodate the views of the school to popular beliefs, is at the same time more in harmony with the tenets of the school in adopting a doctrine, which does not involve the general denial of the validity of human testimony. He adopts therefore, the plan of distinguishing testimony as human and superhuman (*apauruṣeya*)....In the case of human testimony, its validity may be impaired by defects in the speaker, but the presence of excellencies in him precludes the presence of defects".

a general capacity to understand the mutual connection of words and their meanings, arrives at the sense of a particular word soon after it is heard. It is not necessary that he should infer the soundness of the source of the words first and then alone get at their sense. The author emphasises that the knowledge arising out of sentences such as "There are fruits on the river bank", which speak of an established entity (*bhūtavastu*), is purely verbal but not inferential.

Yāmuna also refers in this connection to the theory of *niyoga* advanced by the Prābhākara.⁵²³ According to the latter, the *apūrva* is indicated by the Optative suffix, '*liṅ*', in an injunction. He further says that in the injunctive sentence, "One desirous of heaven should perform the *jyotiṣṭoma* sacrifice", the performer (*niyojya*) is qualified by 'heaven'. Refuting this argument, Yāmuna says that heaven is something that is going to be established in future, but not an already existent entity. So, it cannot become an attribute of the agent. On the other hand, the desire (*kāmanā*) regarding heaven, which exists at the time of activity, could alone be taken as the attribute of the person concerned. All injunctions should be understood as referring to the thing to be established (*sādhya*), the means thereof (*sādhana*) and the cause-effect relationship between them (*sambandha*). It is not always true that a *niyoga* is ever associated with the realisation of certain fruits like heaven. In injunctions ordaining obligatory rites, for instance, the *niyoga* has no connection with the realisation of a corresponding result. So, the proper way of understanding an injunctive sentence is that the optative and other affixes first make an agent understand that the performance of a particular rite leads to a particular result. Then the agent, motivated by desire regarding the result, exerts. There is nothing contradictory in admitting that words, referring to existent factors (*siddha-vastu*) even in ordinary parlance, become valid in their own right.

Yāmuna points out that *Upaniṣads* which speak of the Supreme Being, should therefore be treated as authoritative, since they give us a correct knowledge regarding the Lord, a knowledge that is free from all defects.

523. See p. 114 f. above for the theory of *niyoga*.

As regards the contention of the Mīmāṃsakas that *Upaniṣads* are not primarily valid on the ground that they speak of a *siddha-vastu*, the *Brahman*, the author argues in favour of the validity of the *siddhapara*-statements, like the *Naiyāyika*.⁵²⁴ Defects of repetition (*anuvāda*) and contradiction to facts (*viparyaya*), which the Mīmāṃsakas point out in the case of existing factors can also be applied to statements speaking of *kārya*, says Yāmuna. It is asserted that all types of knowledge are valid in their own right provided they are free from defects like doubt and falsehood and also that no distinction should be made in terms of something to be accomplished through action (*kārya*) and something that already exists (*siddha*).

Yāmuna criticises the Bhāṭṭa view that omniscience is beyond all possibility. The author states that this view is directly opposed to the Vedic passages which speak of the Lord's Omniscience as quite natural with Him : "He sees even without eyes",⁵²⁵ "The knowledge of the Lord is natural",⁵²⁶ and so on. These statements should not be taken in a secondary sense as urged by the opponent because there is nothing contradictory to their primary significance.

It is argued that the existence of the Supreme Being is asserted by various *Upaniṣads* which also attribute Omniscience, Mercy, etc, to Him. Once the Lord is thus proved to exist, it follows that the *Pāñcarātra*-scriptures which depend upon Him for their origination are undoubtedly valid.

The next discussion is as to who actually is the Highest Deity glorified in the *Upaniṣads*. Our author declares that Vāsudeva is the Highest Being of the *Upaniṣads*; He creates, maintains and dissolves the universe and he is Omniscient and merciful. Yāmuna quotes several passages from the *Mahābhārata*, the *Viṣṇupurāṇa*, the *Liṅgapurāṇa*, the *Varāhapurāṇa* and the *Manusmṛti*, in support of his view. Rudra and other gods cannot

524. See p. 111 ff.

525. Cf. *Śvetāśvatara* III. 4 : "paśyatyacakṣuḥ sa śṛṇotyakarnaḥ", and also *Kena* 1.7 : "yaścakṣuṣā na paśyati".

526. *Ibid* : III. 6 : "na tasya kāryaṁ karaṇaṁ ca vidyate svābhāviki jñānabalakriyā ca".

be supreme because they are known to have birth, etc. Texts which seem to glorify them as supreme should be taken in a secondary sense since they are contradicted by direct Vedic assertions which make it clear that Viṣṇu alone is the Highest Person. The supremacy of Vāsudeva is emphasised by quotations from *Purāṇas* like the *Matsya*, the *Vāyu*, the *Bhaviṣyat* and the *Varāha*. The part where Yāmuna deals with the question of the Supremacy of Nārāyaṇa⁵²⁷ may be studied with special interest because the *Puruṣanirṇaya*, another work of our author, entirely devoted to the same question and to which he himself refers here,⁵²⁸ is no longer available.

Vāsudeva who had a direct comprehension of the instrumentality of *Dīkṣā* (Initiation) etc., to salvation, taught the *Pāñcarātrāgamas* to sages like *Nārada* and *Śaṇḍilya*. These *āgamas* ordain worship to Him as the only means of attaining the highest bliss. But the Śaivite *āgamas* ordain non-Vedic practices like "knowing the correct significance of the 'six symbols' (*mudrikāṣaṭka*)" and "wearing them" (*taddhāraṇa*) as the means of salvation. They also clearly declare that *mokṣa* cannot be attained through the knowledge regarding *Brahman*. These and such other factors are directly opposed to scriptures which speak of *Brahman* as the source of the highest bliss. Therefore, there could be no doubt regarding the non-Vedic character and the consequent invalidity of the *Śaivāgamas*, says Yāmuna.

Yāmuna further points out that the *Purāṇas* declare that Rudra deluded people by propounding non-Vedic doctrines like the *Ārhata*. So the source of the Śaiva and such other *āgamas* pronounced by Rudra and gods other than Viṣṇu, could only be deceit, doubt, etc., which stand in the way of admitting validity for those *āgamas*.

As regards the origin of the *Pāñcarātra* texts, Yāmuna states that Nārāyaṇa Who possesses a comprehensive knowledge regarding the vast Vedic literature, understood that His devotees

527. See *ĀP* : pp. 42-45.

528. *Ibid* : p. 45.

were unable to grasp and retain its meaning. Then, out of mercy, He gave them the *Pañcarātra Saṁhitās* through sages like Nārada and Śaṇḍilya; and these *Saṁhitās* bring out in an abridged form the very essence of the Vedic teaching.

Then the author turns to the argument that the *Pāñcarātra* is non-Vedic since it ordains *Dīkṣā* over and above the *Upanayana* sacrament for performing worship in temples. Yāmuna replies that it is not a non-Vedic mark. Special sacraments are ordained as and when necessary, to qualify one to perform particular duties. Thus, for instance, even for the performance of the *jyotiṣṭoma* rite, a special *Dīkṣā* is ordained by the injunction, “*āgnāvaiṣṇavamekādaśa-kapālaṁ nirvaped dīkṣiṣyamāṇaḥ*,”⁵²⁹ on a person who had already been initiated by the *upanayana*. But this cannot be put forth as the cause for the non-authoritative character of the above Vedic passage.

With regard to the argument that the *Pañcarātra* is non-Vedic on the ground that it is not enumerated as one among the fourteen sources of knowledge,⁵³⁰ it has been replied that on such a consideration, even the *Rāmāyaṇa* and *Mahābhārata* of great sages like Vālmīki and Vyāsa would be liable to the same defect of non-Vedic character, because they too are not included in the traditional list of the fourteen sources of knowledge.

The next discussion is about the alleged condemnation of these *āgamas* by Bādarāyaṇa, in his *Brahmasūtra*. The point to be kept in mind here is that Yāmuna does not hold Bādarāyaṇa, the author of the *Brahmasūtra*, to be different from Vyāsa, the author of the *Mahābhārata*.⁵³¹ According to him, both are identical. Thus he states that it is not possible to imagine Bādarāyaṇa refuting the Bhāgavata religion in his *Brahmasūtra*,

529. Quoted by Śabara in his commentary under *PM* : XII. i. 25.

530. See p. 101 above, for this argument.

531. Whether Bādarāyaṇa, the author of the *Brahmasūtra* is the same as Vyāsa, the author of the *Mahābhārata*, or a different person, is a matter of controversy. See in this connection, an article entitled “Is Vyāsa the same as Bādarāyaṇa”, by Śrī P.V. Subramanya Sastri, *Journal of Sri Venkateswara Oriental Research Institute* (Vol. VII.) pp. 176-179.

which he himself commends in glowing terms in his *Mahābhārata*, as the very essence of the four *Vedas*. Yāmuna quotes many passages from the *Mahābhārata* in support of his view.

The four aphorisms comprising the ‘*utpattayasāmbhava*’ or the ‘*Pāñcarātra*’ section of the *Brahmasūtra* (II. ii. 39-42)⁵³² are then explained after a refutation of the interpretation offered by the Advaitins. The Advaitins hold that all the four aphorisms refute the *Pāñcarātra*. They take a passage from one of the *āgamas* : “From Vāsudeva is born the individual self called Saṅkarṣaṇa ; from Saṅkarṣaṇa is born the mind (*manas*) called Pradyumna”, etc., and point out that this is a clear indication of the non-Vedic character of these *āgamas*, since the self which is birthless is said to be born. Against this and such other arguments, Yāmuna states that there is nothing in these *Āgamas* that contradicts Vedic conceptions. He takes the first two aphorisms as giving the *pūrvapakṣa*-view and the last two as declaring the *siddhānta*, the heart of the *Sūtrakāra*. The passage quoted above by the Advaitins does not state that a *jīva* is liable to birth, etc., or that an instrument (mind) is born out of an agent (*karṭṛ*). Terms like ‘*jīva*’ and ‘*manas*’ used here point to the superintending deities over those entities, having a particular form. Nowhere do the *Pāñcarātra-āgamas* say that the *jīva* and *manas* are born. Mind and such other sense-faculties are born out of the *Brahman* Himself according to the *Upaniṣads*, and the *Pāñcarātra*-texts themselves clearly accept this view. So, one has to take the *Pāñcarātra* to be as valid as the *Upaniṣads* themselves. The passage in question does not, as contended by the adversary, state that there are many Lords, each independent of the other, since the *Pāñcarātra* declares on the other hand, that there is no plurality of Lords and that Vāsudeva is the only source of the entire world-manifestation.⁵³³ The Lord, out of mere

532. The *sūtra*-number given here is according to the *Śrībhāṣya* of Rāmānuja. According to Śaṅkara, the number of these *sūtras* would be II. ii. 42-45. While giving the *Pūrvapakṣa*-view, we adopted the number according to Śaṅkara. We adopt here the number followed by Rāmānuja in the *Siddhānta*.

533. Though it is Vāsudeva that manifests Himself as Saṅkarṣaṇa, Pradyumna and Aniruddha, there is nothing to indicate that He is equal with the other three. He is considered to be the Highest and the most important of all these forms. The statement of the *Ahīrbudhnya Saṁhitā*

sport, manifests Himself in four different forms and protects the world. We have to accept that these manifestations are as genuine and purposeful as the other manifestations of Viṣṇu, such as Rāma, Lakṣmaṇa, Bharata and Śatrughna.⁵³⁴

The above argument is purely from the standpoint of a Pāñcarātrin. It will be highly interesting to note that, after all, the *Pāñcarātra* did not fail to appeal to some noble thinkers, even among the followers of Śāṅkara. It appears that Śāṅkara's attack on the *Pāñcarātra-vyūha*-theory could not convince his own followers. A section of the Advaitins held that the *Pāñcarātra* theory of the origination of the *jīva*, *manas*, etc., should not be understood literally and primarily. On the other hand, it should be taken in a secondary sense (*gauṇa*). The Advaitin who held this view was Amalānanda Sarasvatī, the famous author of the commentary called the "*Vedāntakalpataru*" on the *Bhāmātī* of Vācaspatiśmīra, which, in its turn, is a commentary on Śāṅkara's *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya*.

ch. 36 : śl. 65b, "guṇapradhānabhāvastu rāmāderiva yujyate", deserves to be noted. Vāsudeva is the main form, to which the rest are subordinate and complementary. Cf. *ibid.* ch. 53 :

"vyūhatrayasya bhavati kālēṇa kalanām sadā,
bhagavān vāsudevastu na vyūho nāpi kālavān
vyūhatrayamapekṣyaiva kālavyūhanirūpaṇam
kālenāmānataścāyamamitadyutirucyate" (śls. 11b-13a)

"vyūhatritayapūrvatvāt pradhānaḥ paripāthyate
saṅkarṣaṇādīmūrtiyantam aśeṣabhuvanaṁ yataḥ
bibhartyādhārābhāvena vyāpnotyantaśca tat svayaṁ" (18a-19).

Also cf. *ibid.* : ch. 55 : śl. 29 :

"saṅkarṣaṇādirūpeṇa vyūhyātmānam tridhā sthitaḥ
tattadāśritakāryāya yo vibhussarvatomukhaḥ"

It is thus clear that the criticism that the *Pāñcarātra-vyūha* theory admits plurality in the Godhead is baseless.

534. This explanation of Yāmuna is quite in accordance with the Pāñcarātra texts. Cf. AS. 36. 64-65 :

"pratitretāyugaṁ devaḥ sādhuṭrāṇakṛte hariḥ
rāmākṣmaṇaśatrughnabharatādyātmanā svayam
caturdhāvasthitaḥ tadvat cakrātmā harireva hi
guṇapradhānabhāvastu rāmāderiva yujyate"

Amalānanda advances the following argument in support of the Pāñcarātra-āgamas and their Vyūha-theory :

"The *Pāñcarātra-āgamas* were intentionally composed by Lord Vāsudeva. But the fact that He is omniscient (that is to say that His compositions are valid *in toto*) is known only through the *Vedas*, which are, so to say, the voluntary revelations by Lord Vāsudeva (*niśśvasitaṁ śrutih*). Thus, the Pāñcarātra texts, for their own validity, depend upon a Vedic statement to the effect that their author Vāsudeva is Omniscient, whereas the *Vedas*, being eternal in character, do not require anything else to prove their validity. Their validity is thus intrinsic (*svataḥ*). Now we read from the *Pāñcarātra* works that a '*jīva*' is born, whereas the Vedic texts declare that a '*jīva*' is not born. In such a case, it is the Vedic texts with intrinsic validity that establish themselves first, prior to the *āgama*-text. So we have to attach primary significance to the Vedic doctrine of the non-origination of the individual self and secondary significance (*gauṇa*) to the *āgama*-doctrine of the origination of the individual self. In the face of opposition from the *Veda*, the *āgama* gets only a secondary position regarding validity. But there is no question of the *āgama* statements being based on delusion (*na tu bhrāntam*).

These *āgamas* were composed by Vāsudeva, the Divine Being and His omniscience is attested by the *Vedas* themselves. The promulgators of other schools of thought like Kapila (of Sāṅkhya) and Patañjali (of Yoga) on the other hand, were human beings and hence were susceptible to err. So, there cannot be any comparison between the *Pāñcarātra-āgamas* and the texts of other schools of thought. It is no doubt stated in some Purāṇas that Lord Vāsudeva appeared as the Buddha and deluded people through non-Vedic preachings. But there is no proof as such, of any Purāṇic text declaring that the *Pāñcarātra* too was intended by the Lord to delude the world (*vyāmoḥārthan*).

The relevant portion of Amalānanda's commentary is worth quoting in full : ⁵³⁵

535. See *Śāṅkarabhāṣya* with *Bhāmātī*, *Vedāntakalpataru* and *Kalpataru-parimala*, edited by Mm. Anantakrishṇaśāstrin, re-edited by Bhārgava śāstrin and published by Pandurang Jawaji, Bombay, (1938). Vide Amalānanda's commentary on the aphorism : "utpattayasambhavāt" (*Brahmasūtra* II. ii. 42), p. 573.

“Pañcarātrakartur Vāsudevasya vedādeva
sarvajñatvāgamāt kapilapatañjalyādinām ca jīvatvāt, pañca-
rātrasya purāṇeṣu buddhādi-deśanāvat vyāmohārtham
Īśvarapraṇītatvāśravaṇāt, na yogādyadhikaraṇagatārthatā;
siddhāntastu—

buddipūrvakṛtiḥ pañcarātram, niśśvasitam śrutiḥ |
tena jīvajānistatra siddhā, gauṇī niyamyate ||

yāvaddhi ekadeśe vedāvirodhādīśvarabuddheḥ
vedamūlatvaṁ, vedādvā sarvaviśayatvaṁ pramīyate, tāvadeva
svataḥpramāṇavedāt jīvanutpattipramitau tādr̥gbuddhipūrva-
keśvaravacanāt na jīvotpattir-avagantum śakyate; *ataḥ
pramāṇāpahṛtaviśaye gauṇam tadvacanam, na tu bhrāntam
pūrvapakṣayukteriti*”.

Thus it has been proved that the *Pāñcarātra-āgamas* do not contradict Vedic doctrines. As regards the contention that these *āgamas* are contradicted by other *smṛti*-works, or by statements found elsewhere in these *āgamas* themselves, Yāmuna says that the contradiction is only apparent. The seemingly contradictory passages lose their contradiction when we keep in mind the fact that when one text is primary others become auxiliary. As such, the explanation offered by Śaṅkara to the four aphorisms of the *Brahmasūtra* in question, is entirely against the intention of Bādarāyaṇa, who holds the *Pāñcarātra* in high esteem and that it is as valid as the *Vedas* themselves.

Yāmuna states that Bādarāyaṇa, having refuted systems like the Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika on the ground that they militate against the Vedic doctrines, takes up the question of the validity of the *Pāñcarātra-āgamas*, because the context is such that the *Pāñcarātra* too, like the Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika may be subjected to doubts regarding validity. That is why, Bādarāyaṇa presents doubts regarding the validity of the *Pāñcarātra* in the first two aphorisms which form the *pūrvapakṣa* and establishes its validity in the last two aphorisms, which form the *siddhānta*. The *pūrvapakṣa*-view had already been given above. The conclusion arrived at is that there is nothing objectionable in speaking of the Jīva (Śaṅkarāyaṇa) and others as being “born”, since they are the Lord Himself, who is of the form of Knowledge (*viññāna*) and who is the Source (*ādi*) of the entire-universe. So

it is to be admitted that Lord Vāsudeva, though One, Himself becomes the ‘*kāraṇa*’ as well as the ‘*kārya*’.

Then he takes up the statement, “Śāṇḍilya studied the *Pāñcarātra-āgamas*, being unable to get the means of attaining the Highest from all the four *Vedas*”, which had been cited by the Advaitins as an instance of the denunciation of the *Vedas* by the *Pāñcarātra-āgamas*. For this, the reply is given that a defamatory statement (*nindā*) does not intend to blame what is expressly deprecated. Its purpose lies in praising something other than what is deprecated. Thus, we should take the present passage as intended to praise the *Āgamas*, but not to under-estimate the *Vedas*, as alleged. Then, the correct method of construing the above passage is also pointed out. The statement does not mean that “there is no human end in the *Vedas*”. It only means that “Śāṇḍilya could not get at the human end which is laid down in the *Vedas* because of their vastness”. Thus it is concluded that the purport of the *āgamas* and the *Vedas* is one and the same that and there is no contradiction between them.

Yāmuna then examines the view entertained by the *Bhāṣyakāra*⁵³⁶ that the *Pāñcarātra* is partially non-authoritative. He says that this statement had been made by the *Bhāṣyakāra* lest the weak-minded should reject the *Vedas* completely and take up these *Āgamas*, because of their easily comprehensible nature.

Yāmuna explains the aphorisms of the *Pāñcarātra-adhikaraṇa* (II-ii-39 to 42) in different ways and for different purposes. The *sūtra*, “*na ca kartuḥ karaṇam*”⁵³⁷ is explained by him as speaking of the revealed character (*apauruṣeyatva*) of the *Vedas*. Thereby the Naiyāyika's view that the *Vedas* are the work of *Īśvara* is refuted. It may be recalled that Yāmuna differs from the Naiyāyika regarding the authorship of the *Vedas*. According to Yāmuna, they are impersonal in character, whereas, for the Naiyāyika, they are the work of *Īśvara*, the Lord of the universe. The above *sūtra* means that the *Vedas* are not (*na ca*) the work (*karaṇam*) of *Īśvara* (*kartuḥ*). In the course of these explanations, Yāmuna makes it clear that the *Pāñcarātra* is as valid as the

536. See *ĀP.* p. 66

537. *Brahmasūtra* : II.ii. 40.

Vedas themselves. He says further that since Vāsudeva Himself is glorified in many *Upaniṣads* and *Purāṇas*, *Pāñcarātra*, His work, cannot be questioned in regard to its validity by attributing evil qualities like deceit to Vāsudeva, its author.

Regarding the contention that the *Pāñcarātra* is invalid on the ground that people outside the pale of the *Vedas* practise the rites ordained by it, Yāmuna disproves it with all his logical skills, posing various alternatives regarding the exact meaning of the expression “being outside the pale of the *Vedas*”. Vedic seers of great repute like Bhṛgu and Bharadvāja accept the authority of these *āgamas*, as is revealed by their own works. Even today, orthodox people are found to perform the rites enjoined in these texts, as for instance, the construction of temples, consecration of images and the like. They perform those rites, even as they perform other Vedic duties.

As regards the argument that *Pāñcarātra* is invalid since it is followed by the Bhāgavatas who do not belong to any of the three higher castes, Yāmuna replies that the Bhāgavatas are orthodox Brāhmaṇas following the *Ekāyana*-branch of the *Śukla Yajurveda*. They too maintain the Brahmanical marks like knots of hair and sacred thread and remember their *gotra*. The Brahmanical status of a man, however, is known by ocular perception (*pratyakṣa*) that is coupled with the recollection (*smaraṇa*) of the particular family to which he belongs. Since such a practice of remembering the *gotra* exists among the Bhāgavatas, the fact that they are Brāhmaṇas is to be accepted without any doubt.

Yāmuna then examines the *Smṛti*-statement that the Bhāgavatas belong to the *vaiśya-vrātya* community⁵³⁸ which is decidedly non-Vedic. It had been urged by the opponent that the Bhāgavatas were referred to by the name “*sāttvata*” in the *smṛtis*. In reply Yāmuna points out that the terms, “*bhāgavata*” and “*sāttvata*” appearing in the *smṛtis* need not necessarily be taken as pointing to those belonging to the particular *vaiśya-vrātya*

538. Vide MS. X. 23 :

“vaiśyāttu jāyate vrātyāt sudhanvā “cārya eva ca|
bhāruṣaṣca nijaṅghaṣca maitrassāttvata eva ca||”

community, because there are orthodox people also bearing the same name. As a matter of fact, the Bhāgavatas have nothing to do with the *vaiśya-vrātya* community referred to in the *smṛtis*. If these two terms, “*bhāgavata*” and “*sāttva*”, are taken to point only to a community low in the social scale, Yāmuna argues that even the term, “*ācārya*”, mentioned in the passage, “*vaiśyāttu jāyate vrātyāt sudhanvā “cārya eva ca*”,⁵³⁹ will have to be taken as referring to another low-class person known as “*ācārya*” but not to the learned Brāhmaṇa teacher, since it is mentioned along with the term “*sāttvata*”. But we know that the term “*ācārya*” signifies the Vedic teacher and that it could also mean a low-born man.

As regards the contention that the terms “*bhāgavata*” and “*sāttvata*” should be taken in their conventional sense alone, meaning a low community, the author says that this contention is baseless. When a term is capable of yielding a meaning by etymology itself, there is no justification in pressing the conventional sense into service. Even the principle of the *rathakāra-nyāya* applies only to cases other than these. Thus, etymologically these two terms, “*bhāgavata*” and “*sāttvata*” which are formed by the addition of the suffix “*aṅ*” to the bases “*sāttvat*” and “*bhagavat*”, refer to the devotees of the Lord referred to by these bases, and this explanation is to be accepted as genuine.

Therefore the contention of the opponents that these Bhāgavatas are identical with *vrātyas*⁵⁴⁰ on account of similarity

539. *Ibid.*

540. Vide the following extracts from the *Līngadhāraṇacandrikā*, regarding the *vrātya* community : “The Atharvaveda mentions a new class of beings called ‘vrātyas’. They meant originally those that were naturally pure and thus needed no saṁskāra—hence they are glorified in the Atharvaveda. Prāṇa is spoken in the *Praśnopaniṣat* as being a ‘vrātya’ and has been explained by Śaṅkarācārya in his *bhāṣya* as “prathamajātāt anyasya saṁskarturabhāvāt asaṁskṛtaḥ; tvaṁ svabhāvata eva śuddha ityabhiprāyaḥ’.....The Vrātyas seem to have attached greater importance to a life of austerity and meditation upon God, than to the performance of sacrificial rites and the like.

It is said in the *Atharvaveda* (XV-11) that any one who “entertains a Vrātya will gain the road that gods travel”, “will gain possession of

of avocation, stands refuted. *Vrātyas* who look after the temple and the Bhāgavatas who perform the five-fold acts like *upādāna*, *abhigamana*, *ijyā*, *svādhyāya* and *yoga* which are ordained upon devout Pāñcarātrins, cannot at all be identical. The usage of terms like '*bhāgavata*' and '*sāttvata*' should not be understood as necessitated by the non-Brahmanical status of these people. They should be explained like the terms "*bhāhmaṇa*" and "*parivrājaka*". Yāmuna supports this view by citing other *nyāyas*.

waters", "will obtain what is dear", etc. The Veda similarly mentions further other benefits bestowed upon those that honoured the *Vrātyas*. The word '*vrātya*' may or may not be understood as a form of Brahman — but it is evident that at this and subsequent times there must have developed in the public a reverence for religious mendicants who wandered about the land....without conforming themselves to the Brahmanic conventions.

Even during the Vedic times, their failure to conform to Vedic rites seems to have been disapproved, and the *Vrātyas* were regarded as falling outside the pale of orthodox society. And an attempt seems to have been made by the orthodox section to take the *Vrātyas* back into their fold by subjecting them to some purificatory ceremonies called '*vrātyastomas*', a noteworthy content of the *Tāṇḍyabrāhmaṇa* of the *Sāma Veda*. 'They are sacrifices meant to enable these Āryan but non-Brahmanical Indians to enter the Brahmanical order' (MacDonel, *Sanskrit Literature*, p.210). But it seems that the *Vrātyastomas* had not much effect and the *Vrātya*-section continued to develop and increase. Otherwise, there was no necessity for the later orthodox literature contained in *sūtras* and *smṛtis* to treat of *Vrātyas* and the *Vrātyastomas*. e.g. *Kātyāyana Śrautasūtra* says : "vrātyayogyah stomah.....vrātyāḥ prasiddhā eva, patitasāvitrikāḥ" (*Vācaspatya* : p. 5071).

They came to be a heterodox and degraded people, as may be ascertained from the derivative explanation of the word '*vrātya*' as : vrātāt samūhāt cyavati yat, avyavahārye saṁskārahine jātimātropajivīni" (*Vācaspatya* : p. 5071)—pp. 151-3.

"The position of the *Vrātyas* was much better than that of the Śūdras. They were certainly non-Śūdras but were privileged Āryans and had degraded themselves by discarding the Brahmanical conventions. Otherwise the *Vrātyastomas* or the purificatory ceremonies cannot be significant except that they were designed by the orthodox section to take back the *Vrātyas*, the non-conformists, within their fold".—p. 158.

The next contention is that the Bhāgavatas are not at all orthodox Brāhmaṇas, since they worship the Lord for their livelihood and also take in the food offered to Him, which acts are strictly forbidden for the orthodox. The reply is that all Bhāgavatas are not found engaged in worshipping the Lord for livelihood. It is true that some Bhāgavatas, with acute pecuniary conditions may worship for their maintenance (*svārtha*). But this does not, in the least, affect the Brahmanical character of the Bhāgavatas in general, whose one-pointed devotion to the Lord is unquestionable. Worshipping for personal sustenance is prohibited only when it is done by greedy worshippers purely as a trade, but not otherwise.

As regards the argument that the Bhāgavatas are identical with the *Devalakas* who worship God for livelihood and live upon God's exchequer, which activities are denounced by the *smṛtis*, Yāmuna, on the evidence of many *smṛtis*-passages, replies that the condemnation applies only to those who are not initiated according to the *Pāñcarātra* scriptures. It is also pointed out that the term, "*devalaka*" applies to one engaged in the worship of deities other than Viṣṇu, like Rudra and Kālī.

Regarding the allegation that the Bhāgavatas are not orthodox since they eat the food offered to the Lord (*naivedya*) and use His *nirmālya*, which activities are condemned by the *smṛtis*, Yāmuna discusses at length and concludes on the evidence of many *Samhitās* and *Smṛtis* that there is nothing contradicting the usage of Viṣṇu's *naivedya* and *nirmālya*. Statements condemning their usage, found in some texts, are to be taken as referring to the *naivedya* and *nirmālya* of deities other than Viṣṇu. Yāmuna declares that nobody can call in question the holy character of the *naivedya* and *nirmālya* of Viṣṇu.

Regarding the contention that the Bhāgavatas are non-Vedic on the ground that they perform sacraments like *garbhādhāna* in a way that is quite different from the familiar one followed by others generally, Yāmuna replies as follows : Bhāgavatas who follow the *Ekāyanaśākhā* of the *Śukla Yajurveda*, perform sacraments only according to the *Gṛhyasūtra* of Kātyāyana. They do not lose their Brahmanical status by not performing the rites in the way ordained by other branches of

the *Veda*. One following a particular Vedic recension and undergoing certain *samskāras* should not question the way in which these very sacraments are being performed by other Vedic groups. One has to take into consideration the *tradition* that governs such practices.

The *Ekāyana* branch of the *Śukla Yajurveda*, on which the *Pañcarātra* is claimed to be based, Yāmuna declares, is not originated by a human being. He refers his readers in this connection, to another work, *Kāśmirāgamaprāmāṇya*, which seems to be own work,⁵⁴¹ and which is unfortunately lost to us. This work is devoted to establish the *apauruṣeyatva* or the revealed character of the *Ekāyana* branch, says Yāmuna. The Bhāgavatas of the present day (his own times) says Yāmuna, in fine, cannot be proved to be *Vrātyas* (the non-conformists to Vedic rites) because they carry out all the Vedic rites like any other orthodox follower of the *Veda*, perform the *Sāvitrī* (*Gāyatrī*)-japa and so on.

Towards the end of the text, there are two stanzas in praise of Nāthamuni, the author's grandfather and also of the disciples of Nāthamuni. It is said that the disciples of Nāthamuni were great champions of the Bhāgavata (Sāttvata) religion and that they were unparalleled dialecticians, fit to silence the opponents through the very arguments set forth by the latter. Nāthamuni is glorified here as a great devotee of Mukunda (Viṣṇu, the bestower of *mokṣa*) and as one who had a direct vision of the Three Realities (*tattvatraya*—i.e., *Cit*, *Acit* and *Īśvara*), through his *yogic* powers.

(e) *The Siddhitraya*

The *Siddhitraya*, which we now take up for study, happens to be the largest and the most important of all the compositions of Yāmuna. This work can rightly be said to be the source-book of Rāmānuja's *Śrībhāṣya*, since many of the arguments and points of philosophical importance set forth in the *Siddhitraya* are either quoted or adapted by Rāmānuja.⁵⁴²

541. See pp. 2-3 above.

542. See Ch. VI below.

It may be noted, at the outset, that already by the time of our author, there existed the *Siddhi*-literature, i.e., literary works having the term '*siddhi*' as the last member;⁵⁴³ e.g., the *Iṣṭasiddhi*, the *Naiṣkarmyasiddhi*, the *Brahmasiddhi* and the *Sphoṭasiddhi*. "The term '*siddhi*' stands for conclusive ascertainment as a result of careful investigation ; and it presupposes discussion of a polemical nature, in many cases".⁵⁴⁴ The fact that Yāmuna, in the *Siddhitraya*, refutes the view set forth in the three Advaita works, the *Iṣṭasiddhi*, the *Naiṣkarmyasiddhi* and the *Brahmasiddhi*, may be taken as explaining the name '*Siddhitraya*'.⁵⁴⁵

As the very name suggests, the *Siddhitraya* consists of three parts devoted to the establishment of the *Ātman* (the individual self), *Īśvara* (the Supreme Being) and *Samvit* (knowledge as distinct from the object), which are known as the *Ātmasiddhi*, *Īśvarasiddhi* and *Samvitsiddhi* respectively. It is a matter of regret that all these three *Siddhis* suffer from gaps and the extant text of the *Siddhitraya* is only a fragment of an originally larger work.

As regards the order in which these *Siddhis* were originally written, internal evidence shows that it is the *Samvit* - that comes first, since reference to it is found in the *Ātma*.⁵⁴⁶ The second and the third in succession are the *Ātma* - and the *Īśvara* -. This is proved by the fact that Yāmuna refers to the *Ātma* in the *Īśvara*.⁵⁴⁷ But the more popular order in which these sections are

543. Vide Introduction to the *Brahmasiddhi* (Section I) by Mm. Prof. S. Kuppaswamy Sastry.

544. *Ibid.* p. xxii.

545. Vide commentary on the *Siddhitraya* (*Īśvarasiddhi*), p. 106, by Sri Uttamūr T. Virarāghavācārya.

546. Vide *Siddhitraya* with the commentary by Anṇaṅgarācārya, *Ātmasiddhi*, p. 84 : "prakāśaśca...samvitsiddhāveva sādhitam".

547. Vide *Īśvarasiddhi*, p. 256 : "pūrvadeha...ātmacintāyām".

found in the available editions⁵⁴⁸ is made up of those relating to the establishment of the *Ātman*, the *Īsvara* and the *Samvit*. We shall follow this order in studying the work. The fact that the *Ātmasiddhi* has an invocatory stanza (*maṅgala-sloka*) may, however, support this arrangement but it cannot be taken as a strong proof, since the available texts of the two other *Siddhis*, especially the *Samvit*, have no beginning.

The *Ātmasiddhi* is the largest of all the three *Siddhis* available, and it consists of metrical as well as prose passages. In this section, the author proposes to discuss and establish the real nature of the *Ātman*, the individual self. The *Nyāyasiddhāṅjana* of Venkaṭanātha alias Vedānta Deśika reveals the fact that the *Ātmasiddhi* is a digest of the *Nyāyatattva* of Nāthamuni⁵⁴⁹ and it is probable that it is a digest of the *pramāṭr-pāda* of the latter. From the manner in which the subject is introduced in this part which has its share of gaps, Yāmuna seems to have dealt with it in its entirety.⁵⁵⁰ Having established that the finite self is self-luminous, the text undertakes to establish its eternal character (*nityatva*) by first stating the *prima facie* view advanced by the Buddhists. Even this *pūrvapakṣa* is not completely found here. It is at this point that this section breaks off. The verse that summarises the *siddhānta*-view on the individual self is :

548. The editions of the *Siddhitrāya* are :

- (i) by Śrī Rāmamiśraśāstrin. Benares, Pandit Series.
- (ii) with commentary by Uttamūr T. Virarāghavācārya. Śrīvāṇī Press, Tirupati, 1942.
- (iii) with commentary by P.B. Anṇaṅgarācārya of Vadtal. Nirṇayasāgar Press, 1954.
- (iv) with English translation by Prof. R. Ramanujacharya. Ubhaya Vedānta Granthamala Book Trust, Madras, 1972. Throughout this Thesis, page-references to the *Siddhitrāya* correspond to the work edited by P.B. Anṇaṅgarācārya.

549. Vide *Nyāyasiddhāṅjana*, pp. 243-44 : "nyāyatattvaśāstraparakaraṇaḥ hi Ātmasiddhiḥ".

550. Cf. *ĀS.* p. 14 f.

"tadevamanavasitaviśeṣavimarsakajanavimatidarśanāt, tattatpakṣasādhanaśābalābalānavagamācca tatastataḥ saṁdihānāḥ prekṣāvanto na tāvat paramapurusaṁsthāya ghaṭeraṇ, yāvadayamātmā paramātmā ca svarūpataḥ, pramāṇataḥ, sambandhataḥ, prāptitā, tatsādhanaśāca na nirṇīyetaḥ tatpratibodhāyedaṁārabhyate".

"dehendriyamanahprāṇadhībhyo 'nyo 'nanyasādhanaḥ nityo vyāpī pratikṣetramātmā bhinnah svataḥ sukhi"⁵⁵¹

This stanza puts forth the *Siddhānta* or the author's own view on the nature of the individual self and the rest of this section is by way of substantiating this view, in the course of which various theories on the nature of the self advocated by the Cārvākas, the Buddhists, the Advaitins, the Sāṅkhyas and Mimāṃsakas are stated and refuted.

The *Īśvarasiddhi*, too, has passages both in verse and prose. In this section Yāmuna tries to establish the existence of the Supreme Being who is also the Controller of the entire universe. This section too breaks off somewhat abruptly towards the end. The term '*tatra*'⁵⁵² with which the vulgate text of the *Īśvarasiddhi* begins, leaves room to think that the opening part of this section is also lost. The available text of this section has the following order of arguments—the Mimāṃsaka's contention that no Supreme Creator for this world is necessary ; refutation of this view by the Naiyāyika, in favour of an Omniscient Creator-God; the Mimāṃsaka's criticism of this, and a further refutation of the Mimāṃsaka's view by the Naiyāyika. It is here that this *Siddhi* ends. Some hold that this section, in its present form, is complete. In such a case, it has to be taken for granted that the author, concurs with the Naiyāyika's manner of proving the existence of God through Inference (*anumāna*), which, however, is hard to believe.⁵⁵³

The *sāstrayonitva* section of Rāmānuja's *Śrībhāṣya* which follows the *Īśvarasiddhi* almost *verbatim*, has an interesting feature about it, viz., that the entire *Īśvarasiddhi* in its present

551. *Ibid.* p. 17.

552. Cf. the opening stanza of the *IS.* p. 225 :

"tatra kasyacidekasya vaśe viśvaṁ pravartate iti sādhayitum pūrvam pūrvapakṣaṁ pracakṣmahe".

553. Yāmuna does not admit Inference as a means of establishing the *jīva* even, as is evidenced by the following statement in *ĀS.* p. 139: "ānumānikapapyātmasiddhimāśraddadhānāḥ śrautimeva tāṁ śrotṛiṇāḥ saṅgirante". From this, we can infer that Yāmuna would not have employed Inference to establish the existence of Supreme Being.

form has been included in the *pūrvapakṣa* and the conclusion has been arrived at in a different fashion, after refuting the contention of the logician too, with which the extant text of the *Īśvarasiddhi* ends⁵⁵⁴. The Naiyāyika infers the existence, omnipotence, etc. of God through logic whereas the Vedāntin establishes them strictly on the authority of scriptural passages, without recourse to pure logic. In the light of this, it appears that the entire text of the *Īśvarasiddhi* originally written by Yāmuna, consisted of a further *siddhānta*-portion establishing the existence of God on the lines of Vedāntic thought, which however, came to be lost in course of time. This view has the express support of the opening verse of the *Siddhi*, wherein the term 'pūrvapakṣa' occurs, covering even the Naiyāyika's arguments.⁵⁵⁵

The third section viz., the *Samvitsiddhi*, has a speciality about it, in that it is full of metrical passages ; this section too is subject to the same fate of having gaps as the two preceding ones. Perhaps this is the only section that suffers heavily from gaps, at the beginning, the middle and the end. The available portion of this *Siddhi* contains passages which refute the Advaitic interpretation of some important Upaniṣadic texts and also the Advaitic conception of the *Brahman*, *māyā*, etc. Some of the passages of this section may make us suppose that the original text consisted of the refutation of the Buddhist conception of *saṃvit* (consciousness) also.⁵⁵⁶

Some verses of the *Samvitsiddhi*, not available in the vulgate text, are found quoted in the commentary of the *Śrībhāṣya* by Sudarśanasūri and also by Venkaṭanātha in some of his works. We shall discuss later on the missing portions of this *Siddhi*.

* * *

554. *Brahmasūtra* I. i. 3 : "śāstrayonivāt"

555. *ĪS.* p. 225 : "pūrvapakṣaṁ pracakṣmahe".

556. Cf. *SS.* p. 332 f : "nīlādyupaplavāpetasvacchacinmātra-santatiḥ"

The Ātmasiddhi

The *Ātmasiddhi* opens with an invocatory stanza, wherein the author aspires for the highest form of devotion to the Supreme.⁵⁵⁷ This verse is important because it not only stresses the need of devotion (*bhakti*) to the Lord, but also brings out, in a succinct way, the characteristics of the Supreme Godhead. The entire universe of matter and spirit—Matter in the unmanifest (*prakṛti*) and the manifest (*vyakta*) forms, the element Time (*kāla*), and souls which are many (*aneka*) and classified as the bound (*puruṣa*), the liberated (*mukta*) and the ever-liberated (*nityasiddha*)—is said to run its course under the Will (*icchā*) of the Supreme Being, who is associated with Śrī. The Supreme Being is also said to be attended upon by the liberated and ever-released souls (*nityasiddhas*), whose only enjoyment is serving the Lord and His consort.

The author then sketches briefly the different views regarding the individual self and the Supreme Being with respect to such issues as their form, means of establishing their existence, mutual relations, release for the individual self and the means of release. He also observes that the compositions of philosophers like Bhartṛhari, Śaṅkara and Bhāskara have only misrepresented these issues and thus justifies his own undertaking in the present work.⁵⁵⁸

In a verse that follows,⁵⁵⁹ Yāmuna enumerates six characteristics of the individual self, which he proposes to

557. Cf. *ĀS.* p. 1 :

"prakṛtipuruṣakālavayaktamuktā yadicchām anuvidadhātī nityam
nityasiddhairanekaiḥ
svaparicaraṇabhogaiśśrīmati priyamāṇe bhavatu mama paramin
pūruṣe bhaktibhūmā ||

558. *ĀS.* pp. 4-17. Cf. *ibid* : pp. 15-16 : "yadyapi bhagavatā
bādarāyaṇenedamarthānyeva sūtrāṇi prañitāni ; vivṛtāni ca tāni
parimitagambhirabhāṣiṇā dramīdabhāṣyakṛtā ; vistṛtāni ca tāni
gambhīranyāyasāgarabhāṣiṇā śrīvatsāṅkamīśreṇāpi ; tathāpi
ācāryaṭaṅka-bhartṛprapaṅka-bhartṛmitra-bhartṛhari-brahmadatta-śaṅk-
ara-śrīvatsāṅka-bhāskarādiviracitasitāsativividhanibandhanaśrad-
dhāvīpralabdhabuddhaya na yathāvat, anyathā ca pratipadyante iti
yuktaḥ prakaraṇaprakramaḥ"

559. *Ibid.* p. 17 :

"dehendriyamaṇaḥprāṇādhibhyo 'nyo 'nanyasādhanaḥ
nityo vyāpī pratikṣetramātmā bhinnassvatassukhī".

establish in the *Ātmasiddhi*, after refuting other views. The self, according to him, is quite distinct from the physical body, sense-organs, mind, vital breath and intellect. It is self-luminous, eternal and also has attributive consciousness which is all-pervasive. There are as many selves as there are bodies. The self is naturally blissful.

The first critic introduced by Yāmuna for refutation is the Cārvāka with his theory that the self (*ātman*) is not something different from the physical body. The concept of the self held by the Cārvāka, which is quite well-known, has been refuted by all theistic philosophers alike⁵⁶⁰ and so we shall pass on to the next theory on the nature of the self set forth by Yāmuna for refutation.

This is to the effect that the sense-faculties themselves are the self. The advocates of this theory maintain that, since the sense-organs are not visible, qualities like colour and size which are found in visible objects are also absent from them. As a result of this, there would be no conception of "aham" (I) associated with the presentation of the colour, form, etc., by the senses. The advocates of this theory claim that the defects from which the Cārvāka's theory of the self suffers, are absent here. The knowledge arising from the activity of a particular sense-organ pertains only to that particular sense. This point is corroborated by them by quoting a passage from the *Varāhapurāṇa*,⁵⁶¹ which apparently demarcates the knowledge of one sense-organ from that of another.

Criticising the view, Yāmuna says that it cannot stand the strain of logical scrutiny. If the senses are themselves the self, they must be so, either individually or collectively. No sense

560. Cf. *Prabhākaravijaya* of Nandīśvara, where the section on the nature of self is almost identical with the *Ātmasiddhi*-portion setting forth the Cārvāka-conception of the *ātman*.

561. *Varāhapurāṇa* ch. 98 : śls. 1-26 narrate the story of sage Satyatapas, replying to a hunter who questioned him about the whereabouts of a boar which had taken shelter in his āśrama. The sage in an indirect way replies that "neither the eye has a tongue nor the tongue, an eye". Cf. :

"draṣṭuṁ cakṣur nāsti jihveha vaktuṁ
jihvāśyāt tattvato 'stīha cakṣuḥ"

individually can be called the self, because then the recollection of a particular object by a particular sense-organ, already cognised by another sense, becomes impossible. But such a thing is a matter of experience for us, as is clear from the statement, "The pot which I saw before, is now being touched by me". The senses cannot also form the self collectively, for we do not either cognise or recollect a single object through all the sense-organs put together. This view also goes against our practical experience. If one sense fails to function, then according to this view, it should result in the death of the man possessing that sense.

Another defect about this theory is that when a particular sense-organ fails to function, the objects comprehended by that sense-organ before, can no longer be recollected later. But we know that recollections take place even in such cases. It is not a hard and fast rule that the knowledge arising out of a particular sense-organ inheres only in that particular sense. Thus, for example, we know that the sin arising from injuring a person through a weapon pertains only to the man who uses the weapon, but not to the weapon itself. The passage of the *Varāhapurāṇa* is to be understood in a different way. The statement made by the sage Satyatapas proceeded from his unwillingness either to let off the boar which resorted to him, or to allow the hunter and his family to die of starvation.

This is followed by another theory which maintains that the mind is the self and claims to be free from all the defects found in the preceding ones. The popular view that mind is superior to all the other sense-organs lends support to this view. Since mind is one and eternal, there is also no difficulty in accounting for perception and recollection, even though the senses may themselves fail to function.

This view is unsound, says Yāmuna because mind is, after all, an instrument for acquiring knowledge, like any other sense-organ. Even when the external sense-organs are in contact with their respective objects, they do not produce knowledge all at a time. They do so only one at a time, which makes us infer the existence of yet another means of knowledge without the aid of which other senses are not able to represent their objects simultaneously. This proves that mind is also an instrument involved in the production of knowledge. So it is contradictory

to say that mind itself is the self, i.e., the agent of knowledge. If, however, what is thus served by other senses is called the self and the mind is equated with it, it would only be a difference in name. But this would contradict all experience.⁵⁶²

The conception of the mind according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika is then set forth and refuted as unsound.⁵⁶³ But it may be noted that Yāmuna does not clarify his own position on the nature of the mind, except that it is an instrument but not the agent or possessor of knowledge.

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas infer mind as the ninth category on the ground that the absence of simultaneous recollections cannot otherwise be accounted for.⁵⁶⁴ Another reason they put forth is that pleasure, pain, etc., which are the special qualities inherent in the self, should have a non-inherent cause, which could only be of the form of conjunction (*saṃyoga*) of the self with some *other entity*; it is this *other entity* that is called '*manas*'. This view is supported by them through the illustration of the production of colour in the atoms of earthen articles resulting from the conjunction of fire. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas also point out that mind is not constituted of any one of the five elements—earth, water, fire, air and ether. If the mind is elemental, it must be one among the five elements. The possibility of the mind being made up of one of these five elements is ruled out by Inferences. Thus, to cite one or two instances: 'Mind cannot be constituted of earth because it is an *indriya* helpful in cognising taste (*rasa*). The mind cannot also be made up of water, for it is instrumental to the cognition of smell'.

These arguments are criticised by Yāmuna, through another critic. The question of accounting for the absence of simultaneous recollections remains unanswered, even after the

562. Cf. *ĀS.*, p. 46 : "tathā sati saṃjñāmātre vivādaḥ.....kintu tadā sarvalaukikavayavahāro bādhyetetyalam".

563. *Ibid* : pp. 46-54.

564. Cf. *Nyāyasūtra* : I. i. 16 : "yugapajñānānutpattir manaśo liṅgam".

mind is postulated. Although a man might have all the latent impressions in him necessary to rouse recollections of all the experiences he had, yet he is able recollect them one at a time, but not all at a time. It cannot be replied that this non-simultaneity is due to the sequence in which the stimulants of the *saṃskāras* occur. Even though one may try, through concentration, to recollect all his past experiences, he is able to recollect only one at a time. So, ultimately, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas have to bring in *adr̥ṣṭa* and such other factors to account for the non-simultaneity of recollections. The same principle can be applied to the present case also. Although the senses are in contact with external objects, knowledge regarding all entities is not produced at one and the same time, because of the *adr̥ṣṭa* of the person concerned. So it is clear that there is no need to bring in a ninth category called *manas*.

The argument that pleasure, pain, etc. which are inherent in the self should have, as their non-inherent cause, the contact of the self with some other entity—which entity is called *manas*—is also pointed out to be baseless. The non-inherent cause for pleasure and pain is the knowledge produced from the contact of the senses with favourable and unfavourable objects, which necessarily precedes all experience of pleasure and pain. This *jñāna*, in its turn, has, as its non-inherent cause (*asamavāyī-kāraṇa*), the contact of the senses with the self, where the senses happen to be already in conjunction with their respective objects. The conjunction between the self and the sense-organs has again, as its non-inherent cause, volition, *adr̥ṣṭa* and such other factors. As a matter of fact, volition itself forms the *asamavāyī-kāraṇa* for *adr̥ṣṭa*. This makes it clear that mind cannot be postulated as the ninth category on the ground that pleasure etc. require an *asamavāyī-kāraṇa*.

The next argument, viz., that the non-inherent cause of the special qualities of an eternal category could only be of the form of the conjunction (*saṃyoga*) of the eternal category with another entity, is also pointed out to be wrong. The illustration of colour found in the atoms of earth after contact with fire is also misplaced. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas have to infer the production of colour in earth-atoms only on the basis of their observation of colour in the effect (*kārya*). Likewise, even in the case of pleasure,

pain, etc., they should be admitted to have been preceded by the *jñāna* regarding entities that are favourable and unfavourable. Therefore, the postulation of the mind as the ninth category is not justified, since we are able to account for the non-appearance of simultaneous recollections in the manner shown above.

Even if the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas want to infer the conjunction of the self with some other entity only on the strength of invariable concomitance (*vyāpti*), then it will result in the inference of the conjunction of the self with a well-known entity possessing the quality of touch such as the physical body; and so, this cannot improve the position. As regards the view that the possibility of the mind being elemental is disproved by inferences, it is criticised as preposterous. The inference which denies that mind is constituted of the element earth, also implies at the same time that it is made up of water. Likewise, the inference which disproves the watery character of mind, implies its being made up of air and so on. So, this type of inference is not helpful to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas.⁵⁶⁵

The critic points out that mind is neither elemental in character, nor the ninth category. Mind is nothing but intellect (*buddhi*). The different states of mind are also matters of experience to us, as for example when we say, "My mind is perturbed", "My mind is peaceful," and so on. So, reference to the mind as an instrument of knowledge, found in authoritative texts, should only be understood as pointing to the different states of mind as '*buddhi*' and '*ahaṅkāra*'. This discussion ends here and Yāmuna points out, without giving us his own view on the matter, that under no condition can mind be called the self, whether it is identical with *buddhi* or a different category altogether.

The theory that is next introduced is that which identifies the *ātman* with vital breath. This is based on the observance of negative and positive concomitances of vital airs and the feeling of *ātmavā* in all bodies. To be clear, we feel the presence of the *ātman* in a physical body only when there is *prāṇa* inside; and we feel the absence of the self in a body when there is no *prāṇa*

565. Cf. ĀS., pp. 48-51.

in it. Since *prāṇa* is mobile, scriptural texts which speak of the *ātman* being liberated from the body, its movement in other dominions, etc., become meaningful. Otherwise, these texts should only be explained secondarily.

This theory is unsound, says Yāmuna. Vital breaths are not different from the air outside. That is why they cannot have consciousness. Another point is that when the self does not have any activity in deep sleep, *prāṇa* is still found to function. It is only due to the function of the *prāṇa* that the food, etc. taken in by man converted into the seven *dhātus*, even when he is asleep. So *prāṇa* is nothing but air within the body, associated with minute particles of the three elements— fire, water and earth.

Another strong proof against *prāṇa* being the self is the fact that it can be felt by touch as any external object. Moreover, *śrutis* which speak of the movement of the self after exit from the body cannot be divested of their primary significance. The *ātman* is subtle (*avibhu*) and as such, like the mind, can have motion in accordance with other contributory factors like volition and unseen merit (*adrṣṭa*). Yāmuna tells us that this discussion also appears in the section dealing with the magnitude (*parimāṇa*) of the self, which, unfortunately, is not available.⁵⁶⁶

The next view introduced is that the self is identical with *saṁvit* or consciousness.⁵⁶⁷ The advocates of this view put forth as the reason the fact of *saṁvit* being *ajāḍa*, i.e., different from what is non-intelligent. Whenever there is *jaḍatva*, there is the absence of *ātmavā*, as in the case of a pot. By *ajāḍatva* is meant the characteristic fact of self-manifestation, because we know that consciousness, when it exists, does not fail to shine forth of its own accord.

The Bhāṭṭa's criticism of the above is then given briefly, that consciousness is also non-intelligent (*jaḍa*), like a pot etc. and that its existence can only be inferred by means of an

566. Cf. ĀS., p. 56 : "parimāṇanirūpape 'pyetat bhaviṣyatītyala-madhunā".

567. Cf. *ibid* : "bhavatu tarhi saṁvidevātmā, ajaḍatvāt".

occasional property called 'jñātātā' or 'prakāśa' or 'prākāṣya' (manifestedness) generated in the objects.⁵⁶⁸

This view of Bhāṭṭas is then controverted from the Prābhākara-standpoint. There is no justification for the postulation of an unknown property called *jñātātā*. Consciousness is itself enough to account for all usage (*vyavahāra*). Mere objective consciousness without reference to a knower and the known, cannot be said to exist at all. The triple factor of knowledge, the knower and the known is a necessity for all cognitions.

The view that self-luminous Consciousness constitutes the self is then taken up. The statement, 'I know', is explained by the Buddhists as not primarily speaking of a knower as the substratum of Consciousness. This is a determinate perception (*savikalpaka*), which, according to them, is not strictly perceptual in character. The point that the *ātman* is not something different from Consciousness is explained by them on the ground that it is always presented together with the latter (*sahopalambha*). This rule of *sahopalambha*, according to them, does not have any exception. That is why the nature of the self described by others proceeds only from the misconception that the self is different from Consciousness and as such, the argument cannot be correct. The Buddhists point out, in fine, that self-luminous Consciousness is the only reality and that the world of illusory distinction between the knower and the known, is based on the impressions of that Consciousness (*vāṣanā*). The conclusion of the Advaitins regarding the nature of the self is also shown by Yāmuna to be similar to the above, except for the fact that the reason they put forth for the illusory appearance of distinctions in the world, is beginningless Nescience (*anādyavidyā*) and also that the self is of the form of such a Consciousness.

The above views are supported from quotations from the Buddhist and Advaita works.⁵⁶⁹

568. Cf. *ibid* : p. 57 : "tataśca tadgatāgantukaprakāśāti-śayadarśanena paścāt samvidanumāsyate iti".

569. *Pra. Vār. III. 354* :

"avaibhāgo 'pi buddhyātmā viparyāsitarśanaiḥ
grāhyagrāhakasamvittibhedavāniva lakṣyate"

Again, "śuddham tattvaṁ prapañcasya na heturanivṛttitah
jñātrjñeyavibhāgasya māyaiva janani tataḥ" (This is to be identified).

The Buddhist conception that momentary consciousness (*kṣaṇabhaṅginī samvit*) is the only Reality, is then criticised. Recognition of the type, "This is what I saw", involving a recollection and continuity, becomes inexplicable on this view, says Yāmuna. Even a recourse to the view that consciousness can exist without a substratum (*nirālambana-jñāna*) cannot solve this problem, because this view goes against our practical experience. Moreover, all knowledge in general will have some object or other ; if it does not pertain to any object (*ālambana*), it cannot be called *jñāna* at all. Another contradiction in the Buddhistic argument is that the reason they put forth, viz., 'being without a substratum or object (*nirālambanatva*)', does really have something to establish (*sālambana*) ; this is nothing but a contradiction in terms. Yāmuna further points out that the theory of the *nirālambanatva* of knowledge is refuted by Nāthamuni in his *Nyāyatattva* (called *sāstra*) by justifying the concept that all knowledge is real (*yathārtha-Khyāti*).⁵⁷⁰

It is further pointed out that the difficulty of accounting for recognition cannot even be met by the conception of a stream-cognition (*samvit-santāna*), or by denying the validity of recognition by inferences. An intelligent entity which is the seat of the stream of cognitions and which is also existent at the time of recognition, is declared by Yāmuna as an essential factor for recognition.

With the Buddhistic conception of Consciousness as the only reality thus set aside, the criticism now naturally turns to the Advaita which conceives of the self as Consciousness.

According to the Advaita, Consciousness is beginningless because it is self-existent and also because its antecedent non-existence (*prāgabhāva*) cannot be proved to exist by consciousness. 'Beginninglessness' also wards off modifications like growth and annihilation. For the same reason, it is also devoid of all differences of similar (*sajātiya*) and dissimilar (*vi-jātiya*) types, or even differences of an inherent nature (*svagata*). It can have no cognisable attribute too ("ato 'syā na meyaḥ kaścidapi

570. *ĀS. p. 65* : "yathārthakhyātisamarthanena ca sāstre....."

dharmo 'sti').⁵⁷¹ It is this self-luminous and immutable Consciousness that manifests itself as the finite and the infinite selves. *Iṣṭasiddhi*⁵⁷² is quoted by Yāmuna on the above. The view of Sureśvarācārya⁵⁷³ is also quoted to show that the self is of the form of *Saiṃvit* and that this alone could be the purport of all the Vedāntas.

Detailed examination of the statements is then made. The Advaitic concept of the self is contradicted by secular as well as scriptural usage. Thus, for example, the judgement, "I know this", shows consciousness as pertaining to an object and also as forming an attribute of the perceiving self, the knower. Knowledge arises, exists and vanishes. It is absent from states of sleep, swoon, etc., because any knowledge relating to those states is not recollected. Terms like *saiṃvit* and *jñāna* are only relative, implying the reference to an agent and an object. Absolute knowledge without any agent and object cannot exist at all.⁵⁷⁴

The statement that the previous non-existence (*prāgabdhāva*) of Consciousness cannot be established by Consciousness in incoherent, says Yāmuna. Consciousness generally reveals all objects irrespective of the time-factor. Only sensory perception has such limitations. With this, it is also pointed out that the view which holds that all objects of knowledge (*prameya*) are eternal because of their invariable relation with the eternal means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*) is wrong. The *pramāṇa-prameya*

571. Cf. *Iṣ. S.* p. 1: "nāsyā meyo dharmo 'pyastiyarthah". There are many lines from *Iṣṭasiddhi* actually quoted by Yāmuna in his *Ātmāsiddhi*, pp. 67-69.

572. Yāmuna quotes on p. 69 of the *ĀS.* the line, "yānubhūtirajameyā 'nantātmā", which is from the opening verse of *Iṣ. S.*

573. The following two verses from the *Bṛhdāraṇyakabhāṣyavārtika* are quoted :

"parāgarthaprameyeṣu yā phalatvena sammatā|
saiṃvit saiveha meyo 'rtho vedāntoktipramāṇataḥ|
aprāmānyaprasaktiśca syādito 'nyārthakalpane|
vedāntānām atas tasmān nānyamarthaṃ prakalpayet"||

574. *ĀS.* p. 73 "saṃbandhiśabdāśca saṃvidanubhūtijñānaprakāśādiśabdā iti śabdārthavidah; na hyakarmakasya jānātyāderakartṛkasya vā prayogo loke vede vā".

relation consists in the representation of the real form of objects by the means of knowledge, as belonging to a particular time, place, etc. The statement of the *Iṣṭasiddhi*⁵⁷⁵ that recollection does not pertain to external objects, that is to say, that it is invalid, is also pointed out to be baseless.

Self-existent consciousness cannot establish the non-existence of its own *prāgabdhāva*. Non-existence is established by effectual non-apprehension (*yogyānupalabdhi*) alone. All forms of knowledge like Perception and Inference cognise their objects under given conditions of time. Knowledge devoid of all distinctions cannot exist at all. Consciousness pertaining to others can be inferred. Otherwise, all activities would become impossible.

'*Anubhūtitva*' or being *anubhūti* or Consciousness is explained by Yāmuna as lying in manifesting its own self or its object to its substratum. Yāmuna argues out in detail against the statement of the Advaitins that Consciousness ceases to be itself, if it is cognised by anything else.

The argument that Consciousness is devoid of all modifications on the ground that it is without a beginning, is shown to go wrong in regard to its *prāgabdhāva* (prior non-existence); for such non-existence, though devoid of a beginning, is liable to end. The opinion that Consciousness is devoid of all distinctions is also shown by Yāmuna to be incorrect. The self, which is eternal, is distinct from the body, the senses, etc. One has to admit that the distinctions between different kinds of knowledge and their objects are all ultimately real on the strength of practical experience.

The contention that Consciousness has no cognisable attributes (*nāsyā meyo dharmo 'sti*) is also wrong. Qualities like self-luminosity and eternity with respect to Consciousness are admitted by the Advaitins themselves. The forms of consciousness, attributes like manifestation, eternity and number, are mutually distinct but not identical. Therefore, the declaration of the *Iṣṭasiddhi*, '*nāsyā meyo dharmo 'sti*'⁵⁷⁶ is only a contradiction

575. Cf. *ibid.* p. 76 : "ata eva 'smṛtir na bāhyaviṣayā, naṣṭe 'pyarthe smṛtidarśanāt' ityapi pralāpah".

Cf. *Iṣ. S.* IV-17; p. 294.

576. *Iṣ. S.* p. 1.

Y—20

in terms. The Genitive Case in “*asyāḥ*” (of this) necessarily implies some relation. Consciousness being manifest, it should only be qualified. If it is unmanifest, it would only become an absolute non-entity like a hare's horn. This manifestation must pertain to some person. Therefore, the Advaitic doctrine of Consciousness as the self cannot be the purport of the Vedāntas, says Yāmuna.

Recognitions like “I experienced this at one time” (*ahamidamanvabhūvaṁ*), cannot be explained on the Advaitic view as on the Buddhistic view, he says. Going into the details of the Advaitic concept, the author says that the view that Consciousness erroneously appears as the agent, even as the shell appears as silver, is incoherent. If this were correct, the illusion then should take the form, “Consciousness is I”, which, however, is not the case. The judgement, “I am conscious”, shows ‘consciousness’ as an attribute of the entity called “*aham*” (I). The doctrine of the illusory knowership of the Consciousness also cannot be maintained by its advocates. According to them, the self, after the dawn of true knowledge, loses its knowership. If this were true, absence of such knowledge is preferable to its attainment, points out Yāmuna.

Another *pūrvapakṣa* view is that there exists a “witnessing inner self” (*sākṣin*), distinct from the knower denoted by the term ‘I’. But this, according to our author, is unwarranted. ‘Being a witness’ means having direct knowledge of things. Direct knowledge pertains to the self denoted by the term ‘I’, which alone could be the witness (*sākṣin*), as is evidenced from statements like, “I know” (*aham jānāmi*), and “It manifests itself to me” (*mahyaṁ prakāśate*).

The next claim of the Advaitins is that egoity (*ahaṅkāra*), an evolute of the unmanifest *prakṛti* and intellect (*buddhi*), may be accepted as possessing this knowership. This view is rejected by Yāmuna on the ground that like the body, *ahaṅkāra* and *buddhi*, too, are devoid of consciousness, mutable, non-intelligent, etc. Knowership cannot be ascribed to them, even through the reflection of, or contact with consciousness, for consciousness is imperceptible and it also possesses no real knowership according to the Advaitins.

The view that *ahaṅkāra* manifests the self as residing within itself as a mirror, is then put forth. According to it, the judgement, “I know,” is a case of erroneous knowledge. In states of deep sleep and release, there is no representation of the entity, ‘I’; hence the self then exists in its original form of pure consciousness. So, what is referred to as “I”, cannot be the self. *Naiṣkarmya-siddhi*⁵⁷⁷ is quoted in support.

This view is criticised. Non-intelligent *ahaṅkāra* cannot manifest the self which is self-luminous, even as a lump of spent-up coal cannot manifest the Sun, as the former is dependent upon the latter for its very existence.⁵⁷⁸ *Ahaṅkāra* and the self are of two opposite natures; if the self were to be manifested by the former, it would only become non-intelligent like a pot.

The exact nature of the ‘manifestation’ claimed to be effected by *ahaṅkāra* in respect of the self cannot be explained too. The possibilities of manifestation ever taking place are also examined and refuted by Yāmuna. In the course of this refutation it is also stated that the Advaitic conception of a positive and indefinable nescience (*ajñāna*) as the material cause of the world is mere talk.

Moreover, a manifesting entity does not show the thing to be manifested as residing in itself. Lamps, etc., are given as the illustration. The theory of the intrinsic validity of knowledge demands a representation of all objects as they exist. The entity denoted by the ‘I’ alone could be the inward self, but not pure Consciousness, says Yāmuna.

The statement that the manifestation of ‘I’ is absent in states of deep sleep and release is shown by Yāmuna to be contradicted by common experience. In deep sleep, the element

577. NKS. II. 32 : p. 70 :

“ātmanāścedahaṁdharmo yāyānmuktisusuptayoḥ
yato nānveti tenāyamanyadīyo bhavedaḥam”

578. ĀS. p. 94 :

“śāntāṅgāra ivādityamahāṅkāro jaḍātmakaḥ
svayaṁjyotiṣāmātmānaṁ vyanaktīti na yuktimat”.

This is quoted by Rāmānuja in his *Śrībhāṣya* under I. i. 1.

of 'I' continues to exist, but does not cease to exist. None that has arisen from sleep recollects that he, during sleep, existed as pure Consciousness. Judgements like "I knew nothing at all" and "I was not conscious even of my own self", adduced by the Advaitins in support of their view, are explained by Yāmuna in accordance with his own line of argument that during deep sleep, the self-exists only as the 'I'.

Equally illogical is the contention that the consciousness of 'I' is absent in the state of *mokṣa*. If this argument were correct, it only comes to mean that the self perishes in release, as held by the Bauddhas. Awareness as '*aham*' (I) constitutes the very being of the self, and it is not its attribute. The statement, "Knowledge has arisen in me" (*jñānam me jātam*), shows knowledge as an attribute of the self.⁵⁷⁹

It is only for freeing one's own self from the sufferings of worldly existence and for attaining unending bliss that one would aspire and try for *mokṣa*. This cannot go well with the Advaitic conception of *mokṣa*, according to which in release, there would be a cessation of all ideas relating to the self termed "I". This view would thus result in the futility and the consequent invalidity of all the scriptures.

The Advaitins may further contend that in the judgement, "I know" (*aham jānāmi*), the self is actually represented by the term, "*jānāmi*", but not by the term "I". The entity "I" is only an objective element (*yuṣmadārtha*), dependent upon the self. This view is set aside on the ground that it contradicts experience. None would think of the entity, 'I', referred to in the above judgement as the objective element and as the not-self. The entity 'I' is self-luminous and independent, and it alone could be the knowing self. Even in the state of release, as in the state of bondage, the self shines forth as 'I', for its own sake, as opposed to entities like a pot. It should not be argued that this knowledge of '*aham*' would result in ignorance and bondage, for there is no invariable concomitance between the former and the latter.

579. ĀS. pp. 99-104.

Passages from the *Upaniṣads*⁵⁸⁰ and the *Bhagavadgītā*⁵⁸¹ are then quoted by Yāmuna to emphasise that seers like Vāmadeva, gods like Rudra and even the Supreme Being had the consciousness of 'I' while referring to their own selves.

The consciousness of 'I', in the absence of all contradictory factors, refers primarily to the self. When it refers to the body, it is termed '*avidyā*' or ignorance. The *Viṣṇupurāṇa*⁵⁸² is adduced by Yāmuna in support of this definition of *avidyā*.

Moreover, the Advaitins cannot explain the erroneous conception of the body as the self, for nobody thinks of his own body as pure consciousness, which, according to the Advaitins, is the self.

The Advaitic conception of the self is thus shown by Yāmuna as unsound on the ground of practical experience, reasonings, scriptural statements and also due to the fact that nescience (*avidyā*) cannot be attributed to the self.⁵⁸³

Fallacies are then pointed out in the Inference of the Advaitins that Consciousness is the self of the ground that it is *ajāda*, non-material or sentient. This term, '*ajādatva*', cannot properly be defined by the Advaitins. It may be said that a thing which exists but which is not a self-luminous entity, is *jaḍa* and that a thing which exists and shines forth as a self-luminous entity is *ajāda*. But on this definition, *ajādatva* may also apply to *sukha*, *duḥkha* and *icchā*, which are part of our experience, and to lamps etc., which exist and illumine. This reason, viz., *ajādatva*, can also be assailed as *āsiddha* and *viruddha*, since

580. Cf. ĀS. pp. 107-08 :

Brhadāranyaka : III. iv. 10 : "taddhaitat paśyan ṛṣirvāmadevaḥ pratipede aham manurabhavam sūryaśca".

Atharvaśiras : "ahameva ca vartāmi bhaviṣyāmi"; etc.

581. *Bhagavadgītā* : XV. 18a : "yasmāt kṣaramatīto 'hamakṣarādapi cottamaḥ" etc.

582. VI. 7. 10a : "śrūyatām cāpyavidyāyāḥ svarūpaṁ kulanandana" etc.

583. Cf. ĀS. p. 110 :

"ataḥ pratyakṣasiddhatvād uktanyāyāgamānvayāt avidyā-ayogataścātmā jñātāhamiti bhāṣate".

the Advaitins do not accept any manifestation different from Consciousness. They hold pleasure and pain as being *jaḍa* and not the self, for they manifest for the sake of others. But Yāmuna asks whether knowledge manifests itself for itself or for others. They have to say that it manifests for another entity denoted by 'aham' (I) and to whom an experience, 'I am happy' etc., occurs. So, this reason is *asiddha*. Thus, the self is that which is referred to as 'I', and which, being *ajaḍa*, manifests itself for its own self. Knowledge is dependent upon the self for its own manifestation. It is on this supposition that types of knowledge like pleasure and pain are said to manifest only to the self on which they are based, but not to others. The self, on the other hand, does not, for its own manifestation, stand in need of any relation with another self or anything else for that matter.

The author then proceeds to refute the Buddhistic theory of *sahopalambha* in great detail. This theory tries to prove that there is no self different from knowledge, by reason of the two being presented together, as expressed in such statements as, "*sahopalambhaniyamād abhedah nīlataddhiyoḥ*".⁵⁸⁴ But this *sahopalambha* theory, says the author, can equally be turned against the Buddhist, to prove that it is knowledge that is ever presented along with the self, in which case, knowledge will be *mithyā* or unreal. In our experience, there are two phases of *sāmānyas* and *viśeṣas* concomitant, presented as modes of a piece of knowledge. The Buddhistic theory of *sahopalambha* is *asiddha* in this instance, because *viśeṣas* vary from one another. The theory cannot be valid, because there is no knowledge which is purely particular (*viśeṣamātra*). 'Sāmānya', of course, is not acceptable to the Buddhists. But according to us, the self continues to shine forth even after cessation of all sensory activities as in states of deep sleep and dissolution.

The term '*sahopalambha*', is a contradiction in terms since the usage of the word '*saha*' ('along with') implies the acceptance of two different entities. So, having referred once to two different

584. This is attributed to Dharmakīrti. See *Pañcīkā* of Śālikanātha on *Bṛhatī* of Prabhākara under I. i, 5, p. 79 (Madras University Sanskrit Series No. 3, Part I). The second half of the verse is :

"bhedaśca bhrāntivijñānaiḥ drśyetendāvivādvaye".

entities as '*nīla*' (a blue object) and its '*dhi*' (knowledge) (*nīla-taddhiyoḥ*), the Buddhists cannot identity them.

The identity sought to be established by *sahopalambha* is vitiated also by the contingency that knowledge and its opposite, viz., *jaḍatva* which is negated by knowledge, are attended by *sahopalambha* and hence would become identical. It is also liable to the same fallacy in the case of the cognitions of the bound selves (*baddha*) which co-exist with the knowledge of the Enlightened One (*buddha*). If, according to the Buddhistic theory, all these cognitions were to be identical with *jaḍatva* and omniscience, it would not only result in knowledge becoming *jaḍa*, *mūrta*, etc. but also in the Enlightened becoming the bound, since knowledge would have all the limitations of the bound selves.⁵⁸⁵

With his theory of *sahopalambha* thus refuted, the Buddhist now tries to establish identity between knowledge and the knower through a slightly modified argument. According to this, identity between two entities can be established when both of them are cognised by a single cognition. *Saṁvit* and its knower can thus become identical, only when they both become the objects of another single cognition. Similar is the case of identity between *saṁvit* and object.

Even this argument is criticised by Yāmuna as unsound, since all the defects pointed out earlier in the *sahopalambha* argument, would continue here also.

Another defect pointed out is that this argument cannot achieve the desired identity between two entities like knowledge and an object, or knowledge and the knower, that is to say, that the probans is *aprayojaka* or inefficacious. Thus, there need not be any identity between knowledge, the knower and the known, even if they are all cognised by a single cognition. An object like *nīla* (a blue object, say, a blue pot), being non-luminous by its very nature, stands in need of self-luminous knowledge (*prakāśa*)

585. Cf. ĀS. p. 114 :

"anekāntaśca saṁvidi pratiṣṭidhyamānair jaḍatvādibhiḥ ; sarvajñajñānena sahopalambhaniyamabhāgibhiḥ saṁsārījñānaisca ; teṣāmbhedābhūpagame jñānasya jaḍatvamūrtatvādi, buddhasya baddhatvamityāpadyeta."

for its manifestation. Such being the case, there is no justification for the identification of objects with knowledge. The point that Yāmuna stresses here is that co-presentation of knowledge and objects is not due to the natural identity between both of them. Rather, it is due to the incapacity of the objects to manifest themselves independently, without the aid of self-luminous knowledge. Even granting that the theory of *sahopalambha* is valid, it might establish the identity of cognisable (external) objects alone, but never that of knowledge and its knower.⁵⁸⁶

The Buddhist theory of *sahopalambha*, says Yāmuna, is also contradicted by practical experience because, in all cases of knowledge, the knower shines forth as quite distinct from knowledge as well as the objects of knowledge.

The opponent might now contend that perception of entities is rendered possible only when the counter-correlatives of those entities are perceived. Thus, according to him, difference between knowledge and the knower could be apprehended only when the counter-correlative of difference, viz., knowledge, is either directly perceived or is at least capable of being perceived. But since knowledge cannot be an object of perception, being non-material, difference, whose counter-correlative knowledge is, cannot also be perceived.

But this is a baseless contention, says Yāmuna. Perception of objects should not be linked to the perception of their counter-correlatives. It is enough if the counter-correlatives are generally known and it is not necessary that they should also be *perceived*. In common experience too, all objects appear to be mutually distinct, although we do not perceive the counter-correlatives of those objects.⁵⁸⁷

The Buddhist now tries to vindicate his *sahopalambha* theory from the viewpoint of the relative strength of *pramāṇas*—Perception and Inference. He contends that Perception which establishes the difference between knowledge and its objects cannot contradict Inference which, on the contrary, proves their

586. Vide ĀS. pp. 115-16.

587. *Ibid* : p. 116

identity and on which is based his edifice of the *sahopalambha* theory. While agreeing that difference between entities is a matter of perception, he maintains that the *sahopalambha* or co-presentation of knowledge and the objects invariably proves their identity, which necessarily involves the refutation of difference. On this ground, he declares that Perception cannot disprove the conclusion arrived at through Inference. In support of this, he cites the instance of the inference which establishes difference between two flames appearing on one wick, which are, however, cognised as identical through recognititon (*pratyabhijñā*), a variety of Perception. Even as the inference here is more valid than Perception, so also, in the case under discussion, inference should be held more valid than perception, says the Buddhist.

But this contention, according to Yāmuna, is idle, because the criterion of relative strength between the two means of knowledge referred to above, viz., perception and inference, lies in one of them being free from ocular and such other defects. So long as defects in the causes continue to exist, even perceptual knowledge fails to disprove inference, which is based upon valid perception. The instance of flames cited by the opponent, should also be properly examined. Perception of the identity of flames can be proved to be erroneous because the person who perceives it fails to grasp the distinction between one flame and another in a continuous or non-continuous burning of oil lamp. He fails to notice the difference of flames because of two factors : (a) the close similarity of the preceding and the succeeding flames and (b) the appearance of those flames on one and the same wick.

All cases of erroneous perception of identity between two different entities are to be explained in this manner. Yāmuna says that even cases where difference is perceived in one and the same entity, could be proved erroneous, as for example when one and the same moon appears as two. Here, the observation of two moons is clerly attributable to some defect in the eye, and hence, could be proved to be erroneous. Such perceptions are also known to be defective due to the fact that they are contradicted by the perception of other persons who are free from such defects and to whom the same moon appears as one. It is therefore clear that

perception proceeding from defective sense-organs cannot refute inferences based on valid observations.

Yāmuna points out that the point under discussion is of a dissimilar nature.⁵⁸⁸ We perceive differences among things, and this is a valid perception, since it cannot be attributed to any defect. Therefore, the question of inference disproving perception does not arise here. That the perception of differences between the knower and knowledge is free from ocular and such other defects is also corroborated by the fact that the 'knower' and the 'knowledge' are beyond the purview of sense-organs. Moreover, there is no proof contradicting this difference, as in the case of the observation of two moons. Knowledge, in other words, consists in the realization or the correct apprehension of objects. Since this knowledge is self-luminous, *sahopalambha* would be a natural concomitant of the process of knowledge, and there can be no special theory about it, such as the Buddhists advance, for proving the identity of the cogniser and the cognition.

Yāmuna, in conclusion, states that the observations made above would prove that the Buddhistic conception of the self (*ātman*) is in utter contradiction to all practical experience.⁵⁸⁹

The author then turns to the Advaitic concept of the self as of the nature of luminosity. The self is quite distinct from non-luminous entities like pots, etc., and can therefore be described as of the nature of self-luminous knowledge. But it cannot, on this score, be identified with pure knowledge because it is independent and it possesses knowledge as its attribute. It also shines forth as 'aham' (I). Knowledge, on the contrary, is dependent upon the self and is also occasioned, and it assumes the form of the object cognised. Yāmuna emphasises the point that on no ground can the self be identified with pure knowledge, being the possessor of knowledge.⁵⁹⁰

588. Cf. ĀS. p. 117, ff.

589. *Ibid.* pp. 119-20.

590. *Ibid.* : pp. 120-21.

Passages are then quoted by the author from *Upaniṣads* like the *Chāndogya*,⁵⁹¹ the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*⁵⁹² and the *Praśna*⁵⁹³ in support of his description of the self as the knower and the controller of the vital breaths and as the self-luminous entity referred to as 'aham' (I), residing in the cavity of the heart.

Having thus shown that the individual self is possessed of knowledge, the author now proceeds to show that even the Supreme Self is a knower. The *Taittirīya* passage, "*satyaṁ jñānam anantaṁ brahma*",⁵⁹⁴ is explained by him as referring to the *Brahman* as the possessor of knowledge, but not as knowledge itself, as held by the Advaitins. Yāmuna argues that the term, 'jñāna', if it were to refer to 'knowledge' alone, should, according to Pāṇini's aphorism, "*liti*",⁵⁹⁵ have the *udātta* accent on the first syllable. But in the passage cited, the term 'jñāna', is pronounced with the *udātta* on the final syllable. The final *udātta* accent can be accounted for, only when the suffix, 'ac', in the sense of possession is added to the term 'jñāna'. So, the term 'jñāna', occurring in the above passage, means 'one who possesses knowledge'. Thus the Supreme Person is a Knower, but not mere knowledge. The author also quotes another passage from the *Aitareya Upaniṣad*⁵⁹⁶ to show that the Supreme Self is clearly referred to as a 'knower'.

Yāmuna thus concludes the topic that the individual self is the knower but not knowledge itself.⁵⁹⁷

The author then examines the nature of the means (*pramāṇa*) by which the individual soul is established as being distinct from the body, senses, etc.

591. VIII. xii. 3 : "atha yo veda idaṁ jighrāṇīti sa ātmā"

592. VI. iii. 7 : "yo'yaṁ vijñānamayaḥ prāṇeṣu hr̥dyantarjyotiḥ puruṣaḥ"

593. IV. 9 : "eṣa hi draṣṭā śrotā ghrātā rasayitā mantā boddhā kartā vijñānātmā puruṣaḥ"

594. II. i. 1.

595. VI. i. 193.

596. V-3,4 : "prajñām brahma....sa etena prajñenātmanā". But the reading generally found in printed texts of the *Upaniṣad* is : "prajñātmanā".

597. ĀS. p. 123.

The Nyāya view is first taken up for a critical examination, which tries to establish the self by inference on the ground that it is the substratum of the qualities, desire, hatred, effort, pleasure, pain and knowledge.⁵⁹⁸

Inference which is based upon the knowledge of invariable concomitance (*vyāpti*) between the probans and the probandum, is of two types : the *viśeṣatodṛṣṭa*⁵⁹⁹ and the *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa*, based upon concomitances between the particular and the general, i.e., the former referring to the concomitance of particular objects within the purview of sense-organs, and the later referring to the concomitance of objects beyond the ken of perceptual knowledge.

598. Cf. *Nyāyasūtra* : I. i. 10 : "icchādveṣaprayatnasukhaduḥkhañānāni ātmano liṅgam".

599. (a) Gautama in his *Nyāyasūtra* and Īśvarakṛṣṇa in his *Sāṅkhyakārikā*, refer to three types of inference—'pūrvavat', 'śeṣavat', and 'sāmānyatodṛṣṭa'. Vācaspatimiśra, in his commentary on the *Sāṅkhyakārikā*, makes a twofold division as 'vīta' and 'avīta', but nowhere do we find the 'viśeṣatodṛṣṭa' as a type of *anumāna*.

(b) Kauṇḍinya, in his commentary on the *Pāsupatasūtra* under I. i, p. 7 (Trivandrum Sanskrit Series) also does not name 'viśeṣatodṛṣṭa' but makes a different classification. He says : "tacca dvividham : dṛṣṭam sāmānyatodṛṣṭam ca; tatra dṛṣṭamapi dvividham—pūrvavat, śeṣavacca".

(c) *Nyāyamajārī* of Jayantabhaṭṭa (Vol. I. pp. 131-32), though making no express reference is made, describes *anumāna* which can be called "viśeṣatodṛṣṭa".

(d) Kumārila, for the first time, refers to the "viśeṣatodṛṣṭa" as a type of *anumāna* in his *Ślokavārtika* (section on *Anumāna*. verse 143), and ascribes the coining of this name to Vindhyavāsini. Cf. "viśeṣadṛṣṭametacca likhitam vindhyavāsini".

(e) The Śaiva work, *Paṇḍarāsaśāstrī*, with the commentary by Umāpati Śivācārya, gives *viśeṣatodṛṣṭa*. Umāpati says under V-42 (jñānapāda) : p. 542 (Jñānasambandhaviṇaya Press, Chidambaram) : "dṛṣṭam, sāmānyatodṛṣṭam viśeṣatodṛṣṭamiti dvividhā".

(f) Yāmuna himself refers to this in his *IS*. p. 233.

(g) In the Viśiṣṭādvaita literature, see Vedāntadeśika's *Nyāyapariśuddhi*, (p. 107), for this *anumāna*-variety.

(h) Also see *Bhaja's Śṛṅgāraprakāśa* by Dr. V. Raghavan, p. 739, for a complete account of the *viśeṣatodṛṣṭa*, and *Epistemology of the Bhāṭṭa School of Pūrvamīmāṃsā* by Govardhanadas P. Bhatta, p. 256. ff.

The "*viśeṣatodṛṣṭa*" would apply to cases falling within the possibility of one's direct experience. In the present case, if the relation between the particular *icchā*, *jñāna*, etc., and *ātman* could be seen by us, there would be no necessity for any *anumāna* to infer the self. Like the *sādhana-viśeṣa*, the *sādhya-viśeṣa* would also be perceptible. Therefore, *ātman* not being perceptible in this manner, the Naiyāyika would apply the next variety, viz., the *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa*, to achieve his end.

After making an *anuvāda* of the Nyāya-arguments inferring the self which are quite well-known,⁶⁰⁰ Yāmuna begins to refute them. It may be noted that the inferences advanced by the Naiyāyikas are, to a large extent, purely negative, being of the *kevalavyatireki* - type. While they infer some substratum for *icchā*, *jñāna*, etc., on the ground that they are qualities, employing the positive type of *anumāna* (the *anvayin*), they employ a number of *kevalavyatireki*-inferences to prove that the qualities referred to above inhere in an entity other than the body and also that they do not inhere in the body.

In reply to these arguments, Yāmuna states that the positive and the negative types of inference advanced by the Naiyāyika would merely point to "some" entity as the substrate of the qualities like effort and desire. But they fail to specify what that entity is, so much so that it is difficult to call it the "self". The Naiyāyika had brought in the purely negative type of inference—the *kevalavyatirekin*, so as to specify the substratum of the qualities as the *ātman*. But Yāmuna does not accord the *kevalavyatirekin* the status of a *pramāṇa* on the ground that it does not satisfy the necessary conditions. To explain, a reason can establish its end under the following conditions : (i) it must be present in the subject (*pakṣa*),⁶⁰¹ (ii) it must also be present in the positive instance (*sapakṣa*),⁶⁰² (iii) it must be absent from the negative instances (*vipakṣa*),⁶⁰³ and it must not be vitiated

600. See *Nyāyasūtra* : I. i. 10, ff, with Vātsyāyana's commentary.

601. In the statement, "The hill is fiery, because it is smoky", the *pakṣa* is the hill.

602. In the above, the *sapakṣa* is an instance which contains fire, as the kitchen, for example.

603. *Vipakṣa* is that where fire does not exist, e.g., a lake in this case.

by the defects called (iv) “*satpratipakṣa*”⁶⁰⁴ and (v) “*bādha*”.⁶⁰⁵ The *kevalavyatirekin* inference in question, says Yāmuna, does not satisfy the second condition mentioned above, viz., that the reason should be present in the positive illustration also. In the inferences of the *kevalavyatirekin* variety, not even a single case of positive illustration can be pointed out. Since the concomitance is to be grasped between the ‘*abhāvas*’ or non-existences of the probans and the probandum, it is not possible to show any positive instance (*sapakṣa*). When the inference thus fails to satisfy one of the important conditions, viz., presence of the reason in the *sapakṣa*, there could be no sound knowledge of *vyāpti* between the means and the end, so that it loses its character of an *anumāna*. That is why the author does not accept the *kevalavyatirekin* as an inference at all.⁶⁰⁶ In this respect, he compares the *kevalavyatirekin* to the fallacy called ‘*asādhāraṇa*’, where a reason is found to exist only in the subject (*pakṣa*), absenting itself from all instances, positive as well as negative, as in the statement, “Sound is eternal because it is sound” (*śabdo nityah śabdatvāt*).

The logician might now argue that even the *kevala-anvayin* type of *anumāna*, which the author holds valid, is vitiated by a similar defect. The *kevala-anvayin* or the purely positive inference too fails to satisfy the third condition referred to above, viz., absence of the *hetu* from all negative instances (*vipakṣa*). In all inferences of the *kevala-anvayin* type, not even a single case of *vipakṣa* can be shown where the reason is non-existent. In this regard, the logician points out that the *kevala-anvayin* inference is comparable to the fallacy called ‘*sādhāraṇa*’,⁶⁰⁷ where the

604. The fallacy *satpratipakṣa* arises when one reason admits of being counter-balanced by another reason that proves the non-existence of the probandum (*sādhya*). E.g., the statement, “Sound is eternal because it is audible”. The reason which disproves this can be stated as: “Sound is non-eternal for it is also originated like a pot”.

605. *Bādha* (stultified reason) is one which is put forward to prove a *probandum* whose non-existence is established through another proof. E.g., “Fire is not hot, for it is a substance”.

606. ĀS. p. 127 : “*kevalavyatirekī tu sādhanadaśāmeva nāsādayati*”

607. *Ibid* : pp. 127-28.

reason is found to exist in the *pakṣa* as well as *vipakṣa* as in the statement, ‘The hill is fiery because it is cognisable’ (*parvato vahnimān prameyatvāt*).

Replying to this objection, Yāmuna says that an inference in general should be based upon invariable concomitance (*vyāpti*) between the reason and the thing to be established. The *kevala-anvayin* inference with which the Naiyāyika finds fault, poses no difficulty in arriving at the invariable concomitance (*vyāpti*). It is no doubt true that in this type of inference, it is not possible to know that the reason is absent from the *vipakṣa*. But this will in no way hamper the knowledge of *vyāpti*. The absence of the reason from the negative instance (*vipakṣa*) cannot be grasped in this type of *anumāna*, only because there could be no *vipakṣa* at all. The instance of a *kevala-anvayin* inference is : “Everything is nameable because it is cognisable” (*sarvam abhidheyam premeyatvāt*). It may be noted that here no negative concomitance can be shown in the form : “wherever there is no nameability, there could be no cognisability”, because everything is cognisable and nameable, according to Nyāya. So, in such cases, there is no possibility of any negative instance ever existing. When there is no *vipakṣa* at all, how can any reason be found to be absent from it? So, the third of the five conditions enumerated above, should be taken as applying only to such inferences where a *vipakṣa* is capable of being pointed out. Since there is an unobstructed knowledge of *vyāpti*, it is to be admitted that the *kevala-anvayin* inference is valid.

It may further be contended by the Naiyāyika that the reason employed in the *kevala-anvayin* might, under different conditions of place and time, be vitiated by the defect called ‘*upādhi*’. But Yāmuna rejects this objection summarily by saying that anticipations regarding the possible defects in a reason could all be set at rest by cogent reasoning,⁶⁰⁸ the ultimate result being that the *vyāpti* between the *sādhana* and the *sādhya* becomes known.

608. ĀS. p. 128 : ‘*deśakālādisaṅkitopādhivigam’epi...*’ etc.

ĀP : p. 30 : “*anāgataviparyayotprekṣāyāḥ pratyakṣavirodhāt, aśeṣavyavahārocchedahetutvācca*”.

Continuing, Yāmuna says that the case of the *kevalavyatirekin* which the opponent so zealously adheres to, is an altogether different one. There it is not possible to conclude that the reason is concomitant with the thing to be established. Moreover, in the *kevalavyatirekin*, the concomitance is being established with the *abhāvas* with reference to the *sādhana* and the *sādhya*. As a matter of fact, the instances of *abhāva* are much more in number than those of the *pakṣa*, in which the reason and the thing to be established (*sādhya*) are present. Since it is highly difficult to have a complete knowledge of these *abhāvas*, there could be no knowledge of *vyāpti* through *abhāvas*. Even if a few cases of *abhāva* were noticed, it does not improve the position. Moreover, the real cause behind the absence of the *sādhya* which is referred to in the *kevalavyatirekin*, cannot be ascertained. The absence of the *sādhya* need not necessarily be due to the absence of the *sādhana* or the reason. It may also be due to some other factor.⁶⁰⁹ The intention of the author in raising this objection is to show that the *kevalavyatirekin* does not also satisfy the fifth condition required of an inference, viz., absence of the defect called 'bādha'.

Last of all, the author finds fault with the illustration given by the Naiyāyika in his inference. It had been said that qualities like *icchā* and *jñāna* belong to an entity other than the body, even as the quality 'sound' belongs to an entity other than the earth. The instance of the quality, 'sound', belonging to an entity other than earth, no doubt points to the existence of a different entity, but that entity is not precisely known as ether. Likewise, when it is said that qualities like desire and knowledge belong to an entity other than the body, no definite conclusion that they inhere in the self alone could be reached.

The author then introduces the Sāṅkhya view for a critical examination and refutation. The Sāṅkhya, like Nyāya school, adopts inference (*anumāna*) as the chief means of establishing the self. Thus it infers the self on the ground that (i) collocations (*saṅghāta*) do exist for the sake of another entity (*parārtha*); (ii) there must be an entity which is the reverse of the trinity of

609. ĀS. p. 128 : "sandehagrastatvācca—kiṃ sādhanābhā-vaprayuktaḥ sādhyābhāvaḥ, kiṃ vā nimittāntaraprayukta iti".

guṇas, (iii) there must exist some controller for the body, senses, etc., as for the chariot, etc., (iv) there must exist a subject or being that is affected by feelings of pleasure and pain, and (v) the scriptural texts promising *kaivalya* (release) and enjoining activity to that end, as also the efforts of seers to attain it should all be accounted for.⁶¹⁰ The Sāṅkhya also seeks to prove that the self thus established, need not itself be a collocation (*saṅghāta*) due to the fact that the argument will then be vitiated by the fallacy of infinite regress (*anavasthā*). These reasonings are too well-known, and they can be understood from authoritative treatises of the school like the *Sāṅkhyakārikā* and the commentary of Vācaspati on it.⁶¹¹

According to Yāmuna, the arguments advanced by the Sāṅkhyas fail to achieve their desired end. The defect from which the inferences of the Sāṅkhya school suffer is similar to the one attributed to the Nyāya school earlier in regard to establishing the *ātman* through *anumāna*. It had been pointed out earlier, in reply to the Naiyāyika, that while a substratum could be inferred for qualities like desire, knowledge and effort, there is no proof for maintaining that that substratum is the *ātman* alone. Likewise, here too the arguments advanced by the Sāṅkhya merely point to the existence of a controlling and perceiving agent. They cannot establish the particular features intended by the arguer, viz., that the self is not an aggregate (*saṅghāta*) and that it is the opposite of the threefold *guṇa*, and so on.⁶¹²

610. Yāmuna quotes from the *Sāṅkhyakārikā*, śl.17. Cf. ĀS. p.130:

"saṅghātaparārthatvāt triguṇādiviparyayādadhīṣṭhānāt puruṣo 'sti bhoktṛbhāvāt kaivalyārtham pravṛtteśca".

Cf. also *Sāṅkhyakārikā* : śl. 19, on the characteristics of the self.

"tasmācca viparyayasiddham sāksitvamasya puruṣasya kaivalyam mādhyaस्थ्यam draṣṭṛtvamakartṛbhāvaśca".

611. The *Sāṅkhyakārikā*, with the (*Sāṅkhyatattvakaumudī* of Vācaspati along with *ṭīkā* by Bānshi Dhara Misra had been published under the Chowkhamba Sanskrit series No. 54 Vidyavilas Press Benaras, 1921. See page 233, ff for the explanation of the verse "Saṅghāta" the (śl. 17). This has also been edited with an English translation by S.S. Suryanarayana Sastri and published by the University of Madras 1935.

612. ĀS. p. 133 : "atrāpi saṅghātapārāthyādibhir yadapi paraḥ ko 'pyadhiṣṭhātā draṣṭā siddhaḥ, tathāpi na tasya asarṇhatatvātriguṇatvādirabhimataviśeṣaḥ śakyaniścayaḥ".

The advocate of the Sāṅkhya school holds that the self could not be accepted as a collocation (*saṅghāta*) for fear of infinite regress (*anavāsthā*). But such an infinite series of entities, says Yāmuna, cannot be a defect, when it becomes a logical necessity, as in the unending cause-effect series of a seed and its sprout, which is accepted as valid on all hands. As regards the contention that the self need not necessarily be an aggregate to become the principal entity (*śeṣin*) subserved by other entities, Yāmuna says that the way in which the Sāṅkhyas characterise the self affords no room for such a supposition. The *ātman*, according to them is of the form of mere knowledge and is immutable. It is too perfect to admit of any additional significance brought about by a subordinate entity. An entity can become the principal one (*śeṣin*) only when it derives something from other entities, as when it is brought into existence by them (an example being a pot brought into existence with the help of a potter's stick), or when it attains some speciality through them (as when a body is decorated with flowers). Since the self is perfect in every respect by its own nature, the Sāṅkhya cannot call it a "*śeṣin*".

The doctrinal and dialectical weakness of the Sāṅkhya is all the more exposed by Yāmuna when he proves that *śeṣitva* (the character of being the primary entity) cannot go well with the Sāṅkhya theory even through a recourse to delusion (*bhrama*). The self being pure knowledge opposed to all defects, no delusion of being a *śeṣin* can occur to it. The intellect (*buddhi*) or mind too cannot have this erroneous knowledge, for, they are insentient by their very nature.

Sentience cannot be attributed to the mind by calling it a reflecting agent of consciousness, for both the mind and consciousness being pure and colourless, no reflection can take place. This difficulty persists, even when the mind is said to attain sentience through similarity with consciousness,⁶¹³ for the term,

613. Cf. *Sāṅkhyakārikā*, śl. 5, with the commentary of Vācaspati, pp. 132-33 :

"...buddhitattvasya sukhādayo 'pi pariṇāmabhedā acetanāḥ, puruṣastu sukhādyananuṣaṅgī cetanaḥ, so'yaṁ buddhitattvavartinā jñānasukhādinā tatpratibimbītaḥ, tacchāyāpattyā jñānasukhādīmāniva bhavātīti cetano 'nugṛhyate; citi cchāyāpattyā cācetanāpi buddhiḥ tadadhyavasāyaśca cetana iva bhavātīti".

'similarity', cannot properly be explained by the advocates by the Sāṅkhya school. If by similarity is meant immutability, it would mean that the mind cannot change into different states as pleasure and pain, which, however, is not the case. Similarity cannot even be explained as 'knowership', for the self of the Sāṅkhyas is mere 'knowledge', but not a possessor thereof.⁶¹⁴ Attempts to find similarity between the mind and consciousness on the basis of the former being different from a *jaḍa*-entity (*ajāḍatva*) are also futile, says Yāmuna. *Ajaḍatva* (not being inert or *jaḍa*), as already shown,⁶¹⁵ is not different from 'knowership', for which there is no provision in the Sāṅkhya. The mind, it has earlier been said, depends upon consciousness for its own manifestation, and it cannot now be contended that it is self-luminous. Even granting that consciousness is reflected in the mind, there cannot arise the qualities of 'knowership' and 'delusion' in the mind, since these qualities are present neither in the mind nor in consciousness. Yāmuna adds that this *pratibimba*-theory had been refuted in earlier works like the *Nyāyatattva*⁶¹⁶ of Nāthamuni.

The advocate of the Sāṅkhya tries to solve the difficulty by saying that the very presence of consciousness (*caitanya*) can make the mind assume different states. Though the mind is thus the entity that is actually involved in the process, yet it is consciousness that is called the witness (*sākṣin*) and the enjoyer, because of its relative importance. The point is supported by the illustration of an emperor who alone is described as having waged

Cf. *Sāṅkhyakārikā*, śl. 20 :

"tasmāt tatsaṁyogādacetanam cetanāvadiva liṅgam gunakartṛtve'pi tathā karteḥ bhavatyudāsinaḥ".

614. Yāmuna quotes in ĀS, p. 136, Patañjali's *Yogasūtra*, I. 9 : "yadā citireva puruṣaḥ kimatra kena vyapadiśyate".

615. See pp. 155-56 above.

616. This work is not available.

and won wars although it is his generals and soldiers that actually fought and won.⁶¹⁷

Even this argument is unsound, says Yāmuna, because the Sāṅkhyas do not admit of any real witnessing character for the self; a witness is one that perceives things directly, but is not mere consciousness. This perceiving power is not natural to the self as described in Sāṅkhya. Such a power of witnessing things cannot be attributed to it through delusion, and this point has just been explained. Pointing out that the illustration of the emperor cited by the Sāṅkhya is also incoherent, Yāmuna says that an emperor is neither inactive nor nonchalant⁶¹⁸ like the Sāṅkhya self. Undoubtedly, the emperor is the pivotal principal entity that directs his subordinates to do certain things and attains wealth, glory, victory, etc., through them for himself.

Concluding the refutation of the Sāṅkhya school, Yāmuna points out that no negative inferences fare well in establishing the *ātman* as being distinct from the body, sense-organs, etc., because they are directly stultified by judgements based on perceptions like "I am fat", which appear to identify the body, etc. with the self.

Having thus refuted the Nyāya and the Sāṅkhya theories regarding the means of establishing the *ātman*, the author says that the Vedāntins adopt a different attitude to this question. For

617. Cf. *Sāṅkhyatattvakaumudī* on śl. 62, p. 498 :

"tasmāna badhyate 'ddhā na mucyate nāpi saṁsarati kaścit |
saṁsarati badhyate mucyate ca nānāśrayā prakṛtiḥ" ||

"bandhamokṣasaṁsārāḥ puruṣeṣūpacaryante; yathā jayaparājayau
bhṛtyagatāvapi svāmini upacaryete, tadāśrayeṇa bhṛtyānāṁ tadbhāgitvāt
tatphalasya ca śokalābhādeḥ svāmini sambhavāt".

It may be noted that the same analogy occurs in the *Vyāsabhāṣya*
on *Yogasūtra* : I. 24.

618. Cf. *Sāṅkhyakārikā* : śl. 65 :

"tena nivṛttaprasavām arthavaśāt saptarūpavinivṛttāṁ
prakṛtiṁ paśyati puruṣaḥ prekṣakavadavasthitaḥ svacchaḥ".

Cf. also *ibid* : 66a : "....dṛṣṭā mayetyupekṣaka ekaḥ".

them, Vedic texts are the sole means of establishing the self.⁶¹⁹ Yāmuna, in this connection, quotes three varieties of texts : (a) those which distinguish the self from the body and its modes,⁶²⁰ (b) those which call the self eternal,⁶²¹ and (c) those which state that the self possesses no body during the state of *mokṣa*.⁶²² Yāmuna says that there is one more *pramāṇa* which establishes the self, and that is *śrutyarthāpatti* (presumption from the incompatibility of the meaning of the Vedic texts). The Vedic texts ordain a number of rites upon the self as the means of achieving fruits like Heaven,⁶²³ which are to be achieved only in the hereafter. These texts could not be valid, unless the self upon which they ordain the rites were itself eternal and distinct from the body, senses, etc.

Having thus briefly set forth the Vedāntic viewpoint regarding the means of establishing the *ātman* to which he himself contributes, Yāmuna enters into an elaborate discussion on the views of the Bhāṭṭa and the Prābhākara Mimāṁsakas regarding the same problem.

The Bhāṭṭa, to start with, does not find any justification in resorting to *śruti* for establishing the self. Perception itself can establish the self, as in the statements, "I know", and "This is my body". These statements according to him, point to the self as distinct from the body, etc. Clarifying his position, he says that since everybody has a direct experience of the entity of "*aham*" (I), and since the external senses cannot cognise the self which is subtle and colourless, the mind alone should be accepted as

619, ĀS. p. 139 :

"ānumānikīmapyātmasiddhim aśraddadhānāḥ śrautīmeva tām
śrotriyāḥ saṅgirante".

620. Cf. *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* VI. v. 15 : "sa eṣa neti neti".

Cf. also *Īśāvāsya* : VIII : "akāyam avraṇam aśnāviraṁ" etc.

621. Cf. *Bhagavadgītā* : II. 20 : "na jāyate mriyate vā" etc.
Cf. *Chāndogya* : VI. i. 3 : "jīvāpetam vāva kiledam mriyate na jīvo
mriyate".

622. Cf. *Chāndogya* : VII. xii.1. : "na ha vai saśarīrasya sataḥ
priyāpriyayorapahatirasti".

623. Cf. "jyotiṣṭomena svargakāmo yajeta".

perceiving the self. The mind is known to produce cognitions quite independent of other senses, as in the case of pleasure and pain. The following syllogism embodies the Bhāṭṭa position : "The *ātman* is cognised by mental perception (*mānasa-pratyakṣa*), because, while being imperceptible to the external senses, it is still directly experienced like pleasure, etc."⁶²⁴

Refuting the Prābhākara's claim that the *ātman* is cognised as the substratum of knowledge during the perception of objects,⁶²⁵ the Bhāṭṭa states that it is opposed to our practical experience. In an objective perception, one sees the object alone, but not the self too. There may, however, arise such reflective cognition as "I know this object", but it is an instance of mental perception, says the Bhāṭṭa. Here the objective knowledge existing in the self is inferred through the adventitious characteristic called '*jñātātā*' or manifestedness, produced in the object. The Prābhākara view that the distinction between one's knowledge and that of other would cease to exist if the self were not admitted to be the substrate of all knowledge, is also refuted by the Bhāṭṭa. The distinction between one's knowledge and other's knowledge lies in the difference of the sense-object contacts associated with one's self and others. There could be nothing more objectionable than saying that the self is cognised by the same means as an object. On the other hand, it has to be admitted that knowledge exists in a general and latent form throughout the perception of all objects. The Bhāṭṭa observes that knowledge itself can account for the distinction between different entities and that there could be no question of the self being manifested as the substratum of knowledge, along with objects. The Prābhākara view that all cases of objective cognition consist of the triad (*tripuṭī*) made up of knowledge, the

624. Cf. ĀS. p. 142 : "ātmā mānasapratyakṣagrāhyaḥ, bahirindriyāyogyatve sati pratyakṣatvāt sukhādivat".

Vide *Epistemology of the Bhāṭṭa School of Pūrva Mīmāṃsā*, p. 403: "Kumārila says that the self is known through the notion of "I" (*aḥampratyaya*) and Pārthasārathi, on the basis of this, concludes that the self is known through mental perception (*mānasapratyakṣa*)".

625. The Prābhākaras show, in support, the *Chāndogya* text, (VII. xii. 3) "atha yo veda idaṁ jighrāṇīti sa ātmā"

knower and the known is, according to the Bhāṭṭa, opposed to practical experience.

A different attitude is adopted by the Prābhākara to this problem. He brushes aside as meaningless the theory of mental perception, put forth by the Bhāṭṭa.

Knowledge, according to the Prābhākara, is self-manifest. When an object is cognised, the knowledge that arises not only manifests the object concerned, but also the self that forms the substratum of the knowledge. The *ātman* is manifested only when the objects are cognised, and is thus not self-luminous in nature. The syllogism put forth by the Bhāṭṭas, that the self is cognised by mental perception is criticised by the Prābhākara. The syllogism is vitiated by the fallacy of *vyabhiçāra* in the instance of knowledge (*sāmvedana*), which is directly experienced, but not perceived by the *manas*. The Prābhākara says that the difficulty cannot be overcome by saying the *jñāna* is also cognised by mental perception. Posing various alternatives, he shows that *jñāna* cannot be mentally grasped. The mind is only an *indriya*, and whatever is cognised by a sense-organ should, as a rule, be different from the self. So, saying that the self is perceived by the mind is a contradiction in terms. The illustration of pleasure etc., given by the Bhāṭṭa is vitiated by the defect called *sādhyaavikalatā* (absence of the probandum). Pleasure and pain, according to the Prābhākara, as according to the *Siddhāntin*, are not perceptible in nature. They appear as perceptible and are really different states of the sense-organs. When the sense-organs are relaxed and active, we feel pleasure (*sukha*) and in the absence of this feature, we experience pain (*duḥkha*). The pairs of *rāga* and *dveṣa* (love and hatred) and *śoka* and *bhaya* (grief and fear) cannot also be given as illustrations in the place of *sukha* and *duḥkha*, for the same reason. Love and hate are different states of consciousness (*caitanya*), and grief and fear are different states of the mind.⁶²⁶

626. Cf. ĀS. pp. 144-46 : "...sukhaduḥkhaayoḥ pratyakṣatvānabhyupagamāt ; anabhyupagamaśca indriyapauṣkalyanāśayoreva sukhaduḥkhatvāt; rāga-dveṣādayastu caitanyasyaivāvasthāvi-śeṣās tadvadeva pratyakṣibhavanti..." etc.

Since the self is impartite (*nirāmśa*), it is difficult to say for the Bhāṭṭa, how the self can be the cogniser as well as the cognised. If the self were admitted to possess parts, it would only land the arguer in *infinite regress*, for the part that acts as the cogniser requires another part for its own validity and so on, *ad infinitum*. This would further weaken the Bhāṭṭa's position, for the self would then become an aggregate (*saṅghāta*) and consequently, non-eternal.

The Bhāṭṭa's claim that objective knowledge merely presents the objects but not the self too, is condemned by the Prābhākara as being contradicted by practical experience. When an object is perceived, there is an invariable manifestation of the *ātman* too. If the self were not manifested as the substrate of knowledge, then there should be the mere cognition of objects, without any notion of their association with either oneself or others. But none has such an experience. Therefore, it has to be admitted that whenever an object is cognised, two entities also shine forth along with it invariably : the knowledge and the knower. If the self were not the substrate of knowledge, there would then be no distinction of one's knowledge from that of others. The claim of the Bhāṭṭa that *jñāna* is inferred, is also wrong because, were it inferred, the judgement should then take the form, 'I knew', but not 'I know', inference being a past event.⁶²⁷ The entire process of *anumāna*, consisting of the cognition of the invariable concomitance (*vyāpti*) between *jñāna* and *jñātātā*, involves more time than actual perception and so, does not last till the reflective cognition arises.

The theory of the self being cognised by mental perception is also cumbersome because knowledge which is self-luminous can itself be accepted as manifesting the self, as in the case of the object. The distinction between the 'knowledges' associated with different persons could also be conveniently explained only when the self is accepted as the substrate of those knowledges. The Prābhākara further says that all objects are perceived only when knowledge exists, but not otherwise. In deep sleep, for instance, though the objects exist, these are not cognised because no knowledge exists then, the senses being dormant. The Prābhākara

627. Cf. ĀS. pp. 148-49: "anumitajñānālambanatve cājñāśiṣamityeva pratibhāṣaḥ syāt; na jānāmīti".

finds parsimony in accepting a single self-luminous entity, viz., knowledge, which manifests all entities including the self, instead of positing self-luminous character to the self.

The Prābhākara argues that in the state of release too, as in deep sleep, the self cannot have any knowledge. The totality of causes like the body and sense-organs is absent during *mokṣa* and so, no knowledge is possible. The mind which is eternal, cannot be said to account for knowledge during release ; because, though eternal, it still requires *dharma* and *adharma* to produce knowledge. The *ātman* cannot be said to either possess knowledge as a permanent attribute or produce knowledge by its very existence, for, then there could have been no state of transmigration at all, the self being eternal, and there could also be no distinction between bondage and release. *Śrutis* characterise *mokṣa* as a state which transcends both *dharma* and *adharma*⁶²⁸ including the *dharma* brought out by *yoga*, and so, knowledge in the state of release is an utter impossibility. Moreover, if *mokṣa* were to result from *dharma*, it cannot be real *mokṣa* since it would only result in rebirth.⁶²⁹

In conclusion, the Prābhākara points out that texts⁶³⁰ which speak of the self as the possessor of knowledge in the state of release should not be given primary significance. They should be explained as mere *arthavāda* passages intent upon glorifying *ātmajñāna*.

Criticising the Prābhākara theory that the *ātman* is manifested not by itself, but by knowledge as an entity different from it, and also that the *ātman* is not self-luminous, Yāmuna says that there could be nothing more absurd and objectionable than this. Knowledge is a distinct entity and so is the self. The self cannot be manifested by knowledge, even as the quality of

628. Cf. *Muṇḍaka* : II. ii. 9 : "kṣīyante cāśya karmāṇi" and *ibid* : III. i. 3 : "tadā vidvān punyapāpe vidhūya nirañjanaḥ" etc.

629. *Ibid* : I. ii. 12 : "nāstyakṛtaḥ kṛtena", and *Chāndogya* : VIII.1.6: "tadyatheha karmacito lokaḥ kṣīyate", etc.

630. Cf. "susuptasthāna ekibhūtaḥ prajñānaghana evānandamayo hyānandabhāk" (*Māṇḍūkya* : V)

Cf. "sarvaṁ ha paśyaḥ paśyati sarvamāpnoti sarvaśaḥ" (*Chāndogya*: VII. ii. 6)

taste cannot be cognised by the faculty of colour. The self does not come under the purview of knowledge pertaining to objects. The Prābhākara-theory that knowledge is self-luminous and that it reveals *ātman* on one hand and objects on the other, is beset with many incoherences. Yāmuna points out that even knowledge has to shine forth to a self, like an object. Experience shows that knowledge regarding a particular object pertains only to a particular self, but not to all selves. This phenomenon has to be explained by the Prābhākara only with reference to the relation of that particular knowledge with the particular self, to which it shines forth. It is thus clear that knowledge, which the Prābhākara claims to be self-luminous, requires some connection with an *ātman* for its own manifestation. Knowledge has no independent status. If it becomes manifest, it does so, only in association with a self but not of its own accord. If the Prābhākara theory were correct, then it would require even pleasure and pain to be self-luminous, for, whenever they exist, they are directly experienced.

It may be recalled that the Prābhākara found the assumption of self-luminous knowledge less cumbersome than positing such a self luminous character with the *ātman* itself.⁶³¹ Repudiating the above assumption, Yāmuna says that if the principle of economy were the chief criterion, the Prābhākara should accept the *ātman* alone as the single self-luminous entity, for it is the self that invariably stands as the witness to all objects as well as their cognitions. Acceptance of a number of self-luminous 'knowledges' pertaining to different objects is indeed cumbersome. The argument that the witnessing entity, *ātman*, could be manifested by knowledge, the witnessed entity, is as absurd as the statement that a man who sees a pot, is himself manifested by the pot, says the author.⁶³²

631. See p. 174 above.

632. ĀS. p. 159 : "yatsākṣī khalvayam puruṣaḥ, na tenāsau pratyakṣaḥ, ghaṭasākṣātkāriva ghaṭena".

Having thus set aside briefly the Prābhākara view of the *ātman* being revealed by knowledge, Yāmuna proceeds to set forth an important doctrine about the *ātman*, according to his own school of thought, viz., that the *ātman* is self-luminous in character and that it possesses knowledge as a natural and eternal attribute (*prakāra* or *dharmaviśeṣa*), which, in later terminology of the school, came to be known specifically as '*dharmabhūtajñāna*'.⁶³³ This conception of knowledge as an eternal and invariable attribute of the self is an important landmark in the history of the Viśiṣṭādvaita philosophy. All later writers like Rāmānuja and Vedāntadeśika found it a very important and helpful concept, since it not only affords the interpretation of many a Vedāntic text but facilitates the refutation of the Advaitic theory of *avidyā*.

Whenever we perceive an object, there is a chain of factors involved : the object, the light, the sense-organ, the knowledge and the self. Among these, each succeeding factor manifests the preceding one. These do not, for their manifestation, require other entities that either belong to their own class (*sajātīya*), or those that depend upon them for their own manifestation. For instance, a pot, for its manifestation, does not expect another pot; it requires a light for that purpose. The light, again, requires neither light nor the pot for its revelation. It requires the sense-organ, and so on, with other entities. But the *ātman* requires neither another self, nor knowledge, senses, etc., for its manifestation ; it is self-luminous and so, does not stand in need of any other entity for its own cognition.⁶³⁴ The point to be noted here is that knowledge and the *ātman* are both self-manifest in the sense that they do not require another knowledge or another thing for their manifestation. The distinction of the self from knowledge is that it does not require anything other than its own self, including knowledge, for its cognition.

633. *Ibid.* p. 161. Cf. *Vedārthasaṅgraha* : p. 45 : "kṣetrajñānām svadharmabhūtajñānasya..." etc.

634. Cf. ĀS. p. 160 :

"sajātīyasvasādhyārthanirapekṣātmāsiddhayaḥ sarve padārthāstenātmā nirapekṣasvasiddhikāḥ"

Deśika in his *Tattvaṭīkā*, p. 112, quotes this verse and explains "*siddhi*" as "vyavahārayogyatārūpaḥ prakāśaḥ".

Knowledge, for the self, is as eternal and as natural as radiance is for the sun. It is not something that is occasioned in its essence, as held by some. But when knowledge comes into contact with different objects, it gets different designations as objective knowledge. Yāmuna, in this connection, refers to as many as five different views against the conception of *dharmabhūtajñāna*, the chief authors of these views being the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas and the Pūrvamīmāṃsakas. The main point of their contention is that knowledge cannot be an eternal attribute of the self and that it could only be occasioned.

The first of these views which opposes the conception of *dharmabhūtajñāna* is that experience proves that knowledge can be occasioned. Knowledge arises only when the sense-organs come into contact with their respective objects, but not otherwise. Judgements of the type, "I know" (in the Present Tense) and "I knew" (in the Past Tense), clearly show knowledge as conditioned by time. If knowledge is an eternal characteristic of the self, there could then be no distinction between the states of deep sleep and waking, and also between bondage and release. It would then be difficult to determine the relation between knowledge and the objects in contact with it. It would also be difficult to distinguish one item of objective knowledge from another, for, knowledge being eternal, it would manifest all objects simultaneously, if it is admitted to be self-luminous; if it were non-luminous, it would not manifest any object at all. Thus, there is no guiding principle as to why only a particular object should be cognised by a particular person at a particular time, but not all objects by all persons at all times.⁶³⁵

The second view is that if knowledge is eternal, the contact between it and the objects cannot be accounted for. It cannot be argued that knowledge, though eternal, could relate to the objects only when the sense-organs that carry it are actually in contact with those objects. This argument is not accepted by the opponent, mainly on the ground that there is no direct contact between knowledge and the objects and also due to the fact that knowledge being a quality (*guṇa*) like colour or taste, or a generic

635. Cf. ĀS. p. 162.

attribute (*jāti*), cannot leave its substratum, the *ātman*, and go out to contact other objects.⁶³⁶

Some try to account for the contact of knowledge with its objects by assuming the self as possessing two phases : the substantial (*bahula*) and the unsubstantial (*vīrala*).⁶³⁷ The '*bhulātman*' is the actual self, and the '*vīralātman*' is the *ātman* which comes into contact with, or possesses knowledge at a particular time, as its attribute. The opponent, anticipating this view, points out that the *ātman* is eternal, impartite and devoid of all qualities like substantiality, touch and contact. This theory also lands one in the Jaina view, for it is there that mutually contradictory qualities are attributed to one and the same entity.

Some, however, put forth a different theory for explaining the contact of knowledge with its objects. According to them, the *ātman* is all-pervasive and is qualified by knowledge. This knowledge can manifest all entities at all times. But the manifestation of objects is obstructed by the quality, *tamas* (inertia). They are cognised only when the sense-organs predominated by the quality *sattva* (serenity), break through the veil of *tamas* shrouding those objects. The degree of manifestation of the objects depends upon the intensity of the *sattva* quality belonging to the senses. This view does not pay special attention to the self-luminous character of the *ātman* because knowledge itself can manifest it.⁶³⁸

Anticipating the above view, the critic says that the senses here are said to be merely instruments for dispelling the *tamas* standing in between consciousness and the objects. They are not actually the means of producing knowledge, which is the chief function of all the senses. He says that neither the manifestation existing in the objects, nor the contact of consciousness with the objects, can be called *jñāna*. If the manifestation existing in the objects were called knowledge, then, even the objects would become identical with knowledge, since they form the very substrate of that manifestation. If the contact of objects and consciousness is to be termed '*jñāna*', the objects would also

636. *Ibid.* pp. 163-64.

637. *Ibid.* pp. 164-65.

638. *Ibid.* pp. 166-66.

become possessors of knowledge since they are in contact with the *jñāna*. Experience, however, shows that *jñāna* is only an occasioned attribute of the *ātman* through such statements as "I perceive the object now" and "I do not perceive it now". The opponent says that this phenomenon cannot be explained away through the illustration of the radiance of the Sun, which, though eternal in essence, appears to manifest only certain entities at one time but not all objects at all times. The sun's rays, the *pūrvapakṣin* says, constitute a substance (*dravya*) and can thus travel, expand or contact things, unlike consciousness, which is only a *guṇa* of the *ātman*.⁶³⁹

Others who try to make a compromise, say that the self possesses two kinds of knowledge : the eternal and the non-eternal. Eternal knowledge pertains to the *ātman* as such ; the non-eternal knowledge pertains to objects. This view claims that this second variety of knowledge, viz., the non-eternal knowledge, can account for the states of deep sleep, waking, etc. Anticipating this view, the opponent refutes it by saying that he does not at all accept the *ātman* as the substratum of eternal knowledge. He admits that throughout the waking state the *ātman* possesses knowledge, but not during deep sleep, for there is no warrant for such a supposition. The opponent, at great length, demonstrates that the manifestation of the *ātman* during deep sleep cannot be inferred.⁶⁴⁰ Such an inference is also not necessary, for recollections like "I slept well", prove that the self exists during sleep, and that there is no objective knowledge during that state. Statements like "I slept well", says the opponent, are not really recollections. As already pointed out, they are inferences proceeding from a particular state of the sense-organs, viz., their being in a relaxed condition. Even granting that these statements are recollections, the self thus recollected cannot essentially be characterised by eternal knowledge. The cognition, "I slept well", says the opponent, proceeds from *nidrā* (sleep), which, on the authority of Patañjali, is one of the five states of mind.⁶⁴¹ This state, *nidrā*, is itself based upon the quality of *tamas* (inertia),

639. *Ibid.* pp. 166-167.

640. *Ibid.* pp. 167-170.

641. Cf. *Yogasūtra* : I. 10 : "abhāvapratyayāmbanā vṛttir nidrā". See *ĀS* p. 171 for the above quotation.

Cf. also *Yogasūtra* : I. 5-6 : "vṛttayaḥ pañcatayyaḥ, kliṣṭāḥ akliṣṭāḥ; pramāṇaviparyayaḥ avikalpanidrāsmṛtayaḥ".

which is marked by the absence of all objective cognition. So, the *ātman* during deep sleep witnesses only *tamas* (inertia or *ajñāna*), and if at all it is recollected, it is done only as the witness of *tamas* but not as the possessor of eternal knowledge. In conclusion, the opponent says that the determination of the nature of the *ātman* in deep sleep which is under dispute, is dependent upon an objective experience like the nature of the *ātman* during the wakeful state, where *ātman* means the knower of the object. Knowledge is a special quality of the *ātman* like pleasure and pain,⁶⁴² and therefore, it could only be occasioned, but not eternal.

Refuting these arguments, Yāmuna declares that knowledge is an attribute quite natural to the self, even as luminosity is to light.⁶⁴³ Knowledge characterises the very nature of the *ātman*, so much so it is difficult to comprehend it without knowledge. Since the self is eternal, it follows that knowledge also is eternal. Conversely, says Yāmuna, any entity that is devoid of consciousness cannot be the self. By this statement, Yāmuna implies that even in the state of release, the self continues to exist as a knower.

So as to distinguish the self from inanimate entities like the pot, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas and the Bhāṭṭas advance a new argument that the *ātman*, though devoid of knowledge, still possesses the power that can produce knowledge in the state of

642. The opponent says that *sukha* and *duḥkha* could be the special qualities of the self because, while they are not known to have any substrate that is generally accepted (like the body), they are still known to become manifest to some substratum like the quality knowledge; this substrate is indicated to be the *ātman* by statements of co-ordinate predication like '*aham sukhi*'.

643. See *ĀS*. p. 178 : "...raveriva tejasvitvaṁ". For another simile, see *ibid* : p. 172, "prakāśa iva tejasah".

mokṣa.⁶⁴⁴ Criticising this, the author says that there is neither any proof for such a supposition, nor is any purpose served by it. If the *ātman* really possesses the cognitive power in *mokṣa*, it should naturally produce knowledge. To say that the effect is absent even when the necessary means exists, is quite-preposterous. Moreover, such a power of producing *jñāna* cannot inhere in a realised soul. The power to produce a sprout, for instance, lies only in rice-seed which has not been cleansed of the chaff. To give another illustration, the capacity to generate smoke exists only in fire that is in contact with wet fuel. Likewise, the power to produce *jñāna*, if at all there is such a power, should exist only in an *ātman* that is associated with a body and senses. Since, in the state of *mokṣa*, the self is devoid of the physical body and senses, it is clear that it cannot at all possess the cognitive power referred to above.

The opponents assert that the self is devoid of knowledge in *mokṣa*. This when analysed, means that the capacity to generate knowledge is also absent, which ultimately results in the annihilation of the *ātman* itself. This assumption is also cumbersome because the self can be distinguished from what is non-self, by virtue of its characteristic knowledge itself, says Yāmuna.⁶⁴⁵

Having thus established that *jñāna* is eternal in character, Yāmuna points out that this should not drive anybody to the conclusion that knowledge itself could be the self. Knowledge and the self, as explained earlier, are of a diametrically opposite nature, and their identity is not justified. Knowledge depends upon a substrate (the self) and a counter-correlative (the object) for its own manifestation. But the *ātman* is quite independent of all such limitations. He is self-luminous and is directly experienced as “*aham*” and as the possessor of knowledge. This

644. See *Epistemology of the Bhāṭṭa School of Pūrva Mīmāṃsā*: (p. 9) where Pārthasārathimīśra is said to have put forth this view in his *Śāstradīpikā* (Nirṇayasāgara Edition), pp. 128, 130.

645. ĀS. p. 173 : “*api ca bodhe satyevātmano 'nātmavyavacchede sambhavati, kṛtaṁ tacchaktyāśrayaṇena*”.

point has already been explained, even through other means of knowledge, viz., inference and scriptural testimony.⁶⁴⁶

Yāmuna observes that those who maintain that the self is mere consciousness cannot make any headway in accounting for the relation between knowledge and the object that is known. They say that knowledge is nothing but the conjunction (*samyoga*) between consciousness and the object, and call consciousness ‘the knower’. Yāmuna points out that this ‘conjunction’ (*sambandha*) which the opponents call ‘*jñāna*’, does not pertain to any single entity. It always involves two entities. Thus, since the conjunction in question is common to both consciousness and the object, the latter would also become a knower. The analogy of *kārya-kāraṇa* relation (the cause-and-effect relation) cannot be brought in to assert the knowership of consciousness. To explain, *kārya-kāraṇa-bhāva* is common to both the cause and the effect. Even then, it is still possible to say which is a cause and which is an effect. On this analogy, the opponent argues that although the subject-object conjunction is common to both consciousness and object, it is still possible to say that consciousness alone is the knower, since the object is insentient and dependent on consciousness by its very nature.

Refuting this, the author says that the relation between consciousness and the object in question, cannot be compared with *kārya-kāraṇa* relation. In the *kārya-kāraṇa-bhāva*, there is mutual dependence and expectancy between the entities functioning as the cause and the effect.⁶⁴⁷ A cause anticipates an effect and an effect presupposes a cause. But there is no such mutual expectancy between consciousness and the object. It cannot be said that these entities need each other for purposes of ‘revelation’ (*siddhi*). Yāmuna says that the term ‘*siddhi*’ can have two meanings: ‘*utpatti*’ (production) and ‘*prakāśa*’ (manifestation), out of which, neither would apply here. The first meaning, viz., “*utpatti*”, does not apply here, because neither the objects require consciousness for their production, nor does

646. *Ibid* : p. 173.

647. ĀS. p. 174 : “*na ca kāryakāraṇabhāvavad vyavasthitatvaṁ, tatra janimato janayituṣca parasparāpekṣānīyamalakṣaṇasambandhaḥ*”

consciousness require the objects for its own production. Objects like a pot only require clay, the potter's rod and such other causes for their origination. They do not, as such, stand in need of consciousness for their production. Consciousness being eternal, there could be no question of its needing the objects for its production. Such a supposition would also be self-contradictory. The second interpretation offered for the term "*siddhi*", viz., "*prakāśa*" (manifestation), cannot also be applied here. The self being self-luminous, it does not require other objects for its manifestation. Even the objects do not require consciousness for their manifestation, for, as has already been pointed out, manifestation (*prakāśa*) is not something which is beyond consciousness (*saṃvit*) or an extraneous thing pertaining to objects as a property. Therefore; the statement that objects require consciousness for manifestation (which is not different from consciousness itself) results in the defect called "*ātmāśraya*". Even if *prakāśa* exists separately from *saṃvit*, it cannot be the only entity on which *prakāśa* could depend, because, if it were so, *saṃvit* being all-revealing, *prakāśa* cannot be confined to particular objects. To avoid this difficulty, the opponent has to concede that the objects require not consciousness alone, but also other circumstances to complete the causal machinery. If this is accepted, knowledge would be something manifested out of the consciousness as a result of certain conditions, which means that the *ātman* is not of the form of knowledge, but the possessor thereof. Yāmuna says that the opponent is now nearer to his own viewpoint, that the *ātman* is not mere consciousness, but that it is qualified by knowledge, although the opponent does not expressly name that quality, "knowledge".⁶⁴⁸

Stretching the argument further, the opponent says that knowledge which manifests, could only be an occasioned attribute of the self. He says that the manifestation of objects results from a corresponding activity inherent in the *ātman*. Conjunction between a person and a village (*grāmapuruṣa-saṃyoga*) is given as the illustration.⁶⁴⁹ The manifestation of objects in question,

648. ĀS. p. 175 : "āgantukātiśayāśrayaṇe vā nāmāntareṇa jñānamevāṅgikṛtamiti tadvānevātmā āyātaḥ".

649. Vide *Epistemology of the Bhāṭṭa School of Pūrva Mīmāṃsā* : p. 60.

although actually pertaining to entities other than the self (viz., pot, etc.), is a special characteristic of the self, being an effect. It may be noted that the conjunction (*saṃyoga*) between a person and a village cited here, is also a special feature of the person, because it is produced by the activity of "going" inherent in that person. Since the cognitive activity of the *ātman* is accidental, *jñāna* that results from it could only be accidental but not eternal, says the opponent.

Rejecting this as an unsound argument, Yāmuna cites as an exception the instance of a man who acquires land and such other property which come to him not as the result of any activity on his own part (*akriyājanya*) like purchasing, but as a natural bequeathal consequent on the death of his predecessors and such other conditions. Similarly, a man may acquire trees and crops, which grow in his field either of their own accord, or through some other agency, although he himself does not grow them. It is thus clear that "ownership" (*svatva*) as such, does not arise from any activity of the man to whom it pertains. It is observed that factors like time (*kāla*) and activity (*vyāpāra*) also form part of the causal machinery in producing effects by their mere presence, though they are themselves, not involved in any activity. It has to be admitted, therefore, that "ownership" and such other factors do not require any activity of the person concerned.

The opponent cannot justify his argument by saying that *jīvana* (living) itself is an activity, because it is a common but not special activity of the person, says Yāmuna. Yāmuna concludes that the manifestation of objects is due to the special property (*asādhāraṇa-dharma* i.e., *jñāna*), but not any special activity (*asādhāraṇakriyā*, i.e., cognitive activity) of the man that cognises those objects. Consciousness is thus a natural and hence an eternal attribute of the soul, as radiance is for the sun.⁶⁵⁰

650. Cf. ĀS. p. 178.

The author then meets the objections raised earlier by the opponents against the eternal character of knowledge. It had been contended that knowledge is only occasioned by the sense-object contact and that judgements like "I know" (Present Tense) and "I knew" (Past Tense) show knowledge as conditioned by time.⁶⁵¹ Yāmuna says that these arguments are vitiated by the defect called "*vyabhicāra*". The effulgence of the Sun is given as an exception. Judgements like "The Sun is illuminating this region", "He had illuminated this region" and "He will illumine this area", in three different periods, prove that the radiance of the Sun, although eternal and natural in character, is conditioned by time. The opponents have to explain this phenomenon only with reference to the contact between the Sun's radiance and the regions radiated by it. Likewise, consciousness, though it is natural and eternal with the self, still appears to be conditioned and occasioned by the different objects manifested by its contact with sense-organs.

It is due to this accidental sense-object contact that knowledge appears to depend upon the sense-organs, etc. It is again due to this sense-object conjunction that one feels and says that knowledge is conditioned by time. Yāmuna asserts that the distinction in knowledge as connected with different periods of time is not natural with it, but due to the sense-object contact delimiting it. This assertion, he continues, is based on the fact that the self is cognised as invariably associated with knowledge. The *ātman* is never experienced by anybody as an inert and insentient entity like a stone. It is, on the other hand, experienced as the possessor of knowledge.⁶⁵² The element, "air", for instance, could be apprehended only by reason of its being the substrate of the quality of touch (*sparsa*) which leads us to conclude that 'touch' is a natural attribute of air. Similarly, since the self is directly apprehended as the substrate of the quality '*knowledge*', it is to be concluded that knowledge is its natural characteristic.

651. See p. 178 above.

652. *ĀS.* pp. 179-180 : "katham punaratra nirṇayaḥ? ...tādrūpyeṇaiva pratyakṣatvāt ; na hi jātucid acidrūpo 'yamātmā loṣṭādivadrṣṭacarah", etc.

Activities like going and coming cannot be natural with the self, because it can exist even without these activities.⁶⁵³

The *pūrvapakṣin* may, however, bring in the analogy of the physical body so as to disprove the above statement that knowledge is natural with the self. He explains that although the self is always found associated with the physical body, the latter cannot be accepted as the natural attribute of the former. Extending this analogy to knowledge, he states that the self, although found ever associated with knowledge, cannot be said to possess knowledge as its natural attribute.

Yāmuna, in reply, states that what the opponent has said is not universally true. It is not true that the self is always experienced as united with a physical body. To show that the claim of the opponent runs counter to practical experience, Yāmuna says that *yogins* who control their mind, experience the self as the entity "*aham*" (I), completely devoid of the idea of the physical body.⁶⁵⁴ It has earlier been pointed out that even in ordinary experience, the cognition of knowing (*jānāmīti pratyayaḥ*) in such statements as "*aham jānāmi*" (I know) actually pertains to the self, which is completely dissociated from the body and such other factors.⁶⁵⁵

Emphasising the point that the experience of the self is untainted by the cognition of the body, Yāmuna observes that in *mokṣa* not a single body accompanies the soul. There are indeed many kinds of bodies that the self may take up, such as human, divine and so on, according to its past deeds (good or bad), and these bodies are liable to birth and death. None of these bodies is known to accompany the *ātman* in *mokṣa*, as does the mind, says Yāmuna.⁶⁵⁶ It may be argued that the body in a subtle form

653. *Ibid.* p. 180 : "yo yatsvabhāvo na bhavati, sa tadvirahenāpi svarūpata upalabhyate, gamanādirahitatayeva devadattādiḥ".

654. *Ibid.* : "yoginām prāṇihitamānasāmuparatabahirindriyāṇām ca dehānusandhānavirahenāpi ahamiti sphuṭāmanubhavāt".

655. *Ibid.* p. 179.

656. *Ibid.* : p. 181 : "karmānugūnyena suramanujādijātiyatayā bhidyamānāsu āgamāpāyiniṣu tanuṣu manasa iva ekasya varṣmaṇaḥ svabhāvānubandhitvenāśrayitumaśakyatvāt". This indicates that the author holds the mind as continuing to exist in the state of *mokṣa*. Also cf. *ibid.* : p. 53 : "ata eva apavargadaśāyāmapi mano 'nuvṛttiḥ".

(*liṅgaśarīra*) accompanies the soul after death, although it does not belong in reality to the *ātman*. The author does not agree that the *liṅgaśarīra* exists at the time of cosmic dissolution (*pralaya*) and in release (*mokṣa*).⁶⁵⁷ Even granting that the subtle body continues to exist after death, it is not enough to prove that it is a property of the *ātman*, because we do not perceive it.⁶⁵⁸

Yāmuna then anticipates four views in opposition to the eternity of knowledge and refutes them all.

The first objection is that the soul should continue to be manifest (*prakāśa*) in states like deep sleep and swoon, if knowledge were natural with it. Yāmuna meets this objection by posing three alternative explanations for the term "*prakāśa*".⁶⁵⁹ The term "*prakāśa*" could mean (i) the adventitious property produced by knowledge in objects, referred to as "*jñātātā*" or "*prākāṭya*" (manifestedness). It could mean (ii) knowledge ; or (iii) it could not be something far removed from knowledge itself. The first alternative, held by the Bhāṭṭas, has already been refuted on the ground that *jñātātā* cannot be a property over and above knowledge.⁶⁶⁰ Even if *prakāśa* be something other than *jñāna*, it can be explained that the quality *tamas*, veils it during deep sleep, says Yāmuna.⁶⁶¹ As regards the two other alternatives, they are not acceptable to the author, since *ātmānubhava*, according to these views, continues to exist in the state of deep sleep, etc.

The second objection raised is that if the self had *ātmānubhava* or experience of its own state, there should be some

657. Cf. *ibid* : p. 181 : "Liṅgasya punaranuvṛttāvapi apratyakṣatvāt", etc.

658. See p. 182 above.

659. ĀS. p. 181 : "...prakāśa iti padārthamātrasādhāraṇaṁ bodhajanyaṁ prakāṭatādipadaparyāyaṁ dharmamabhipretya vā 'yaṁ prasaṅgaḥ, atha bodhameva, tadaviprakaṣaṁ vā?"

660. Cf. p. 174 above, where the Bhāṭṭa-view is refuted by Yāmuna from the Prābhākara's standpoint.

661. Cf. ĀS. pp. 181-82 : "bhāve 'pi tamaḥpratibandhādapi anudayaḥ sambhavi".

activity (*vyavahāra*) about it on the part of the self in the waking state.⁶⁶² Controverting this view, the author says that there could be no *vyavahāra* regarding the self, either physically or verbally (*kāyika* or *vācika*). In fact, no activity is possible with reference to the *ātman*, of taking it up or leaving it.⁶⁶³ It may be contended that verbal activity is possible. Even as the knowledge pertaining to external objects which exists in inarticulate dumb persons (*mūka*) and young children (*bāla*) does not find any verbal expression by reason of their defective or under-developed articulatory system,⁶⁶⁴ so also, the *ātmānubhava* in question does not take up any verbal form, for want of necessary conditions like the functioning of the sense-organs.

The next objection is that *ātmānubhava*, if it exists in deep sleep, should be recollected as such, after waking, as in the case of other objects.⁶⁶⁵ Refuting this claim, the author says that latent impressions (*saṁskāra*) which are responsible for recollection, could form only when the mind assumes a state (*vṛtti*). During deep sleep, all sense-organs including the mind being dormant, the mind cannot form itself into a state. Deep sleep, swoon, etc., are not mental states like awareness through sight, touch, etc., says Yāmuna.⁶⁶⁶ Therefore, the *ātman* during such states exists in its essential and natural form of knowledge.⁶⁶⁷

It cannot be contended, says Yāmuna, that the self can produce impressions necessary to rouse recollection by virtue of

662. Cf. *Ibid* : p. 182 : "atha matam—svāpādāvapi svānubhavasadbhāve jāgara iva vyavahāraprasaṅga iti..."

663. *Ibid* : p. 182 : "kaḥ khalvātmani vyavahāraḥ? na hyasāvadātum hātumpekṣitum vā śakyaḥ".

664. Cf. *ibid* : "kimaṅga, nirvikalpakabālamūkādivedanaviṣayo vyavahriyata eva?"

Cf. *Epistemology of the Bhāṭṭa School of Pūrva Mīmāṃsā* : p. 193

665. Cf. ĀS. p. 183 : "smṛtiprasaṅga iti cenna, avṛttitvāt".

666. *Ibid* : "na hi mūrchā prasnāpo vā buddhivṛttiviśeṣo darśanasparśanādivat, yena smṛtibijam saṁskāramādadhīyātām".

667. *Ibid* : "...nirvṛttikasāmsiddhikabodhasvarūpeṇa avasthānamātramātmanah".

its essential nature, knowledge itself. If this is admitted, knowledge being as eternal as the *ātman*, there would be an unending series of impressions, so much so that there would be no *mokṣa* at all for the self.⁶⁶⁸

Emphasising the point that the self-experience during deep sleep cannot be recollected, Yāmuna says that there are no conditions favourable for it. Remembrance of a particular thing can take place under certain conditions : the experience of that thing should cease after giving rise to corresponding impressions, and the impressions, thus left, should be roused or stimulated by the observation of features like similarity that pertain to their respective objects.⁶⁶⁹ But since the knowledge of the self is eternal like the self, it cannot be said to be present at a particular time and absent at other times.⁶⁷⁰ Since the experience of *ātman* never terminates, no recollection of it can take place. Recognitory statements like "I am the same person as the one of yesterday" (*ya evāhaṁ pūrvedyur-āsaṁ sa evāhamadyāpi*), however, contain an element of recollection in them. This recollection pertains only to the self in so far as it is connected with a particular time, but not to its essential form.⁶⁷¹ Moreover, impressions that give rise to recollection are laid only by experience that is clear (*pañīyas*) and determinate (*savikalpaka*).⁶⁷² But the self-experience during deep sleep is vague (*aviśada*) due to the presence of the quality, *tamas*, and is also indeterminate (*nirvikalpaka*) due to the absence of sense-object contact. The absence of recollection

668. *Ibid* : "...anavaratopacīyamānasamkāratayā anirmokṣaprasaṅgāt".

669. *Ibid* : p.184 : "anubhave ca svānurūpasamkāradhānaniruddhe sadrśasambandhidarśanādisamudbodhitanijabijānusāreṇa smaraṇamupajāyate".

670. *Ibid* : "na ceha ātmasvarūpabodhasya jātucit nirodho janma vā; nityātmāsattāprayuktatvāt".

671. *Ibid* : "ya evāhaṁ pūrvedyurāsaṁ sa evāhamadyāpī smṛtisambhinnapratyayo 'pi kālāvacchinnaśvarūpagocaraḥ, na svarūpamātre".

672. Cf. *ibid* : pp. 184-85 : "pañīyasā savikalpakēnāvagamena smṛtibijamādhiyate"

regarding self-experience during deep sleep (*svātmānubhava*) is also explained with the help of an instance from common experience. Although we cognise our bodies and are aware that we possess them, we are not always body-conscious. We do not always recollect the form of our body and also the fact that we possess the body. Applying this analogy to self-experience (*ātmānubhava*), it is argued that although it exists in deep sleep, it is not recollected later, as if there were no such experience at all.⁶⁷³

The fourth objection is that the states of *samādhi* and *mokṣa* cannot differ from that of deep sleep, if the self were ever-knowing. This objection is ruled out by Yāmuna on the ground that the said distinction is quite palpable. In deep sleep, impressions of ignorance etc. continue to exist, and the knowledge of the self is contracted by *tamas* responsible for sleep.⁶⁷⁴ In *mokṣa*, on the other hand, there is not a trace of any impression, and knowledge then blossoms in its original splendour.⁶⁷⁵ Similarly, in the *asamprajñāta* type of *samādhi*, there is a complete cessation of all external sense-activity ; the mind is absolutely controlled and nurtured in non-attachment (*vairāgya*) towards wordly objects.⁶⁷⁶ The mind of a person in this type of *samādhi* is thus so ripe as to bring about release for that person.⁶⁷⁷ But all these features are absent in deep sleep. So, no comparison can be drawn between deep sleep on one hand and release and *samādhi* on the other.

673. *Ibid* : p. 185 : "sāmyācca ananubhavābhimānaḥ śarīrataddhāraṇaprayatnānanusandhānavat".

674. *Ibid* : "kleśavāśanānāṁ guṇābhibhavasya caikatra bhāvāt".

675. *Ibid* : p. 186 : "ītaratra tadatyantaniṣṭteḥ".

676. There is a variant reading here given by all texts of *ST*: "samprajñāta". See *Yogasūtra* : I. 17 : "vitarkavicārānandā-smitārūpānugamāt samprajñātaḥ", and I. 18 : "virāmapratyayābhyā-sapūrvaḥ samkāraśeṣaḥ anyah".

677. Cf. *ĀS* : p. 186 : "asamprajñātasamādhāvapi paramavairāgyaśālinā paṭutaranīrodhasamkāreṇa caritādhikāriṇā apavarginā viśeṣaḥ".

Reference has already been made to another view⁶⁷⁸ which, purporting to be based on the Yoga school of thought, holds that the self, during deep sleep, is manifested by a particular state of mind called 'nidrā'. The view seeks the support of recollections like "I had a good sleep", "I had a disturbed sleep" and "I had a very bad sleep". These statements, as already pointed out,⁶⁷⁹ are not recollections but inferences based upon the relaxed, strained and such other conditions of the physical body and the senses, says Yāmuna.⁶⁸⁰ That is why it is not necessary to accept *nidrā* as a separate *vṛtti*.

The *Yoga-sūtra*, "*abhāvapratyayālambanā vṛttir nidrā*"⁶⁸¹ on which the opponent bases his argument, is then explained by Yāmuna. By "*nidrā*" is meant not any state of mind, but only a general absence of all mental states that give rise to knowledge. The context (*prakaraṇa*) in which this aphorism occurs is concerned with control of mind.⁶⁸² So, it is proper to explain that *nidrā* is called here a "*vṛtti*" only in the sense that it should also be controlled and overcome like all other *vṛttis*.⁶⁸³ So, the term, "*vṛtti*" in the *sūtra*, like the term "*viparyaya*" occurring in another *sūtra*,⁶⁸⁴ should be interpreted in a secondary sense.

678. See p. 180 above.

679. *Ibid.*

680. See ĀS : p. 187 : "naivāmi vāsanāyonayaḥ pratyayāḥ, api tu.... ānumānikā iti".

681. *Yogasūtra* : I. 10. *Tattvavaiśārādī* of Vācaspati on it says : "jāgratsvapnavṛttināmabhāvaḥ tasya pratyayaḥ kāraṇam buddhisattvācchādakaṁ tamaḥ ; tadevālambanā viśayo yasyāssā tathoktā vṛttir nidrā".

682. The "*pāda*" in which this aphorism occurs is called "*samādhipāda*".

683. Cf. *Vṛtti* on *Yogasūtra* : I. 10 : "pratyayaviśeṣo nidrā, sā ca samādhāvitapratyayavat niroddhavyeti".

684. *Yogasūtra* : I. 8 : "viparyayo mithyājñānamatadrūpa-pratiṣṭham".

Since the Yoga school holds all knowledge as valid, and since it does not accept the *anyathākhyāti* theory of error, the term "*viparyaya*" (illusion), should only be understood in a secondary sense as non-discrimination between the right and the wrong. Yāmuna says that the *Nyāyatattva* of Nāthamuni⁶⁸⁵ proves all knowledge as valid (*arthāvybhicāri*), a view to which Yāmuna himself contributes. In the light of this, the aphorism of Patañjali quoted above is taken as saying that all factors like *nidrā* and *viparyaya* that stand in the way of *mokṣa* should efficiently be put down.⁶⁸⁶

Even if *nidrā* be accepted as a particular state of mind, it only contributes to the author's stand that the self is ever-knowing. The advocate of the Yoga school only wants to prove that knowledge of the self in deep sleep is brought about by *nidrā*, a state of mind. This in other words, means that the self is ever-knowing, which the author himself maintains.⁶⁸⁷

It cannot be urged that *jñāna*, resulting from the *vṛtti* which depends upon the sense-organs, could only be accidental. Stressing upon the indispensability of knowledge, Yāmuna says that even the presence of *tamas* during deep sleep will have to be accounted for only with the help of knowledge.⁶⁸⁸ Explaining this point, Yāmuna says that in deep sleep, the existence of *tamas* cannot be proved at all. It cannot be cognised by the mind, because all senses including the mind itself, are dormant in that

685. See ĀS. pp. 187-88 : "nāhyatadrūpapratīṣṭham mithyājñānam kiñcidasti, sarvasarividāmarthāvyabhicārāt; sa cādhikaraṇasiddhaḥ".

Cf. *NPS*. I. p. 91 : "yannāthamunimīśrādyair yathārthakhyātisāadhanam" etc.

686. See note 683 above. Cf. ĀS. p. 188 : "kaivalyabhāgi yaccit, tatpratyanīkatayā nidrāder niroddhyatvenopadeśaḥ"

687. See ĀS. p. 188.

688. *Ibid.* p. 189 :

"yatassvatassato bodhārte puṁso yathoditam tamassvāpādikālinam na siddhyet hetvasiddhitaḥ".

state and so no mental state can exist. It is also clear that *tamas* is not a self-luminous entity,⁶⁸⁹ and claims made in its favour are sublated by practical experience. So, ultimately, the opponent has no choice other than to admit that knowledge, which forms the natural attribute of the self, is itself capable of manifesting all objects or features like *tamas* present in deep sleep.⁶⁹⁰

Compressing these results into a syllogism, Yāmuna says that the self-luminous character of the self has to be admitted on the ground that it happens to be the knower. Entities like the pot, on the other hand, which are not self-manifest, are known to be invariably devoid of this special property, viz., “knowership” (*jñātrtva*).⁶⁹¹

The author then proceeds to refute the charge that there could be no distinction between one item of objective knowledge and another, if knowledge were an eternal attribute of the self.⁶⁹² For this purpose, he enters into a very elaborate discussion which takes us almost to the end of this section, on the real significance of the term, “*prakāśa*” (manifestation), which is referred to in the above syllogism. It has already been pointed⁶⁹³ out that the term “*prakāśa*” can have three different meanings : “*jñāna*” (knowledge), “*jñātātā*” (manifestedness) and “*sāmvidadūratva*” (not being remote from knowledge).

The Naiyāyika interprets “*prakāśa*” as ‘knowledge’ and explains the relation between the self and knowledge as the one that subsists between the substratum and the thing subsisting in it (*āśrayāśrayibhāva*). But on this view, the negative

689. *Ibid* : “na ca svaprakāśam tamaḥ”.

690. *Ibid* .

691. This is a *kevalavyatireki* type of anumāna, which the author himself refuted above (pp. 163-64). The present statement is to be understood as having been made by the author from the standpoint of those who admit its validity.

692. See p. 178 above.

693. See p. 188 above.

concomitance in the above-mentioned syllogism would be of the form : “Any object possessing a manifestation that is non-eternal or dependent upon other factors cannot be a knower, as for example, the pot”. But the negation of specific features implies the acceptance of general ones, and so, the non-eternity of manifestation would also mean that the pot, etc. can have occasioned knowledge, which however, is absurd.

Even if the *Naiyāyika* explains the relation between *jñāna* and the self in terms of the subject-object relation (*viśaya-viśayibhāva*), there crop up fresh difficulties. The self would then become the object of knowledge eternally,⁶⁹⁴ which goes against its self-luminous character. Moreover, since knowledge can manifest an object only when the senses function, the manifestation of the self by knowledge necessarily involves sense-functioning and cannot, therefore, be eternal.⁶⁹⁵ The mediacy of the causal machinery is inevitable, even when the self is to be manifested. It cannot be urged that dependence upon causal conditions becomes necessary only when the self of another person is cognised, for, even the apprehension of one's own self involves the operation of causes, as when it is cognised by inference, verbal testimony and *yogic* perception.⁶⁹⁶ It would also be mutually contradictory to say that the self can, at one and the same time, become the subject as well as the object of cognition regarding its own self.⁶⁹⁷ The self, as a matter of fact, cannot be cognised in its essential form (*svarūpa*) by any means. Inference, verbal testimony and such other means can only

694. See ĀS. p. 191 : “...viśeṣaṇiṣedhasya sāmānyābhyanujñākṣepakatvāt āgantukam jñānam ghaṭādāvanumata-māpadyeta ; atha tanmābhūḍiti viśayaviśayibhāva eva saṁbandhaḥ saṁgīyeta, tato nityavajjñānaviśayatvamātmanah prasajyeta”.

695. *Ibid* : “jñānaviśayikāraśca sādhanaviśeṣāyattatvena niyata itī na svābhāvikatvasambhavaḥ”.

696. *Ibid* : “ātmano 'pi ānumānikāgamikayogajñānaviśayikāre tatsāpekṣatvadarśanāt”.

697. *Ibid*. p. 191 : “viruddhe ca ekasya ekakriyāyām karmakartṛtve”.

establish the self in some of its aspects like eternity, subtlity and pervasiveness, but not in its essential form.⁶⁹⁸ So, the contention that the *ātman* in its essential form can become the object of eternal knowledge, becomes untenable. This difficulty cannot be got over by saying that the self can become the cogniser as well as the cognised, by its particular and general aspects. If this is admitted, the self would no more be self-manifest, like the word “*śabda*”, says Yāmuna.⁶⁹⁹ When the word “*śabda*” is uttered, it has two phases in it — as the “revealer” (*vācaka*) and the “revealed” (*vācya*). “*śabda*” becomes “*vācya*” as the quality of audibility. It also becomes “*vācaka*” as appearing in a particular sequence. But in either case, “*śabda*” cannot be self-manifest. Thus, even the self would cease to become self-manifest, if the subject-object relation between it and knowledge is explained in terms of the general and particular aspects.

The next view is that of the Bhāṭṭa viz., that “*prakāśa*” is not identical with “*jñāna*”. We have already seen that for him, “*prakāśa*” means “*jñātātā*”, a feature that is common for all entities, sentient as well as insentient. It is due to this *jñātātā* that each and every entity is apprehended and spoken of as manifested. The relation in which *jñātātā* stands with reference to the entities is described as the one that exists between the basis and the based (*āśrayāśrayi-bhāva*). Since the *ātman* is said to be the knower, *jñātātā* which pertains to it, would also be eternal, contends the Bhāṭṭa.

“*Prakāśa*”, according to the Prābhākara, is identical with “*jñāna*”.⁷⁰⁰ The relation between *prakāśa* and the different entities it manifests is explained by him in terms of the capability of rendering those entities fit for *vyavahāra*, i.e, thought and discussion.⁷⁰¹ It is due to this *jñāna* that we can uniformly refer

698. *Ibid* : p. 192 : “nityatvaniratisāyasūkṣmatvavyāpitvacitsvābhāvyādirūpeṇa pratyagarthasya aupadeśikatvamānumānikatvaṁ vā, na svarūpataḥ”.

699. *Ibid* : rūpabhedenā gamyagamakatvāṅgikārapakṣe ‘pakṣasyeva śabdāder na svatassiddhatvam”.

700. *Ibid*. p. 193 : “na jñānātirekī prakāśo nāma”.

701. *Ibid*.: “yadvyavahāropajanānānugūṇaṁ tat prakāśate ityucyate”.

to the *jñātṛ*, *jñeya* and *jñāna* itself, as manifesting. The Bhāṭṭa-view that *jñātātā* is eternal like the *ātman* would make *jñāna* quite unnecessary, says the Prābhākara. It cannot be contended that *prakāśa* is identical with consciousness for, then, even the pot, etc. with which *prakāśa* unites, would become identical with consciousness. Even if *prakāśa* is held to be different from consciousness and as manifesting to the soul, the possessor thereof, this does not include *saṁvit* in scope because “*saṁvit*” is consciousness itself, but not the possessor thereof.⁷⁰²

The Bhāṭṭa's position becomes weaker if he says that the *prakāśa* of objects is dependent upon their relation with consciousness. Here, there are two difficulties. If this relation with consciousness is explained as inherence with the *ātman* that possesses it, then pot etc., which are devoid of this feature would become unmanifest. If, on the other hand, this relation with consciousness (*caitanyasambandha*) is interpreted as ‘becoming the object of consciousness’, then, consciousness and the self would both become unmanifest. The untenability of this second alternative is said to have been shown by Nāthamuni in his *Nyāyatattva*.⁷⁰³ The contention of the Bhāṭṭas that the self can be established only as the substratum of the *prakāśa* brought about by *jñāna* and that *jñāna* is inferred through the property called *jñātātā* are already refuted.⁷⁰⁴

Yāmuna then points out that the Prābhākara fares no better than the Bhāṭṭa, in spite of his admission that knowledge is self-manifest. Even in his case, the difficulty of explaining the relation between *jñāna* and other entities persists. According to the Prābhākara, *jñāna* becomes fit for *vyavahāra* in the essential form as *jñāna* itself; entities like the pot etc. as the objects of *jñāna* ; and *ātman* as the substrate of *jñāna*. There is thus no uniformity of *vyavahāra* regarding the triple entity— *jñāna*, *jñeya* and *jñātṛ*, says Yāmuna.

702. *Ibid*. : “cetanaiva hi sā, na cetayate”.

703. *Ibid*. p. 194 : “...na viśaya viśayibhāvah, tasyaivānirūpaṇāt; anirūpaṇam ca bhrāntiyadhikaraṇasiddhāntārambhe saṁvitsiddhau ca anusandhātavyam”.

704. See p. 172 f. above.

The Bhāṭṭas and the Prābhākaras, according to him, cannot offer any satisfactory explanation for the way in which *jñāna*, inherent in the self, can produce either *prakāśa* or *vyavahāra* in another entity. Proximity of causes like the senses cannot explain this phenomenon. A cause has its own limitations. It can give rise to an effect, but not also to the subsequent factors that are to be brought about by that effect itself. So, the senses and such other causes can produce knowledge, but not other features like *prakāśa* (manifestedness) or *vyavahāra*, which are to be produced by knowledge. For a product to fulfil its purpose, it is no longer necessary that there should be a continuity of the efficient cause which brought it into being.⁷⁰⁵ Thus, for a pot to be able to bring water, the co-presence of the potter is not necessary.

The two Mīmāṃsakas cannot also explain why *jñāna*, a product, should cease to exist when its efficient cause, viz., the sense-object-contact, ceases to exist. We know by experience that an effect like a jar, for instance, exists even when its causes like the potter's wheel and rod cease to exist.⁷⁰⁶ Therefore, one has to admit that in the process of an objective perception, consciousness goes out along with the (subtle) sense-organ to the particular object and gets connected with it,⁷⁰⁷ says Yāmuna.

The theory set forth above can satisfactorily explain the invariable concomitance witnessed between sense-object-contact and knowledge. The Bhāṭṭa also cannot explain as to how *jñātātā* pertaining to the objects vanishes when *jñāna*, its efficient cause, ceases to exist.

705. Cf. ĀS. p. 195 : "na khalu labdhātmakam kāryam svanimittakāraṇamanuruddhya kāryamārabhate".

706. *Ibid* : "na ca nimittakāraṇanāśe kāryanāśaḥ".

707. Cf. ĀS. p. 195 : "ata indriyeṇa saha caitanyamapi nissṛtya tena tenārthena sannikṛṣyate".

Cf. *Śrībhāṣya* under II. ii. 27, pp. 810-811 : "...tattadarthavyavahārayogyatāpādanarūpatayā sāksāt pratiyamānasya jñānasya tattadarthasambandhāyattam tattadasādhāraṇyam; sambandhaśca saṁyogalakṣaṇaḥ"

The opponents may bring in the analogy of Number (*saṁkhyā*) to justify their contention that an effect perishes when its efficient cause perishes. To explain, numbers *two*, *three*, etc., upto infinity are produced by enumerative cognition (*apekṣābuddhi*). When the efficient cause, viz., the enumerative cognition ceases to exist, its products, viz., numbers *two*, etc., also cease to exist. Applying this analogy to the case of knowledge, the opponents argue that *prakāśa* ceases to exist when its efficient cause, viz., knowledge, ceases to exist.

Objecting to this Yāmuna says that the non-existence of numbers 2, 3, etc., consequent to that of their enumerative cognition, is *asiddha* or unestablished. Therefore, like the number 2, the other numbers ranging from 2 to infinity should be accepted as lasting so long as their substrata, viz., entities, last, for the very reason that they too are numbers (*saṁkhyā*).

The eternity or non-eternity of the number pertaining to objects individually, depends upon the corresponding eternal or non-eternal character of the objects to which the number pertains. This is a fact admitted on all hands. It is therefore proper to maintain that the numbers 2, 3, etc., upto infinity (*parārdha*) last so long as their substrata, viz., the different entities last, because the generality of numberness (*saṁkhyātva*) runs through them all, says Yāmuna.

The argument may further be stretched that *oneness* (i.e., the number 1) cannot be a number on the ground that it is not something over and above the very form of the object to which it pertains. Yāmuna says that *oneness* is also a number on the ground that it runs through all entities, as when we say "one pot", "one piece of cloth" and so on.⁷⁰⁸ If *oneness* (*ekatva*) were identical with the very being of the entities, as held by some, there would not be a uniform and continuous cognition of "oneness" running through different objects. The contention that *ekatva* is of the form of the object would also land one in the trouble of equating things related by number 1, as for instance, a pot with a piece of cloth. The syllogism in this connection is : "Oneness is a number like the number 2, because, it is opposed

708. ĀS. p. 197 : "saṁkhyaiṣa sā ; dravyāntare 'pyanuṣṭeḥ".

to other numbers like 3, 4, etc.,”⁷⁰⁹ Here, the words “opposed to” mean “lacking in co-ordinate predication (*sāmānādhikarāṇya*) between the numbers 1 and 2.”

It may further be contended that “two-ness” (*dvitva*), etc. do not last till their substrates last, on the ground that they, like conjunction (*saṃyoga*), are qualities pertaining to many entities. This argument is vitiated by the defect called “*anaikānta*” in the instance of “*nānātva*” (diversity), which, though a quality pertaining to many entities, does not cease to exist so long as those entities exist. Yāmuna also proves that “*nānātva*” is a number different from *oneness* and *two-ness*.⁷¹⁰

Having thus proved that two-ness (*dvitva*) etc., last till their substrata last, Yāmuna shows that these are not *always* cognised. *Dvitva* etc. are relative in nature. So, they are not cognised when the objects serving as their correlatives are not cognised and also when there is no desire on the part of a man to know them.⁷¹¹ It is thus shown by the author that the invariable concomitance between knowledge and its causes becomes accounted for, only when consciousness is admitted to connect its objects through the sense-organs.

Yāmuna also finds fault with the theory advanced by the Mīmāṃsakas regarding the manifestation of external objects. *Jñāna* which manifests objects, like the light of a lamp, manifests them only by going out and contacting them.⁷¹² It cannot be contended that *jñāna*, being a formless entity (*amūrta*), cannot possess any activity. Yāmuna examines the possible definitions

709. *Ibid* :

“saṅkhyāikatā viruddhatvāt, dvisaṅkhyevānyasaṅkhyayā ekam dvāviti na hyasti sāmānādhikarāṇyadhīh”

710. *Ibid*. p. 198.

711. *Ibid* : “āpekṣikatvāt dvitvādeḥ, pratiyogyanavagrahāt bubhutsoparamāccāpi satyā evānavagrahaḥ”.

712. ĀS. p.198 : “sarvaṃ ca prakāśakam prakāśyavastusannikṛṣṭameva prakāśakam dṛṣṭam dipaprabhādi”.

for the term “*mūrti*”, as an element in the word, “*amūrtatva*”, and shows that on no ground can *jñāna* be denied activity.⁷¹³ The term, “*mūrti*”, can be interpreted in two ways : (a) as an entity occupying a limited area and (b) as an entity possessing touch. The first definition is too wide since it is applicable even to *jñāna*, which is an entity⁷¹⁴ and is inherent in the self. Yāmuna also proves that *jñāna* is non-pervasive⁷¹⁵ and that it is of unsurpassed rapidity. The second definition of “*mūrtatva*” is “*sparsāvattva*”—having touch. This is not acceptable because *śabda* (sound) is an exception to this. Sound is devoid of touch, but yet it is capable of covering long distances. The mind is the illustration for another exception to the above rule, which, although devoid of touch, is accepted by the Vaiśeṣikas and the Mīmāṃsakas as possessing activity.⁷¹⁶

Consciousness which can thus contact objects through the senses, also possesses the capacity of revealing even objects of the past and the future. There is nothing wrong in such a conception, in as much as even philosophers of other schools⁷¹⁷ admit that entities of the past and future can become objects of the present cognition, that they can have manifestation, number and so on. As a matter of fact, for the *Siddhāntin*, objects of past and future periods of time exist even at the time of cognition, in

713. *Ibid* : p. 199.

714. *Ibid* : “iṣyata eva sā caitanye”. Cf. *Śrībhāṣya* under II. ii. 27: p. 811 : “jñānamapi hi dravyameva; prabhādravyasya pradīpaguṇabhūtasyeva jñānasyāpi ātmaguṇabhūtasya dravyatvam-aviruddham”.

715. This applies to the state of bondage.

716. The Naiyāyikas thus speak of a type of relation called “*jñānalakṣaṇa*” to account for the illusory appearance of nacre as silver.

717. For the Vaiśeṣikas, things of past and future become objects of the cognition belonging to the present time. For the Bhāṭṭas, objects of past and future not only exist now as the universal (*jāti*) but also possess the property called *prākṛtya*.

different states.⁷¹⁸ Just as our eye cognises the yonder stars, so also our *jñāna* can cognise entities belonging to the past and future, says Yāmuna. Stating this in a syllogism,⁷¹⁹ Yāmuna points out that the past and the future cannot be remote for *jñāna* on the ground that they, like *jñāna* and *jñātṛ* can also be manifested by *jñāna*.

Consciousness being very rapid,⁷²⁰ it appears as if it did not contact each and every entity that exists between the point of time in which it operates and that point to which its entity belongs, even as the sequence between the conjunction of a circularly rotating firebrand with a particular point in space, and its disjunction there from are not noticed, due to the speed of rotation.

Yāmuna also explains that consciousness which goes out from a sense-organ, manifests only those objects that are fit to be cognised by that particular sense, but not all objects with which it may come into contact. Thus, consciousness coming out through the eye, for instance, manifests only the colour, etc., of the objects that are fit to be seen, but not taste, smell and other qualities.⁷²¹ To drive home this point that only things fit for

718. Cf. ĀS. p. 200 : "api ca atītatayā anāgatatayā ca tāvapy adyāpi vidyete", i.e. as "pradhvaṃsābhāva" and "prāgabdhāva" respectively.

Vedāntadeśika in his *Nyāyasiddhāṇḍana*, V. (p. 242), quoting ĀS, says : "atītānāgatatayā tāvapyadyāpi vidyete iti tena rūpeṇa bodhasannikarṣe nānupapattiḥ iti ca taddravyasattayā saṃyogopapattirupapādītā; tatraivamāśayaḥ—yathā kaiścidasatoreva bhūtabhaviṣyatos-sāmānyātmanā 'dyāpi vṛtṭeḥ prākṛtyāś rayatvamupapāditaṃ, tathā taddravyātmanāpi vṛtṭeḥ saṃyogo 'pyupapanna eva; viśiṣṭenāsaṃyogaśced viśeṣākāreṇa na prākṛtyamiti tulyamiti".

719. ĀS. p. 201 :

nātītānāgate buddher dūre bhavīṭumarhataḥ
buddhyā prakāśyamānatvād buddhibodhṛsvarūpavat".

720. Cf. the following quoted by Deśika in his *Nyāyasiddhāṇḍana*, (V. p. 237), as from the *Nyāyatattva* of Nāthamuni :

"atyantavegitātyantaśauksmyaṃ nirbharatā tathā
svasattākālabhāvāptir jñāne lakṣmacatuṣṭayam".

721. Cf. NK. II. p. 109 : "...guṇayogyatāmeva puraskṛtya indriyāṇi dravyamupādāte".

apprehension are cognised by consciousness, Yāmuna gives two instances. The first is that of the denotative capacity (*śakti*) of words like "cow". Though the word "cow" denotes both the universal (cowness) and the individual, it is only the universal that is taken as signified. The second example is that of an injunction like "*dadhnā juhoti*". It is proper to take this statement as specifying a particular type of oblation, viz., curds into the fire, but not as ordaining something already known, viz., the performance of a fire-sacrifice, which has already been covered by the injunction "*agnihotraṃ juhoti*".⁷²² Likewise, consciousness pertaining to particular sense-organs manifests only those entities that are fit to be cognised by those senses, but not all entities. In this connection Yāmuna also quotes two passages, one from the *Bhagavadgītā*⁷²³ and another from the *Manusmṛti*,⁷²⁴ to show that consciousness comes out through the medium of sense-organs.

Having thus established that *jñāna* contacts its objects through the senses, Yāmuna proceeds to answer the objection raised earlier⁷²⁵ that consciousness being a *guṇa*, it cannot leave aside its substrate, the self, and go out to contact its objects. Yāmuna says that there is no question of *jñāna* leaving aside its substratum. It can go out and contact through the senses without at the same time severing its connection with the self. Even qualities like sound (*śabda*) and smell can move out of their substrata, says Yāmuna.⁷²⁶

722. *Taittirīya Samhitā* : V. ix. 1.

723. *Bhagavadgītā* : II. 37b : "tadasya harati prajñāṃ vāyurnāvamīvaṃbhasi".

724. *Manusmṛti* : II. 99 :

"indriyāṇāṃ hi sarveṣāṃ yadyekam kṣaratīndriyaṃ
tadasya kṣarati prajñāṃ dr̥ṣṭeḥ pādādivoḍakam".

725. See pp. 178-79 above.

726. Cf. ĀS. p. 203 : "dr̥śyante ca guṇā api śabdagandhasūryāloka-ratnaprabhādayo gatimanto dharṃyatīvartinaśca".

Deśika interprets this in his *Nyāyapariśuddhi* : I. p. 182 : "*ātmāsiddhau* tu śabdasya dharṃyatīvartitvagatimattvavādas tadāśraya-bhūtāvayavadvāreṇeti netavyaḥ".

But the illustration of *śabda* (sound) is again a matter of controversy. The Bhāṭṭas think that sound is an eternal and all-pervasive entity. The Prābhākaras are of the view that sound is eternal and all-pervasive like the element ether, and that it is the special quality of the latter. They further say that though all-pervasive and ever-present, it is manifested only through some agents like the effort of human beings. It is due to these delimiting and manifesting agents that sound appears as confined only to a limited area and as possessing motion.

Refuting this contention, Yāmuna says that sound belongs to the element air, but not to the ether.⁷²⁷ This is proved by him on the ground that sound is produced invariably in association with air, like the quality of touch, which also belongs to air. Thus, when a drum is beaten with a stick or when a bamboo is split there is the production of air, accompanied by sound. So it is to be admitted that the Mīmāṃsaka's theory of sound being eternal is also untenable.⁷²⁸ Sound is non-eternal because it is produced and it is also a quality apprehended by a sense-organ, the ear, like the quality of smell. It is also possible to show that sound is produced by human effort because, like conjunction (*saṃyoga*), it is apprehended only after an activity like splitting the bamboo takes place.

It may be argued that human effort and such other factors are not the causes, but mere manifesters of sound. This is

727. Yāmuna here goes against the normal view that *śabda* pertains to the ether. But Deśika explains this in his *Nyāyasiddhāṇjana*: p. 250 : “*ātmāsiddhivacanāṃ tu paramatena, ekadeśimatena vā ghaṭate*”.

He quotes Parāśara's view that sound belongs to ether alone : “*Bhāṭṭaparāśarapādair vākyanirūpaṇe śabdasya gaganaguṇatvamevābhīhitam—gaganaguṇaśabdādisvarūpasthitiḥ pravartayatā bhagavataiva...*” etc.

728. Cf. *Nyāyakusumāñjali* : II. p. 86 : “*na hi varṇā eva tāvannityāḥ*”.

Ibid : p. 100 : “*śabdo' nityaḥ utpattidharmakavāt, ghaṭavat*”.

Ibid : p. 109 : “*astu tarhi śabdo nityaḥ nityākāśaikaguṇatvāt tadgataparamamahatparimāṇavaditi pratyānumānamiti cenna, akāryatvasyopādher vidyamānatvāt*”. etc.

cumbersome ; there is economy of thought in maintaining that human effort etc. produce sounds rather than in making them the causes of manifestation of sounds. Another defect in the introduction of the revealing agent (*abhivyañjaka*) for sounds is this. A manifesting agent, when it manifests a particular object, manifests simultaneously all factors that exist in one and the same substratum and which are capable of being cognised by a single sense-organ. A lamp, for instance, reveals not only a pot, but also its colour, number, magnitude and such other factors.⁷²⁹ Thus, if the air produced by the conjunction, disjunction etc. of various parts of the mouth is held to manifest but not produce sounds, it should, on the analogy of the lamp given above, manifest all sounds simultaneously. But this is not our experience. We find that the airstream originating from the throat, when it reveals the letter “*ka*”, for instance, does not at the same time reveal other letters like “*ga*”.

Yāmuna sums up the defects in the theory of manifestation of sound in five “*kārikās*”.⁷³⁰ The Mīmāṃsaka says that sound pertains to a single substratum, viz., ether, and that it is apprehended by a single sense-organ, the ear. As such, there is no reason as to why only certain sounds should be revealed but not all, by effort and such other factors. Since we do not in our common experience, observe that a single agent manifests all sounds simultaneously, it is proper to hold that sounds are caused

729. ĀS pp. 204-05 : “*abhivyañjakāśca ekadeśāvasthitānekendriyagrāhyān yugapadabhivyañjanti, yathā pradīpo rūpasamkhyāparimāṇāni karakādīnścaikapradeśavartinaḥ*”.

730: *Ibid* : pp. 205-06 :

“*nityatvavādināśśabdā nirbhāgavyomavartinaḥ |
śrāvaṇāścetyabhivyañjantinyame nāsti kāraṇam ||
deśaikye grāhakaikye ca vyañjakaikyaṃ hi darsitam |
tadabhāvāt prayatnotthamārutaḥ kāraṇaṃ dhvaneḥ ||
ata eva ca nānātvaṃ pratyuccāraṇamiśyatām |
kṛtasya kāraṇāyogādhetupaūṣkalyābhedataḥ |
kiñcodātānūdātātadvādirghatvahravāśādayaḥ |
gādisthā yugapadbhānto na bhindyuḥ svāśrayān katham ||
sthānaikyāpātasādrśyāt pratyabhijñāpi naikyataḥ ||
pradīpapratyabhijñeva jñāpitā bhedahetavaḥ*”

by the air originating from the articulatory regions by human effort. Since each act of pronunciation produces a separate sound, it is proper to assume that the sounds produced are indeed many, each being distinct from the others. Moreover, characteristics such as the *udātta* and the *anudātta* intonations and the length and shortness of utterance point out that their substrate, viz., the sounds, must also be mutually different. Recognitory statements like “so ‘yam gākārah” (“This ‘ga’ is the same sound ‘ga’ which had earlier been apprehended”) cannot be adduced as a proof for the eternity of sounds, says the author.⁷³¹ The statement, “so ‘yam gākārah”, like the statement, “*seyam jvālā*” (which identifies flames erroneously due to their similarity), proceeds from a mistaken conception of the identity of sounds. This false identity is based on the similarity of the place of articulation.

Yāmuna has thus proved that sound, given in the above pages as an illustration,⁷³² is only produced, but not manifested by utterance and that it is a quality of air. Since sound is thus proved to be a quality of air, it follows that it can also travel along with its substratum, air. The analogy of sound thus serves to establish that knowledge can also go out and contact its objects.

But the Prābhākara again steps in to point out that even in this theory of the *Siddhāntin*, there is no uniformity of *vyavahāra* regarding the triple entity, *jñāna*, *jñeya* and *jñātṛ*. According to this theory, *prakāśa* ultimately becomes identical with the conjunction (*saṁyoga*) of knowledge with the objects or some other property born out of *saṁyoga*. Pointing out defects in the theory, the Prābhākara says that if *prakāśa* were identified with *saṁyoga*, then this definition being too narrow, it would apply only to the objects, but not to *jñāna* and *jñātṛ*. If, on the other hand, *prakāśa* is equated with *samavāya* (inherence) of *jñāna*, then again *jñāna* and its object will both become unmanifest since *samavāya* pertains to the *ātman* alone. If, as

731. Cf. NK. II : pp. 100-01 : “evam vyavasthite ‘numānamapyucyate śabdo ‘nityaḥ uttpattidharmakatvāt, ghaṭavat; na cedam pratyabhijñānabādhitam, tasya jvālādi pratyabhijñānenāviśeṣāt”.

732. See p. 204 above.

the third step, mere relation (*sambandhamātra*) without any specification either as *saṁyoga* or *samavāya* were meant by the term “*prakāśa*”, then this definition being too wide, it will apply even to the body and senses. The Prābhākara says that difficulty arises only when “*prakāśa*” is interpreted in terms of relations like *saṁyoga* and *samavāya*. So, without recourse to any relation as such, he tries to solve the problem by saying that *jñāna*, by its very nature (*svabhāva*), can render all *vyavahāra* possible with regard to the triple entity, *jñāna*, *jñeya* and *jñātṛ*. *Jñāna*, by itself, becomes responsible for the *vyavahāra* concerning itself; with reference to the *ātman*, its substratum, it is through *samavāya*; and with reference to the objects, it is through other causal factors like the sense-organs. So, no doubts can be entertained regarding this *vyavahārānugūṇya* of knowledge, since it is quite natural with it, concludes the Prābhākara.

Rejecting this claim, Yāmuna refers the Prābhākara to the defect earlier pointed out in the latter's theory.⁷³³ An effect that has come into being through an efficient cause, does not depend upon the same cause for bringing out its own subsequent activities also. To show the untenability of this argument, it has also been pointed out earlier⁷³⁴ that for a pot to be able to bring water, the co-presence of the potter was not necessary. Sense-object contact and such other causal conditions produce *jñāna* alone. They cannot produce “*prakāśa*” and such other factors belonging to *jñāna*. Even if the term “*prakāśa*” were interpreted as *jñāna* that renders *vyavahāra* possible as claimed by the Prābhākara, there is still no uniformity of significance suggested by the term.

The term “*vyavahārānugūṇasamvedana*” can be taken either as a compound of the *Bahuvrīhi* (possessive) or of the *Karmadhāraya* (appositional) type. As a *Bahuvrīhi*, it means “that which possesses knowledge responsible for *vyavahāra*”. This definition applies only to the *jñātṛ* and *jñeya* but not *jñāna* because there can be no other *jñāna* which may be said to be possessed by *jñāna*. As a *Karmadhāraya*-compound, the expression means the “quality of being knowledge, responsible for

733. See p. 198 above.

734. *Ibid*.

vyavahāra", and this definition does not apply to both the *jñeya* and *jñātṛ*, for they are not identical with knowledge. Another incoherence regarding this theory of *vyavahārānugūṇya* is this: *Ānugūṇya* or conduciveness to *vyavahāra* should only be deduced from activity or *vyavahāra* itself. But even before the *vyavahāra* takes place, one feels and says one has cognised the object regarding which there is the *vyavahāra* in question. Therefore, the theory of the Prābhākaras lacks exactitude of definition, and so, is not acceptable.⁷³⁵

Having thus silenced his critics, Yāmuna gives out his own opinion on the matter. Basing his argument on the statement made by Nāthamuni in his *Nyāyatattva*, "*anubhavādūratvaṁ smṛti-nimitittam*",⁷³⁶ Yāmuna explains that "*prakāśa*" means not being remote (*adūra*) from *anubhava* or experience.⁷³⁷

The term "*adūratvaṁ*" can be interpreted as "being different from that which is remote" (*dūrāt anyatvaṁ*) and also as "being opposed to what is remote" (*dūreṇa viruddhatvaṁ*). Accordingly, "*anubhavādūratvaṁ*" can be interpreted as (a) being different from that which is remote from *anubhava*, and also as (b) being opposed to that which is remote from *anubhava*.⁷³⁸

Explaining further, Yāmuna says that the *prakāśa* of a particular entity is nothing but a reference to the knowledge (*bodha*) and the entity in contact with that knowledge, which knowledge is not far from one's experience, as in the case of the illumination of external objects. Thus, when a particular region is illumined by the rays of the sun, we experience it and say that the region is illumined. This experience and the verbal activity (*prakhyā* and *upākhyā*) proceed from the fact that the region is

735. ĀS. pp. 207-08.

736. *Ibid* p. 208. The *Nyāyatattva* from which this is quoted, is yet to be recovered. This quotation points out that remembrance takes place only when there is experience. It can be explained thus: "*Prakāśa* is being not far from experience (i.e., being nearer to experience) and the contiguity is itself the cause of remembrance".

737. *Ibid* : "etaduktam bhavati—samvidadūratvaṁ prakāśa iti".

738. *Ibid* : p. 209 : "bhavatvanubhavādūratvaṁ dūrādanyad virodhi vā tadbhāvaśca prakāśatvaṁ kimatra bahu jalpyate".

not remote from the light of the sun.⁷³⁹ Just as the darkness of that particular region is dispelled by virtue of the region not being far from light (*ālokādūra*), so also in the case of the *prakāśa* under discussion, *ajñāna* regarding a particular entity gets dispelled by reason of the object not being far removed from *jñāna*. It is due to this contiguity to *jñāna* (*jñānādūratva*) that an object like a pot and also the experience regarding it are simultaneously recollected after the experience itself has faded away, says Yāmuna.

By this interpretation of *prakāśa* as being not remote from knowledge, the doubts raised by the opponents regarding the possible relations like *saṁyoga* and *samavāya* become groundless, says the author. As a matter of fact, for him, *saṁyoga* is the only possible relation. *Saṁyoga*, in other words, is a very close contiguity which again is identical with the term "*nairantarya*"⁷⁴⁰ (not being separated by space). *Saṁyoga* between the inseparables (*ayutasiddha*) is called *samavāya* (inherence) in the Vaiśeṣika system. But this comes under *saṁyoga*. So, no argument can be made against this theory of *prakāśa* on the assumption of *samavāya* being a separate entity, says Yāmuna.

A second definition of *prakāśa* is also given by Yāmuna. *Prakāśa* is the capacity to give rise to *vyavahāra* and this capacity is characterised by its not being far from knowledge.⁷⁴¹

739. *Ibid* : p. 210.

740. *Ibid*. p. 211 : "nairantaryapadaparyāyamatyanta-sāṁpiyamātram ca saṁyogaḥ". Also cf. "atyantasāṁpiyam saṁyogaḥ" quoted by Deśika in his *Nyāyasiddhāṅjana*, p. 263, as from the 7th chapter of the 'Prameyapāda' of the *Nyāyatattva*.

The part dealing with the inclusion of *samavāya* under *saṁyoga* is lost, as is clear from the following statement of ĀS : p. 211 : "yathā ca saṁyogāntarbhāvaḥ samavāyasya, tathā sambandhavimarśe darśayaṣyāmaḥ".

Deśika, interpreting the passage, "nairantarya..." etc. in his *Nyāyasiddhāṅjana*, V. (p. 242). says : "tadapi parābhyupagatasamavāyān-abhyupagamāt, svamate samavāyasya svarūpaviśeṣānatirekāt atiriktasambandhābhāvaparam, na tu guṇaguṇinoḥ saṁyogalakṣaṇa-sambandhaparam".

741. This, to some extent, admits the Prābhākara's definition of '*prakāśa*'.

Though *prakāśa* in thus capable of contacting all entities, it can only manifest particular entities through particular senses, but not all. For example, the *jñāna* coming out through the eye manifests only objects that are fit to be seen, but not those that fall outside the purview of the eye. So with other objects. The reason for this specific manifestation is twofold, says Yāmuna. Though the causal conditions necessary to produce *prakāśa* are present in their plenitude, *prakāśa* may not still arise with regard to a given entity when that entity is obscured by some other factor, or when it is not fit for cognition. Yāmuna cites the instance of the colour and taste of the waters of the *Yamunā* to support the above. Though the eye may be in contact with the waters of the *Yamunā*, the colour whiteness is not cognised since it is obscured by the blueness of its surface. The taste of the water is also not apprehended by the eye since it is not fit to become the object of ocular perception.

This marks the end of the discussion on the significance of the term '*prakāśa*'.⁷⁴² The upshot of the above discussion, says Yāmuna, is that the *ātman* which possesses *jñāna* as its very being and also as its quality, cognises objects through the medium of the sense-organs.⁷⁴³

Yāmuna then meets the objection raised earlier⁷⁴⁴ by the opponents that knowledge, on the analogy of pleasure and pain, could only be a special property of the soul and thus, could only be occasioned but not be natural with the soul.

Knowledge, Yāmuna says in reply, is a quality dependent upon the very existence of the self, its substrate. It is also found in experience that qualities dependent upon the being of their substrate, last so long as their substrata last. Since it has already been detailed in the preceding pages that *jñāna* depends upon the

742. This discussion was started on p. 194 above.

743. Cf. ĀS. p. 212 :

"ato yathoktanityātmā svataścaitanyaavigrahaḥ
jñānasvabhāva evānyat karaṇaṇiḥ pratipadyate"

744. See p. 178.

very being of the self, it has to be admitted that it lasts so long as the self lasts, that is to say, that it is eternal but not accidental.

Yāmuna also points out that pleasure and pain cited as instances by the critic, cannot be qualities of the self. They are only the relaxed and uneasy states of the sense-organs. This point too has been indicated already.⁷⁴⁵ The position cannot be improved by giving *rāga* and *dveṣa* as the illustrations in the place of *sukha* and *duḥkha* ; for, even they are not directly the qualities of the self. Rather, they are different states of mind. This too has been pointed out earlier.⁷⁴⁶ The *Brhadāraṇyaka* passage, "*kāmassaṅkalpaḥ*"⁷⁴⁷ etc., and also the *Bhagavadgītā* passage "*icchā dveṣaḥ*"⁷⁴⁸ etc., are quoted by the author to corroborate the view that *rāga* and *dveṣa* are mental states.

But it may be pointed out that the *Gītā* passage referred to here, viz., "*icchā dveṣaḥ sukhaṁ duḥkhaṁ saṅghātaḥ cetanādhṛtiḥ*", clearly states that *jñāna*, indicated by the term "*cetanā*", cannot even be a property of the self. But Yāmuna says that the proper interpretation of the above passage should be like this : "*cetanādhṛtiḥ*" should not be split into two words as "*cetanā*" and "*dhṛtiḥ*". It should be taken as a single compound, meaning the body (*kṣetra*). In other words, the term "*cetanādhṛtiḥ*" defines the body as a collocation (*saṅghāta*)

745. See p. 173 above. This is only an alternative view, as he is going to say later that *sukha* and *duḥkha* are different states of *jñāna*, which is tantamount to saying that they pertain to the self. Cf. *Nyāyasiddhāntajñāna* : V. (p. 243) : "sukhaduḥkhe nātmadharmau ityādiṣu vaibhāvavādena, matāntareṇa vābhihitam..." etc.

746. See p. 173 above.

747. I. v.3: *kāmassaṅkalpo vicikitsā śraddhā āśraddhā dhṛtiradhr̥tir hr̥ir dh̥ir bh̥irityetat sarvaṁ mana eva*".

748. *Bhagavadgītā* : XIII. 6 : "*icchā dveṣassukhaṁ duḥkhaṁ saṅghātaścetanādhṛtiḥ etat kṣetraṁ samāśena savikalpamudāhṛtam*".

controlled or supported by knowledge.⁷⁴⁹ The body is, indeed, seen to possess activity by means of *jñāna*. This definition is supported by Yāmuna through quotations from the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*⁷⁵⁰ and the *Viṣṇupurāṇa*⁷⁵¹ which mention that the Supreme Being possesses everything as His body, including the individual selves. These passages are very significant because they form the basis of the *ātmaśarīrabhāva* that subsists between the Supreme Person on one hand and the individual self and the *prakṛti* on the other, which became one of the cardinal points of Rāmānuja's philosophy.

It may, however, be pointed out that the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* text "*kāmassaṅkalpaḥ...*"⁷⁵² quoted above, also mentions *dhīḥ* or *jñāna* as a quality of the mind, but not of the self. But Yāmuna says that the term, "*dhīḥ*", here means "*utprekṣā*" or 'conjecture' but not "*jñāna*". As a matter of fact, the self-same *Upaniṣad* mentions elsewhere that "*jñāna*" is a natural attribute of the self: "*na vijñātur vijñāter viparilopo vidyate*"⁷⁵³ and "*na hi draṣṭur drṣṭeḥ viparilopo vidyate avināśitvāt*"⁷⁵⁴. Here the passage, "*na hi draṣṭuh*", states in clear terms that since the knower (*draṣṭā*) is eternal (*avināśin*), knowledge (*drṣṭi*) that qualifies him is also eternal. This, in other words, means that knowledge depends upon the very being of the self for its existence.

749. ĀS. p. 214 : "cetanayā dhriyamāṇassaṅghāto dehaḥ".

Cf. Rāmānuja's commentary on the *Gītā* : XIII. 6 : "ādhṛtirādhārah, sukhaduḥkhe bhujjānasya bhogāpavargau sādhyataśca cetanasyādhāratayotpanno bhūtasāṅghātaḥ", etc.

750. V. 7 : "yasya pṛthivī śarīraṁ, yasyāpaśśarīraṁ, yasyātmā śarīraṁ". This is the Mādhyandina-reading.

751. I. 22. 86 : "yāni mūrtānyamūrtāni yānyatrānyatra vā kvacit santi vai vastujātāni tāni sarvāṇi tadvapuḥ".

Yāmuna quotes only the second half of the second line.

752. I. v. 3.

753. IV. iii. 30.

754. IV. iii. 23. Udayana in his *Nyāyakusumāñjali* : V. (p. 112.) takes this passage as showing that the knowledge of the Supreme is eternal. Cf. : "tadenamevaṁbhūtamadhikṛtya śrūyate na draṣṭur drṣṭer viparilopo vidyate avināśtīvāt iti".

Yāmuna here controverts the interpretation offered by the Advaitins for this passage, that "*draṣṭā*" is an attribute (*viśeṣaṇa*) of the term, "*drṣṭi*" (*viśeṣya*). They construe the terms thus : "There is no annihilation of knowledge (*drṣṭi*) which is of the form of the knower (*draṣṭā*)" and they ultimately identify the *ātman* with *drṣṭi*.⁷⁵⁵ But this interpretation is defective in two ways, says Yāmuna. Firstly, if the term "*draṣṭā*" were the *viśeṣaṇa* of *drṣṭi*, it would then be necessary that the term should be in the feminine gender. Secondly, if the above argument were correct, the *probans* referred to in the *śruti*-text, viz., "*avināśitvāt*" becomes identical with the *probandum* itself, viz., "*avināśitva*" (*na viparilopaḥ—na vināśaḥ—avināśitva*). In other words, there would be no reason worth the name at all. The Vedic text in question would then mean : "There could be no destruction of knowledge, which is of the form of the knower, because it does not perish", where the defect of *sādhyasamatva* (identity between the *probans* and the *probandum*) is quite palpable.

Even if the term "*drṣṭi*", is taken as speaking of the real form of the self (*draṣṭā*), the reason, "*avināśitvāt*", would turn out to be "*aprayojaka*" (*ahetu*), which means that it cannot establish its *probandum*, viz., the indestructibility of the self (*avināśitva*). Such an interpretation would also contradict the positions taken by the opponents. Thus, for the Naiyāyika who maintains that the knowledge of the self is only accidental (*kādācitka*), it would be contradictory to say that the self is of the form of knowledge, which would ultimately mean that knowledge is eternal. Similarly, for the Advaitins who do not accept the eternity of the "*aham*" (I) it would be contradictory to say that the self, which is none other than the "*aham*", is

755. Cf. *Upadeśasāhasrī* : (Minor Works of Śaṅkara): śl. 8 :

"mānasyas tadvadanyasya drśyante svapnavṛttayaḥ
draṣṭur drṣṭistato nityā śuddhānantā ca kevalā".

Cf. *Brahmasiddhi* : pp. 7-8 : "api ca ekatva evāyaṁ draṣṭṛdrśyabhāvo 'vakalpate; draṣṭureva cidātmanastathā viparīpāmādvivartanādvā...na tarhi paramārthato drśyaṁ drśyate, paramārthataśca drśyamānaṁ draṣṭṛvyatiriktamastīti durbhaṇaṁ ...evaṁ ca draṣṭuravyatireko drśyasyāmnāyate ātmani vijñāte sarvamidam vijñātaṁ bhavati".

eternal (*avināśin*). It is, therefore, proper to construe the reason “*avināśitvāt*” along with the term “*draṣṭuḥ*”, rather than with “*drṣteḥ*”, since this is fully corroborated by many *nyāyas* and scriptural statements. Therefore, when it is said that the self exists, it follows as a corollary that its attribute ‘knowledge’ also exists on the ground that it depends upon the very being of the self, even as light (*prabhā*) depends upon the flame of a lamp, for its existence.

In the light of this, the above text “*na hi draṣṭur drṣteḥ*”,⁷⁶⁶ means that self-luminous knowledge, which forms an essential property of the self never ceases to exist, either in the state of bondage or release. And this knowledge, due to its manifold relation with manifold objects, internal as well as external, attains several designations such as perception, smell, taste, touch, inference, and the like. Yāmuna quotes three more passages from the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*⁷⁶⁷ to support the view that knowledge forms an inseparable and essential characteristic of the *ātman*.

Quoting three passages from the *Chāndogya*⁷⁶⁸ and one more from the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*,⁷⁶⁹ Yāmuna says that even in the state of *mokṣa* which is characterised by the absence of the physical body, senses, etc., the self continues to have knowledge. It is therefore clear that knowledge is an essential characteristic of the self. Yāmuna also adduces one statement from the

766. *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* : IV. iii. 23.

767. *Ibid* : VI. v. 13 : “sa yathā saindhavaghano ’nantaro ’bāhyaḥ” etc.

Ibid : VI. iii. 9 : “svena bhāsā, svena jyotiṣā”.

Ibid : VI. iii. 6 : “ātmajyotiṣamrāḍīti hovāca”.

768. VII. ii. 6 : “na paśyo mṛtyuṃ paśyati ... sarvaṃ ha paśyaḥ paśyati”.

VIII. xii. 3 : “nopajanaṃ smaraṇ”.

VIII. xii. 6 : “sa vā eṣa etena daivena cakṣuṣā...paśyan ramate”.

769. IV. iv. 14 : “jānātyevāyaṃ puruṣaḥ jñātavyaṃ tu na veda”.

Viṣṇupurāṇa,⁷⁶⁰ one identified as from the *Mahābhārata*⁷⁶¹ and three verses from the *Viṣṇudharma*⁷⁶² as further proofs for this view. The *ślokas* from the *Viṣṇudharma* quoted by him explain in plain language that knowledge is quite natural and eternal with the *ātman*. It is never created or brought anew into existence, because it is always present. Knowledge and such other characteristics of the self can only be revealed or manifested by putting down the undesirable qualities that obscure their manifestation. Therefore knowledge and such other characteristics of the self are eternal. The *Brahmasūtra*, “*jñāta eva*”⁷⁶³ (“That is why the self is the knower”) is also adduced by the author in support of the above.

Having thus established on the strength of logical arguments and scriptural statements that *Dharmabhūta-jñāna* is eternal in character, Yāmuna proceeds to explain his earlier statement that knowledge which is natural to the self, gets different designations under different conditions of contact with the objects.⁷⁶⁴ He states that either the different types of relations of objects with knowledge, or *jñāna* itself in relation to those objects, get different designations such as “*nīścaya*” (certitude),

760. VI. vii. 22 :

“nirvāṇamaya evāyamātmā jñānamayo ’malaḥ
duḥkhājñānamalā dharmāḥ prakṛteṣu na cātmanaḥ”.

Yāmuna quotes here (p. 218) the first line of the verse.

761 See ĀS. p. 218 : “jyotiṣāmapi tajjyotiḥ”. See commentary on it by P.B. Anṇagarācārya.

762. *Viṣṇudharma* of Śaunaka (from *Bhaviṣyatpurāṇa*) : ch. 104: 55-57 :

“yathā na kriyate jyotsnā malaprakṣālanān maṇeḥ
doṣaprahāṇāna jñānam ātmanaḥ kriyate tathā
yathodapānakaraṇāt kriyate na jalāmbaram
sadeva nīyate vyaktim asataḥ sambhavaḥ kutah?
tathā heyaguṇadhvaṃsād avabodhādayo guṇāḥ
prakāśyante na jāyante nityā evātmāno hi te”.

Cf. *Brahmasūtra* : IV. iv. 1 : “saṃpadyāvīrbhāvassvena śabdāt”.

763. *Brahmasūtra* : II. iii. 19. Also cf. *Śrībhāṣya* : I. i. 1 : p. 135.

764. Cf. ĀS. p. 161 :

tadevaṃ citśvabhāvasya pūṃsāsvābhāvīkī citiḥ
nānāpadārthasāṃsargāt tattadvittitvamaśnute”.

"*saṁśaya*" (doubt) and the like.⁷⁶⁵ Accordingly, he defines *niścaya* or certitude as a firm and close conjunction (*dr̥ḍhasaṁyoga*) of consciousness with a single entity. If this conjunction is not firm and close, and also if it pertains to many entities but not one, then it goes by the name of "*saṁśaya*" or 'doubt'. Again, if this conjunction (*saṁyoga*) of *jñāna* with objects follows the latent impressions (*saṁskāra*) of previous experience, it is called 'recollection' (*smaraṇa*).⁷⁶⁶ Therefore, it is proper to hold that *jñāna* in general regarding a particular object is the contact of *dharmabhūta-jñāna* with the particular object.

It cannot be urged that even the objects become possessors of *jñāna* on the ground that they too have contact with *jñāna*, points out the author. This objection is groundless because 'knowership' (*jñātr̥tva*) pertains to the self through *jñāna* but not to the object, even as the illumination of an external object does not belong to that object.

Although an object is said to be manifested when it is in contact with the light of the Sun, and though this contact is common to both the object and the light, it is still proper to say that the capacity to manifest rests only with the Sun, but not with the object. Likewise, in the process of an objective manifestation, it should be admitted that the capacity to know pertains only to the self, but not to the object as such. From the same analogy, it can be deduced that the self contacts different objects through its attributive knowledge and attains knowledge regarding those objects.

Therefore it has to be concluded that the self has *jñāna* as its essential characteristic and that it is always aware with regard to its own self. With regard to the objects, however, it (the self) may or may not know, owing to different causal factors.

765. *Ibid.* p. 219 : "tadevamātmāsvabhāvabhūtasya caitanyasya viśayasamśleṣaviśeṣeṣu niścayasamśayādivyavahārabhedah, tattadviśeṣabhāji caitanye vā". It is the second alternative that the author contributes to ; "*saṁśaya*", etc. are not ends in themselves since they are only different states of consciousness.

766. *Ibid.* : "caitanyasya viśayeṇa dr̥ḍhasaṁyogo hi niścayaḥ, tasyaiva bahubhir yugapadadr̥ḍhasaṁyogaḥ samśayḥ, jñānavāsanānusāreṇa samśleṣaḥsmaraṇamityādiḥ".

Cf. *Nyāyasiddhāntajana* : VI. (p. 258) : "asmanmate tu anubhava-saṁskārasmr̥tīnām jñānavasthāviśeṣarūpatvāna kaściddoṣaḥ".

Though the self is thus essentially characterised by *jñāna* and is ever-luminous, it is still not grasped clearly and discriminately. Yāmuna says that the acceptability of the different types of inference and other statements detailed in the preceding pages is based on the consideration that they aim at giving us an insight into the real nature of the self. But the means of knowledge like *anumāna* and even *āgama*, cannot, after all, give us any direct experience of the self. That is why those who are unsatisfied with the mediate knowledge of the self provided by those means of knowledge, take to the practice of *yoga* (concentration) and try to achieve a direct and clear experience of the *ātman* by controlling the mind. The fact that immediate knowledge regarding the self arises only at the culmination of the highest stage of concentration (*bhāvanāprakarṣaparyanta*) is admitted on all hands. Concluding this topic, Yāmuna states that the *ātman* which is self-manifest, shines forth more vividly and directly with the help of scriptural texts, inferences and yogic perception.⁷⁶⁷

* * *

The author then takes up the next topic for discussion, viz., the duration (*kālāvachheda*) of the existence of the self.⁷⁶⁸

The first critic introduced by Yāmuna, who does not admit an eternal self, is the Buddhist. According to him, the self exists only for a single moment and becomes extinct in the next moment. The entire train of misery in this world is mainly due to the conception of an eternal self. The momentary character of the self, he argues, is to be understood from the fact that it exists. Any entity that exists should exist only for one moment. Since the self is an existent entity, it has to be admitted as lasting only for a moment. The Buddhist further explains that the existence (*sattā*) of entities is none other than their character of leading

767. *ĀS.* p. 222 :

evamātmā svatassiddhyan āgamenānumānataḥ
yogābhyāsabhuvā spaṣṭam pratyakṣeṇa pratiyate".

768. *Ibid.* p. 17 :

"dehendriyamanahprāṇadhībhyo 'nyo 'nanyasāadhanah
nityo vyāpi pratikṣetramātmā bhinnassvatassukhī".

The author now undertakes to explain the second line of this verse.

to a fruitful activity (*arthakriyākāritā*). It is not possible to ascribe existence to an entity if it does not lead to a fruitful activity. Continuing, the Buddhist says that this fruitful activity is invariably associated with momentariness (*kṣaṇikatā*) and that this type of existence (leading to fruitful activity) cannot be met with in an entity that is not momentary. He further explains that there are only two possible ways in which the objects of the world can give rise to fruitful activity, either simultaneously (*yaugapadya*) or in succession (*krama*). There is not a third way open here. Just as in the case of two alternatives of being (*bhāva*) and non-being (*abhāva*), if one is absent, the other one should necessarily exist, so also, objects that give rise to a fruitful activity can do it either in a sequence or simultaneously, but not in a third way; and these characteristics cannot be found in a non-momentary entity.

It is a matter of regret that the text of *Ātmasiddhi* breaks off at this place.

* * *

(ii) *The Īśvarasiddhi.*

In this section Yāmuna undertakes to establish that the entire universe is under the control of a single Supreme Being. He sets out the arguments advanced by the Mīmāṃsakas and the Naiyāyikas, against and for such a conception. As we have already pointed out at the beginning,⁷⁶⁹ this section, second among the three *Siddhis* comprising the *Siddhitraya*, also suffers from gaps like the other two *Siddhis*. The very opening verse of this *Siddhi* leaves room for the assumption that the beginning of this section might have been lost.⁷⁷⁰ The conclusion of this section also is somewhat abrupt, and it is likely that the original text must have been still larger and complete. It has also been mentioned earlier⁷⁷¹ that the vulgate text of the *Īśvarasiddhi* sets

769. See p. 140 above.

770. *IS.* p. 225, śl. 1 :

“*tatra kasyacidekasya vaśe viśvaṃ pravartate
iti sādhayitum pūrvaṃ pūrvapakṣaṃ pracakṣmahe*”.

771. See p. 140 above.

forth the arguments of the Mīmāṃsakas against the existence of a Supreme Creator-God for this universe, the refutation of it by the Naiyāyika, a further criticism of the Naiyāyika's view by the Mīmāṃsaka, and a subsequent refutation of the Mīmāṃsaka's position by the Naiyāyika. If the available text of the *Īśvarasiddhi* is to be taken as complete in itself, it would mean that Yāmuna adopted the Naiyāyika's method of Inference (*anumāna*) for proving the existence of God. But this seems to be improbable because, for the Viśiṣṭādvaitins, God can be established only through scriptural authority. Logic can only have a secondary place in proving things. It cannot independently lead to any conclusion, particularly so in proving the existence of the Supreme Person. Moreover, the inferences employed by the *Naiyāyika* could establish a Supreme Being who is a mere *nimitta* or an efficient cause of the universe. For the Viśiṣṭādvaitins, on the other hand, the Supreme Being is both the material and the instrumental cause of this world (*upādāna* and *nimitta*).⁷⁷² This can be proved only by resorting to the scriptures, but not to the means of knowledge called Inference (*anumāna*). We have already seen in the *Ātmasiddhi*⁷⁷³ that Yāmuna holds *anumāna* as incapable of proving the existence of the individual self even, not to speak of the Supreme Being. In such a case, it is highly improbable that Yāmuna would have written a separate section merely for putting forth the Naiyāyika's inferences regarding the existence, supremacy, etc. of the Lord, in relation to the creation of the world.

So it seems fairly certain that there must have originally existed a further portion setting out the author's own view (*siddhānta*) on the matter as a Viśiṣṭādvaitin, based not on pure logical arguments as in the case of Nyāya, but on scriptural statements. The term “*pūrvapakṣa*”⁷⁷⁴ occurring in the opening

772. Vide *Nyāyasiddhānta*, III. (pp. 230-32), where it is pointed out that inferences could only prove God as an efficient cause of world-manifestation. Here, on p. 232 the Vedāntin's act of refuting inference as a means of proving God's existence is defended and the Vedāntic view that God is both the *upādāna* and *nimitta* for the world is justified.

773. Cf. p. 139, *AS.* : “....ānumānikīmapi ātmasiddhimaśrad-dadhānāḥ śrautīmeva tāṃ śrotṛiyāḥ saṅgirante”.

774. Vide p. 225, śl. 1b : “iti sādhayitum pūrvaṃ pūrvapakṣaṃ pracakṣmahe”.

verse of the *Īśvarasiddhi* supports the view that this section must have consisted of the *Siddhānta*-view also. Another evidence for this view is the fact that the Mīmāṃsakas, after denying the possibility of applying *pratyakṣa* (perception) as a means of establishing the Supreme Being, poses two alternatives to the Naiyāyika, whether *anumāna* or *āgama* could establish the desired end.⁷⁷⁵ The available text contains only the examination of *anumāna*, but not that of *āgama*. So, it is easy to surmise that the original text of the *Īśvarasiddhi* also consisted of the Mīmāṃsaka's critique of the scripture as a proof of the existence of God. The fact that the *śāstrayonitva* section of the *Śrībhāṣya*⁷⁷⁶ brings the entire vulgate text of the *Īśvarasiddhi* under the *pūrvapakṣa* and also that the existence, supremacy, etc. of God have been proved there on scriptural authority, in conformity with the Vedāntic view after refuting the Naiyāyika's arguments, lends strong support to the view that the available text of *Īśvarasiddhi* is only a part, or rather an incomplete fragment of a larger original text.

* * *

The Mīmāṃsaka happens to be the most uncompromising adversary of the concept of an Omniscient Supreme God, whether on the basis of logic or of verbal testimony. The view that such an Omniscient Being is necessary to account for the world-order is also contradicted by him as unsound. He is also against the popular view that the creation and dissolution of the universe are simultaneous operations. A strict believer in the efficacy of the ritual as he is, the Mīmāṃsaka declares that human beings can themselves produce the things needed for their own enjoyment, through the performance of various rites ordained by the scriptures.

To start with, the Mīmāṃsaka points out that there are two difficulties in admitting a Supreme Person of omniscience and omnipotence. Firstly, none of the well-known means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*) is capable of proving His existence. Secondly, there are clear contradictions to such a conception. The means of

775. *Ibid.* p. 233 : “nāpi pramāṇāntaraṃ—tat khalu anumānaṃ, āgamo vā.”

776. Vide *Śrībhāṣya* under *Brahmasūtra* I. i. 3 : “śāstrayonitvāt”.

knowledge known as “*pratyakṣa*” (perception) cannot prove His existence. Here, there are two alternatives : perception may be ordinary (*laukika*) or *yogic* (pertaining to the *yogins*). The perception of ordinary human beings, which is specific in character, cannot cognise the entire range of objects obtaining in this world. Since the Supreme Being sought to be established is said to be capable of having a direct perception of all entities in the universe, the means of knowledge that purports to cognise Him should also be capable of embracing all entities, including those of the past and future, those that exist in distant regions and even those that are inscrutable and imperceptible. But the fact that the ordinary perception is bound by certain laws, spatial and temporal, wards off the instrumentality of perception towards the establishment of the Supreme Being. Perception can apprehend only objects of the present moment, those that are fit for cognition falling within its scope. Because of these limitations, ordinary perception can lay no claims to such an over-all character.

Even the perception of *yogins* is no exception to the rules that govern ocular perception in general, says the Mīmāṃsaka.⁷⁷⁷ As the very name ‘perception’ (*pratyakṣa*) would suggest, *yogic* perception also cognises only objects that exist in the present period of time (*vidyamānaikagocara*), but not those of the past or future, even as the intuitive insight called “*pratibhā*”⁷⁷⁸ found in some persons does not have all-round cognition. Even in the

777. *ĪS.* p. 228.

778. *Ibid.* : śl. 3 :

“pratyakṣatve tadapyevaṃ vidyamānaikagocaraṃ
bhūtādigocaraṃ naiva pratyakṣaṃ pratibhādivat”.

The illustration, *pratibhā*, may be taken either as a negative one (*vyatireka*) or a positive one (*anvaya*). *Pratibhā* is explicable as “pratinīyataṃ bhānaṃ”, which means that it too has a specific well-defined scope. This *pratibhā* or intuitive insight found in some persons, may not sometimes correspond to actual facts. Cf. in this connection, *Śloka-vārtika* under I. i. 4, śls. 28 and 32 as also the commentary of Pārthasārathimīśra on them.

“pratyakṣatvena tasyāpi vidyamānopalambhanaṃ
satsamprayogajātvaṃ vāpyasmatpratyakṣavad bhavet” (śl. 28)

“laukikī pratibhā yadvat pratyakṣādyanapekṣiṇī
na niścayāya paryāptā tathā syād yogināmapī” (śl. 32)

case of *yogic* perception, there are two possibilities : it may be due to the sense-organs (*aindriyika*) or may not arise out of them at all (*anaindriyika*). Even if it is admitted that *yogic* perception arises out of the senses, two alternatives are pointed out : this perception may be due to the external senses or to the internal sense-organ, viz., mind. It cannot be said that the external senses can establish a Supreme Person because their limitations are too well known. The external senses can produce knowledge only regarding those entities that are fit to be cognised by them. The tongue, for instance, cannot give rise to cognitions regarding all entities past and future, or those that fall outside its scope. It can give rise to cognition of taste alone, and that too, of a thing that is capable of being tasted, belonging to the present time and so on. The external senses, therefore, cannot establish contact with things of the past and future. Contact (*sannikarṣa*), in general, can take place between two existent entities but not between two things of which one is existent and the other non-existent, belonging either to the past or future. So, the senses require "contact" with their respective objects as a necessary condition,⁷⁷⁹ if they are to produce cognition regarding those entities. Therefore, the possibility of external senses cognising entities of past and future is ruled out. Embodying the above observations in a syllogism⁷⁸⁰ the Mīmāṃsaka says that even as a seed (*bīja*) cannot produce its sprout without soil, water and such other factors that serve as the auxiliary causes, so also, external senses cannot give rise to knowledge regarding objects of the past or future, without establishing contact (*sannikarṣa*) with those objects. So it is clear that external senses cannot transgress the laws that govern their perceptions.

Even the internal sense-organ, viz., mind cannot achieve the desired end because its scope is limited to the cognition of pleasure, pain, etc.⁷⁸¹ It cannot be argued that the mind can directly cognise external objects, independent of the external sense-organs, for, there could then be no purpose served by sense-

779. *IS* p. 229 : "ato 'pekṣito 'rthasannikarṣaḥ".

780. *Ibid.*

781. *Ibid* : p. 230.

organs like the eye and the ear. For, in that case, there could be no person blind or deaf in this world,⁷⁸² because the mind could itself directly function as the eye as well as the ear. But this is opposed to our practical experience. Putting the above argument in a syllogism, the Mīmāṃsaka states that even as the sense-organ, eye, which requires light for cognising a thing, cannot cognise a pot if the latter is in darkness, so also, the mind, which requires the mediacy of external senses, cannot cognise the external objects without the aid of the external senses.⁷⁸³

Even factors like the administration of powerful drugs offered by perfected souls (*siddhas*), the incantations of *mantras*, performance of penances and achievement of *yogic* concentration, cannot altogether change the natural functioning of the sense-organs. They may, to some extent, bring out or enhance the inherent capacities in the senses but they cannot produce anything that is not natural to those sense-organs.⁷⁸⁴ The capacity of each sense-organ is well marked off.⁷⁸⁵ Thus the ear, for instance, even after it is given many powerful drugs, cannot transgress its realm of hearing and produce cognitions of colour or taste. It is thus clear that knowledge arising out of the sense-organs is, on the whole, incapable of cognising entities of the past and future.

Even the view that *yogic* perception does not arise from the senses, but from a very intensive stage of concentration (*bhāvanā-prakarṣa*)⁷⁸⁶ offers no satisfactory solution to the above problem, says the Mīmāṃsaka. The perception that arises out of such a concentration may, however, be admitted to be very clear and distinct. But there are two difficulties here. If this knowledge does not contain anything new in addition to what has already been cognised in an earlier experience, it comes under the fold of recollection (*smṛti*). If, however, it sets forth something over and above the actual cognition of an earlier experience, then it

782. *Ibid.* "ataśca na kaścidandho badhiro vā bhavet".

783. *Ibid.*

784. *Ibid.*

785. *Ibid.* p. 231 : "...sāmarthyasya ca pratiniyamāt".

786. *Ibid.*

comes under the category of illusion (*vibhrama*). Since these are the only two possible alternatives that perception arising out of concentration can share, it can lay no claims to validity at all.⁷⁸⁷ This position cannot be improved by stating that this perception arising out of the concentration is identical with our ordinary perception, for again the defects pointed out regarding ordinary sensory perception raise their heads. If this *pratyakṣa* born out of *bhāvanā* (concentration) is called perception itself, then it cannot verily transgress the laws that govern perception in general. If it transgresses them, then it cannot be called perception at all. The upshot of the above discussion is that perception cannot point to the existence of a Supreme Being.⁷⁸⁸

The Mīmāṃsaka then points out that even inference (*anumāna*) cannot prove the existence of the Supreme Person.⁷⁸⁹ This inference is again of two types : the '*viśeṣatodṛṣṭa*' and the '*sāmānyatodṛṣṭa*'—the former based on the concomitance observed in objects within the purview of the senses, and the latter on the concomitance of objects lying beyond the ken of sense-organs.⁷⁹⁰ The *viśeṣatodṛṣṭa* type of inference which requires the cognition of invariable concomitance between a particular probans and a particular probandum, both of which are objects of direct perception, cannot operate in the case of the Supreme Being who happens to be beyond the purview of all means of knowledge. Even as persons who have never seen fire cannot recollect smoke as an invariable concomitant of fire, so also, one who has never seen the Supreme Being cannot think in terms of proving Him through the *viśeṣatodṛṣṭa* type of *anumāna*.⁷⁹¹ The Mīmāṃsaka then points out that even the *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa-anumāna* cannot prove His existence because there is no

787. *Ibid.* p. 232 : "...smṛtīvibhramasrotasoranyatarāvartapari-vartinaḥ kutaḥ prāmānyakūlapratilambhaḥ?"

788. *Ibid.* : "...na viśvānubhavaśāśvaryaśālini pratyakṣam pramāṇam".

789. Cf. *Ibid.* p. 233.

790. See f.n. 599 above, where we have discussed the *viśeṣatodṛṣṭa* as a form of *Anumāna*.

791. *Vide* ĀP. p. 4 for parallel statements.

indicative mark that can help to infer Him. Since the *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa* type can infer an entity in a general form, it cannot serve the purpose of establishing a particular person as the Creator of the universe. This is what the Mīmāṃsaka has in mind when he says that the *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa* inference cannot prove the existence of the Supreme Person.⁷⁹²

At this stage the Naiyāyika steps in to point out that the *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa* type of inference can itself establish the existence of a Supreme Designer-Architect for this universe. In this connection he sets forth two inferences. The first one infers a single intelligent agent for this world and the second one posits to that agent the capacity for creating and directly perceiving all entities of world. The first inference is : "This universe, like our own healthy body, is under the control of a single intelligent principle, because it is constituted of insentient matter."⁷⁹³ Here the illustration of a healthy body (*aroga-svaśarīra*) is intended to eliminate cases of unhealthy bodies which are seen to depend upon more than one person for their sustenance. Having thus inferred a single intelligent agent for the world, the Naiyāyika, in the second syllogism, proceeds to prove that this intelligent being also happens to be the abode of all supra-human perfections like Omniscience and Omnipotence. He says that it is possible to infer that intelligent being as possessing the power not only to create but to perceive directly all the entities in this world, on the ground that these entities are all effects (*kārya*).⁷⁹⁴

Explaining his position the Naiyāyika says that all the effects obtaining in the world, as for instance, a pot, pitcher or

792. *Vide* ĪS. p. 234 : "na ca sarvārthanirmāṇasākṣātkārapaṭiyasi liṅgaṁ sāmānyatodṛṣṭamapi kiñcana labhyate".

793. *Ibid.* p. 234 : śl. 4:

"nanvekacetanādhīnaṁ vivādādhyāsitam jagat
acetanenārabdhatvāt arogasvaśarīravat".

794. *Ibid.* p. 235 : śl. 5 :

"tathā sarvārthanirmāṇasākṣātkāraṇakauśalaṁ
kāryatvādeva jagataḥ tatkarturanumīyatām".

The inference that is intended by such a statement is : "An effect should have an agent, because, like a pot, etc., it is also an effect".

palace, are known to have been made by intelligent beings who knew their material and instrumental causes, and also knew for whom and for what purposes those entities were intended (*saṁpradāna* and *prayojana*).⁷⁹⁵ Hills, oceans, and such other entities which we find in this universe, can also be inferred to have an intelligent being at the helm of their production, because those entities are also effects (*kārya*) like a pot, etc. The reason in this statement, viz., *kāryatva* (that hills, etc., are effects), cannot be said to be vitiated by the defect called *asiddhi* (non-establishment), because it can be shown that even hills etc. are products on the ground that they have parts (*sāvayava*) like other well-known effects.

The Naiyāyika urges that all entities in this universe, starting from the final product (*antyāvayavin*) and going up to the diad (*dyvaṇuka*), are formed by a peculiar combination of parts. Between the ultimate *avayavin* and the diads or binaries, the constituent parts of all entities go on gradually decreasing in number. Thus, we ultimately arrive at four different types of subtle atoms (*paramāṇu*) of the four Elements, viz., Earth, Water, Fire and Air, which form the material causes of this universe.⁷⁹⁶ The initial vibration (*ādiparispanda*) of those atoms which is responsible for the creation of matter, takes place through the conjunction of particular individual souls with their own *adr̥ṣṭas* (unseen potencies). This conjunction (*saṁyoga*) serves as a non-inherent cause (*asamavāyi-kāraṇa*) for the initial movement in the atoms.⁷⁹⁷

Therefore, for the world-creation, *adr̥ṣṭas* in the form of *dharma* and *adharma* associated with the individual beings serve

795. p. 235 : "sarvaṁ hi kāryamupādānopakaraṇasaṁpradānaprayojanasamvedicetanaracitamavagataṁ ghaṭamaṇikagr̥hādi."

796. *Ibid.* p. 236 : "iha cāntyāvayavibhyaḥ prabhṛti ādvyaṇukamakḥilamavayavi kramanihiyamāna-nānāvayavya-tiṣaṅgaviśeṣajanitamavagatamityantata upādānaṁ caturvidhāḥ paramāṇavaḥ prapañcasya."

797. *Ibid.* pp. 236-37 : "teṣāmādiparispandaśca tadanugūṇādr̥ṣṭaviśiṣṭatattatkṣetrajaṇāsāmyogāsamavāyikāraṇakaḥ..."

as the auxiliary causes.⁷⁹⁸ The purpose (*prayojana*) to be served by such a creation is, indeed manifold, involving the production of an infinite variety of entities for the enjoyment of the individual selves. The *saṁpradāna* or the beneficiaries of such a creation are the *jīvas* themselves. Since these individual selves are incapable of cognising *dharma* and *adharma* that inhere in their own selves, there arises no question of their cognising those of other persons. Therefore there could be no doubt that the *sāmānyatodr̥ṣṭa* inference could establish a single Designer-Architect for this wonderful cosmos, who is distinct from all the individual selves.⁷⁹⁹

The fact that this Creator is an abode of unsurpassed Omniscience, Omnipotence and Lordship can be deduced through the principle of *adhikaraṇa-siddhānta*, says the Naiyāyika.⁸⁰⁰ *Adhikaraṇa-siddhānta* or the 'conclusion resting on implication' can be explained as the principle by which, when a certain thing is known or accepted, certain other things automatically follow by reason of their dependence upon the former.⁸⁰¹ Since the fact of the Earth, etc. having a Creator cannot be proved unless the Creator is also accepted as a direct perceiver of all entities including the atoms (which form the material cause of the universe), the admission of such a power of all-round perception in that Creator follows by the principle of *adhikaraṇa-siddhānta*. Therefore it is clear that the Creator of this universe is capable of directly perceiving all entities in this world.

798. *Ibid.* : p. 237.

799. *Ibid.* : "...tadatirekī nikhilabhuvananimāṇanipuṇo 'dhikaraṇasiddhāntasamadhigataniratiśayasahasakalaviṣayasamvid-aiśvaryaśaktyatiśayaḥ puruṣadhaureyakaḥ kimiti na sāmānyatodr̥ṣṭaliṅgādanumīyate?"

800. *Ibid.* Cf. *ĀP.* p. 17.

801. Cf. *Nyāyasūtra* under I. i. 30 : "yatsiddhau anvayaprakaraṇasiddhiḥ, so 'dhikaraṇasiddhāntaḥ". Cf. Vātsyāyana's commentary on it : "yasya arthasya siddhau anye arthāḥ anuṣajyante, na tair vinā so 'rthāḥ siddhyati, te 'rthāḥ yadadhiṣṭhānāḥ, so 'dhikaraṇasiddhāntaḥ".

This, in modern logic, gets the name "*pakṣadharma*".

Pointing out defects in such an inference, the Mīmāṃsaka says that the characteristic of 'being under the control of a single intelligent principle' (*ekacetanādhīnatva*), posited in regard to the earth, body etc., does not stand scrutiny at all. "In what aspect are the earth, etc. dependent upon a single intelligent being?" asks the Mīmāṃsaka.⁸⁰² Three possible alternatives are pointed out here. The earth, the body, etc. can be said to be controlled by a single intelligent principle in respect of their (a) production (*janma*), or (b) maintenance (*sthiti*), or (c) movements (*pravṛtti*).⁸⁰³ The body, cited as an illustration by the Naiyāyika above, cannot be said to depend upon a single intelligent person, either for its own production or existence.⁸⁰⁴

Each and every being that shares in the pleasures as well as the pains attendant upon a body, along with the particular being owning the body, is to be viewed as responsible for the production and maintenance of that particular body. This has to be admitted, because those that share in the joys and sorrows of a given self, do possess unseen potencies (*adrṣṭa*) within themselves which are necessary to bring out the experience of pleasure and pain through that particular body.⁸⁰⁵ Moreover, the physical body, which is well-known to be an aggregate, does not require any active principle for its sustenance, over and above the particular combination of its constituent parts. If this sustenance is explained as breathing (*prāṇana*) which requires an intelligent principle, definitely this does not apply to the earth, etc., given as the minor term (*pakṣa*) in the syllogism. Therefore, it is easy to conclude that no definition can be offered for *sthiti*, which applies both to *pakṣa* and *sapakṣa*, viz., the earth, etc. and the physical body respectively. Even if the third alternative pointed out earlier, viz., that the world depends upon a single being for its activities (*pravṛtti*), is resorted to, this

802. *IS*. p. 238.

803. *Ibid*. "kimasya tasminnāyattam kinnu janmāthavā sthitiḥ pravṛttirvā "dyayostāvat sādhyahīnam nidarśanam"

804. *Ibid*. : "na khalu śārīramekacetanādhīnotpattisthiti".

805. *Ibid*. p. 238 f : "bhavati hi taducitādrṣṭaśālinām sarveṣāmeva teṣām taddehina iva tadutpattisthitinimittatvam".

cannot be maintained, says the Mīmāṃsaka. The definition of *pravṛtti*, he points out, cannot be applied to entities such as huge rocks, trees, and cars, which can be hauled only by many strong persons.⁸⁰⁶ So the defect called *vyabhicāra* is clear in this definition. Since the fact of the world possessing an intelligent creator follows from the very fact of its being constituted of matter, the contention that the creator should also be cognisant of the material and such other causes, etc. is redundant, observes the Mīmāṃsaka.⁸⁰⁷

If, to avoid the above defect, it is held that the universe is subservient to sentient beings, without specifying any *single* sentient being, there would arise another defect. The Mīmāṃsaka maintains that the human beings, through the performance of sacrificial rites, can themselves produce different objects for their own enjoyment. So, the above statement that the universe is subservient to sentient beings (*jīvas*) lands the Naiyāyika in the fallacy of *siddha-sādhana*,⁸⁰⁸ "proving the proved". The Mīmāṃsaka further points out that there is economy of thought in maintaining that the individual selves, admitted both by the Naiyāyika and the Mīmāṃsaka, are themselves the creators of the different entities found in this world. It is not necessary that the *jīvas*, in order to become the creators of certain entities, should also have a direct knowledge of the material and such other causes of those entities. As a matter of fact, these beings have the qualification required of a creator : they are able to perceive the earth etc., which form the material causes and the sacrifices, etc. which form the instrumental causes.⁸⁰⁹

806. *Ibid*. p. 239 : "ekacetanādhīnapravṛttitve tu prabalabahujanasārābhasaprayatnapracāyairupalatarurathādibhir vyabhicārah".

807. *Ibid* : "ārābdhatvādeva caitatsādhyasiddhādvadhikamidam upādānaviśeṣavacanam".

808. *Ibid*. p. 240 :
"cetanādhīnatāmātrasādhane siddhasādhyaṭā
cetanairbhoktṛbhīrbhogyaḥ karmabhir janyate hi naḥ".

809. *Ibid* :
"upādānam pṛthivyādi yāgadānādi sādhanam
sākṣātkartum kṣamante yat sarva eva ca cetanāḥ".

Refuting the popular view that the creation and dissolution of the world are simultaneous operations, the Mimāṃsaka maintains that the earth, etc., at no point of time, came into existence all of a sudden. Similarly, they are not going to dissolve at a particular point of time instantaneously. Creation and dissolution should, therefore, be interpreted as a gradual but not simultaneous accumulation and reduction of mass respectively. Since creation and dissolution cannot thus be simultaneous, there arises no question of the perception of the final atoms of the earth, etc., as a qualifying condition required of a creator.⁸¹⁰

It is no doubt true the *jīvas* cannot perceive the so-called *adr̥ṣṭa* or *apūrvā* that is in the form of potency arising out of an act. But all this is not necessary. It is enough if the *jīvas* perceive the things possessing that potency, e.g., the wheel, rod and the like which are instrumental in the production of a pot.⁸¹¹ As a matter of fact, a potter who does not at all have a direct perception of the productive capacity of the clay, wheel, etc., is able to produce a pot. Likewise, the individual souls (*jīvas*) can themselves become the creators of the earth and such other entities, without necessarily perceiving the material and such other causes of those entities. These *jīvas*, through a study of the Vedic texts, understand that the performance of a particular rite leads to a particular result ; they, accordingly, perform those rites and produce an infinite variety of objects for their own enjoyment.⁸¹²

Having thus pointed out that the inference that the earth etc. have a creator is vitiated by the defect called *siddhasādhana*, the Mimāṃsaka further observes that the reason *kāryatva* employed by the Naiyāyika suffers from the fallacy of *svarūpāsiddhi* also.⁸¹³

810. *IS*. p. 241 : "adyavadeva viśvambharādayaḥ kramaprāptāgan-tukopacayāpacayaikadeśaśālino na yugapadeva niravaśeṣavilaya-jananabhāginah..."

811. *Ibid* : "karmanāḥ śaktirūpaṁ yad apūrvādhīpadāspadaṁ mābhūt pratyakṣatā tasya śaktimaddhyakṣagocarah"

Cf. *AP* p. 15.

812. Vide *IS* : p. 242.

813. *Ibid* : p. 242, ff.

Explaining, the Mimāṃsaka says that an agent can produce only such things as lie within the limits of his capacity, and use the material and other causes which are also capable of being known by him.⁸¹⁴ But the earth etc. cannot be said to be the work of any agent. It is also not possible to say how any being could have a direct knowledge of the material, auxiliary and such other causes of those entities. Moreover, products like the pot and pitcher are very well-known to be prepared by persons that know their material and such other causes.⁸¹⁵ So, the reason *kāryatva* (being a product) can only infer an agent who knows the material and such other causes of the given entities, but not an altogether different person possessed of Omniscience and such supra-human characteristics.

If this reason *kāryatva* is analysed further, it would only point to an agent having characteristics diametrically opposed to those purported to be established by the Naiyāyika. Entities like the pot etc., we know, are made by persons of limited knowledge and capacity, devoid of lordship and such other perfections. Therefore, *kāryatva* would only establish an agent with these characteristics even for effects like the earth and the hills, but not an omniscient and omnipotent Being, as desired. The fallacy is, therefore, *viruddhatva*.⁸¹⁶

But this refutation of the inference based on *kāryatva* as the reason should not be understood as a total refutation of the status of *anumāna* as a means of knowledge, says the Mimāṃsaka. When a given entity possessing an indicative mark (*liṅgin*) happens to be cognised by any *pramāṇa* other than that on which it is based at the moment, then this other *pramāṇa* would itself ward off all the contradictory factors that are

814. *Ibid*. p. 242, f : "api ca tadeva cetanakartṛkaṁ jagati paridṛṣyate, yadeva śakyakriyāṁ śakyajñānopādānādi ca".

815. *Ibid*. p. 243.

816. *Ibid*. p. 243, f : "api cānīśvareṇa parimitaśaktijñānena vighrahavatā anavāptakāmena kṛtamavagataṁ ghaṭādikāryamiti tathāvidhaṁ boddhāramupasthāpayan heturabhimatapuruṣasārvañña-sarvaiśvaryādiviparyayasāadhanāt viruddhaḥ syāt".

assumed on the strength of that indicative mark (*liṅga*).⁸¹⁷ To explain, since the invariable concomitance of smoke with fire is arrived at by repeated observation of their co-presence in the kitchen and such other places, the same smoke, when it is noticed by a man as coming from a hill-top, might lead him to suppose that the fire on the hill-top too should have been lit by a person as in a kitchen, that it is being fanned, that it is utilised for cooking and so on. But all these contingent suppositions can be set at rest by the *pratyakṣa* itself, through which the fire is observed by the man. That is to say, when the man goes up the hill, he, through direct observation, would be convinced that all the features he had earlier assumed with reference to the hill-fire, on the strength of the indicative mark, viz., smoke, actually do not exist at all. But, when it is desired to establish a Supreme Designer-Architect for this universe who is beyond the ken of all possible means of knowledge through inference based on the reason, *kāryatva*, it is an altogether different matter. The knowledge of *vyāpti* (invariable concomitance) which is the very life of *anumāna*, should not stop at pointing to an intelligent agent in a general fashion. All the particular features associated with that agent, like his possession of a physical body, limited knowledge and capacities, etc. that are understood through invariable concomitance, should also be taken into account, without a single exception, says the Mīmāṃsaka.⁸¹⁸

Continuing, the Mīmāṃsaka points out that the Naiyāyika's inference also suffers from another fallacy called '*satpratipakṣa*', that is, that there is another equally strong, inference which disproves the agency of a Supreme Lord, with regard to world-creation. He says that all the activities of intelligent beings necessarily proceed from one or other of two motives : that of personal gain (*svārtha*) or that of affection for

817. *Ibid.* p.244: "pramāṇāntaragocare hi liṅgini liṅgabalādāpatato viparītaviśeṣān tatpramāṇameva pratirūṇadhi". Cf. *ĀP.* p. 17.

818. *IS.* p. 244 : "iha punaratipatitasakalamānāntarakarmabhāve sarvanirmāṇanipuṇe siṣādhayaṣiṣite yāvanto 'nvayavyatirekādvadhāritāvinābhāvabhājo dharmāstānapyaviśeṣeṇopasthāpayati".

others.⁸¹⁹ Since these two motives cannot be proved to characterise the Lord, it is easy to conclude that He could not have created this universe. Examining the possibility of tracing other motives in the activities of the Lord, the Mīmāṃsaka points out that the Lord could not have created the world for some personal gain (*svārtha*), since He is said to have fully realised all His desires (*avāptasamastakāma*).

Even the second motive, viz., love for others, cannot be attributed to His activities, because conditions favourable to rouse love in Him were absent prior to the creation of the world. Since the universe prior to the creation was in a state of dissolution, all the living beings were in a state of undifferentiated chaotic mass, with all their bodies, senses, etc., dissolved.⁸²⁰ Since the beings in such a stage cannot be said to have any misery as such, the possibility of the Lord's becoming merciful on seeing their plight also gets ruled out. Since the two motives of *svārtha* and *kāruṇya* are thus shown to be absent in the Lord, it has to be admitted that He could not have created the universe at all. The syllogism implied by the Mīmāṃsaka in reply to that of the Naiyāyika is this : "The world is not created by any intelligent being because the two motives of personal gain and mercy for others are wanting in that being". Moreover, if the Lord is said to have created the *jīvas* out of pure mercy for them, then He should have created them all happy. But most of these beings are not happy and this leads to the conclusion that the Lord did not create this world out of mercy. If the individuals' past *harman*s (acts) are held responsible for their own misery, then the Lord's independence gets impaired, for He would then become a mere instrument in the hands of *karman*.⁸²¹

The Naiyāyika's argument that the maker of an object should know directly the material and such other causes of that object is vitiated by the defect *anaikānta*, says the Mīmāṃsaka. He, on the analogy of knowledge (*jñāna*), points out that one need

819. *Ibid.* :

"svārthakāruṇyabhāvena vyāptāḥ prekṣāvataḥ kriyāḥ
Īśvarasyobhayābhāvāt jagatsargo na yujyate".

820. *Ibid.* p. 245.

821. *Ibid.* p. 245 : śl. 12.

not be a perceiver of the *upādāna*, etc., of the entities to become their creator. A man can become the agent in a cognitive experience, without even perceiving the *upādāna* and *upakaraṇa* of knowledge, viz., his own self and mind, respectively.⁸²² It is thus clear that the creatorship of a person regarding a given entity does not depend upon his perception of the *upādāna* and such other causes of that entity.

Because of all the above defects, the reason '*kāryatva*' employed by the Naiyāyika earlier, fails to prove that the universe is created by a person possessed of Omniscience and such other suprahuman characteristics.⁸²³ In conclusion, the Mīmāṃsaka gives five syllogisms embodying the results of the above discussion.⁸²⁴

(a) Earth, hills and the like are not effects (*kārya*) because, like the element ether (*gagana*), they are altogether different from other well-known effects.⁸²⁵

(b) Infinitesimal atoms (*paramāṇu*) are not perceptible because, unlike other perceivable entities such as a pot, they are extremely subtle.

(c) The time (*kāla*) of cosmic dissolution was not devoid of sentient beings because, like the present period, that period was also of the form of Time (*kāla*) attended by sentient beings.

(d) Phenomena like the physical body and the universe cannot have a Supreme Lord as their creator because they, like a pot, etc., are effects.

822. *Ibid* : p. 246. Cf. *AP*. p. 15.

823. *IS* : p. 246, śl. 13.

824. *Ibid* : p. 247.

825. This can be restated as follows : "The earth, etc., are not products because, as opposed to the instances of pot, etc., their material and such other causes cannot be perceived".

(e) God could not have created the entities obtaining in this world because, like a released soul (*muktātman*). He does not have any motive or physical body.

In reply to these objections, the Naiyāyika says⁸²⁶ that entities like the earth and the hills should necessarily be admitted as products (*kārya*) because, like the well-known products such as a pot, they too consist of parts (*sāvayava*). Other grounds on which the earth, etc., could be shown as effects are: (i) they, while possessing great magnitude, have vibration (*mahattve sati kriyāvatvam*) (ii) and visible forms (*mahattve sati mūrtatvam*), (iii) while being apprehended by external sense-perception, they still possess the larger and the lesser generality (*bāhyapratyakṣatve sati sāmānyaviśeṣavatvāt*).

The Naiyāyika states that no satisfactory explanation can be offered by the Mīmāṃsaka as to why the earth, hills, etc., which possess parts, could not be effects, while the pot, etc., are accepted to be so. Since there is no decisive characteristic to distinguish only certain configurations as effects, but not others, it has to be admitted that the earth and the like are also effects.⁸²⁷

It had earlier been pointed out by the Mīmāṃsaka that an agent can produce only such things as lie within the limits of his capacity and that their material and other causes are also capable of being known by him.⁸²⁸ In reply to this, the logician says that the capacity to do and the power to know pertaining to an agent, can after all be inferred only from the activity and knowledge exhibited by the agent through his products.⁸²⁹ The reason '*kāryatva*', mentioned in the case of the earth and the like, is itself capable of asserting that their agent is one that is capable of producing them and also knowing the necessary causal factors. Thus, we find no difference at all between well-known products like the *prākāras* and *gopuras* on one hand, and the

826. *IS*. p. 247, ff.

827. *Ibid* : p. 249.

828. See p. 231 above.

829. *IS*. p. 249 : "kintu te kriyājñānaśakti kriyājñānābhyāmeva samadhigamaniye".

physical body, earth, etc., on the other.⁸³⁰ Since there is no hard and fast rule that the activity put forth by an agent should only produce an entity that is of a particular magnitude, the objection raised against the earth etc., being products, stands refuted. Having thus established that the earth and the like are effects (*kārya*), the Naiyāyika says that when this much is established, it follows naturally that their Creator is a person of unlimited power and knowledge.⁸³¹

As regards the fallacy of *siddhasādhana* pointed out by the Mīmāṃsaka, viz., that the *jīvas* could themselves become the architects of the universe, the logician says that such an assumption is unfounded. Even as the individual self is admitted as controlling his own body and senses, so also the Supreme Being is to be accepted as controlling the entire cosmos. The *adhiṣṭhāna* or superintendence of God with regard to the universe is of the form of the proximity (*sannikarṣa*) of His own self possessed of a Will (*saṅkalpa*) necessary to bring about activity. With regard to atoms this proximity of the Lord takes the form of *saṁyoga* or conjunction with them. With regard to *adr̥ṣṭa*, this *sannikarṣa* of the Lord would become *saṁyukta-samavāya* or inherence in an entity that is already having a conjunction.⁸³² Activity or *pravṛtti* in the atoms is to be understood as their motion from one place to another (*parispanda*). But the merit and demerit of the selves (*dharma* and *adharma*), being *guṇas*, cannot have the above type of activity (*pravṛtti*).⁸³³ Their activity is to be understood in terms of their coming into contact with a particular place and time under other causal conditions necessary to produce pleasure, pain, etc. Mere *dharma* and *adharma* cannot, of their own

830. *Ibid* : "...na viśeṣaḥ prasiddhaprākāragopurādikārye-bhyastanubhuvanādeḥ".

831. *Ibid* p. 249 : "siddhe ca kāryatve tadupādānādisākṣātkaraṇa-tadadhiṣṭhāna-tatpreṇanipunaḥ puruṣaviśeṣaḥ siddhyatyeva".

832. *Ibid* p. 250 : "sa ca dravyaisaṁyogalakṣaṇaḥ, tadguṇaistu saṁyuktasamavāyarūpaḥ".

833. *Ibid* : "pravṛttiśca paramāṇūnām parispandalakṣaṇā ; dharmādharmayostu phalodayānukūlatādr̥ṣṭadesākālādisahakāriśa-hitatā".

accord, produce any fruit, unless they are controlled by an intelligent being, even as a chisel cannot produce wooden articles so long as it is not operated by a carpenter.⁸³⁴

Phenomena like the production of a sprout from a seed that has fallen in a field and grown of its own accord, which cannot apparently be traced to the activity of any intelligent agent, should not lead anybody to conclude that the inference of an intelligent agent made earlier is vitiated by the fallacy of *vyabhicāra*, says the Naiyāyika. All instances of products which appear to have no intelligent beings responsible for their production, should be included in the minor term (*pakṣa*) itself, says the Naiyāyika. Pleasure and pain, which appear to have no intelligent controller, are still found to produce certain effects like laughter and tears, which may again be taken as an instance of the fallacy of *vyabhicāra*.⁸³⁵ But the above principle of 'inclusion in the minor term' averts the above defect in their case too, says the logician.

The Mīmāṃsaka had earlier contended⁸³⁶ that the *jīvas*, who are accepted as existing both by himself as well as the Naiyāyika, should be admitted as the creators of all the entities obtaining in the world. But this is a baseless contention, says the Naiyāyika. There is no justification whatsoever, in ascribing to the individual selves the power of controlling the atoms, guiding the *adr̥ṣṭa* etc., for we know for certain that they do not have the power of cognising entities that are inscrutable and distant from the range of their knowledge. Assumptions, if they are made, should only be in conformity with, but not opposed to our practical experience.⁸³⁷ But in the case of the Supreme Lord, there is no conclusive proof to the effect that He is devoid of such powers and perfections. His power to produce this wonderful

834. *Ibid* p. 251 : "na hi cetanena vardhakinā 'nadhiṣṭhitā vāsi.... yūpādīnyāpādayitumalan". Cf. *ĀP* p. 13.

835. *IS* p. 251. "bījaṅkurādayastu pakṣāntarbhūtā iti tair vyabhicāravacanam anabhiññatayava śrotīyāṇām". See also *ibid* p. 252.

836. See p. 229 above.

837. *IS* p. 253 : "dr̥ṣṭānusāriṇī hi sarvatra kalpanā; na dr̥ṣṭavirodhinī".

cosmos is asserted through the means of knowledge called Inference, and as such, there could be no defect called *siddhasādhana* here. When once the Lord is thus established through *anumāna*, it goes without saying that He happens to be the abode of Omniscience, Omnipotence and such other perfections that are natural and unsurpassed in character. This has to be admitted because all products invariably point to the existence of their agents who possess the required competency to produce them.⁸³⁸

The reason *kāryatva* was earlier shown by the Mīmāṃsaka to be vitiated by the fallacy of *viruddhatva*, on the ground that it establishes an agent with characteristics like limited knowledge and power, lack of lordship, etc., that are diametrically opposed to those purported to be established.⁸³⁹ But this objection is brushed aside by the logician as highly preposterous. He says that all the characteristics like limited knowledge and power that are suggested on the strength of the reason *kāryatva* pertaining to the maker of the earth and such other entities, serve no purpose at all (*aprayojaka*) in bringing about the desired end. A given entity like pot, for instance, merely requires for its production a potter who is capable of producing it. But it is not necessary that this potter should also be devoid of the capacity to produce and the power to know all *other* entities. Indeed, for the production of a particular entity, lack of knowledge regarding entities other than the one in question cannot be made a necessary condition or criterion.⁸⁴⁰ Even granting that absence of knowledge regarding other things is a necessary pre-condition qualifying the producer of a given entity, there are two alternatives suggested by the phrase, "absence of knowledge". It can mean: (a) absence of knowledge regarding the whole range of objects obtaining in the world, other than the one in question

838. *Ibid* : "yathoditapramāṇabalena siddhyan sāmsiddhikasarvārthadarśanatātpreraṇāśaktisāmpanna eva siddhyati; kāryatvasya samarthakartṛpūrvakatvena pratibandhāt".

839. See p. 231 above.

840. *IS*. p. 253, f : "yattu parimitaśaktijñānaiśvaryādyāpādanāt dharmaviśeṣaviparītaśādhanaṭvamudbhāvitam, tadatisthaviyah; aprayojakatvātteṣām"

; or (b) absence of knowledge regarding only *a few*, but not all objects other than the particular object under consideration.⁸⁴¹ Among these alternatives, the first one is untenable because we nowhere meet with such a phenomenon. None can say that the potter knows the pot and the pot alone, but not other things. Even the second alternative, viz., that the agent of a particular entity lacks knowledge regarding a *few* other entities, cannot be maintained because it is difficult to specify which these *few* objects are, and also because this 'absence of knowledge' regarding the *few* entities, goes on changing from man to man. Thus, for instance, a man might know only certain things but not other things, while another man might know things which the former does not know, and might not know what the former knows. The view that the agent of a particular thing should necessarily be devoid of knowledge regarding some object or other is also equally defective, because we cannot arrive at any regulation (*vyavasthā*) about it.

The Mīmāṃsaka had earlier urged that the creator of the universe should also be an embodied being.⁸⁴² But this cannot be taken as a hard and fast rule since it cannot be applied to the particular instance of an *ātman* entering a particular body, says the Naiyāyika. If possession of body is made a necessary condition for all activities, then, even for taking up a body the self should be admitted as requiring another body. Though the phenomenon of a single *ātman* possessing more than one body at one and the same time is met with in the case of a *yogin*, such a thing is quite unheard of and absurd in the case of an ordinary man. It may, however, be urged that even ordinary persons, after death, continue to possess subtle bodies (*sūkṣma-śarīra*) and then take up new physical bodies for rebirth. This is a wrong supposition, says the Naiyāyika. Referring the Mīmāṃsaka to an

841. *Ibid*. p.255: "api ca kiṃ taditarasamastavastuviṣayamajñānādi vyāpakaṃ; uta katipayagocaramiti vivecanīyam".

842. See p. 232 above.

earlier portion of the *Ātmasiddhi*,⁸⁴³ he says that it has been pointed out that a person, after casting off his body, enters into a fresh one, with the help of the vital airs (*prāṇa*) alone, but not with the help of the subtle body. These vital airs are set in motion by the *jīva's karman*, which enable him to reach another body.

Having thus established that an *ātman* can take up a body without necessarily possessing another body, gross or subtle, the Naiyāyika proceeds to explain that even for controlling the physical body, the self does not stand in need of another *śarīra*. Thus, when a self enters a body, the body becomes the object, but not the agent, in the act of controlling, since it would be contradictory for one and the same entity to become simultaneously the subject as well as the object regarding a single activity.⁸⁴⁴ The point may further be stretched that, inasmuch as the self can become a controller only when it comes into contact with body, but not otherwise, the body, like the self, should also be accepted as an agent in the act of controlling.

Against such a view, the Naiyāyika says that a self cannot be called controller in the real sense, unless it is associated with the entity to be controlled, viz., the body in this particular case.⁸⁴⁵ Therefore, it is proper to accept that a controlling agent, in general, should have some connection or other with the thing to be controlled, but not that he should necessarily be connected

843. *ĪS.* p. 256 : “pūrvadehapariyāgena dehāntaraprāpakakarmapreritaprāṇasahāya eva dchāntaram praviśatītyupapāditamātmacintāyam”. This is a refutation of the view of the *Prābhākara* *viśaya*, *op. cit* : “na hi yugapaccharīradvaya-parigrahassambhavati; naivam—tatrāpi sūkṣmaśarīraparityāge sarvatra śarīriṇa eva kartṛtvam”.

844. *Ibid.* p. 257 : “....yugapadekakriyāyāmekasya karmakartṛtvavirodhāt”.

845. *Ibid.* : “....astvekatastu asambaddhasyādhiṣṭhānānupapatteḥ preryavastusambandhinā prerakeṇa bhavitavyamiti”.

with a body.⁸⁴⁶ This point is illustrated on the analogy of a measuring rod and such other implements, which are found to be utilised only by those persons that have contact with them.

So, the real crux of the problem is that an intelligent being can be said to control another entity, when it has some contact with the latter. It is not necessary to bring in association with a physical body (*dehasambandha*) as a further requisite in this connection. The Naiyāyika says that he had already made it clear that the Supreme Lord has contact with the infinitesimal atoms and *adrṣṭa* that form the material and the instrumental causes for cosmic creation.

It may be contended further that a person is able to give rise to activity in external objects like a wheel or a rod, only through the mediacy of his own physical body, but not independently of it, and that the Supreme Being also, likewise, should be accepted as possessing a body for controlling the atoms, *adrṣṭa* etc.⁸⁴⁷ Rejecting this view, the Naiyāyika says that it cannot be universally true because we know that by a mere exercise of will-power, through incantations and such other means, poison can either be removed from or introduced into the bodies of others.⁸⁴⁸ It cannot be argued that the Lord cannot have any will (*saṅkalpa*) necessary to bring about activity in other beings, unless He Himself possesses a body, because the physical body does not form either the agent or the instrument in the act of willing. It is only the *manas* that forms the means of *saṅkalpa* for the Lord. The Naiyāyika says that no doubts should be raised against the Lord's possessing *manas*.⁸⁴⁹ There is also no

846. *Ibid.* “tenādhiṣṭhānakriyāpekṣitādhiṣṭheyapadārthasambandhamātrātīrekeṇa dehasambandho nāmāparo nādartavyaḥ”.

847. *Ibid.* p. 257, f. : “atha svadehavyatirikte vastuni pravṛttviśeṣakarataḥ dehadvāreṇaiva; drṣṭāṁ hi daṇḍacakraḍiṣu karaṣaṁyogādīnā kulālādeḥ pravartayitṛtvamityucyeta”.

848. *Ibid.* p. 258. “abhidhyānamātreṇaiva paraśarīragata-garanīrasanaviśārāṇadarśanāt”.

849. *Ibid.* p. 259 : “kimastīśvarasya manaḥ? bādham”.

justification in the speculation that the admission of *manas* in the case of the Lord would imply the acceptance of a physical body, etc. for Him. Such a possibility is ruled out by the fact that an effect (*kārya*) invariably presupposes such an agent who is competent enough to bring about that particular effect. The point here is that if God is said to depend upon a physical body, it implies that He could not have produced all the entities obtaining in this world such as the earth, oceans and hills. The very nature of these products makes us infer that the person that produced them is One that does not possess a physical body, because association with a body is always indicative of the agent's limited capacities.⁸⁵⁰

As a matter of fact, mind is eternal and even when the body perishes, it can still have contact with the self with which it was previously associated.⁸⁵¹ It may again be argued that all the products are seen to be produced generally only by persons having physical bodies and that the same fact could be inferred in the case of the Lord also. But the Naiyāyika says that only that much which is relevant for assessing inductive relation in conformity with what is perceived, could be admitted, but not all factors that are met with in experience.⁸⁵² Since we cannot even imagine the wonderful creation of this vast universe consisting of the five Elements, their products and so on, it will be totally wrong and unjustified to attribute its creation to the embodied individual self, who is bound by merit and demerit, and who is also of limited knowledge and capacities. All this goes to show beyond any shadow of doubt that there exists Supreme Lord of unlimited knowledge, power and such other superhuman perfections, who, without standing in need of any physical body, can, by His mere and unfailing will, create the entire universe.

850. *Ibid.* ".....kāryatvākṣiptasamarthakartṛmattvāt draḍhimnaivāpāstatvāt".

851. *Ibid.* : "manaso nityendriyatayā dehāpagame'pi sambandhābhyupagamād anaikāntikaśca".

852. *Ibid.* : "yāvaddhi drṣṭānugunaṁ vyāptyupayogi, tāvadanujñāyate".

It may be recalled that the inference of a Supreme Creator for this universe with *kāryatva* as the reason was supported by the illustration of a pot, etc.⁸⁵³ Now that the Naiyāyika has inferred a Supreme Designer-Architect for this world who is an abode of omniscience, omnipotence and such other perfections, the opponent might object to it on the ground that the *vyāpti* (invariable concomitance) between *kāryatva* and the creatorship of such a Supreme Person, cannot at all be observed in the case of a pot, cited as an illustration in this inference referred to above. Rejecting this as an unsound objection, the logician explains that although invariable concomitance (*vyāpti*) is noticed in a particular form between smoke and fire in a kitchen, we are able to infer fire from the smoke found elsewhere, in a form and magnitude that are in conformity with the different minor terms, though such a form and magnitude of fire were not previously met with in a kitchen at the time of noticing the *vyāpti*.⁸⁵⁴ That is why it is admitted that smoke actually establishes its relation with the fire which is necessary to produce smoke, viz., fire which is in contact with wet fuel (*ārdrendhana*). In this process, all the particular features with which fire was found associated at the time of understanding the invariable association like the time, place and quantity of fuel are all set aside ; and this is a necessary condition for all inferences of this type, viz., the *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa*.

Likewise, the invariable relation between *kāryatva* and the 'creatorship of a competent person' (*samarthakartṛtva*), understood from pot and such other instances, when applied to the particular cases of earth and the like, would necessarily point to the creatorship of a Person competent enough to produce them even though such a Person might be quite distinct in all respects

853. *Ibid.* pp. 235-36 :

"tathā sarvārthanirmāṇa-sākṣātkaraṇakauśalaṁ
kāryatvādeva jagatastatkarturanumīyatām".

"sarvaṁ hi kāryamupādānopakaraṇasaṁpradānaprayojana-
sāṁvedicetanaracitamavagatāṁ ghaṭamaṇikagrāhī".

854. *Ibid.* p. 260 : "yādṛśo dhūmo yatrāvagataḥ tatraiva
tādṛśastatsāṁpādanasamartho drṣṭāntabhūmāvapariḍṛṣṭo 'pi sāmānya-
vyāptibalena pakṣadharmatāvaśāt siddhyatīti cet...".

from other well-known agents.⁸⁵⁵ Here also, the reason *kāryatva* is to be understood as establishing its relation only with an intelligent agent capable of bringing the entities into existence without taking into account particular characteristics like possession of a physical body, lack of lordship and omniscience that were found to characterise an agent while apprehending invariable concomitance in the case of the pot and the like.

So as to emphasise the point that the Creator so established should also be accepted as possessing certain special characteristics like omniscience and omnipotence as an exception to the general characteristics like limited knowledge and power, the Naiyāyika cites three instances where certain general laws suggested through the observation of invariable concomitance are seen to have exceptions that are necessarily admitted, on the basis of practical experience. The first instance is that of the mind, which does not have the quality of touch. It is known by repeated observation that all entities which are in conjunction with all-pervasive entities,⁸⁵⁶ or those which possess activity,⁸⁵⁷ are invariably felt by the sense of touch. The fact that mind is in conjunction with the *ātman* is inferred through the special qualities of the self like knowledge, pleasure and pain. That the mind is capable of moving is also well-known. Thus though the conditions necessary to make the *manas* tectile are satisfied, it is still not admitted as possessing touch.⁸⁵⁸

The next illustration is that of the organ for touch, viz., the skin, which is admitted to be devoid of manifested touch. By repeated observation, we know that all entities which are constituted of the Element air, and which possess visible

855. *Ibid.* p. 261 : "ihāpi kāryatvaṃ samarthakartṛpūrvakatvena ghaṭādiṣu viditasambandhaniyamaṃ kṣityādiṣu drśyamānaṃ svasaṃ-pādanasamarthaṃ adṛṣṭapūrvameva buddhimatkartāramupasthāpayati".

856. Earth is the illustration here. We know that jars, etc., made of the earth are in contact with all-pervasive ether and are also felt by touch.

857. Air is the illustration. It has motion and is also felt by touch.

858. *IS* : p. 261.

magnitude, do not exist at a fixed place, and also that they are felt by touch. But the organ for touch, although inferred as constituted of the Elements air,⁸⁵⁹ is still found to have a fixed abode, viz., the entire physical body, and is also found to have no manifested touch.⁸⁶⁰

The third instance is that of the sense-organ, eye, which is devoid of both manifested colour (*rūpa*) and touch (*sparsā*). By frequent observation, we know that all entities constituted of the Element fire (*tejas*), possess either manifested colour (*rūpa*) or touch (*sparsā*) or even both. For instance, we can apprehend both colour and touch in a flame which is an effect of the Element, *tejas*. Mere colour, to the exclusion of touch, is noticed in the lustre of a gem, and mere touch without association of colour is felt in vessels heated by fire. The fact that the eye is made up of *tejas* is inferred on the ground that it serves as a means of cognising colour. But still, in the case of the eye, we are not able to meet with manifested colour or touch, either severally or collectively.⁸⁶¹

In all these illustrations, although senses like the mind, the organ of touch and the eye are inferred to possess the characteristics necessary to give rise to certain other features suggested by invariable concomitance, such features are still not accepted, with a view to avoid violation of a number of genuine rules⁸⁶² and also because those features are stultified by the means of the knowledge called *yogyānupalabdhi* or effectual non-

859. Element air is said to have two forms : (a) the extremely subtle or the causal form (*paramāṇu*) which becomes the source of other forms of air and (b) the gross form (*mahāvāyu*) which represents the effect stage of air and which is felt by touch.

860. *IS* : pp. 261-62.

861. *Ibid* : p. 262.

862. Thus, for instance, if the mind is accepted as possessing touch, it would mean that it is elemental in character. If this elemental character is denied to the mind, then again the general law that entities possessing touch should necessarily be elemental in nature, gets impaired. If, on the other hand, mind is accepted as the product of one of the five Elements, then it would not become a means of apprehending the special qualities of the *ātman* like knowledge, pleasure and pain. The possible violations of general rules in the two other instances should also be envisaged similarly.

apprehension. That is to say, those features are not apprehended while there are conditions favourable for their apprehension, which, in other words, means that those features are absent in the particular instances.

Similarly, in the case of the Creator for the universe established through inference (*anumāna*), all the particular features that are supposed to characterise Him, like the possession of a physical body, limited knowledge and power, should be accepted as stultified by the same means of knowledge, viz., '*yogyānupalabdhi*' because those characteristics are not apprehended in this particular case, while the conditions necessary to give rise to them prevail. Here again, such characteristics are not admitted, with a view to avert the slackening of a number of stipulated conditions. Therefore, there is absolutely no distinction between the positions held by the Naiyāyika and the opponent, with regard to having certain exceptional cases in their arguments, and these are to be taken for granted.⁸⁶³

Having thus made a clean case for the *sāmānyatodrṣṭa* type of inference as a means of establishing a Supreme Creator-God for this world, the Naiyāyika sets forth a number of syllogisms to prove that that Supreme God possesses special characteristics like the perception of infinitesimal atoms, *adrṣṭa* of the living beings and so on :

(i) Infinitesimal atoms and the like (i.e., *adrṣṭa*) are seen to act under the direction of an intelligent person, because, like a ball and such other objects, they also happen to be insentient.⁸⁶⁴

863. *IS*. pp. 262-63.

864. *Ibid* : pp. 263-64 : "vivādādhyāsitaṁ paramāṇvādi prekṣāvatpreritaṁ ceṣṭate, acetanatvāt; yadacetanaṁ, tat tathā, yathā tathāvidhaṁ kandukādi".

(ii) All activities of external as well as internal entities, i.e., activities belonging to earth etc. and mind etc. respectively, presuppose the direct perception of their material and instrumental causes by an intelligent being, because like the activities observed in entities such as a ball, the former also happen to be effects.⁸⁶⁵

(iii) Atoms are capable of being perceived like a pot, etc., on the ground that they are also objects of knowledge.⁸⁶⁶

(iv) The entire universe is subservient to the will of one Person because like our own body, it is also devoid of knowledge.⁸⁶⁷

The first of the above syllogisms infers that the Supreme Being possesses the will (*saṅkalpa*) and volition (*prayatna*) to set the atoms, *adrṣṭa*, etc., in motion. The succeeding three inferences prove that the Lord possesses a direct knowledge of the atoms and *adrṣṭa*. Having thus inferred that the insentient entities are all under the control of the Supreme, the Naiyāyika, in two more inferential statements,⁸⁶⁸ tries to prove that even the sentient beings are controlled by the Supreme Person :

(v) All intelligent beings act under the supervision of a single intelligent agent (i.e., the Lord), for, they, like the sense of touch, perform their activities, standing in need of contact with their own physical bodies.

(vi) The entire universe has a single pivotal person because like a country ruled by a sovereign, it also consists of sentient and insentient entities.

In the *Āgamaprāmāṇya*, where also Yāmuna discusses the proofs for God, more or less the same treatment is found.⁸⁶⁹ What

865. *Ibid* : p. 264 : "...vivādādhyāsitaṁ bāhyābhyantarapravṛttayah prakṛtyupakaraṇapratyakṣapūrvikāḥkāryatvāt tadvadeva".

866. *Ibid*: p. 264.

867. *Ibid*.

868. *Ibid* : p. 265.

869. *ĀP*. pp. 2-4; 12-18.

Yāmuna might have said further in the missing portion of the *Īśvarasiddhi* might be seen in the *Śrībhāṣya*⁸⁷⁰ of Rāmānuja where the Naiyāyika's argument is also included in the *pūrvapakṣa*. Rāmānuja is generally known to have based himself on Yāmuna.

* * *

(iii) *The Sāmvitsiddhi*.

Sāmvitsiddhi, the third among the three 'siddhis' comprising the *Siddhitraya*, we have already pointed out, actually happens to be the first section composed by Yāmuna, followed by the *Ātma* and the *Īśvara*-. This section is the worst affected by gaps in the beginning, middle and in the end. As contrasted with the two other sections, this is full of metrical passages.⁸⁷¹ In the available portion of this text, the *Advaitic* interpretation of some important *Upaniṣadic* texts, and the *Advaitic* conception of the reality of the material universe, *Brahman*, *māyā* and such other issues are found refuted to a larger extent ; and some of the passages indicate that the original text of this *Siddhi* had also refuted the Buddhistic, Jaina, Sāṅkhya and the *Mīmāṃsā* views regarding certain issues. Some of the passages missing from the available text of this *Siddhi* are available in the quotations made by Sudarśanasūri in his commentary on the *Śrībhāṣya* and we are discussing them below.

The available text of the *Sāmvitsiddhi* opens with an inquiry into the reality or unreality of the material universe which we perceive. The nature of the world has posed a serious problem to all philosophers alike, Vedic as well as non-Vedic. The *Advaitic* concept is quite well-known in this matter. The *Chāndogya* passages, "*sadeva somya idamagra āsīt ekameva advitīyaṁ brahma*"⁸⁷² and, "*aitadātmīyam idam sarvam tat satyam sa ātmā tat-tvam-asi śvetaketo*"⁸⁷³ form the mainstay for the *Advaitic* negation of the absolute reality of the universe.

870. Under *Brahmasūtra* : I. i. 3 : "śāstrayonitvāt".

871. With the exception, however, of such expressions as "tathā", "uktaṁ ca", "iti", etc., found in verses 25, 26, 27 and so on.

872. VI. ii. 1.

873. VI. viii. 6.

The *Advaitins* explain the passage, "*ekameva advitīyaṁ brahma*"⁸⁷⁴ as speaking of the unreality of everything other than the *Brahman*. They say that the expression, '*advitīya*', which is in apposition with the terms, "*sad-*" and "*brahma*", denotes such an unreality.⁸⁷⁵ This view is first attacked by Yāmuna.

Yāmuna says that the term, '*advitīya*', can be taken either as a *tatpuruṣa* or a *bahuvrīhi* compound. In any case, this term cannot be interpreted as negating the existence of the world-manifestation, says the author. In the *tatpuruṣa*-compound, the second of the two terms entering into the compound becomes the more important of the two.⁸⁷⁶ If the expression '*advitīya*' is taken as a *tatpuruṣa*-compound, the following explanations would become feasible.⁸⁷⁷ The negative particle '*nañ*' in the word '*advitīya*', possesses three senses : (a) it may indicate what is opposed to *dvitīya* (*viruddha*), (b) what is similar to it (*sadṛśa*), or (c) what is other than the *dvitīya* (*anya*). In all these explanations, the particle, '*nañ*', does not deny the existence of any entity whatsoever. Thus, if '*nañ*' is taken in the sense of 'difference' or 'similarity' in the expression '*advitīya*' the entity that is referred to by the term '*dvitīya*', should necessarily be admitted to exist, because difference or similarity of an entity with reference to another entity designated by the term '*dvitīya*', cannot be undersotod if the latter itself does not exist. Even if the particle, '*nañ*', is taken as conveying the sense, "being opposed", (*viruddhatva*) to *dvitīya*, it would, in other words, mean that the *Brahman* would either be denoted by the term '*prathama*' or by '*trītiya*', '*caturtha*', etc., because it is these terms that are directly opposed to the term, '*dvitīya*'.⁸⁷⁸ In such a case, all entities denoted by the terms '*prathama*', '*trītiya*', etc., stand

874. *Chāndogya* : VI. ii. 1.

875. Cf. *Brahmasiddhi* of Maṇḍanamīśra (*Brahmakāṇḍa*) : p. 6 : "tathā 'ekamevādvitīyam' ityavadhāraṇādvitīyāśabdābhyāṁ tasyaivārthasya punaḥ punaḥ abhidhānāt sarvaprakāraheda-nivṛttiparatā śruteḥ".

876. E.g., "*rājapuruṣaḥ*".

877. SS. p. 268, ff.

878. *Ibid.* p. 269 :

"viruddhatve dvitīyena, trītiyaṁ prathamam tu vā brahma prāpnoti yasmāttat dvitīyena viruddhyate".

in opposition to what is indicated by the term '*dvitīya*', but are not stultified by the term, '*dvitīya*'.

Another possible contention of the *Advaitins* is that the term '*advitīya*' can be taken as an *avyayībhāva* compound in which case the particle '*nañ*', may be taken as denying the existence of everything other than the *Brahman*.⁸⁷⁹ According to this view, the term '*dvitīya*' appearing in the compound '*advitīya*', stands for the universe other than the *Brahman*. But this view cannot be correct says Yāmuna, because the term '*advitīya*' which is in co-ordinate predication with the term '*brahman*', can only indicate the sense of that which is opposed to, similar to, or different from the *Brahman*; but it cannot deny the existence of the world.⁸⁸⁰ This explanation also does not fit in, says the author. If *Brahman* is explained as that with reference to which there could be nothing that forms a second entity, then all the passages which define the *Brahman* as "*satyaṁ jñānam anantaṁ brahma*"⁸⁸¹ would crumble into nothingness, because, strictly speaking, these passages are different from, but not identical with Him.

Another defect in this explanation of the *Advaitins* is that the negative particle '*nañ*' constituting the compound '*advitīya*', cannot become an attribute of the term, '*brahman*'. It would then become a substantive itself, being in apposition with the terms, '*sat*' and '*brahman*'. It cannot be contended that non-existence of the world could form an attribute of the *Brahman*. Non-existence is an absolute non-entity and it cannot form a *viśeṣaṇa* of the *Brahman*, an Absolute Reality. Even granting that 'non-existence of the world' forms an adjective of the *Brahman*, the *Brahman* would, as before, be indicated by the terms, '*trītiya*' or '*prathama*'. So, it is clear that the term '*advitīya*', either as a *tatparuṣa* or an *avyayībhāva* compound, cannot be proved to sublate the world.⁸⁸²

879. *Ibid* :

"nanu nañ brahmaṇo 'nyasya sarvasyaiva niṣedhakam
dvitīyagrahaṇam yasmāt sarvasyaivopalakṣaṇam"

880. *Ibid*. p. 270 :

"naivam niṣedho na hyasmāddvitīyasyāvagamya
tato 'nyat tadviruddham vā sadṛśam vātra vakti saḥ".

881. *Taittirīya* : II. 1.

882. *SS*. p. 270

Even if '*advitīya*' is taken as a *bahuvrīhi* compound, the world other than the *Brahman* cannot be denied reality.⁸⁸³ In a *bahuvrīhi* compound, the two words entering into it refer to an altogether different entity. The *Brahman*, according to this view is one that does not have a second ('*dvitīya*'). When analysed, this statement means that the *Brahman* itself becomes the second, and as such there could be no contradiction to entities denoted by the terms '*prathama*', '*trītiya*', etc., existing in the universe. It may be contended by the *Advaitins* that the term '*dvitīya*' appearing in the expression '*advitīya*', stands for 'difference' in general, and that the passage may be explained thus : "Since there is no entity that differs from the *Brahman*, the *Brahman* is called *advitīya* ; and the sublation of the world of difference indicated by the term '*dvitīya*' has to be necessarily accepted". This is a wrong conception, says Yāmuna. Since the words entering into a *bahuvrīhi* compound should point to an entity other than those denoted by them, the non-existence of what is *dvitīya*, purported to be established by the *Advaitins*, should form an adjective of another entity, viz., the *Brahman*. But this cannot go well with the *Advaitic* theory because even the non-existence of a second entity (*dvitīyābhāva*) which is other than the *Brahman* cannot be real, and as such, cannot qualify the *Brahman*. The Genitive, which is the Sixth Case (*ṣaṣṭhī*) and which is implied in the explanation, "The *Brahman* is that to which there is not a second entity", can be proper, only when there exists, in reality, another entity related to the *Brahman*.⁸⁸⁴ But since the *Brahman* which is devoid of all qualities is the only reality for the *Advaitins*, and also since the relation of any other entity to the *Brahman* is unreal, they cannot resort to the *bahuvrīhi* compound involving the Sixth Case. The position cannot be improved even on the analogy of statements like '*rāhośīraḥ*', (Rāhu's head) where the Sixth Case is employed with reference to one and the same entity and has no reference to any other entity (Rāhu is nothing but the head.)

883. *Ibid* : p. 271, f.

884. *Ibid*. p. 272 : "satyarthāntarasāmbandhe ṣaṣṭhī yasyeti
yuyate"

The difficulty in the *Advaitin's* position is that the non-existence of entities cannot either be identified with or made the attributes of the *Brahman*, the Absolute Reality. A non-existent entity cannot be identified with the *Brahman*, because even the *Brahman* would turn out to be non-existent. The *Brahman* cannot also be qualified by a non-existent entity because only existent entities can serve as the attributes of other existent entities.⁸⁸⁵

Having thus refuted the explanations offered by the *Advaitins* for the passage, “*ekameva advitīyaṁ brahma*”,⁸⁸⁶ the author declares that it speaks of the non-duality of the *Brahman*, but does not at all contradict the existence of the universe. The fact that this world is a reality is fully supported by the means of knowledge called ‘*pratyakṣa*’ (Perception) and also by the *śruti*-texts, says Yāmuna.

He then offers his own explanation for the text in question. The expression, ‘*advitīyaṁ brahma*’, declares that in all the three periods of time, past, present and future, there could be no second person that is fit to be counted as either an equal or superior to the *Brahman*.⁸⁸⁷ This follows from the fact that entire universe is but a fragment of the unending glory of the Supreme Being.⁸⁸⁸ That is why the world cannot at all be counted as a second entity with reference to the *Brahman*.

Clarifying his statement, Yāmuna says that when we say for instance that an emperor is *advitīya*, that he does not have a second, we only mean that there is no other emperor who can equal him. This statement does not preclude the existence of his wife, children, retinue and other paraphernalia.⁸⁸⁹ Similar is the

885. *Ibid* :

“dvitīyavastunāstitvaṁ na brahma na viśeṣaṇaṁ
asattvāna hyasad brahma bhavennāpi viśeṣaṇam”

886. *Chāndogya* : VI. ii. 1.

887. *SS*. p. 272, f : “dvitīyagaṇanāyogyo nāsīdasti bhaviṣyati”

888. *Ibid*. p. 273 :

“samo vābhyadhiko vāsyā yo dvitīyastu gaṇyate
yato 'sya vibhavavyūhakalāmātramidaṁ jagat”.

889. *Ibid*. p. 274 : “yathā colanṛpassamrāḍadvitīyo 'dya bhūtale
iti tattulyanṛpatinivāraṇaparam vacaḥ
na tu tadbhṛtyatatputrakalatradiniṣedhakam”.

case with the statement that the *Brahman* is ‘*advitīya*’. The entire cosmos consisting of various orders of beings such as the gods, demons, men and the creator *Brahmā*, is but a drop in the unending ocean of the glory of Viṣṇu, who is the very embodiment of six perfections (viz., *jñāna*, *śakti*, *bala*, *aiśvarya*, *vīrya* and *tejas*) and the Lord of all, untouched by imperfections like ignorance, merit and demerit, found in common among other beings.⁸⁹⁰ By this statement, the author suggests that the Highest Being glorified in the *Upaniṣads* is Viṣṇu alone and that *Brahmā*, Śiva and other deities are but mere fragments of His glory.

It cannot be urged that even entities that are not equal can be counted along with the *Brahman*. To point out the incoherence in such a contention, the author says that while counting the seven seas, for example, nobody would even count the waves, foam, bubbles and drops of water, on a par with the seas.⁸⁹¹ The reason is clear, viz., that waves, bubbles etc., are but different modes of water itself, and as such, do not deserve to be counted separately, on a par with the seas. Citing another instance,⁸⁹² he says that when we say that there is only a single Sun but not two suns shining over the firmament, we are not denying the existence of the rays of the Sun. To cite one more instance, when we count certain entities, the factor number (*saṅkhyā*) itself is not counted as another entity, because it is not different from the entity itself.⁸⁹³ Likewise, the universe consisting of sentient and insentient entities cannot be counted on a par with the Supreme

890. *Ibid*. : “tathā surāsuranarabrahmabrahmāṇḍakoṭayaḥ
kleśakarmavipākādyairasprṣṭasyākhileṣitūḥ
jñānādiśāḍguṇyanidheracintyavibhavasya tāḥ
viṣṇorvibhūtimahimasamudradrapsa-vipruṣaḥ”.

891. *Ibid*. pp. 274-75 :

“kaḥ khalvaṅgulibhaṅgena samudrān saptasaṅkhyayā
gaṇayan gaṇayedūrmiphenabudbudavipruṣaḥ?”

892. *Ibid*. p. 275 :

“yathāhaika eva savitā na dvitīyo nabhassthale
ityuktyā na hi sāvitṛ nīṣiddhyante 'tra rāsmayaḥ”.

893. *Ibid* :

“yathā pradhānasāṅkhyeyasāṅkhyāyām naiva gaṇyate
saṅkhyā prthaksatī, tatra saṅkhyeyānyapadārthavat”

Brahman because it is but a drop in His unbounded splendour. Quoting other *śruti*-texts⁸⁹⁴ like “*pādo 'sya viśvā bhūtāni*”,⁸⁹⁵ “*etāvānasya mahimā*”,⁸⁹⁶ “*Yatrānyanna vijānāti sa bhūmā*”⁸⁹⁷ and a *smṛti*-text, “*merorivāṇur yasyedaṁ brahmāṇḍamakhilam jagat*”,⁸⁹⁸ Yāmuna emphasises that the whole universe is but a mode (*itthambhāva*) of the Supreme.

Pointing out that even other Upaniṣadic passages are in full support of the reality of the world, Yāmuna refers to the *Chāndogya* text : “*vācārambhaṇam vikāro nāmadheyam mṛttiketyeva satyam*.”⁸⁹⁹ This passage points out that the entire universe with movable and immovable entities is only a mode of the immutable *Brahman* who is designated by the term, ‘*sat*’, and who is the root-cause of the entire world-manifestation. This passage aims at pointing out the identity of cause and its effect, says Yāmuna.⁹⁰⁰ An effect like a pot for instance, does not, in essence, differ from a lump of clay. It is clay alone that exists in a different state as a pot. So what we call an effect is but a mode or *prakāra* of the cause, even as a spark of fire is only a mode of the fire. This point had been clarified by the *Chāndogya* through many illustrations such as those of a lump of clay (*mṛttikā*), iron (*loha*) and the seed (*bīja*).⁹⁰¹ All these passages go to prove that the universe has come out of the *Brahman* and that it is only a mode of His. So it is proper to say that the Supreme *Brahman* is the soul of the universe.

894. *Ibid* : p. 274, f.

895. *Taittirīya Āraṇyaka* : III. 12.

896. *Ibid*.

897. *Chāndogya* : VII-24.

898. To be identified.

899. Vi. i. 4. Vide *SS* : p. 276, f.

Cf. *Vedārthasaṅgraha* : p. 10: “*ekameva mṛddravyaṁ, svaikadeśena nānāvyaavahārāspadavāya, ghaṭaśarāvādinānāsamsthānavasthārūpa-vikārāpannanānānamadheyamapi, mṛttikāsamsthānaviśeṣatvāt, mṛddravyaṁ itthamavasthitam, na vastvantaramiti*”.

900. *SS*. p. 276, ff.

“*vācārambhaṇamātram tu jagat sthāvarajaṅgamaṁ vikārajātaṁ, kūṭasthaṁ mūlakāraṇameva sat ananyat kāraṇāt kāryam pāvakāt viśphulingavat*”

901. *Ibid* : p. 278.

The same point is implied in the *Kenopaniṣad* passage : “*nāśakat dagdhumanalaḥ*”,⁹⁰² etc., where *Brahman* is said to be the root of the powers of all the gods. The assertion of the *Chāndogya* that the knowledge of one leads to the knowledge of all, does not, as urged by the *Advaitins*, prove the falsehood of the world other than the *Brahman*.⁹⁰³ The *Chāndogya*, on the other hand, means that when the *Brahman*, the root-cause of the universe and the chief of all the entities is known, everything that depends upon Him for its own existence, as a mode of His, also becomes known. These and a host of *smṛti*-texts make us understand that this world of sentient and insentient entities attains its stature only by reason of its having the Supreme *Brahman* as its inner soul.⁹⁰⁴ This world is, therefore, an aspect of the Supreme. This characterisation of the relation of the *Brahman* with the universe is significant because here we meet with the express statement that the Supreme *Brahman* (*ātman*) is the inner self of the sentient and the insentient entities, which forms the basis of the clear formulation by Rāmānuja of the theory of “*śarīra-śarīri*” relationship.

If, however, the above view is not accepted by the *Advaitins*, they are only going against the established usage of experience and scripture, says Yāmuna. All usage in general proceeds from the fact of the world being a reality, but not a mere illusion. The implication of the *Advaitic* argument is such that even the knowledge regarding the Supreme *Brahman* acquired by the *jīvas*, would turn out to be a mere illusion and there would be no justification for such a flat denial of the basic reality of the

902. This is only a restatement of the meaning of the *Kenopaniṣad*: III. 19ff.

903. *SS*. pp. 278-79:

“*ekapradhānavijñānāt vijñātamakhilam bhavet*

.....
iti pramiyate brāhmī vibhūtir na niśiddhyate”

904. *Ibid*. p. 279 : “*brahmātmanā tmalābho 'yam prapañcaḥ cidacinmayah*”.

Cf. *Vedārthasaṅgraha* : p. 8 : “*ekavijñānena sarvavijñānapratijñā sarvasya tadātmakatvenaiva satyatve siddhyati*”.

Also cf. *ibid* p. 14 : “*jīvātmā tu brahmaṇaḥ śarīratayā prakāratvāt, brahmātmakaḥ; evambhūtasya jīvasya śarīratayā prakārabhūtāni devamanuṣyādīsamsthānāni vastūniti brahmātmakāni tāni sarvāṇi*”.

world-phenomenon.⁹⁰⁵ To avoid this charge, the *Advaitins* speak of what is called the 'conventional reality' (*vyāvahārika-satyatva* or *-sattā*) of the world. *Brahman* is said to have absolute existence (*pāramārthika-sattā*); the ether, etc. have conventional existence (*vyāvahārika-sattā*); and the nacre-silver has a third type of existence called 'illusory existence' (*prātibhāsika-sattā*).⁹⁰⁶ Knowledge conveyed by *pratyakṣa* and other valid means during world-existence, is stated by the *Advaitins* to be conventional reality '*vyāvahārika-satya*'. This reality continues so long as a man has not attained the real knowledge of the *Brahman*, and that is why the world is only illusory in the absolute sense.⁹⁰⁷ Yāmuna says that this contention of the *Advaitins* had already been refuted by him.⁹⁰⁸ It is a matter of regret that the portion of the text containing this refutation is not available. The conclusion thus arrived at is that the non-dual character of the *Brahman* (*advitīyatā*) spoken of in the *śrutis* does not at all, as alleged by the *Advaitins*, sublate the reality of the universe of name and form.

The author then proceeds to examine the views entertained by other schools of thought like Buddhism, Jainism, Sāṅkhya, Advaita and Nyāya, regarding the nature of world-existence.

The Mādhyamika Buddhists who deny the existence of everything, step in as the first adversaries to be criticised by Yāmuna regarding their view of the world-phenomenon.⁹⁰⁹ They say that the world cannot be said to exist (*sat*) because of the fact that sometimes there may also arise the cognition that it does

905. SS. p. 279 :

"tanniṣedhe samastasya mithyātvāt lokavedayoḥ
vyāvahārāstu lupyeran tathā syād brahmadhirapi".

906. Cf. *Vedāntaparibhāṣā* : II. p. 84.

907. *Ibid.* p. 1 : "brahmasākṣātkārānantaram hi ghaṭādīnām bādhaḥ
... na tu saṁsāradaśāyām bādhaḥ". Also Cf. "dehātmapratyayo yadvat
pramāṇatvena kalpitah", quoted there.

908. SS. p. 280 : śl. 35 :

"vyāvahārikasatyatvāt mṛṣātve 'pyaviruddhatā
pratyakṣāderiti mataṁ prāgeva samadūduṣam".

909. *Ibid.* p. 280. ff.

not exist (*asat*). A really existent entity does not allow of such a dual conception regarding its existence. The Sāṅkhyas who are diametrically opposed to this view of the Buddhists ask how one can get the cognition that the world exists (*sat*), if it really does not exist (*asat*). Since one and the same entity cannot, at one and the same time, be said to have opposite characteristics like existence and non-existence, and also since there could be no settled opinion on this view, the Jaina philosophers tried to solve the problem by accepting the world as a complex of both existence and non-existence. The Sāṅkhyas maintain that the universe is always existent (*sadā sattvaṁ*)⁹¹⁰ on the ground that the cognition of non-existence also presupposes existence itself. They further hold that at the time of dissolution too, matter continues to exist, not of course in a manifest form, but in an unmanifest condition, like the feet of a tortoise drawn inside.

But the *Advaitins* adopt an altogether different attitude to this question. They say that the world is neither *sat* nor *asat*, but is quite indefinable, *anirvacanīya*, either as existent or non-existent, for the reason that existence and non-existence are mutually contradictory.⁹¹¹ Therefore, the universe cannot be said to have any of these two possible characteristics, *sattva* or *asattva*, either individually or collectively. The Naiyāyikas and the *Siddhāntin*, as also the Mīmāṁsakas say that existence and non-existence can be posited with regard to one and the same entity due to certain delimiting adjuncts (*Upādhis*) like time and space.

910. Cf. *Sāṅkhyakārikā* : 9.

"asadakaraṇād upādānagrahaṇāt sarvasambhavābhāvāt
śaktasya śakyakaraṇāt kāraṇabhāvācca sat kāryam".

911. Cf. *Tattvopadeśa* ; p. 23 : śls. 52-53a (*Minor Works of Śaṅkara*).

"vidyate na svataḥ sattvaṁ nāsataḥ sattvamasti vā
bādhyatvāt naiva saddvairam nāsat pratyakṣabhānataḥ
sadasanna viruddhatvādato 'nirvācyameva tat".

912. SS. p. 282 : "tadevaṁ vādisammardāt saṁśaye samupasthite
nirṇayaḥ kriyate tatra mīmāṁsakamatena tu".

Criticising the Jaina view that the world is both existent and non-existent in its essential form, the author says that such a view is contradicted by practical experience. A pot, for instance, at one and the same time does not give rise to the cognition that it both exists and does not exist. Experience tells us that a particular entity exists at a place under certain conditions and that the same entity does not exist when those conditions are absent. Our cognitions of existence and non-existence regarding entities are governed by different conditions of place and time. So, one cannot say that pots and other objects exist as well as do not exist. Hence, the 'syādvāda' of the Jaina philosophers,⁹¹³ which never finds a settled conclusion, cannot be accepted as valid.

When the Jain view regarding the world-phenomenon is thus set aside, the advocate of the Sāṃkhya school steps in with his theory of eternal existence of the universe (*satkāryavāda*). He contends that the relation of factors like place and time can function only with regard to those entities that exist in reality. Thus, we can speak of a pot which exists, as being connected with a particular place and time. A non-existent entity cannot be said to have such spatio-temporal relations. The term "relation" (*sambandha*) always involves two entities at least, and therefore, a non-existent entity cannot, under any condition, be said to exist. So, the contention that non-existence can be posited with reference to pots etc., under different conditions of time and place, stands refuted. Therefore, it has to be admitted that an existent entity always exists and that it does not depend upon certain conditions to disprove its existence.

The Sāṃkhya philosopher argues that the world, claimed by others as having a beginning and an end, is, as a matter of fact, always existent, because that which has no beginning and no end, does, likewise, have no middle also.⁹¹⁴ So, the Sāṃkhyas say that an existent entity should be accepted as an absolute reality ; and a non-existent entity should be admitted as an

913. *Ibid.* pp. 283-84 :

"ato deśādibhedena sadasattvaṃ ghaṭādiṣu
vyavasthitam, nirastasyādvādasyeha na sambhavaḥ".

914. *Ibid* : pp. 284-85.

absolute nothing, like the sky-lotus. There is also no justification in the argument that the world has a beginning and an end, because an entity in the state of antecedent non-existence and an absolute non-entity (sky-lotus) do not virtually differ from each other, both being non-existent.⁹¹⁵

At this point again, there occur gaps in the text and it is presumed that the portion containing the refutation of the views of the Sāṃkhya, Advaita and other schools of thought regarding the nature of the world-phenomenon enumerated in the beginning,⁹¹⁶ is lost.

Yāmuna then refutes the interpretation offered by the Advaitins for the *Chāndogya* text, "*aitadātmyaṃ idam sarvaṃ tat satyaṃ sa ātmā tattvamasi śvetaketo*",⁹¹⁷ that it conveys a simple notion of identity between the Supreme Brahman and the individual self. This text, according to them, is very significant because of its clear declaration of this identity. Yāmuna calls in question the authenticity of such an explanation. He asserts that the above passage cannot be explained by the Advaitins in its primary significance simply on the ground that the terms, "*tat*" and "*tvam*", are found in co-ordinate predication (*sāmānādhikaraṇya*). The term "*tvam*" stands for the individual self, who is subject to many imperfections like grief and helplessness, whereas the term "*tat*" points to the Omniscient Supreme *Brahman*, who is an unending ocean of bliss and who is also of an unfailing will. To identify these two is as absurd as identifying darkness and light, says the author.⁹¹⁸

915. *Ibid.* p.285 : "ādāvante ca yannāsti, nāsti madhye'pi tattathā".

916. See p. 256 above.

917. VI. viii. 6.

918. SS. p. 286 :

"kāraṇyaśokaduḥkhārtasācetanā tvaṃpadoditāḥ
sarvajñassatyasaṅkalpo nissīmasukhasāgarāḥ
tatpadārthāḥ, tayoraikaṃ tejastimiravat katham?

Cf. *Tattvapadeśa* : śl. 26.

"sāmānādhikaraṇyaṃ hi padayostattvayor dvayor
sambandhaḥ, tena vedāntaiḥ brahmaikaṃ pratipādyate".

Ignorance, misery, etc. are qualities that are found in an individual self (*jīva*). Omniscience, bliss etc., attributed to the Supreme Brahman, are explained as *definition per accidens* (*taṭasthalakṣaṇa*)⁹¹⁹ by the Advaitins. Yāmuna says that pairs of mutually contradictory qualities like ignorance and omniscience rule out the possibility of identifying *jīva* and *Brahman*. These qualities do not fail to point to the essential difference between their substrata. The position cannot be improved by saying that these pairs of opposites form mere indicators (*upalakṣaṇa*), but not the attributes (*viśeṣaṇa*) of the *Brahman*, and that the entity referred to by these indicators would ultimately remain one, although these indicators may themselves possess contradictory features. Yāmuna argues that the difference between the entities represented by the terms, “*tat*” and “*tvam*”, should necessarily be admitted as real, by whatever name these characteristics are called, either as “*viśeṣaṇas*” or as “*upalakṣaṇas*”, because they are too contradictory to admit of any such explanation. These conflicting qualities like omniscience and ignorance necessarily bring to light mutual difference, but not identity of their substantives, viz., the *Brahman* and the *jīva*.⁹²⁰

To obviate this difficulty, the Advaitins say that the primary meanings of both the terms, “*tat*” and “*tvam*”, are to be abandoned and that these terms should, by a recourse to ‘*lakṣaṇā*’ (secondary significance), be explained as pointing to an undifferentiated single substantive (*viśeṣya*), viz., pure unqualified *Brahman*. They try to justify their stand on the analogy of such recognitory statements as “*so ’yam gauḥ*”, where the terms,

919. Vide *Vedāntaparibhāṣā* : p. 157 : “*taṭasthalakṣaṇam nāma yāvallakṣyakālanavasthitatve sati yadvyāvartakam, tadeva;prakṛte ca jagajjanmādikāraṇam*”.

920. SS. pp. 286-87: “*tvamarthasthe taṭasthe vā*

tadarthasthe vibhedake
guṇe tattvaṃpadaśrutyoraikārthyam
dūravāritam
ajñatvasarvaveditvaduḥkhitivasukhitādikē
viśeṣaṇe vā ciddhātoratavāpyupalakṣaṇe
viruddhaguṇasaṅkrānterbhedasyāt
tvamtadarthayoh”.

“*saḥ*” and “*ayaṃ*”, primarily referring to the bull belonging to the past and the present periods of time are, by implication (*lakṣaṇā*), taken as pointing to a single substantive, just the individual bull, unconnected with either the past or the present.⁹²¹ Rejecting this contention Yāmuna says that the analogy cited does not fit in with the argument.⁹²² Though the fact of belonging to two different places and periods of time is contradictory, this contradiction gets eliminated by the fact that the entity denoted by the terms, “*this*” (*ayaṃ*) and “*that*” (*saḥ*), is essentially one but not manifold. Contradiction of one and the same entity being connected with two different places is removed by the element of time. But the Advaitins cannot make a similar case for their own theory because they do not bring in factors like time and place for support.⁹²³ Yāmuna here implies that even in instances like “*so ’yam gauḥ*”, there is strictly speaking, no recourse to the secondary significance. Even in instances where *lakṣaṇā* is applied, it is seen that only one among the two terms

921. Cf. *Tattvopadeśa* : śl. 27 :

“*bhinnapravṛttihetutve padayorekavastuni
vṛttvaṃ yattathaivaikyam vibhaktyantakayostayoh*”

Ibid. śl. 30 :

“*parasparaviruddham syāt tato bhavati lakṣaṇā
lakṣyalakṣaṇasaṃbandhaḥ padārthapratyagātmanoh*”.

Cf. *Vākyavṛtti* : p. 37 (*Minor Works of Śaṅkara*) :

“*tādātmyamatra vākyārthaḥ tayoreva padārthayoh
saṃsargo vā viśiṣṭo vā vākyārtho nātra sammataḥ
akhaṇḍaikaarasatvena vākyārtho viduṣāṃ mataḥ*”.

Ibid. p.38 : śl. 48 :

“*tattvamasyādivākyeṣu lakṣaṇā bhāgalakṣaṇā
so ’yamityādivākyasthapadayoriva nāparā*”.

922. SS. p. 287 :

“*vācyaikadeśabhaṅgena cidekavyaktiniṣṭhātā
so ’yam gauritivat tattvaṃpadayorityapeśalam*”.

923. *Ibid.* : p. 287, f :

“*deśakāladaśābhedādekasminnapi dharminī
viruddhadvandvasaṅkrānteḥ so ’yam gauriti yuyate
svaprakāśasya ciddhātorviruddhadvandvasaṅgatau
na vyavasthāpakam kiccit deśakāladaśādikē*”.

Cf. *Vākyavṛtti* : śl. 42 :

“*tattvamasyādivākyam ca tādātmyapratipādane
lakṣyau tattvaṃpadārthau dvāvupādāya pravartate*”.

is explained through *lakṣaṇā*, but not both the terms. Yāmuna also seems to suggest here that since the *Brahman* is of the form of self-luminous knowledge, even ignorance (*ajñāna*) cannot be brought in to explain the contradictory characteristics obtaining in the Infinite and the finite selves.⁹²⁴

The Advaitins further assert that, through ignorance (*avidyā*), the Supreme Brahman becomes deluded and sees plurality in Himself and that the scriptures aim at dispelling this delusion by imparting the knowledge of the oneness of the self. But according to Yāmuna, this argument is incoherent. The Supreme Brahman, the Advaitins themselves assert, is essentially free from the world of plurality and is self-manifest. As such, there could be no possibility of ignorance ever affecting Him. Consequently, the false appearance of plurality which results from ignorance, cannot also take place. Therefore, scriptural statements like "*tattvamasi*",⁹²⁵ which are claimed by the Advaitins to stress the oneness of the self by dispelling an illusion which really does not occur to the *Brahman* at all, become purposeless and consequently invalid, says the author.⁹²⁶

Continuing, he points out that since the *Brahman* cannot be proved to be conditioned by such adjuncts as *māyā* and *avidyā*, the classification made by some Advaitins on this basis, viz., that

924. Cf. *Vedārthasaṅgraha* : p. 22, ff : "tattvamiti dvayorapi padayossvārthaprahāṇena nirviśeṣavastusvarūpopasthāpanaparavte mukhyārthaparityāgaśca | nanu aikyatātparyaniścayāt na lakṣaṇā doṣaḥ 'so'yaṁ devadatta' itivat ; yathā so'yamityatra sa iti śābdena deśāntarakālāntarasāmbandhī puruṣaḥ pratiyate ; ayamiti ca sannihitadeśavartamānakālasāmbandhī ; tayossāmānādhikaranyenaikyam pratiyate;...naitadevam.—so'yam devadatta' ityatrāpi lakṣaṇāgandho na vidyate, virodhābhāvāt...deśadvayavirodhaśca kālābhedenā pariḥṛtaḥ ; lakṣaṇāyāmapi na dvayorapi padayor lakṣaṇāsamaśrayaṇam, ekenaiva lakṣitena virodhapariharāt ; ...yathābhūtayoreva hi dvayoraikyam sāmānādhikaranyena pratiyate ; tatparityāgena svarūpamātraikyam na sāmānādhikaranyasyārthaḥ".

925. *Chāndogya* : VI. viii. 6.

926. SS. p. 288 :

"nirdhūtanikhiladvandvasvaparakāśe cidātmani dvaitānarthabhramābhāvāt śāstraṁ nirviṣayaṁ bhavet".

the *Brahman*, when conditioned by *māyā*, gets the designation "*Īśvara*" (the Lord) with superimposed qualities like bliss and omniscience, and that the same *Brahman*, when conditioned by *avidyā*, is called "*jīva*" with superimposed qualities like ignorance and grief, stands refuted.⁹²⁷ He further states that this view of the Advaitins had already been refuted by him earlier; but this portion of the text, however, is not available.⁹²⁸

Even granting that certain delimiting adjuncts act upon the *Brahman*, the above view cannot be maintained, says Yāmuna. "Does *māyā* act upon the unqualified *Brahman*, or upon the qualified?" he asks. On the first alternative, the different natures brought in by the display of *māyā*, like omniscience and ignorance, would exist in one and the same *Brahman* and there would thus be no distinction between the *jīva* and the Supreme. Even on the second view, viz., that *māyā* and such other *upādhis* act upon the qualified *Brahman*, the above defect would still continue. Thus, since the *Brahman* is said to possess attributes, it is necessary for the Advaitins to specify what those attributes are.⁹²⁹ It cannot be *māyā*, since it has just been called an *upādhi* and this argument will then be vitiated by the fallacy of

927. *Ibid* : p. 288, f.

Cf. *Vākyavṛtti* : śl. 44 :

"māyopādhir jagadyonissarvajñatvādilakṣaṇaḥ
pāroḥṣyaśābalaḥ satyādyātmakastatpadābhidaḥ"

Cf. also *Sarvavedāntasiddhāntasārasaṅgraha* : (Minor Works of Śaṅkara) : śl. 762 : "upādhivaiśiṣṭyakṛto virodho brahmātmanor ekatayādhigatyā".

928. SS. p. 288-89 :

"etena satyakāmatvajagatkāraṇatādayaḥ
mā (yopādhau) pare 'dhyastāḥ, śokamohādayaḥ punaḥ
.....
kṣudrabrahmavidāmetanmataṁ prāgeva dūṣitaṁ".

929. *Ibid*. p. 289 :

"citsvarūpe, viśiṣṭe vā māyāvidyādyupādhayaḥ
pūrvasmin sarvasāṅkaryam paraḥ jīvā vibhāgataḥ".

ātmāśraya. “*Jīvatva*” and “*Īśvaratva*” cannot also be the attributes of the *Brahman*, for the defect in this case would be *anyonyāśraya*. No other attribute can be pointed out other than these mentioned above. Since the essential form of the *Brahman* cannot be divided or delimited by any adjunct, it would mean that the *Brahman*, like the element ether, merely gets united with those adjuncts and as such, there would be no distinction between the natures of the *jīva* and the *Īśvara*.

Further, there is no truth in the supposition that the characteristics pertaining to the *upalakṣaṇa* (indicator) do not influence the entity that is actually indicated by it.⁹³⁰ Such a supposition is as absurd as saying that a person wielding a staff is not affected, even if his head is chopped off by an order of a king to the effect, “Let this wielder of the staff (*daṇḍin*) be beheaded.”⁹³¹ Thus, the defect of an intermixture of opposite qualities like omniscience and ignorance in one and the same *Brahman* becomes unavoidable for the Advaitins even after admitting such adjuncts as *māyā* and *avidyā*.

Emphasising the point that a single notion of identity (*tādātmya*) cannot be conveyed by the text “*tattvamasi*”,⁹³² Yāmuna says that *tādātmya*, strictly speaking, can be attributed only to those entities that differ from one another. Even one and the same entity can be said to have difference (*bheda*) and non-difference (*abheda*). Then alone will it be possible to say that

930. *Ibid.* p. 290 : “*taṭasthāvasthitā dharmāśśvarūpaṁ na sprśanti kim?*”

Cf. *Śatadūṣaṇī* : “*vāda*” : 38 : p. 164 (Yedāntadeśika Series) : “*na copalakṣaṇaṁ sarvaṁ bahiṣṭhamiti niyamaḥ; gotvapṛthivītvādyupalakṣaṇasāśnādimattvagandhavattvāder bahiṣṭhatvābhāvāt*”.

931. SS. p. 290 : “*na hi daṇḍīśiraśchedāt devadatto na himsitaḥ*”.

932. *Chāndogya* : VI. viii. 6.

things are connected by the relation of *tādātmya*.⁹³³ The validity of this view cannot be doubted because the relation *tādātmya* cannot subsist between two entities that are either totally similar or opposed to each other. Thus, we cannot say, for instance, that a pot is a pot or that a pot is a mat. Yāmuna says that the Advaitins earlier called in question the validity of the *bhedābheda* view.⁹³⁴ From this, we presume that the portion of this “*siddhi*” dealing with this topic, is lost. Even to refute the view of *bhedābheda*, one should first understand the significances of the terms, ‘*bheda*’ and ‘*abheda*’. But having once accepted that *bheda* and *abheda* are of such and such characteristics, one cannot refute them both together, without being guilty of the fallacy of self-contradiction, says Yāmuna.⁹³⁵

He also points out that by refuting the *bhedābheda* character of entities through dialectical arguments, one is only going against practical experience by which we know that the perceptions of differences as well relations are real and not illusory. Thus, we see the colour *blue* and the object *lotus* and also know that the blue colour pertains to the lotus, as in the

933. SS. pp. 290-91 : “*tattvaṁ padadvayaṁ jīva-paratādātmyagocaram tanmukhyavṛtti tādātmyam api vastudvayāśrayam*”.

The admission of both ‘*bheda*’ and ‘*abheda*’ in one entity is from the standpoint of the Bhāṭṭas or Yādvaprakāśa. In the *siddhānta*, we have to understand *bheda* from the viewpoint of the modes and *abheda* from that of its essential form.

934. *Ibid.* p. 291 : “*bhedābhedavikalpastu yastvayā paricoditaḥ*”. Cf. IS. ch. I, p. 4, f, for this ‘*vikalpa*’.

935. SS. pp. 291-92 :

“*abhedaḥ bhedino 'satye bandhe sati nirarthakaḥ abhedo bhedamardī tu svāśrayībhūtavastunoḥ bhedaḥ parasparānātmyaṁ bhāvānāmevamatayoḥ svarūpamabhyupetyaiva bhedaḥ bhedavikalpayoḥ (bādhanaṁ) tena vāgbādhāvirodhena nigṛhyase*”.

case of the blue colour and a pot.⁹³⁶ The relation in the former case is called 'tādātmya' and in the latter, it is *samavāya* or inherence.⁹³⁷

Pointing out that pressing logic too much into service would only vitiate its status as a valid means of knowledge, Yāmuna cites the instance of conjunction (*saṁyoga*) between two entities.⁹³⁸ Direct experience tells us that *saṁyoga* takes place only between two different entities. Logically, however, this point may be denied through a series of arguments as to whether *saṁyoga* takes place between two different entities or between two identical entities.⁹³⁹ But all such excesses of dialectics should promptly be checked with reference to practical experience. Likewise, the relation called *tādātmya*, which is vouchsafed by valid perception and scriptural testimony, cannot be doubted of its genuineness by the excesses of logic, says Yāmuna.

The text, "*tattvamasi*",⁹⁴⁰ which occurs many times in the *Chāndogya* has this sole purport of stressing the relation of *tādātmya* subsisting between the finite and the Infinite selves. As we have seen already,⁹⁴¹ this *tādātmya* should be explained as *śarīra-śarīri-bhāva* (body-self relation) suggested by the term "*aitadātmyam*".⁹⁴²

936. *Ibid.* p. 292 :

"nīle nīlamatir yādṛgutpale nīlādhirhi sā
nīlamutpalamevedamiti sāṅśāccakāsti naḥ".

937. Yāmuna, in *ĀS.*, says that "*samavāya*" is only a type of *saṁyoga*. Cf. p. 211 : 'yathā ca saṁyogāntarbhāvaḥ samavāyasya...' etc.

938. *SS.* p. 292, f :

"yathā vidītasāṁyogasambandhe 'pyakṣagocare
bhedābhedādīdustarkavikalpādāhānavibhramah".

939. Thus it can be asked : Does '*saṁyoga*' take place between two entities differing from each other, or between entities that are identical with each other? On the first view, even the mount Himālaya could be united with the Vindhya, which, however, is absurd. On the second hypothesis, it would mean that a pot is in conjunction with its own self, which is, likewise, an incoherent statement.

940. *Chāndogya* : VI. viii. 6.

941. See p. 255 above.

942. *Chāndogya* : VI. viii. 6.

The Advaitins, taking the text "*tattvamasi*"⁹⁴³ as conveying a simple notion of oneness, naturally say that in *mokṣa* nothing but mere *Brahman* in the form of knowledge would remain. But this doctrine cannot at all appeal to real seekers after *mukti*, says the author. Thus, if a man were to know that the *Brahman* is of the form of knowledge and that he will have to lose his own self in the *Brahman*, *mokṣa* would lose all its charm for him and he would never strive after, or even aspire for it, says Yāmuna. This theory of *mokṣa* set forth by the Advaitins also suffers from another defect, viz., that, according to it, it cannot be specified as to who actually gets *mokṣa*, the *Brahman* or the individual self. It cannot be the *Brahman* because He is ever-released. The *jīva* too cannot be the recipient of *mokṣa*, for according to the Advaitic conception, he would lose his own self in the *Brahman* at the time of *mokṣa*.⁹⁴⁴

Yāmuna then levels his criticism against the Advaitic doctrine of *Vivarta*, that consciousness which is single and self-luminous, would itself undergo transfiguration as the world of duality. According to the Advaitins, *saṁvit*, or knowledge, does not have any distinctions in essence. Distinctions that are generally met with in ordinary experience are only apparent, brought into existence by adjuncts in the form of different objects. When we see a particular object we only have knowledge pertaining to that object, since other objects do not present themselves to us at that time. But even then knowledge in a general and unqualified form continues to exist, running through each and every entity.⁹⁴⁵

943. *Ibid.*

944. *SS.* pp. 293-94 :

"brahmānandahradāntassthō muktātmā sukhamedhate
phale ca phalino 'bhāvāt mokṣasyāpuruṣārthatā".

Cf. *ĀS* : pp. 90 and 104. Also see *Śrībhāṣya* under I. i. i., p. 129, f.

945. *SS.* p. 295 :

"nanu saṁvidabhinnaikā na tasyāmasti bhedadhīḥ
ghaṭādayo hi bhidyante na tu sā cit, prakāśanāt".

So as to assert the *saṁvit* is free from all distinctions, the Advaitins refute the characteristic called '*bheda*' by posing various alternatives. They say that there is no such thing as *bheda* and that its appearance is only illusory.⁹⁴⁶ Thus, *bheda* cannot be identical with the objects,⁹⁴⁷ because it cannot independently be cognised without any reference to its counter-correlatives, viz., two objects. *Bheda* cannot even form an attribute of objects,⁹⁴⁸ for, being an attribute, it should have some difference or other from the substantive and this difference should again have some other attribute and so on, *ad infinitum*. The Advaitins add that perception also cannot prove *bheda* between objects, because, being momentary, it does not last till the objects possessing *bheda* are cognised. That is why inference (*anumāna*) which depends upon *pratyakṣa* for the cognition of *vyāpti* which is essential for its functioning, cannot at all prove *bheda*. So, the outcome of this discussion is that there is no such thing as *bheda* between objects and that even if cognitions concerning *bheda* arise, no reality can be attributed to them.⁹⁴⁹

946. Cf. *Brahmasiddhi* II. p. 48 : na bhedo bhāvato 'sti ; anādyavidyāvilasitametaditi". Also cf. *ibid* : "tattvānyatvābhyāmanirvacaniyo 'nādivikalpavāsanopādānavikalpaparidarśitaśarīraḥ ayamasmādbhinnaḥ, ayamanayorbheda iti vyavahāraṁ pravartayati".

947. SS. p. 296 : "na vastu vastudharmaḥ vā na pratyakṣo na laingikaḥ".

Cf. *IS*. Ch. I : p. 3 : "ko 'yaṁ bhedo nāma, kiṁ svarūpameva bhedaḥ, uta dharmāḥ..." etc.

Cf. *Brahmasiddhi* : II : p. 47 :

"na bhedo vastuno rūpaṁ tadabhāva-prasaṅgataḥ arūpeṇa ca bhinnatvaṁ vastuno nāvakalpate".

Cf. also *Ibid* : p. 50 : "na bhedo vastuno rūpaṁ; āpekṣiko hi sa pratīyate".

948. *Ibid*. p. 48 "nāpekṣā nāma kaścidvastudharmaḥ".

949. SS. p. 226 :

"ghaṭādivedyabhedo 'pi kevalaṁ bhramalakṣaṇaḥ yadā, tadā tadāyatto dhībheda-vagrahodayaḥ kutaḥ, kutastarāṁ tasya paramārthatvasambhavaḥ".

The Advaitins, pointing out various alternatives, say that *bheda* cannot be attributed to cognitions by reason of their having origination under such conditions as subject-object-relation. Thus, if *saṁvit* has a beginning in time, it should be able to cognise its own *prāgabhāva* (antecedent non-existence), either by its own self or through some other means of knowledge. It will be contradictory to say that *saṁvit*, while existing, cognises its own *prāgabhāva* because *prāgabhāva* which is nothing but the prior condition of the object, belongs to the past. If, however, *saṁvit* does not exist, its *prāgabhāva* cannot also be cognised, because it depends upon self-luminous *saṁvit* for its cognition. Equally untenable is the view that the *prāgabhāva* of *saṁvit* is cognised by means other than *saṁvit*, for, then the self-luminous character of *saṁvit* itself gets impaired. Therefore, since *saṁvit* is uncreate, it should be admitted as eternal and free from all distinctions. The Advaitins put forth another argument to refute *bheda*, viz., that even for cognising *bheda*, *saṁvit* becomes necessary, as for the cognition of the quality colour (*rūpa*). In the light of this elucidation, they say that one cannot call in question the theory of *Vivarta*, simply on the assumption that there exist distinctions in *saṁvit*, which really do not exist at all.⁹⁵⁰

In reply, Yāmuna says that the above theory would only appeal to and satisfy the credulous, but not those who view things in their right perspective, through valid reasonings.⁹⁵¹ We know by experience that cognitions differ from man to man and object to object, and also that they are immediate like pleasure and pain. Even as we admit that the conjunction (*saṁyoga*) between one pair of objects (e.g., a book and the hand) is distinct from that

950. *Ibid*. pp. 296-97 :

"kiñca svayaṁprakāśasya svato vā parato 'pi vā prāgabhāvādisiddhissyāt, svatastāvanna yujyate svasmin sati viruddhatvād abhāvasyānavasthiteḥ" etc.

Cf. *IS*. Ch. I : p. 1 : "na ca svatassiddhasya prāgabhāvādayaḥ svato 'nyato vā siddhyanti", etc.

951. SS. p. 298 :

"hanta brahmopadeśo 'yaṁ śraddadhāneṣu śobhate vayamaśraddadhānāsmo ye yuktīm prārthayāmahe".

of another (e.g., a pot and the club) and also that the desire (*icchā*) regarding a particular object inherent in one person is distinct from that inherent in another, we should accept that cognitions pertaining to different cognisers regarding different objects, are mutually different. The defect in the *Advaitic* theory of a single eternal and all-pervasive Consciousness is that, according to it, either all entities would simultaneously become manifest for ever, or not even a single entity would ever be manifest. Since consciousness is accepted as pervasive like Ether, there would be no question of objects not being presented to it, which, however, is disproved by our experience of occasional cognitions of objects. The Advaitins are thus faced with the difficulty of accounting for the phenomenon of occasioned cognitions. They cannot trace the phenomenon to the means that produce cognition (like the sense-functioning), because, *saṁvit* being eternal (*nitya*), it cannot be said to stand in need of non-eternal means. Nor can the difficulty be got over by saying that cognitions differ with regard to the objects, because *saṁvit*, according to the Advaitins, is one but not manifold.⁹⁵²

Pointing out the untenability of this theory, the author says that even the deaf and blind will have to be admitted as hearing and seeing, because of the fact that all-pervasive *Saṁvit* would even emit through their senses of hearing and seeing. To point out another defect, no distinction can be drawn between a teacher and his pupil, for the all-pervasive and self-manifest *Saṁvit* would embrace all persons alike, without any distinction, says Yāmuna.⁹⁵³

952. *Ibid.* pp. 298-99 :

“pratipramāṭṛviṣayaṁ parasparavilakṣaṇāḥ
aparokṣaṁ prakāśante sukhaduḥkhādivaddhiyaḥ
sambandhivyaṅgyabhedasya saṁyogecchādikasya naḥ
na hi bhedaḥ svato nāsti nāpratyakṣaśca sammataḥ
yadi sarvagatā nityā saṁvidekābhyupeyate
tatassarvaṁ sadā bhāyāt, na vā kiñcit kadācana
tadānīm na hi vedyasya sannidhītarakāritā
vyavasthā ghaṭate, vitter vyomavad vaibhavaśrayāt” etc.

953. *Ibid.* p. 299 :

“tataśca badhirāndhādeśśabdādigrahaṇaṁ bhavet
guruśiṣyādibhedaśca nirmimittāḥ prasajyate”.

It may, however, be urged that there is no plurality of objects in this world because of the fact that each and everything is essentially *Saṁvit* itself. Yāmuna here says that there are only two alternatives before the *Advaitins*. They should either say that no objects are cognised in this world, or that the objects cognised do not differ from Consciousness (*Saṁvit*). They cannot hold the first view, without being guilty of contradicting usage—ordinary as well Vedic. By resorting to the second alternative, viz., that all entities are identical with *Saṁvit*, they are contradicting their own theory of the oneness of *Saṁvit*. Thus, when they say that objects are identical with *Saṁvit*, they are also admitting that *Saṁvit* is identical with those objects and this necessarily involves difference, and as such, cannot be given as *pramāṇa* for the oneness of Consciousness.⁹⁵⁴

At this stage, the Advaitins bring in the theory of *avidyā*. They say that it is all due to the display of *avidyā* that no decision can be arrived at either in favour of *bheda* or *abheda* between objects and *Saṁvit*. This irrationality is, according to them, nothing peculiar because the very nature of *avidyā* allows it. This they regard as creditable for their system. In reply Yāmuna says that the theory of *avidyā* does not stand the strain of logical scrutiny.⁹⁵⁵ *Avidyā* may be explained as absence of *vidyā* (knowledge). But, according to this explanation, *avidyā* would become an absolute non-entity like a hare's horn and as such, it cannot be said to have any hand in the world-phenomenon. The other possible explanation is that *avidyā* is an entity different from *vidyā*, which would only undermine the Advaitic declaration

954. *Ibid.* p. 300 :

“idamākhyāhi bhoḥ kinnu nīlādir na prakāśate
prakāśamāno nīlādissaṁvido vā na bhidyate
ātau pratītiḥsubhago nīrvāho lokavedayoḥ
yataḥ padapadārthādi na kiñcidavabhāṣate
dvītiye saṁvido 'dvaitaṁ vyāhanyeta saṁhitam
yadyayaṁ vividhākāraprapaṇcaḥsaṁvidātmakaḥ
sāpi saṁvit tadātmeti yaṭo nānā prasajyate”.

955. *Ibid.* p. 301 :

“na cāvidyāvilāsatvād bhedābhedānirūpaṇā
sā hi nyāyānalasprṣṭā jātuśābharaṇāyate”.

that *avidyā* is indefinable (*anirvacanīyā*).⁹⁵⁶ It cannot be urged that the distinction of *avidyā* from *vidyā* is itself the result of delusion (*bhrānti*), for then *avidyā* would become identical with *vidyā* itself, which is absurd.⁹⁵⁷

Giving out his own opinion regarding *avidyā*, Yāmuna says that right thinking should make it a different entity from *vidyā*, because the latter is unalloyed and self-manifest, whereas the former is diametrically opposed to it in nature.⁹⁵⁸ Refuting the theory of *avidyā* from another standpoint, Yāmuna asks the Advaitins as to what actually is the form of *vidyā* (knowledge) which forms the counter-correlative of *avidyā*. There are only three alternatives possible. *Vidyā* could either be explained as *Samvit* itself, or the objects to be known (*jñeya*) or the knower (*jñātṛ*).⁹⁵⁹ If the second and third alternatives are maintained, viz., that *vidyā* is of the form of the knower (*jñātṛ*) and the known (*jñeya*), then it cannot dispel *avidyā* which requires only *Samvit* for that purpose.⁹⁶⁰ So the Advaitins have to accept the first alternative, viz., that *vidyā* is of the form of Consciousness (*Samvit*) itself. But the difficulty here is that *Samvit* being ever-manifest and pervasive, *avidyā*, which is of the form of the absence of such a *Samvit* cannot arise at all. Even on the view that *avidyā* is that which is opposed (*viruddha*) to *vidyā*, *avidyā*

956. Cf. *Brahmasiddhi : Brahmakāṇḍa*, p. 9 : “nāvidyā brahmaṇassvabhāvaḥ, nārthāntaram, nātyantamasatī, nāpi satī, evameveyamavidyā māyā mithyāvabhāsa ityucyate ; svabhāvaścet kasyacit, anyo ‘nanyo vā paramārtha eveti nāvidyā ; atyantāsattve khaṇḍaspadrśī na vyavahārāṅgaḥ; tasmādanirvacanīyā”.

957. SS. p. 302 :

“athārthāntarabhāvo’pi tasyāste bhrāntikalpitaḥ
hantaivaṁ satyavidyaiva vidyā syāt paramārthataḥ”.

958. *Ibid* :

“kiñca śuddhājaḍā samvit, avidyeyaṁ tu nedrśī
tat kena hetunā seyamanyaiva na nirūpyate?”

959. *Ibid* :

“api ceyamavidyā te yadabhāvādirūpiṇī
sā vidyā kinnu samvittir vedyam vā veditāthavā”.

960. *Ibid* : “na hi jñānādrte ‘jñānamanyataste nivartate”.

Cf. *Ātmabodha* : śl. 3 :

“avirodhitayā karma nāvidyām vinivartayet
vidyā ‘vidyām nihantyeva tejastimirasaṅghavat”.

can find no place at all, since according to the *Advaitins*, the entire universe is pervaded by a single and unqualified *Samvit* thus leaving no room for *avidyā*. Yāmuna, in fine, points out that the above discussion would expose the incoherency of the *Advaitic* theory of the Monism of Consciousness.⁹⁶¹

Yāmuna then points that the Advaitins cannot offer any satisfactory explanation as to where actually *avidyā* rests. The *jīva* cannot be said to form the *āśraya* of *avidyā*, for then the question arises as to who the *jīva* is. The Advaitins should reply that the *jīva* is one that forms the substrate of *avidyā* and this explanation is vitiated by the fallacy of *anyonyāśraya*,⁹⁶² for *jīvatva* and *avidyā* are interdependent and the one cannot be proved without reference to the other.⁹⁶³ This cannot be explained on the analogy of the seed and the sprout (*bījāṅkura-nyāya*)⁹⁶⁴ for, unlike the latter, *jīva* is unborn. The only other way of explanation is that *Brahman* Himself is the substrate of *avidyā*, which is highly objectionable. *Brahman* being Omniscient, He cannot become the *āśraya*. The Omniscience of the *Brahman* cannot itself be explained as an outcome of *avidyā* and thus illusory, because *Vedic* texts like “*parāśya śaktir vividhaiva śrūyate*”,⁹⁶⁵ the validity of which the Advaitins should also admit, declare in unmistakable terms the fact that the *Brahman* is naturally omniscient and that His omniscience is not conditioned

961. SS. : p. 303

962. *Ibid* : “kiñcāsau kasya? jīvasya, ko jīvo yasya seti cet
nanvevam asamādhānam anyonyāśrayaṇam bhavet
na te jīvādauidyā syāt, na ca jīvastayā vinā”.

963. Cf. *Brahmasiddhi : Brahmakāṇḍa* : p. 10 : “yattu kasyāvidyeti,
jīvānāmiti brūmaḥ ; nanu na jīvā brahmaṇo bhidyante...satyaṁ
paramārthataḥ ; kalpanayā tu bhidyante ; kasya punaḥ kalpanā
bhedikā? na tāvad brahmaṇaḥ; tasya vidyātmanaḥ kalpanāśūnyatvāt;
nāpi jīvānām; kalpanāyāḥ prāk tadabhāvāt ; itaretarāśrayaprasaṅgāt—
kalpanādhīno hi jīvavibhāgaḥ, jīvāśrayā kalpaneti”.

964. Cf. *Ibid*. p. 10 : “....anāditvādubhayoravidyājīvayor
bījāṅkurasantānāyoriva netaretarāśrayatvamaprakṛtīmāvahati....” etc.

965. *Śvetāśvatara* : VI-8.

by any factors. The Advaitins may, however, try to prove that the Omniscience of the Supreme Being is illusory through inference, on the ground that Omniscience consists of the cognition of differences (*bhedas*).

Yāmuna points out that the same reason involving cognition of differences would itself establish the reality of Omniscience, as in the case of the *Mīmāṃsā* principles of exegesis, called *śabdāntara* (usage of different terms), *abhyāsa* (repetition), *saṅkhyā* (number), *guṇa* (quality), *prakriyā* (content) and *nāmadheya* (name).⁹⁶⁶ In the *Pūrva Mīmāṃsā*, the above principles are employed to distinguish one rite from another, on the basis of the distinction of one *apūrva* from another resulting from the performance of those rites. These principles, says Yāmuna, involve the cognition of difference and are also held valid and real. Likewise, since omniscience (*sarvajñatva*) involves the cognition of differences, it should also be admitted as valid and real.

Another incoherence in the Advaitic argument is that if the omniscient *Brahman*, who is ever free from the bonds of transmigration Himself forms the *āśraya* of ignorance, there could be no means of dispelling such an ignorance at all.⁹⁶⁷ The Advaitins cannot also say that the validity of texts which speak of omniscience is only conventional and that absolute validity is accorded only to texts which speak of the oneness of the *Brahman*, for there is no proof for such a claim.⁹⁶⁸ A further

966. SS. P. 304 :

"bhedāvabhāṣagarbhatvādatha sarvajñatā mṛṣā
tata evāmṛṣā kasmānna syācchabdantarādivat".

For a discussion on "*śabdāntara*" etc., see *Śābarabhāṣya*, Vol. I, pp. 94-103—"*śabdāntara*" under II. ii. i : "*abhyāsa*" under II. ii. 2 ; "*saṅkhyā*" under II. ii. 21 ; "*guṇa*" under II. ii. 23, et. seq; "*prakriyā*" under II. iii. 24 and "*nāmadheya*" under II. ii. 22.

967. SS. p. 305 :

"sarvajñe nityamukte'pi yadyajñānasya sambhavaḥ
tejasīva tamastasmānna nivarteta kenacit".

968. *Ibid* : p. 306 :

"sarvajñatvādivacanaprāmāṇyāṇāṃ vyāvahārikam
tātvikam tu pramāṇatvamadvaitavacasāmiti
niyāmakaṃ na paśyāmo nirbandhāt tāvakādṛte".

defect in this theory is that one and the same *Brahman* cannot simultaneously be the *āśraya* as well as the *viśaya* of *avidyā*.⁹⁶⁹ The position cannot be improved by explaining that the *Brahman*, as the entity *aham* (I) becomes the *āśraya* of *avidyā* and that the same *Brahman*, in His essential form as *Brahman*, becomes the *viśaya* of *avidyā*, because there is no proof for such a differentiation in one and the same *Brahman*, says Yāmuna.

This differentiation cannot again be attributed to *avidyā*, because *avidyā* itself is said to depend upon the *Brahman* for its own existence, and thus, as in the first alternative, the defect of *anyonyāśraya* makes its appearance.⁹⁷⁰ To avoid this fallacy, the Advaitins may say that all this is but consistent with the illusory character of *avidyā*.⁹⁷¹ But having claimed everything as unreal in this world, they are not entitled to say that defects can be pointed out only in real but not illusory entities.⁹⁷² Moreover, this explanation cannot be accepted as correct, because the criterion of the defect called '*anyonyāśraya*' lies in one object being dependent upon another which actually depends upon itself for its own production or manifestation. So, the fact of an entity being an existent one (*vastutva*) cannot be made the criterion of this fallacy.⁹⁷³

969. *Ibid.* : "āśrayapratyogitve parasparavirodhinī
katham vaikarasaṃ brahma saditi pratipadyate".

970. *Ibid.* : p. 307 :

"rūpabhedāḥ kutastyo 'yam yadyavidyāprasādajāḥ
nanu sāpi tadāyattetyanyonyāśrayaṇaṃ punaḥ".

971. Cf. *Brahmasiddhi*, p. 10 : "na hi māyāyāṃ kācidanupapattih,
anupapadyamānārthaiva hi māyā".

972. SS. p. 307 :

"avastutvāvidyāyā (nedaṃ taddūṣaṇaṃ yadi)
vastuno dūṣaṇatvena tvayā kvedaṃ nirīkṣitam?"

Cf. *Brahmajñānāvalīmālā* (Minor Works of Śaṅkara) : śl. 20:
"brahma satyaṃ jaganmithyā jīvo brahmaiva nāparaḥ" etc.

973. SS. p.307: "svasādhyaṣya puraskārādoṣo 'nyonyasamāśrayaḥ"
etc.

Further, *avidyā*, in the Advaitic terminology, is *anirvacanīyā*, indefinable either as *sat* or *asat*. They say that *avidyā* is not an entity (*na vastu*). "But if this is true, how can *avidyā* form an object of thought and discussion?" asks Yāmuna.⁹⁷⁴ The Advaitins do not at the same time equate the case of *avidyā* with that of absolute non-entities like hare's horn and the sky-lotus. Again, when they say that *avidyā* cannot also be called a non-entity (*na avastu*), the double negative would only yield a positive sense; viz., that *avidyā* is a real entity. When this sort of definition is possible, there is no truth in the Advaitic assertion that *avidyā* is indefinable.⁹⁷⁵

Yāmuna then proceeds to point out defects in the theory that *avidyā* has *jīva* as its substratum. He asks whether this *avidyā* is single or manifold, and also whether the *jīva*, its substrate, is one or manifold. If *avidyā* is one, then the *brahma-jñāna* acquired by sage Śuka of yore would itself have put an end to it long ago, and as such, the efforts of the Advaitins for *mokṣa* would become unnecessary, says Yāmuna.⁹⁷⁶

To avoid this charge, the Advaitins introduce the theory that there is only one individual self (*eka-jīva*), and that he sees the entire world-manifestation as in a dream. Vāmadeva, Śuka and others are mere dream-perceptions of that single *jīva*. So, the *purāṇic* statements which speak of the attainment of release by sages of the past, are only comparable to the statements made in a dream to the effect that a particular person had attained *mokṣa*, and thus they do not conform to reality. The Advaitins say that the theory of Śuka and others having attained *mokṣa* can be disproved by any one, by the following inference: "The distinction of the released and the bound selves is only the

974. *Ibid.* : "kiñcāvidyā na ced (vastu, vyavahāryam katham bhavet?)."

975. *Ibid.* :

"nāpyavastviti co(ktau tu vastutvaṁ siddhyati dhruvam) (niṣidhyate) samastena nañā vastviti cet (matam) samastena nañā vastu prathamam yanniṣidhyate pratiprasūtam vyastena punastaditi vastutā".

976. *Ibid.* p. 308 :

"sā cedekā, tatassaikā śukasya brahmanavidyayā pūrvameva nirasteti vyarthaste muktaye śramah".

outcome of *avidyā* belonging to myself ; because this distinction is directly experienced like the world of distinctions perceived by me in dreams."⁹⁷⁷

Refuting this *Eka-jīva* theory, Yāmuna points out that the man who makes the above statement cannot use it against another man, who also makes a similar inference to prove that everything is illusory. There is also no proof to say that only a particular inference is valid, but not the other. These views being mutually contradictory, there could be no settled opinion regarding the matter, as in the case of the question as to who is omniscient, Kapila, the Buddha or somebody, says Yāmuna.⁹⁷⁸ The Advaitins maintain that the texts which speak of Śuka and others as having attained *mokṣa* are invalid like the statements regarding *mokṣa* made in a dream. If this is true, the Advaitins too are no exception to this phenomenon and their efforts for *mokṣa* would become futile, says the author.⁹⁷⁹

Further, the Advaitins deny that by their self-knowledge, Śuka and others attained *mokṣa* in the past. Since they have disproved *mukti* for persons of the past, they should likewise prove that in future, too, none would attain *mokṣa* which, again, would undermine the utility of their spiritual pursuits. They should find no difficulty in proving such a thing, because of the fact that they can bring in any number of analogies from dream-perceptions, points out Yāmuna.⁹⁸⁰ But the Advaitins might answer that the self is ever-released, and as such there is no such thing as attaining *mokṣa* in future;⁹⁸¹ the only thing is that the

977. *Ibid.* pp. 308-09 :

"muktāmuktādibhedo hi kalpito madavidyayā drśyatvān māmakasvapnadṛśyabhedaprapaṇcavat".

978. *Ibid.* p. 309, f :

"tvadavidyānimittatve yo hetuste vivakṣitaḥ sa eva hetustasyāpi bhavet sarvajñasiddhivat".

979. *Ibid.* p. 310 :

"yathā ca svāpnāmuktyuktisadrśī tadvimuktigīḥ tathaiva bhavato 'pīti vyartho mokṣāya te śramah".

980. *Ibid.* : "yathā teṣāmbhūtaiva purastādātmanavidyayā muktir bhūto cyate tadvat parastādātmanavidyayā abhāvinyeva sā mithyā bhāvinītyapadiśyatām santi ca svapnadṛṣṭāni drṣṭāntavacanāni te".

981. Cf. *IS.* ch. I. p. 29 : "na hi mokṣo 'prāptaḥ prāpyate, anityatvaprasaṅgāt".

self forgets, under the influence of *avidyā*, the fact that it is ever-free, like a man who searches for a golden ornament, say, a bracelet, forgetting that he has it on his own hand.⁹⁸² So, the attempts to attain *mokṣa* through *brahmavidyā*, aim at bringing to light or manifesting (*vyakti* or *abhivyakti*) the released nature of the self, by dispelling *avidyā* which obscures it, and as such, they are fully justified, say the Advaitins.⁹⁸³

But Yāmuna demands an explanation for the term '*abhivyakti*'. By '*abhivyakti*' should be meant either the essential form (*svarūpa*) of self-manifest Consciousness, or knowledge assuming a mental state in the form, 'I am Brahman' (*aham brahmāsmi*). The first view cannot be maintained because Consciousness being eternal and ever-present, it cannot be said to come into existence only in the dawn of *brahmajñāna*.⁹⁸⁴ The second alternative is equally untenable, for the Advaitins say that the direct realisation in the form, "I am Brahman", constitutes *brahmajñāna* itself. Therefore, they cannot describe this realisation as the fruit of *brahmajñāna*.⁹⁸⁵ Another defect in this theory is that *brahmajñāna* is said to arise from such texts as "*tattvamasi*".⁹⁸⁶ But since *jñāna* is said to have a beginning, it

982. SS. p. 311 : "avidyāpratibaddhatvādatha sā nityasatyapi asatīveti tadvyaktir vidyāphalamupeyate hastasthameva hemādi vismṛtaṁ mṛgyate yathā yathā tadeva hastastham avagamyopasāmyati".

Cf. *Ātmabodha* : p. 16 : śl. 44 :

"ātmā tu satataṁ prāpato 'pyaprāptavadavidyayā tannāṣe prāptavadbhāti svakaṇṭhābharaṇaṁ yathā".

Cf. also IS. ch. I : p. 29 : "sukhamapyaprāptamiveti tatprāptiḥ pumarthaḥ, hastagatavismṛtasuvarṇaprāptivat".

983. SS. p. 911 :

"tathaiva nityasiddhātmasvarūpānavabodhataḥ saṁsāriṇastathābhāvo vyajyate brahmavidyayā".

984. *Ibid.* : "yadi svarūpasamvit sā, nityaiveti na tat phalam".

985. *Ibid.* : pp. 311-312 :

"atha brahmāhamasmīti samvittir vyaktiriṣyate nanu te brahmavidyā sā saiva tasyāḥ phalaṁ katham".

986. *Chāndogya* : VI. viii. 6.

cannot be eternal, as a result of which even the released soul might get frightened that transmigration would again set in.⁹⁸⁷ Yāmuna says that, strictly speaking, *avidyā* cannot form an impediment (*pratibandha*) in the way of the manifestation (*abhivyakti*) of *mukti*, which the Advaitins claim as ever-present. An impediment is that which prevents the production of an effect, even when the causal conditions necessary to give rise to that effect are fully present.⁹⁸⁸ Since *mokṣa* is admitted by the Advaitins as eternal, it cannot be produced at all and as such, *avidyā*, described as a *pratibandha*, cannot at all stand in its way. Similar is the case with the cognition, '*aham brahmāsmi*',⁹⁸⁹ because this cognition, which forms the totality of causes necessary to produce *Brahmānubhava*, does not occur to a man in *saṁsāra* and as such it cannot be said to be obscured or interrupted by *avidyā*.

Having thus pointed out that the *Ekajīva*-theory cannot account for the spiritual activity of man, Yāmuna says that it cannot also stand serious scrutiny. Since the Advaitins say that *jīvatva* is only the result of the action of *avidyā* on the *Brahman*, they are not justified in saying that there exists a single Self.⁹⁹⁰ This theory also contradicts our practical experience by which

987. SS. p. 312 :

"kiñca sā tattvamasyādivākyajanyā bhavanmate utpattimatyanityeti muktasyāpi bhayaṁ bhavet".

988. *Ibid.* :

"api ca vyavahārajñāssati puṣkalakāraṇe kāryaṁ na jāyate yena, tamāhuḥ pratibandhakam".

989. *Ibid.* p. 314 :

"na muktir nityasiddhatvāt, na brahmāsmīti dhīraṇi na hi brahmāhamasmīti samvit puṣkalakāraṇaṁ saṁsāriṇastadāstīti katham sā pratibadhyate".

This *jñāna*, "*brahmāsmi*", is called "*sākṣātkāra*" (direct realisation).

Cf. *Pañcadaśī* : VI-16 :

"asti brahmeti cedveda paroṣajñānameva tat aham brahmeti cedveda sākṣātkārassa ucyate".

990. SS. p. 314 : "prātibhāsikamekatvaṁ pratibhāsaparāhatam".

we know that there are many *jīvas* whose activities are real and contrasted to those experienced in a dream. Thus, the plurality of individual selves vouchsafed by our practical experience cannot be disproved by the Advaitins through logic.⁹⁹¹

Yāmuna further says that one not only sees that there are many *jīvas* in this world, but can also infer to the same effect, viz., that the physical bodies seen in this world are all ensouled like one's own body, on the ground that they also possess different activities.⁹⁹² The souls thus inferred can again be shown to differ from one's own self on the ground that volitions responsible for the movements in those bodies must necessarily inhere in different individual selves. Even when we infer fire on a hill-top, we cannot deny the fact that the hill-fire is different from the fire observed in a kitchen, etc., the latter being the positive illustration (*sapakṣa*) in the process. Likewise, nobody fails to notice the difference between his own self and the other selves, which are inferred in the manner indicated above.

If the inferability of other selves is not admitted, the Advaitins are again going against the sanctions of secular experience and scriptural testimony, says the author.⁹⁹³

It might be urged that plurality of souls, like that of objects, is again illusory on the ground that it is the result of one and the same *Saṃvit* getting conditioned by different adjuncts. Yāmuna, repudiating this argument, points out that if *upādhis* are taken as the standards of arriving at conclusions, then, in one and same physical body, there being different organs

991. *Ibid.* pp. 314-15 :

“yato naḥ pratibhāsante saṃsarantaḥ sahasraśaḥ
āsaṃsārasamucchedam vyavahārāśca tatkr̥tāḥ
abādhitāḥ pratiyante svapnavṛttavilakṣaṇāḥ
tena yauktikamekatvamapi yuktīparāhatam”.

992. *Ibid.* p. 315 :

“pravṛttibhedānumitā viruddhamitivr̥ttayaḥ
tattatsvātmavadanye 'pi, dehino 'śakyanihnavāḥ”.

993. *Ibid.* p. 316 :

“na ceceṣṭāviśeṣaṇa paro boddhānumīyate
vyavahāro 'valupyeta sarvo laukikavaidikaḥ”.

like hands and feet which serve as *upādhis*, we will have to admit the upsurge of a number of consciousnesses. This cannot be accepted, for then the experiences of pleasure or pain located in different organs, cannot be comprehended and recollected by a single self possessing that body. A further flaw in the Advaitic argument is that since Consciousness is single, pervading all bodies, pleasures and pains pertaining to those bodies should also be recollected by that Consciousness itself, which, however, is disproved by common experience.⁹⁹⁴ The Advaitins cannot in defence of their position, pose the problem that the self should recollect all experiences of the previous births also. The self might not have recollections from the previous births on account of such reasons as the agony of death, the tortures undergone in hell, the throes through which the self is born in this world and the lapse of time.⁹⁹⁵ Moreover, when various pleasures and pains arise simultaneously, one has to account for the non-recollection of pleasure, etc., and this can be done only by explaining that the substrata of pleasure and pain, viz., the selves, differ from one another.⁹⁹⁶

Yāmuna then refers to another theory which opines that there are many individual selves, and that the world-appearance has no permanent illusion for all people. “Each person creates his own world of illusion for himself, and there is no objective datum, which forms the common ground for the illusory perception of all men.”⁹⁹⁷ Each man being a separate entity by himself, he does not know anything about the other selves. But

994. *Ibid.* pp. 316-17 :

“na caupādhikabhedena meyamātrvibhāgadhiḥ
svaśarīrepi tatprāpteḥ, śīraḥpānyādibhedataḥ
(yathā) tatra śīraḥpānīpādāu vedanodaye
anusaṃdhānamekatve, tathā sarvatra te bhavet”.

995. *Ibid.* p. 317 :

“prāyaṇānnarakkleśāt prasūtivyaśanādapi
cīrātivr̥ttāḥ prāgjanmabhogā na smṛtigocarāḥ”.

996. *Ibid.* : “yugapajjāyamāneṣu (sukhduḥkhādīṣu sphuṭāḥ)
āśrayāsāṅkarastatra kathamaikyārthavibhramāḥ”

997. *Vide History of Indian Philosophy by S.N. Dasgupta*, Vol. I. p. 477.

this theory is also defective, according to Yāmuna. Here, each individual self is said to be completely ignorant of the remaining selves, seeing his own dream-objects all the while. Therefore, such selves cannot be taken as constituting and running their course in this world, wherein we see by common experience that all *jīvas* are, in some capacity or other, connected with one another.⁹⁹⁸ Yāmuna has thus refuted the theory of the *Advaitins* that the distinctions of the knower and the known (*jñātr* and *jñeya*) are only due to the impact of *avidyā* on *Samvit*, which is unitary.

Yāmuna then calls in question the Advaitic assertion that *Samvit* is *advitīya*, that is to say, it is mere unqualified knowledge. This is quite untenable because they declare that *Samvit* is self-manifest, unitary, pervasive and so on, which, in other words, is only admitting that it possesses qualities such as self-manifestation, unitariness, pervasiveness, etc.⁹⁹⁹ These characteristics cannot be identified with the very form of *Samvit* itself so as to avoid the above difficulty. We find that philosophers entertain divergent views regarding the characteristics of *Samvit*, even though all of them fundamentally agree that *Samvit* exists.¹⁰⁰⁰ This divergence of opinion indicates that *Samvit* and its characteristics like eternity and pervasiveness are mutually different but not identical with each other. The Advaitins cannot call these attributes illusory, for they are mentioned in the *Upaniṣads*, the validity of which has to be admitted even by the Advaitins.¹⁰⁰¹ But they may explain these qualities as one with the essential form of the *Brahman* Himself.

998. SS. p. 318 :

“paravārtānabhijñāste svasvasvapnaikadarśinaḥ
katham pravartayeyustāṁ saṅgādyekanibandhanām”.

999. *Ibid.* p. 319 :

“kiñca svayaṁprakāśatvavibhutvaikatvanityatāḥ
tvadabhyupetā bādheran samvidaste ‘dvitīyatām”

1000. *Ibid.* :

“saṁvideva na te dharmāssiddhāyāmapī saṁvidi
vivādadarśanātteṣu, tadrūpāṇāṁ ca bhedataḥ”.

1001. *Ibid.* :

“na ca te bhrāntisiddhāste yenādvaitāvirodhinaḥ
tattvavedakavedāntavākyasiddhā hi te guṇāḥ”.

Here, there are three alternatives possible, says Yāmuna. Bliss, truth and the like could either be the pure form of the *Brahman*, or be His attributes, or could themselves be designated the *Brahman*, either individually or collectively.¹⁰⁰² On the first view, viz., that bliss, truth, etc., are identical with pure *Brahman*, terms like Existence (*satya*), Knowledge (*jñāna*) and Infinity (*ananta*) occurring in different *Upaniṣads*, would become redundant, since the entity denoted by them remains the same, the pure unqualified *Brahman*. This results in attributing the defect of redundancy to terms, found in *Vedic* texts as well as those employed in ordinary parlance.¹⁰⁰³ As a matter of fact, usage of different terms like Existence, Knowledge and Infinity with regard to the *Brahman* Himself, suggests the mutual difference of those attributes qualifying the *Brahman*. Another strong reason for holding these attributes to be distinct from the form of the *Brahman* is that, although philosophers (whose authority is the *Veda*) are agreed on the fact of the *Brahman* being the Prime Cause of the entire world-manifestation, yet they differ among themselves regarding the attributes of the *Brahman*. This difference of opinion would ultimately point out the difference between the form of the *Brahman* and His characteristics such as Existence and Knowledge.¹⁰⁰⁴

The second alternative, viz., that Existence, Bliss, etc. only belong to the *Brahman* as His characteristics, cannot be maintained by the *Advaitins*, for, then, the declaration that *Brahman* is *advitīya*, (unqualified), gets sublated.¹⁰⁰⁵

The third hypothesis, viz., that each and every attribute like Existence and Knowledge becomes identical with *Brahman*, if accepted, would only result in the plurality of *Brahman*, which again undermines His unitary nature. But the Advaita philosophers take all these attributes like *satya* and *ananta* to represent

1002. *Ibid.* p. 320 :

“brahmeti yāvannirdiṣṭam tanmātram kiṁ sukhādayaḥ
athavā tasya te, yadvā, ta eva brahmasamjñinaḥ”.

1003. *Ibid.* : “ādye tattatpadāmnānavaiarthyaṁ vedalokayoh”

1004. *Ibid.* : “pūrvoktanītyā bhedaśca....” etc.

1005. *Ibid.* : “dvitīye saiva, taireva brahmaṇassadvitīyatā”.

Brahman collectively, even as a collection of trees is taken to represent a forest. But this explanation does not improve the position, says Yāmuna. Thus, just as a forest cannot be something totally different from the trees constituting it, so also *Brahman* cannot be said to be totally distinct from His constituent characteristics like Existence and Knowledge ; and there is thus the defect of redundancy of terms, as in the previous agreement.¹⁰⁰⁶

If, on the other hand, *Brahman* is said to be different from these attributes, this would again refute the theory of unqualified *Brahman*. But the Advaitins take the text, “*satyaṃ jñānāmanantam brahma*”¹⁰⁰⁷ as conveying a general notion of identity, like the statement, “*prakṛṣṭaparakāśasavitā*”.¹⁰⁰⁸ Yāmuna points out that the terms, “*prakarṣa*” (excellence in comparison with other entities) and “*prakāśa*” (luminosity), do not convey any undifferentiated sense of identity. No statement in co-ordinate predication (*sāmānādhikaraṇya*) can be given as an instance of the undifferentiated notion of identity, he adds. The terms, “*prakāśa*” and “*prakarṣa*”, clearly bring out the particular traits of the shining objects, says Yāmuna in fine.¹⁰⁰⁹

The Advaitins now adopt a different method to achieve their end ; they explain terms like ‘*jñāna*’ and ‘*ananta*’, not as conveying any positive attribute of the *Brahman* as such. These terms, on the other hand, convey a negative sense. Thus, for instance by ‘*jñāna*’ is meant the absence or non-existence

1006. *Ibid* :

“*tr̥ṭīye brahma bhidyeta tanmātratvāt pade pade tatsamūho 'thavā brahma tarubṛndavanādivat*”.

1007. *Taittirīya Upaniṣad* : II. i. 1.

1008. *Brahmasiddhi* : I. p. 5 : “*viśiṣṭasya āhlādātmanah prakāśasya cāndramasyeva śabdadvayena pratipādanānna doṣaḥ ; yathā ca prakṛṣṭaḥ prakāśaḥ savitā iti*”.

SS. p. 320-21 : “*prakarṣaśca prakāśaśca bhinnānevārkavartinau*”.

1009. *Ibid*. SS. p.321: “*tena na kvāpi vākyārtho 'vibhāgo 'sti nidarśanam*”.

(*abhāva* or *apoha*) of ‘*ajñāna*’ (called ‘*jādyā*’ by Yāmuna);¹⁰¹⁰ by ‘*ānanda*’ is meant the absence of misery (*duḥkha*) and so on. This negation, according to the Advaitins, is merely of the form of the substratum (*adhikaraṇa*), viz., the *Brahman*.

Here again, a three-fold alternative is posed by Yāmuna.¹⁰¹¹ The ‘*apoha*’ or non-existence might be really existent or non-existent, or be quite indefinable as either existent or non-existent. If non-existences or *apohas* do really exist, then *Brahman* cannot be described as ‘*advitiya*’. If, on the other hand, these *apohas* do not really exist it would only imply the existence of qualities like *ajñāna* and *duḥkha* in the *Brahman* Himself, which, however, is inadmissible. The third alternative, viz., that *apoha* or *abhāva* is something indefinable either as *sat* or *asat*, has already been refuted by him, says Yāmuna. Moreover, if the *apohas* are of the form of the *Brahman* Himself, and also indefinable as either *sat* or *asat*, then *Brahman* too would become similar to inanimate objects such as a pot.¹⁰¹²

Further, the Advaitins should admit that terms like ‘*jñāna*’ and ‘*ānanda*’ convey senses that are opposed to those conveyed by terms like ‘*jādyā*’ and ‘*duḥkha*’ respectively, which are purported to be negated. If this distinction is not admitted between ‘*jñāna*’ and ‘*ajñāna*’ and between ‘*ānanda*’ and ‘*duḥkha*’, the term ‘negation’ carries no sense at all. So, terms like ‘*jñāna*’ and ‘*ānanda*’ would ultimately convey a specific sense of opposedness to ‘*ajñāna*’ and ‘*duḥkha*’ and *Brahman* would again become qualified.¹⁰¹³

1010. *Ibid*.

“*ajādyaduḥkhādyapohena yadyekatraiva vartitā jñānānadādiśabdānām na satassadvitīyatā*”.

1011. *Ibid* : “*apohāḥ kiṃ na santyeva, santo vā, nobhaye 'pi vā?*”

1012. *Ibid* : “*sattve sat sadvitīyaṃ syāt jādyātmakatā pare sadasadvyatirekoktiḥ pūrvameva parākṛtā tathātve ca ghaṭādibhyo brahmāpi na viśiṣyate*”.

1013. *Ibid*. p. 322 :

kiñcāpohyaḥ sādātadviruddhārthasamarpane naiva tattadapohyeta tadekārthaiḥ padairiva”.

The Advaitins themselves admit that even for negation, a particular from of the entity to be negated has to be accepted. Cf. *Brahmasiddhi* : II. śl. 2: p. 44: “*labdharūpe kvacit kiñcit tādṛgeva niṣidhyate*”.

Moreover, *abhāva* (or *apoha*) does not convey the absence of knowledge regarding an entity. Rather, it is of the form of mere substratum (*adhikaraṇa*), devoid of its counter-correlative, viz., the object which is not cognised while the conditions necessary for its cognition are present. This is from the viewpoint of those who hold *abhāva* as a form of knowledge. *Abhāva* can even be explained as a positive entity obtained in a substratum, when its *pratiyogin* (counter-correlative) is not cognised while it is competent enough to be cognised. Therefore, '*abhāva*', in other words, is a positive characteristic found in a substrate. Thus, for example, when we say, 'There is no pot on the ground', we are admitting the existence of the substratum, ground, which, however, is devoid of the object, pot. So, the Advaitic claim for an undifferentiated Consciousness, *Brahman*, becomes untenable.¹⁰¹⁴

Yāmuna then criticises the Advaitic contention that the universe is *sadasadanirvacanīya*, indefinable either as existent or non-existent. There is no proof for such a view, says Yāmuna. Thus, *pratyakṣa* (Perception) does not prove that the objects in this world are *anirvacanīya*. We, by common experience, know that Perception and other means of knowledge produce correct cognitions in us regarding particular entities, and the cognition born out of one means of knowledge is distinct from the cognition produced by another means. Thus, when we see a blue object, we have the cognition regarding blueness and when we see a white crystal, we have cognition regarding whiteness, which cognitions are mutually distinct from each other.¹⁰¹⁵

Similar is our experience with regard to the cognition of tastes. The taste of sweetness in milk is known to be distinct from the bitterness of margosa and so on and so forth. So, the distinction of one cognition from another is a matter of common experience, and the *Vedic vyavahāra* is also based fundamentally

1014. SS. p. 322 :

"pratiyogini dṛṣṭe tu yā bhāvāntaramātradhīḥ
saivābhāva itihāpi sabdhiste sadvitīyatā".

1015. *Ibid.* p. 323 :

"bhūtabhautikabhedānām sadasadvyatirekitā
kuto 'vasīyate? kinnu pratyakṣāder utāgamāt", etc.

on such a distinction of cognitions. So the Advaitins are not justified in saying that *pratyakṣa* or Perception proves that the world-phenomenon is *anirvacanīya*. They have to admit the existence of a variety of entities in this world, possessing specific and distinct forms.¹⁰¹⁶ The Advaitins might, however, agree that the entities in this world appear to be existent, but go on to argue that there is no proof or basis for such an appearance.¹⁰¹⁷ Yāmuna suggests that they, on the strength of the practical observation of different entities in this world, should infer the root-cause of such a phenomenon, which would determine the reality of our perceptions.¹⁰¹⁸ Moreover, since our cognitions regarding different entities arise only when means like *pratyakṣa* and *anumāna* function, but not in their absence, it is reasonable to suppose that the knowledge these means produce, is in general, valid.¹⁰¹⁹ Direct perception which arises from non-defective sense-organs would only cognise *bheda* or difference of entities, but never their identity.

It might be urged that Perception cannot at one and the same time, cognise both the substrate and the difference that subsists in it, for two reasons. For a cognition of the substrate, no cognition of the counter-correlative (*pratiyogin*) is necessary, whereas for the cognition of *bheda*, the cognition of its counter-correlative becomes essential. Perception cannot even be said to cognise the substrate first and the difference (*bheda*) next, by reason of its momentary character. Nor is it possible to identify the substratum and difference (*bheda*) with their respective cognitions. The Advaitins thus conclude that *pratyakṣa* merely cognises the form of objects presented to our sense-organs and that the cognition of difference (*bheda*) does not conform to reality.

1016. *Ibid* : p. 324.

1017. *Ibid* : "satyaṁ pratītirastyasyā mūlaṁ nāstīti cet..."

Cf. IS. ch. I. p. 2 : "satyaṁ, prasiddhirasti....kintu nāsyā mūlaṁ paśyāmaḥ".

1018. SS. p. 324 : "sā cedasti tasyā (tayā) mūlaṁ kalpyatām kāryabhūtayā".

1019. *Ibid* : "kṛpam cendriyalingādi tadbhāvānuvidhānataḥ".

But this view of the Advaitins is based upon their lack of correct knowledge regarding the significances of the *viñāṭīya* and *sajāṭīya* differences that an object possesses, that is, distinctions from dissimilar and similar things. The moment we perceive an object, we perceive it as different from other entities of the same class and also from those of a separate class. This is similar to the non-apprehension of a pot on the ground, for instance, which is understood by mere observation of the ground, while conditions favourable for the perception of the pot are fully present. One and the same entity, with reference to different correlatives, gives rise to different verbal usages (*vyavahāra*). For example, an object six inches long is called shorter, only when it is compared with an object longer than itself and the same object is also termed longer, with reference to a shorter object.¹⁰²⁰ So, *bheda*, which constitutes the very form of objects, is cognised the moment an object is seen. Verbal reference to *bheda*, however, arises only when the counter-correlatives are involved. That is why the world of multiplicity cognised by direct perception possesses many modes and forms that are peculiar to each object and as such, none can deny its reality.¹⁰²¹

1020. SS. pp. 324-25 :

“yaugapadyakramāyogād vyavacchedavidhānayoḥ
aikyāyogācca bhedo na pratyakṣa iti yo bhramah
bhedetarābhāvavivekāgrahaṇena saḥ (sic.)
svarūpameva bhāvanām pratyakṣeṇa parisphurat
bhedavyāhārahetuṣṣyat pratiyogivyapekṣayā”.

The verse, “yaugapadya....” etc. is quoted and explained by Sudarśana in his commentary on *Śrībhāṣya*, Vol. I, p. 82.

Cf. *Brahmasiddhi* : II. śl. 1. : “āhurvidhātr pratyakṣam na niṣeddh vipaścitaḥ”.

Also *Ibid* : II. śl. 4 :

“vidhānameva naikasya vyavacchedo 'nyagocaraḥ
māsma bhūdaviśeṣeṇa mā na bhūdekadhījuṣām”.

1021. SS. pp. 325-26 :

“evaṁ vyavasthitānekaprakārākāravattayā
pratyakṣasya prapañcasya tadbhāvo 'śakyanihnavah”.

Yāmuna has thus proved that *pratyakṣa* only establishes the reality of world-existence and not its indefinability, as claimed by the Advaitins. He then points out that scriptural texts too are not in their favour. Scriptures cannot be cited as a proof to the indefinability of the world, because the sole intention of the scriptures is in establishing something that is to be accomplished through action (*kārya*) but not the indefinability of an existent (*siddha*) thing.¹⁰²² This reply, it should be noted, is purely from the viewpoint of the *Mīmāṃsakas*. Even from the standpoint of the *Vedāntins* who hold that scriptures speak of already established entities, the Advaitic position cannot be correct, because scriptures do not teach anything indefinable.¹⁰²³

Moreover, the phrase, “neither *sat* nor *asat*”, does not convey any sense at all, says Yāmuna. Inference too cannot establish the *anirvacanīyatva*—indefinability—of the world of difference. The Advaitins say that the world cannot be non-existent (*asat*) for the reason that it is cognised as existent (*sat*), and also that it cannot be existent (*sat*) for the reason that it is sublated. The reason employed by the Advaitins is only a fallacy or a semblance of reason (*hetvābhāsa*), for we can conclude by that reason that the world is both existent (*sat*) as well as non-existent (*asat*), says the author. Since the world is cognised, it can be called *sat* ; it can also be called *asat* since it is sublated. Therefore, when this definition is possible, the Advaitins cannot posit indefinability to the world.¹⁰²⁴ The point to be noted here is that the factors of “existence” and “non-existence” become contradictory only when they are posited with one and the same entity in its essential form. As has already been pointed out, there is no contradiction in one and the same entity becoming existent as well as non-existent, when the influence of delimiting adjuncts like place and time is accepted.¹⁰²⁵

1022. *Ibid*. p. 326 : “āgamaḥ kāryaniṣṭhatvādīdṛṣe 'rthe na tu pramā”.

1023. *Ibid*. : “prāmāṇye 'pyanvayāyogyapadārthatvānna bodhakaḥ”.

1024. *Ibid*. :

“nāsat pratīter; bādhācca na sadityapi yanna tat
pratītereṇa sat kim na? bādhānnāsat kuto jagat?”.

1025. See p. 257 above.

Refuting the Advaitic theory of '*anirvacanīyatva*' through logic, Yāmuna poses two alternatives : "Is the *mithyātva* (illusory character) attributed by the Advaitins to this world, real or unreal?" he asks. It cannot be real, for then, there being two real entities, the oneness of the *Brahman* becomes sublated. On the other view, viz., that the '*mithyātva*' is unreal, the Advaitic position is utterly disproved, because what is not unreal become real and the Advaitins, therefore, have to admit the reality of the world-phenomenon.¹⁰²⁶

Yāmuna then criticises the Advaitic conception of the Monism of Existence (*sadadvaita*), that there is but a single Existence (*sat*) in the world and that the existences of all other objects in this world is illusory. This is called the '*sadadvaita*' theory. But all the means of valid knowledge cognise the objects in this world as they are, and these objects are also found to be distinct not only from one another, but also from absolute non-existent entities such as a hare's horn and sky-lotus. Thus, when we say, for instance, "There exists a pot" (*ghaṭo 'sti*), we are positing existence with the pot ; we are not equating it with non-existent entities or with a different object such as a piece of cloth.¹⁰²⁷ Our cognitions, which are the form, "This is a pot", "This is a cloth" and so on, point to the existence of a variety of objects, and thus one has to admit the plurality of existence.

But the Advaitins might put forth the following argument. When we say "*ghaṭo 'sti*" (There is a pot), there are two things spoken of—the object pot and the existence of the pot. Now the Advaitins ask as to what is actually conveyed by the term '*asti*' (*exists*, or *is*). If mere existence (*sattva*) is said to be conveyed by the term, to the exclusion of all entities, it only contributes

1026. See SS : pp. 326-27.

1027. *Ibid.* pp. 327-28 :

"sarvāṇyeva pramāṇāni svam svamarthaṁ yathoditam
asato 'rthāntarebhyasā vyavacchindanti bhānti naḥ
tathāhiha ghaṭo 'stīti yeyam dhīrupajāyate
sā tadā tasya nābhāvaṁ paṭatvaṁ vānumanyate".

to their theory of "*sadadvaita*", according to which existence is unitary but not manifold. If, on the other hand, it is said that the term '*asti*' in the above statement indicates *something other* than mere existence, this is what the Advaitins claim as 'indefinable' either as '*sat*' or '*asat*'. So, either of the two views is to be admitted, they say.¹⁰²⁸

But this is not a genuine argument, says Yāmuna. According to him, if the Advaitins want to apply this analysis to statements like "*ghaṭo 'sti*" and establish *anirvacanīyatva* (indefinability) with regard to each and every object, such an analysis will have to be extended to *Upaniṣadic* texts such as "*asti brahma*"¹⁰²⁹ also, as there is no reason as to why this analysis should not be applied universally. Other *Upaniṣadic* texts like '*ānando brahma*'¹⁰³⁰ and "*satyaṁ jñānāmanantaṁ brahma*"¹⁰³¹ will also be reduced to the same fate of '*anirvacanīyatva*' through this type of analysis. Yāmuna further points out that the same argument, when applied to the Advaitic declaration, "*prapañcaḥ sadasadanirvacanīyaḥ*",¹⁰³² would result in the world being something different from *sadasadanirvacanīya*, that is to say, definable, which, however, is directly opposed to the Advaitic intentions.

Therefore, points out Yāmuna in conclusion, when we make such statements as '*ghaṭo 'sti*' and "*paṭo 'sti*", we are positively asserting the reality of objects like a pot and a piece of cloth, possessing particular forms and modes. So, what is meant by the existence (*sattā*) of an entity is the real existence of that particular entity in its essential form and modes, as distinguished from those of other entities of similar and dissimilar classes. This existence (*sattā*), which is the meaning

1028. *Ibid.* : p. 328.

1029. *Taittirīya Upaniṣad* : II. 6. 1.

1030. *Ibid.* : III. 6.

1031. *Ibid.* : II. i. 1.

1032. Cf. *Tattvopadeśa (Minor Works of Śaṅkara)* : p. 23 : śls. 52-53a :

"vidyate na svataḥ sattvaṁ nāsataḥ sattvamasti vā
bādhya tvānnaiva saddvaitaṁ nāsat pratyakṣabhānataḥ
sadasanna viruddhatvādato 'nirvācyameva tat".

of the verbal root “as” (to be), is dependent upon other factors also, as for instance, the agent of action. Therefore, there is no truth in the *Advaitic* assertion that the existence of objects is unitary and independent.¹⁰³³

The author then proceeds to examine the conception of the Monism of Consciousness (*Cidadvaita*), that there is only one Consciousness and that the plurality of consciousness is only illusory. This view is untenable, he says, because we experience the plurality of cognitions in our everyday life. These cognitions differ according to the objects, the agents and the means of knowledge. Even when the *Advaitins* say that *Samvit* (Consciousness) is devoid of all attributes, they, in other words, are only positing the quality of ‘attributelessness’ (*nirviśeṣatva*) with *Samvit*. That is why they have to accept that cognitions are varied and distinct from, but not identical with the external objects. It is to be noted here is that Yāmuna has already refuted the view which equates the cogniser (*jñātr*) and the cognised (*jñeya*) with cognition (*jñāna*) itself.¹⁰³⁴

The *Advaitins* might argue that since knowledge and its object are presented together in a cognition, the latter cannot be distinguished from the former. Since the cogniser and the cognised which are not self-luminous are represented invariably together with self-luminous Consciousness (*saṃvit-sahopalambha*), they cannot be distinguished from *Samvit*. So, the world of plurality of the knowers and the known is only the result of *Vivarta*—Transfiguration of *Samvit*, contend the *Advaitins*.¹⁰³⁵

It may be noted that the idealistic Yogācāra Buddhists who also adopt the *sahopalambha* argument, try to explain the external forms of objects such as a blue pot, yellow cloth, etc., as mere creations of *vāsanā* (latent impressions) and that they are thus illusory. The *Advaitins* say that the distinctions are all created in Consciousness through ignorance (*avidyā*). Refuting

1033. *SS.* pp. 328-29.

1034. *Ibid* : pp. 329-330.

1035. *Ibid.* p. 330-31.

these views, Yāmuna says that they are opposed to our practical experience. Ocular perception vouchsafes the mutual distinctions of cognisers, cognitions and the objects cognised, and this point cannot be disproved through Inference. Thus, for instance, when we perceive an object, there arises the clear judgement in the form, ‘I know this’ (*ahamidam saṃvedmi*); and this judgement involves the triple entity—the cognition, the cogniser and the cognised, each clearly marked off from the other. Therefore, Inference which tries to prove something directly opposed to Perception cannot be accepted as valid.

Further, the *Advaitins* cannot achieve their end through *sahopalambha* reasoning. The reason, “being presented together” (*sahopalambha*), implies the acceptance of two entities (for, the term ‘saha’ means ‘along with’). This co-presentation can take place only in the case of two different entities. Even the *Advaitins* have to accept this because they cannot say Consciousness is presented along with Consciousness itself. So, the entity that is presented along with *Samvit* should necessarily be distinct from it.¹⁰³⁶

It may, however, be urged that in the state of deep sleep knowledge exists in its mere unqualified form without the association of any entity and that the objects do not have this characteristic, viz., independent manifestation so much so that knowledge alone becomes real and eternal and that the objects cognised in external experience are merely illusory. But this explanation disproves the assertion of the *Advaitins* themselves, says the author. They say that mere *Samvit* shines forth in deep sleep, without any presentation of the object-content. If we apply the *sahopalambha*-argument here, it would mean that just as *Samvit* can exist without any object, so also, the object can exist even without *Samvit*, which only establishes the independent character of objects. If this is not admitted, the *Advaitins* cannot

1036. *Ibid.* pp. 331-32 :

“maivam smārthān paribhavaḥ pratyakṣeṇa baliyasā
saṃrakṣyamānābhedāste nānumānānuvartinaḥ”;
“pratyakṣapratipakṣam ca nānumānam pravartate”;
“kiñca hetur viruddho’yam saha bhāvo dvayoryataḥ
tavāpi na hi saṃvittissvātmanā saha bhāsate”.

employ the *sahopalambha*-argument, so much so that the reason *sahopalambhatva* (being presented together), would become *asiddha* (unestablished).

The *sahopalambha*-argument is also vitiated by the fallacy of *vyabhicāra* in the instance of individual cognitions of different objects like a pot and a cloth. If the *sahopalambha*-rule were applied here, it would mean that a pot can also be cognised by the cognition which apprehends a piece of cloth and so on, which is absurd. If, however, the Advaitins do not admit the validity of the *sahopalambha*-reasoning, this only strengthens the standpoint of the *Siddhāntin*, since the entire range of cognisable objects, along with their internal features of universal (*sāmānya*) and particular (*viśeṣa*) stands clearly distinguished from Consciousness.

Form this point onwards, the text of the *Samvitsiddhi* breaks off, which incidentally marks the end of the work itself.

* * *

MISSING PASSAGES OF THE SAMVITSIDDHI—A STUDY

We have already pointed out in the beginning¹⁰³⁷ that some of the passages missing from the available text of the *Samvitsiddhi* are quoted by Sudarśanasūri in his commentary on Rāmānuja's *Śrībhāṣya*. The passages quoted by Vedāntadeśika in some of his works are identical with those quoted by Sudarśana.

The passages quoted by Sudarśanasūri are :

- I. “*yadyaparakāśamānā dhīḥ kadācidavatiṣṭhate*
.....
ghaṭādāviva tatrāpi kalpanīyaṁ prakāśakam”¹⁰³⁸

1037. See p. 140 above.

1038. See *Śrībhāṣya* with *Śrutaparakāśikā* (Vidyātarāṅgiṇī Press, Mysore) Vol. I : p. 85. Sudarśana introduces these lines with the remark: “*yathā samvitsiddhau—‘yadyaparakāśamānā dhīḥ kadācidavatiṣṭhate’ ityārabhya ‘ghaṭādāviva tatrāpi kalpanīyaṁ iti’*”, by which we can infer that some portion is missing between these two lines.

From the context, it appears that these lines put forth the Advaitic argument regarding the self-luminous character of *Samvit*. *Samvit*, the Advaitins say, should be admitted as self-luminous because, when it exists, it would manifest its own self also, unlike a pot, etc. If *Samvit* is said to simply exist, without manifesting itself, then, as in the case of a pot and the like, it becomes necessary to posit some other entity which would manifest this *Samvit*. The point here is that there would be the defect of *anavasthā* if another factor manifesting *Samvit* is admitted. Since *Samvit* does not stand in need of any other thing other than itself for its manifestation, it has to be admitted as self-luminous, say the Advaitins.

II. The next passage quoted is :

“*ghaṭo 'yamiti vijñāne ghaṭamātram prakāśate*
na vittiriti yuṣmākaṁ goṣṭhīṣu nanu ghuṣyate”¹⁰³⁹

This, occurring in the same context as the above, puts forth the Advaitins' criticism of the Bhāṭṭa-view that in all objective cognitions, the objects alone are presented first and that there would be no question of the manifestation of *Samvit* at that time. It is only later, as in the reflective judgement, ‘I know this pot’, that the cognition (*samvit*) becomes manifest. This view of the *Bhāṭṭas* is referred to in the above couplet.

III. Another passage, of the same context, is :

“*atīte 'nāgate cārthe katham prakāṣyasambhavaḥ*
na hi dharminyasatyeva dharmāḥ sambhavamrccati”¹⁰⁴⁰

The *Bhāṭṭas* try to infer the existence of knowledge in a man regarding the object he sees, through the adventitious property called ‘*prakāṣya*’ (manifestedness) pertaining to the object. The verse quoted above controverts this view of the *Bhāṭṭas*, from the Advaitic standpoint. Since *prakāṣya* is admitted by the *Bhāṭṭas* as a property of objects, it is difficult for them to explain as to how this *prakāṣya* could pertain to objects of the

1039. *Ibid.*

1040. See *Śrībhāṣya* with *Śrutaparakāśikā* : Vol. I : p. 87.

past and future, which do not exist at the present moment. It is clear that mere attributes cannot exist without a substratum. But we are able to render objects of past and future fit for cognition through remembrance and imaginative thinking, and hence the untenability of the *Bhāṭṭa*-theory of 'prākāṭya'.

IV. Another verse quoted by Sudarśana is :

*"tadevāpaśyatām sarvaśūnyatvāt bibhyatām satām
gatissvayaṁprakāśatvādṛte nānyopalabhayate"*¹⁰⁴¹

This verse again puts forth the Advaitic criticism of the *Bhāṭṭa*-view regarding *Sāṁvit*. In the previous quotation, it has been pointed out that 'prākāṭya' cannot be made the property of objects. Therefore, knowledge cannot be inferred through the property 'manifestedness' (*prākāṭya*), and no other knowledge can also be assumed to manifest the first cognition arising out of the sense-object contact. Therefore, admission of self-luminous character with regard to Consciousness (*sāṁvit*) becomes a necessity. If this is not admitted, *Sāṁvit* would become non-existent and all that depends upon it would also turn out to be non-existent.

1041. *Ibid* : p. 89.

CHAPTER V

YĀMUNA'S PHILOSOPHY

Having given in the foregoing sections a detailed analysis and account of the treatment of important concepts of philosophy from different works of Yāmunācārya, we shall now bring together and present, in a codified and succinct manner, Yāmunā's concepts of (a) the individual self (*jīva*), (b) the Supreme Self (*Īśvara*), (c) the relation between God and the world of spirit and matter, (d) *mokṣa* and the role of Lakṣmī (e) *bhakti* and *prapatti* (*śaraṇāgati*)—the means of *mukti* and (f) the characteristics of the state of *mukti*.

(a) *Individual Self (Jīva)* :

The individual self, according to Yāmunā, is quite distinct from the physical body, the senses, the mind, the vital breath and the intellect. It is self-luminous, eternal, subtle and distinct in each body ; that is, there are as many individual selves as there are bodies. The soul is essentially blissful.¹⁰⁴² It is these characteristics that Yāmunā establishes with regard to the self in his *Ātmasiddhi*.

While establishing the above, Yāmunā refutes the purely materialistic position taken by the Cārvākas, the idealistic position of the *Vijñānavādin* Buddhists, the *Advaitic* view of the *ātman* being one and of the nature of consciousness, and lastly the *Nyāya* conception of individual selves, which is not far removed from that of Yāmunā himself. The essential tenet of Yāmunā is that *jñāna* is an integral and inseparable attribute of the *jīva*; that is, he is opposed to the *Advaitic* conception of the *ātman* as of the form of pure knowledge. The *ātman* is self-luminous and not dependent upon any other factor or condition, as contended by the *Mīmāṃsakas*. According to the *Bhāṭṭas* and the *Prābhākaras*, *ātman* is not self-manifest. It depends upon *jñāna* either as its substratum or as something inferred therefrom, and as such, cannot be self-luminous. These views are

1042. *ĀS.* p. 17 :

dehendriyamaṇapraṇādhībhyo 'nyo' nanyasādhanaḥ
nityo vyāpī pratikṣetramātmā bhinnassvatassukhī"

also refuted by Yāmuna at great length. Another important thing, according to Yāmuna, as according to Rāmānuja, is that the individual self is *anu* or atomic in size. Although the text relating to this topic is not available, this is to be taken as his view, from this statement that the *ātman* is "*vyāpī*",¹⁰⁴³ which, according to Rāmānuja, means "*anu*".¹⁰⁴⁴ The word "*vyāpī*", indicates that the *jīva* feels pleasure and pain in any part of the body though his Attributive Consciousness (*dharmabhūtajñāna*) which pervades the entire body.

Yāmuna has also, in the course of his arguments, refuted the *Advaita* and the *Prābhākara* views that the entity '*aham*' (I) does not constitute the self. He has proved that the *ātman* is identical with the entity called '*aham*' (I) and that it continues to exist even in states of deep sleep and *mokṣa*. He has also stressed that *mokṣa* ceases to become a human end (*puruṣārtha*) if it is devoid of the idea of 'I' (*aham*) pertaining to the self. The word "*aham*" means self-awareness which is experienced by all living beings. It does not in this context, either mean "pride" or "*ahankāra*", a product of *prakṛti*.

According to Yāmuna, the means of establishing the *jīva* as distinct from the body, senses, etc., is two-fold : *śruti* and *śrutyarthāpatti*, i.e., presumption arising from the incompatibility of Vedic texts.¹⁰⁴⁵ In this connection, he has also controverted the position taken by the *Sāṅkhyas* and the *Naiyāyikas* who try to prove the existence of the self through Inference (*anumāna*). The *Sāṅkhyas* infer the *ātman* on the ground that it is the entity subserved by other collocations (*saṅghāta*), that it is the reverse of the trinity of '*guṇas*' etc., whereas the *Naiyāyikas* infer it on the ground of its being the substrate of qualities like *icchā* and *jñāna*. These inferences, says Yāmuna, may infer *some* seat for the *guṇas*, or *some* entity that is subserved by collocations and so on, but they fail to show specifically that that particular entity is the *ātman* itself.

1043. See the above verse, second line.

1044. See *Śrībhāṣya* under I. i. 1 : Vol. I : p. 154.

1045. Cf. *ĀS.* pp. 139-40 :

"kālaṅtarabhāvisvargādisādhanaavidhayaścākṣipanti dehādivyatiriktaṁ nityaṁ cetanamiti śrutitadanupapattipramāṇako 'yaṁ pratyagātmeti".

Yāmuna also points out that means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*) like Inference and *Āgama* are necessary for us to grasp the real nature of the self. The most important among these *pramāṇas*, according to him, is *yogic* perception.

(b) *The Supreme Self (Īśvara)* :

As already pointed out, the *Īśvarasiddhi* of Yāmuna, which purports to deal with the question of a Supreme Creator-God for the universe of matter and spirit, is not completely available. After refuting the *Mīmāṃsaka*'s views that God is not necessary and presenting the *Nyāya*-view of God, the text breaks off somewhat abruptly. It is from Rāmānuja's works and in a general way, from Yāmuna's *Stotraratna* and the *Catuśślokī* which describe the Supreme, we can form an idea of Yāmuna's concept of God.

From the opening verse of the available text of the *Īśvarasiddhi*,¹⁰⁴⁶ it appears that the Supreme Being is the Prime Controller of the universe. From different verses in the *Stotraratna*, we gather that the Lordship of the Supreme Being in unexcelled and natural with Him,¹⁰⁴⁷ that the whole universe is but a fragement of His Being,¹⁰⁴⁸ and that He is possessed of infinite good qualities.¹⁰⁴⁹ That is, as against the *Advaitic* conception of the unqualified *nirguṇa-Brahman*, for Yāmuna, *Brahman* is *saguṇa*. In the stanza, "*na dehaṁ*",¹⁰⁵⁰ we have the concept of the *śeṣatva* of the universe, of which we shall say more later on. Unlike the *Advaitin* who holds the Supreme Being as of the form of knowledge (*jñāna*), Yāmuna regards the Supreme Being as the possessor of knowledge. Among His infinite qualities, that which draws the devotee's devotion, is grace (*dayā*)

1046. Cf. *ĪS.* p.225: "tatra kasyacidekasya vaśe viśvaṁ pravartate"

1047. Cf. *SR.* : śls. 6 and 11a.

1048. Cf. *Ibid.* śl. 12c, d :

"kasyāyutāyutaśataikakalāṁśakāṁśe
viśvaṁ vicitracidacitpravibhāgavṛttaṁ"

1049. Cf. *Ibid.* śl. 18 : "vaśi vadānyo...samastakalyāṇagunāmṛto-
dadhiḥ"

1050. *Ibid.* śl. 57 :

"na dehaṁ...nānyat kimapi tava śeṣatvavibhavāt
bahirbhūtaṁ nātha! kṣaṇamapi sahe"

which blesses him with salvation. From Rāmānuja's works¹⁰⁵¹ which are based on Yāmuna's, we can add that as Creator, God for Yāmuna is both *upādāna* (the material cause) and *nimitta* (the efficient cause) of the universe and not merely *nimitta*, as for the *Naiyāyikas*.

The *pramāṇa* that establishes the Supreme Being, according to Yāmuna, would seem to be *āgama*—scriptural statements, as in the case of the individual selves. Yāmuna, who had refuted Inference (*anumāna*) as a means of establishing the existence of the *jīva*, would not have accepted its instrumentality in establishing the Supreme.¹⁰⁵²

According to Yāmuna, there are three realities in this world: *cit*, *acit* and *Īśvara*.¹⁰⁵³ The world of spirit and matter is only an aspect of the Supreme Being, *Īśvara*. The very opening verse of the *Ātmasiddhi* points out that the entire world of men and matter runs its course under the will of the Divine Couple, “Śrīmān” (Lakṣmī-Nārāyaṇa).¹⁰⁵⁴

The Godhead, according to our author, constitutes the Supreme Being Nārāyaṇa in association with His Consort, Lakṣmī. The concept of God in His motherly aspect of love and affection for the creation, gave rise to the concept of Lakṣmī and, according to Yāmuna, Lakṣmī, by virtue of her close association with the Lord, can mediate between man and the Lord. We have also, in the section on the *Śrīstuti* (*Catuśśloki*) of our author, described the origin and growth of this concept of God and His Consort,¹⁰⁵⁵ which might be said to have attained its consummation in the *Viśiṣṭādvaita*, in the Divine, All-powerful and Merciful Couple of Śrīmannārāyaṇa. The author has also stressed the philosophical necessity of such a concept by saying that one who seeks liberation should resort to Śrī and Viṣṇu, one after the other, whole-heartedly.¹⁰⁵⁶

1051. Vide *Vedārthasaṅgraha* : p. 31 : “...upādānakāraṇatvaṁ pratipādyā nimittakāraṇamāpi tadeveti pratipādayanti...”

1052. Cf. *ĀS.* p. 139 : “...ānumānikīmapyātmasiddhimasā radda-dhānāḥ śrautimeva tāṁ śrotiryaśsaṅgirante”.

1053. Cf. *SR.* śl. 4 : “tattvena yaścidacidiśvara...” etc. Cf. also *ĀP.* p. 87 : “svayogamahimapatrayakṣatattvatrayaḥ”

1054. *ĀS.* p. 1 : “prakṛtipuruṣakāla...śrīmati priyamāṇe” etc.

1055. See pp. 18-30 above.

1056. See śls. 2 and 3 of the *CS.* and also pp. 42-44 above.

(c) *The relation between God and the world of spirit and matter :*

It appears from the introductory part of the *Ātmasiddhi* that the author originally dealt with the relation that exists between the Supreme Being and the world of sentient and insentient entities.¹⁰⁵⁷ But the gap in the text does not allow us to know what Yāmuna actually said on this point.

The *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* passages quoted by Yāmuna towards the end of the extant text of the *Ātmasiddhi*¹⁰⁵⁸ present a clear picture of the relation between God and the world of spirit and matter : “*yasya prthivī śarīraṁ ; yasyāpaḥ śarīraṁ ; yasyātmā śarīraṁ*”.¹⁰⁵⁹ The relation subsisting between the world of spirit and matter, and the Supreme Being is that which subsists between the body and its soul—*śarīra-ātma-bhāva* or *śarīra-śarīri-bhāva*. God is the inner self (*antaryāmin*) of the individual selves as well as the material world. Yāmuna, introducing the above *Upaniṣadic* texts, says “*antaryāmibrahmaṇe*”,¹⁰⁶⁰ and thus it is clear that our statement is quite in accordance with Yāmuna's concept of the relation between God and man. The point to be noted here is that the individual self has the Supreme Being as its inward self directly, whereas the *prakṛti* has Him as inward self, indirectly, that is, through the medium of the *jīva*. The passage “*yasyātmā śarīraṁ*” is of special significance for us because it not only points out the difference between the Lord and the *jīva* but also strengthens our statement about *śarīra-śarīri* relation. This is found in the *Mādhyandina*-recension of the *Upaniṣad*, says Rāmānuja in his *Śrībhāṣya*. (I.2.19).

Some of the passages of the *Saṁvitsiddhi* also corroborate the above concept :

Cf. *Saṁvitsiddhi* : pp. 275-76 :

“*pādo 'sya viśvā bhūtāni tripādasyāmṛtaṁ divi*
.....
ityādikāssamastasya taditthambhāvatāparāḥ”

1057. Cf. pp. 12-13 : “tathā ātmaparamātmanossambandhe'pi”, etc.

1058. Cf. pp. 214-15 : “ata eva hyantaryāmibrahmaṇe” etc.

1059. *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* : V-7.

1060. See note 1058.

The entire universe (*samasta*) of sentient and insentient entities is only a mode (*itthāmbhāva*) or *prakāra* of the Supreme; that is to say, the relation between the world and God is what is called *prakāra-prakāri-bhāva*, which in later terminology, can to be characterised as *śarīra-śārī-bhāva*.

Cf. another passage from the *Samvitsiddhi*: pp. 277-78 : "ananyat kārāṇāt kāryaṁ pāvakāt visphuliṅgavat".

This passage points out that the Supreme Being is the root-cause of the entire world-manifestation and that the world has emerged out of Him like sparks from fire, which means that it is His own aspect. The concept involving the simile, "pāvakāt visphuliṅgavat", indeed, goes back to the *Āthrvanika-śruti* : "tadetat satyaṁ yathā sudīptāt pāvakāt visphuliṅgāḥ sahasraśaḥ prabhavante sarūpāḥ, tathā akṣarāt vividhāssomya bhāvāḥ prajāyante".¹⁰⁶¹

Cf. another passage from the *Samvitsiddhi* : p. 279 : "brahmātmanā atmalābho'yaṁ prapañcaḥ cidacinmayah".

This passage speaks out that the world of *cit* and *acit* attains its full status only by having the *Brahman* as its inward self and thus the relation of the *śarīra-śārīn* becomes more clear. This relation is further called "tādātmya".

Cf. *Samvitsiddhi*, p. 293 : "asakṛt tattvamityāha tādātmyaṁ" etc. This *tādātmya* or identity should be understood not as essential identity, but as identity in terms of the *śarīra-śārīri*-relation, as has been explained above. The *Chāndogya* makes it clear that the *Brahman* Himself is the inner Self of everything: "aitadātmyamidam sarvaṁ.... tattvamasi śvetaketo" [VI. viii. 6.]

A study of the *Catuseśloki* and *Stotraratna* would reveal that the individual soul is naturally and eternally subordinate to the Supreme and that the relation between them can be interpreted in many ways—as that which exists between a servant and his master (*bhṛtya-svāmi-bhāva*),¹⁰⁶² the owner and the owned (*sva-svāmi-bhāva*),¹⁰⁶³ the mother and her child (*mātr-*

1061. *Muṇḍaka* : II. i. 1.

1062. Cf. SR. śl 60 : "pitā tvaṁ...tvadbhṛtyaḥ" etc.

1063. Cf. *Ibid.* śl. 53 : "mama nātha yadasti....niyatasvamiti" etc.

śīśu)¹⁰⁶⁴ or even the father and his son (*pitṛ-putra*)¹⁰⁶⁵ and so on. In the opening verse of the *Catuseśloki*, *Śrī* is said to have *Brahmā* and other orders of divinity, along with their consorts, as her subordinates.¹⁰⁶⁶ So, these beings would also stand in the same relation to Viṣṇu.

Dr. S.N. Dasgupta, in his *History of Indian Philosophy*,¹⁰⁶⁷ says : "Yāmuna thus gives us hardly any new ideas about *Īśvara* and His relation to the souls and the world." We do not know in what sense Dr. Dasgupta uses the words, "new ideas". The relation between man and God, we have shown above, can be interpreted as *prakāra-prakāri-bhāva*, *śarīra-śārīri-bhāva*, *śeṣa-śeṣi-bhāva*, etc. and it is the *śarīra-śārīri-bhāva* that became one of the cardinal tenets of Rāmānuja's philosophy. It is because of the "newness" of Yāmuna's ideas that a new school was built up by Rāmānuja.

Another charge levelled by Dasgupta is that "Yāmuna does not make inquiry into the nature of the reality of the world-appearance as not false". Such criticisms are beside the point, for, as we have often pointed out, we do not have the full text of any of the three *siddhis* comprising the *Siddhitraya* of Yāmuna. We have also shown in the previous chapter that certain portions of the *Samvitsiddhi* refute the Advaita-concept of *anirvacanīyatva* regarding the world. Moreover, Yāmuna, who makes it a point to criticise the *Advaita*, would not have left this basic point. Dasgupta again observes : "Yāmuna is also silent about the methods which a person should adopt for procuring salvation and the nature and characteristics of that state". The answer is the same as to the previous criticism. But it would be clear for any one who has gone through the *Stotraratna* and the *Gītārathasaṅgraha*, that Yāmuna explicitly states the means of achieving salvation and the nature of that state, both of which we have explained earlier in detail.

1064. Cf. *Ibid.* śl. 26 : "nirāsakasyāpi....śīśuḥ...na jātu mātuścaraṇau" etc.

1065. Cf. *Ibid.* śl. 60 : "pitā tvaṁ" etc.

1066. Cf. : "kāntaste puruṣottamaḥ" etc., where the phrase "tvaddāsādāsigaṇaḥ" occurs.

1067. Vol. III. p. 155.

(d) *Mokṣa and the role of Lakṣmī :*

According to Yāmuna, the state of release is characterised by the individual self being free from the body, his realisation that he is part and parcel of the body of the Godhead, his enjoyment of bliss in that condition and so on. This bliss, being unlimited and unconditioned, is of the very nature of the Lord's bliss.

Yāmuna also suggests that *mokṣa* for the self is of the form of *sāyujya* with the Lord in the capacity of His eternal and unconditional servant.¹⁰⁶⁸ This '*sāyujya*' is considered superior to other grades of *mokṣa*, viz., *sālokyā*, *sāmīpya* and *sārūpya*.¹⁰⁶⁹

As we have observed earlier in a separate section,¹⁰⁷⁰ the role of Lakṣmī in effecting *mokṣa* for the *jīva* is equally important as that of the Lord Himself. Lakṣmī, the Consort of Viṣṇu, happens to be the Mother and Mistress of the universe and the relation of the *jīva* to the Divine Couple of Lakṣmī-Nārāyaṇa is that of a servant to his master or that of a child to its parents. Lakṣmī is also conceived of as the mediator between man and the Lord. Lakṣmī, the personification of the mercy of the Supreme, is necessary for the release of the *jīva* and *prapatti* or *śaraṇāgati* to her, as to the Supreme, is ordained as the way for *mokṣa*.

(e) *Bhakti and Prapatti—the means of mukti :*

The means of release, according to Yāmuna, consists of either *bhakti* or *prapatti*. *Bhakti*, according to him, results from

1068. Cf. SR. śl. 63 :

"raghuvara yadabhūstvam tādṛśo vāyasasya

.....
pratipadamaparāddhurmugdha sāyujyado'bhūḥ"

1069. Cf. the following quoted by Vedāntadeśika in his *Nyāyasiddhāṇjana* : Pāriccheda II:p.221 (*Vedāntadeśikagranthamālā Series*) :

"lokeṣu viṣṇor nivasanti kecit samīpyamṛcchanti ca kecidanye
anye tu rūpaṁ sadṛśaṁ bhajante, sāyujyamanye sa tu mokṣa uktah".

1070. See p. 39 ff. above

the twin *yoga* of *karma* and *jñāna*.¹⁰⁷¹ *Karma* leads to *jñāna* and this results in *vairāgya*. It is from *vairāgya* that *Bhakti* is produced. The supreme state of devotion called *parabhakti* is the result of the Lord's grace alone.¹⁰⁷²

The germs of *bhakti* and *prapatti* are found in *Upaniṣads* and the *Pāñcarātrāgamas*. *Bhakti* is referred to as *vedana*, *upāsana*, etc., in the *Upaniṣadic* terminology. The *Śvetāśvatara* has a specific statement on *prapatti* or Surrender to the Supreme: "*mumukṣurvai śaraṇamaham prapadye*".¹⁰⁷³ The *Śrīsūkta* of the *Rgveda Khila* emphasises the importance of surrendering to Śrī: "*tām padmanemīm śaraṇamaham prapadye*";¹⁰⁷⁴ and we have a similar statement in the *Durgāsūkta*, also of the *Rgveda Khila*, "*durgām devīm śaraṇamaham prapadye*".¹⁰⁷⁵ *Prapatti* or *śaraṇāgati* is dealt with in the *Ahīrbudhnya Saṁhitā*,¹⁰⁷⁶ the *Bhāradvāja Saṁhitā*,¹⁰⁷⁷ the *Lakṣmī Tantra*¹⁰⁷⁸ and other texts of the Pāñcarātra literature.

As already pointed out, *bhakti* and *prapatti* are the two means of attaining the Highest, among which *prapatti* is considered superior to and easier than *bhakti*.¹⁰⁷⁹ *Bhakti* consists of loving devotion to the Lord, accompanied by other acts like meditation, service, purity of thought, word and deed, and so on. But *prapatti* does not have any such difficult subsidiary acts. Though easier to practise in this regard, *prapatti* is, at the same

1071. Vide GS. śl. 1a : "svadharmajñānavairāgyasādhyabhaktye-kagocarāḥ" etc.

1072. *Ibid.* śl. 26 : "nirastanikhilājñāno...pratilabhya parām bhaktim" etc.

1073. VI. 18.

1074. *Rk.* 5.

1075. *Rgveda*. X-127-12 : "tāmagnivarnām..." etc.

1076. Vol. II. ch. 37 and also ch. 54.

1077. Chs. 1-4.

1078. Ch. 17.

1079. Lokācārya, Varavaramuni and other followers of the Southern School do not regard *Prapatti* as a means. The Lord is the only means in their view. The Lord's uncaused grace brings about *prapatti* which thus precedes the attainment of *mokṣa*. In these circumstances *prapatti* is an *adhikāri-viśeṣaṇa*, a characteristic attribute of the attainer of *mokṣa*.

time, considered to be the most difficult path for the reason that lack of whole-hearted conviction (*mahāviśvāsa*), etc., which is one of the accessories to *prapatti*, would render *prapatti* impossible.¹⁰⁸⁰

Prapatti is to be practised to the exclusion of the triple path of *karma*, *jñāna* and *bhakti*.¹⁰⁸¹ Another point is that *prapatti* to the Lord is to be preceded by that to Śrī, if the former is to become fruitful and these two *prapattis* are mutually complementary.

(f) *The characteristics of the state of 'mukti' :*

According to Yāmuna, *mokṣa* for the individual self is not only cessation of all worldly miseries, but enjoyment of unending bliss in the servitude of the Lord and His Consort.¹⁰⁸² The opening verse of the *Ātmasiddhi* implies that the *summum bonum* of human life is *paricaraṇa* or servitude to the Supreme Being. The *Catuśśloki* (v.3) indicates that "*akṣara*" (*kaivalya*) also can be obtained through the grace of Śrī. The *Stotraratna* (vv. 46, 57) also clearly states that what one should aspire for in the state of liberation is eternal subordination and service to the Lord (cf. *aikāntika-nityakīṅkaraḥ, śeṣatvavibhava* etc.). The released soul, along with the ever-released ones (*nitya-sūris*), is said to attend upon the Supreme Being in the Highest Abode (*paramapada* or *vaikuṇṭha*). Another point to be noted is that the self, even in *mokṣa*, possesses the notion of "*aham*" (I) and does not lose it, as held by a section of the *Advaitins* and the *Mīmāṃsakas*.¹⁰⁸³

1080. See p. 40 above.

1081. Cf. *SR*. śl. 22 : "na dharmaniṣṭho'smi na cātmavedī na bhaktimān" etc.

1082. Cf. *SS*. p. 293 : "brahmānandahradāntassthō muktātmā sukhamedhate".

Cf. *SR* : śls. 37, ff.

1083. See *ĀS*. p. 104 : 'anyacca yaḥ sāmsārikaduḥkhaiḥ...' etc. and p. 106 : "sa ca muktāvapyātmāne ahamityeva prakāśate" etc.

CHAPTER VI

YĀMUNA'S INFLUENCE ON RĀMĀNUJA

We have earlier noticed that all the works of Rāmānuja reveal the great influence of Yāmuna and his works.¹⁰⁸⁴ A close comparison of the *Śrībhāṣya* with *Siddhitraya* reveals that the latter forms the source-book of the former. The refutation of the *Samvādvaita* (the Monism of Consciousness) and *Sadadvaita* (the Monism of Existence) theories of the *Advaitins* is made by Rāmānuja almost in the words of Yāmuna. The demonstration that self is the entity called "*aham*" (I), the knower, is also done by Rāmānuja on the model of Yāmuna's *Ātmasiddhi*. Not only are some of the passages of the *Ātmasiddhi* like "*sāntāṅgāra*"¹⁰⁸⁵ and "*vyāṅgyavyaṅkṛtvam*"¹⁰⁸⁶ quoted by Rāmānuja in his *Śrībhāṣya*, but several others are paraphrased with slight modifications. The opening verse of the *Śrībhāṣya* runs almost like the opening stanza of the *Ātmasiddhi*.¹⁰⁸⁷ The *śāstrayonitva*-section of the *Śrībhāṣya* follows almost *verbatim* the *Īśvarasiddhi*, and as we have already pointed out, the *siddhānta*-view given by Rāmānuja regarding the means of establishing God in his *Śrībhāṣya*, might indicate or detail what Yāmuna himself might have said on the question.

1084. See p. 3 above.

1085. *Śrībhāṣya* under I. i. i. p. 143 (vol. 1) quotes this from *ĀS*: p. 94.

1086. *Ibid*. The verse quoted is from *ĀS* : p. 95.

1087. Cf. *Śrībhāṣya* : the opening stanza :
"akṣilabhavanajanmasthemabhaṅgādīlile
vinatavividhabhūtavrātarakṣaikaadikṣe
śrutiśirasi vidīpte brahmaṇi śrīnivāse
bhavatu mama parasmin śemuṣi bhaktirūpā".

Cf. *ĀS*. opening verse :

"prakṛtipuruṣakālavayaktamuktā yadicchān
anuvidadhati nityaṁ nityasiddhairanekaiḥ
svaparicaraṇabhogaiśśrīmati prīyamāṇe
bhavatu mama parasmin pūruṣe bhaktibhūmā".

Some passages of the *Samvitsiddhi* are also used by Rāmānuja so as to refute the *Advaitic* doctrines of *māyā*, *mukti*, the unreality of the world, etc. The fact that the world of spirit and matter is a mode or *prakāra* of the *Brahman*, stated by Yāmuna in his *Samvitsiddhi*, is clearly analysed and adopted by Rāmānuja. The refutation of the explanation offered by the *Advaitins* for the text, "*tattvamasi*",¹⁰⁸⁸ found in the *Samvitsiddhi*, finds its echo in the *Śrībhāṣya*. That the secondary significance (*lakṣaṇā*) of words is applied only to one of the two terms appearing in a "*sāmānādhikaraṇya*" - statement like "*tattvamasi*", but not to both the terms, and that one and the same entity can be treated as being different as well as non-different, according to delimiting factors like time and place, which are referred to briefly in the *Samvitsiddhi*, are set forth in great detail by Rāmānuja in his works like the *Śrībhāṣya* and the *Vedārthasaṅgraha*.

Another important tenet of Rāmānuja's philosophy, viz., the conception of knowledge as an eternal and invariable attribute (*dharma*) of the individual self (*ātman*), technically called *dharmabhūtajñāna*, finds its basis in the *Ātmasiddhi* of Yāmuna.¹⁰⁸⁹ On the authority of Vedāntadeśika, we know that the portion of the *Vedārthasaṅgraha* of Rāmānuja, dealing with the Supremacy of Viṣṇu over other deities, is based on the *Puruṣanirṇaya* or Yāmuna,¹⁰⁹⁰ which, however, is not available. The opening verse of the *Vaikunṭhagadya*¹⁰⁹¹ makes clear the fact that Rāmānuja followed Yāmuna in forming the concept of *Bhakti*. The passage at the beginning of the *Śaraṇāgatigadya*¹⁰⁹² of Rāmānuja, referring to Śrī, is influenced by Yāmuna's

1088. *Chāndogya* : VI. viii. 6.

1089. See *ĀS* : p. 172, ff.

1090. *Nyāyasiddhāntajana* : ch. III. p. 225 and *Saccaritrarakṣā* . ch. I : p. 46.

1091. Cf :

"yāmunāryasudhāmbhodhimavaḡāhya yathāmatī
ādāya bhaktiyogākhyam ratnam saṁdarsayāmyaham".

1092. Cf. "Om bhagavannārāyaṇābhimatānurūpasvarūparūpaḡa-
vibhavaishvarya", etc. with *CS*.

Catuṣṣlokī regarding the Doctrine of Surrender (*śaraṇāgati*) to Śrī. The explanations offered by Rāmānuja in his *Śrībhāṣya* for the *Pāñcarātra* and *Pāsupata adhikaraṇas* are based on the interpretation of these sections given in the *Āgamaprāmāṇya*.¹⁰⁹³

The relation subsisting between man and God, the *śarīra-śrīri-bhāva* and the *śeṣa-śeṣi-bhāva* traced in Yāmuna's works, gained new impetus and stress at the hands of Rāmānuja. The commentary on the *Bhagavadgītā* by Rāmānuja is chiefly based on the *Gītārthasaṅgraha* of Yāmuna. It has already been mentioned that tradition records Rāmānuja's being attracted to Yāmuna after listening to a particular stanza of the *Stotraratna*.¹⁰⁹⁴

The devotion and regard which Rāmānuja had for this great teacher and his compositions, can well be understood by the following verse ascribed to Rāmānuja himself :

"yatpadāmbhoruhadhyānavidhvastāśeṣakalmaṣaḡ
vastutāmupayāto 'haṁ yāmuneyam namāmi tam"

1093. See *ĀP* : p. 47 f. and 57 ff.

1094. *Vide Prapannāmṛta* : ch. IX, p. 22, where Rāmānuja is said to have been attracted to Yāmuna after listening to verse 11 of his *SR*. starting with "svābhāvikanavadhika" etc.

CHAPTER VII

EVALUATION OF YĀMUNA'S CONTRIBUTION
TO VIŚIṢṬĀDVAITA

In the foregoing chapters, a detailed account of Yāmuna's extant works has been attempted with a view to present a fairly faithful and complete picture of the role he played in developing the school of thought which had its scholastic beginnings in the works of Nāthamuni and its emotional appeal in the songs of the Tamil mystic saints, Ālvārs. Strictly speaking, the expression "Yāmuna's Contribution to Viśiṣṭādvaita" may sound a little queer because the name "Viśiṣṭādvaita" is itself a post-Rāmānuja appellation.¹⁰⁹⁵ Rāmānuja uses the word "Viśiṣṭa-dravyaika".¹⁰⁹⁶ There is also one independent track explaining the significance of the word "Viśiṣṭādvaita".¹⁰⁹⁷ This can be explained as a Sixth Case Compound ("Ṣaṣṭhī Tatpuruṣa Samāsa") in a twofold manner; (a) *Viśiṣṭasya Advaitam*, and (b) *Viśiṣṭayor Advaitam*. The first expression can be interpreted as the non-duality (*advaitam*) of One who is Qualified (*viśiṣṭasya*). Lord Viṣṇu is the One Who has a "viśeṣa" (characteristic feature) viz., that the world of sentient and insentient entities (*Cit* and *Acit*) forms His body. The word body is again metaphorical. Whatever is supported, controlled and made use of invariably by a conscious being is the body in relation to that particular being.

1095. Sudarśanasūri seems to be the first one to use this term in his *Śrutaprakāśikā* on the *Śrībhāṣya* and in the *Tātparyadīpikā* on the *Vedārthasaṅgraha*. See Dr. V. Varadachari, "Antiquity of the term *Viśiṣṭādvaita*", *Viśiṣṭādvaita Philosophy and Religion*, Ramanuja Research Society, Madras, 1974 (p.iii).

The *Rāmānuja Aṣṭottaraśatanāma Stotra* attributed to Vaḍuganambi (Āndhra Pūrṇa) uses the expression "*viśiṣṭādvaita-pāraḡaḥ*" (v.17). If he is same as the personal attendant of Śrī Rāmānuja in charge of the "*kṣīrakaiṅkarya*" to his master, then this Vaḍuganambi would be the earliest one to use the word.

1096. *Śrībhāṣya*, Vol.I (Andhra Press, Madras, 1909), p. 184 : "*Viśiṣṭa-dravyaika yameva hi sāmānādhikaraṇasyārthaḥ*".

1097. See "*Viśiṣṭādvaitaśabdārthavicāra*", an unpublished palm-leaf ms. in Grantha characters, deposited in the Adyar Library and Research Centre, Madras, under Acc. No. 69722.

According to the second dissolution of the Compound, there is oneness of the Lord who exists in two different stages or states: the causal state (*kāraṇāvasthā*) and the effect-state (*kāryāvasthā*). In the causal state God has the subtle (*sūkṣma*) *Cit* and *Acit* as His body, whereas in the effect state the selfsame God has the gross (*sthūla*) *Cit* and *Acit* as His body.

This school, which, from the viewpoint of Religion is called "Śrīvaisṇavism", received its emotional force from the inspired utterances of the Drāviḍa Saints, Ālvārs, who flourished in the Tamil country sometime between the 5th Cent. and the 7th Cent. A.D. As noted in the opening chapter Nāthamuni collected the songs of the Ālvārs, set them to music and introduced their singing in the temple liturgies under the Śrīvaisṇava governance. His grandson Yāmuna inherited the twin tradition of the Sanskrit and the Tamil Vedāntas as a composite religio-literary culture which is now popularly known as the *Ubhayavedānta* tradition.¹⁰⁹⁸

Although Yāmuna did not write any works in Tamil explaining or expounding the *Divyaprabandha*, still he left quite an impression on the commentarial tradition through his own "Nirvāhas" (interpretations) for a few verses (*Pāśurams*) of the *Tiruvāymozhi* of Nammālvār which are recorded in the commentaries on the *Divyaprabandha*.¹⁰⁹⁹ In fact we have such Nirvāhas offered by Rāmānuja also for some songs of the illustrious Ālvārs, which are popular in tradition as "Emberumānār Nirvāhas". We shall now briefly allude to a few important Nirvāhas of Yāmuna (called "Ālvāndār Nirvāhas") before we sum up his contribution to Viśiṣṭādvaita. In all probability, these Nirvāhas were given by Yāmuna during his discourses on the *Tiruvāymozhi* by way of clearing the doubts raised by his

1098. The term "Ubhayavedānta" might have gained currency from the times of Rāmānuja. His personal attendant and disciple, Vaḍuga Nambi (Āndhra Pūrṇa) uses the word "*tadubhayanigamānta*" in his *Yatirājavaibhava*, v. 108.

See also Dr. K.K.A. Venkatachari, "Śrī Rāmānuja and Ubhaya Vedānta", *Studies in Rāmānuja*, pp. 167-174.

1099. See *Aitihya Nirvāha Ratnamālai* (in Tamil) by P.B. Annangaracharya Swamin, Kanchi, 1953.

disciples. These interpretations are a source of great delight for, not only one gets an idea of the profundity of the emotional appeal of the stanza concerned, but also of the ingenuity of the interpreting genius.

I. Yāmuna was once explaining the Pāśuram, “Enṇadāvi mēlaiyāy ērkoḷ..” of the *Tiruvāymozhi* (IV.3.8), which when freely translated, means: “O effulgent and all-pervasive Lord! I cannot express your magnanimity in so many words. My self is dependent upon you and Your Self is dependent upon me (We are made for each other; and we cannot survive independent of each other).”

Some among his Goṣṭhī asked Yāmuna: “There is justification in saying that the *jīva*'s self is dependent upon the Lord. But how can the reverse be true?” Yāmuna offered his interpretation thus: “In fact, one has to doubt the statement of the *jīva* that his *svarūpa* is dependent upon the Lord inasmuch as the *karmas* performed by the *jīva* stand in his way as the stumbling block. There being no such thing that prevents the Lord to do as He wills, one need not doubt the truth of the statement that the Lord's *svarūpa* depends upon the *jīva*.”¹¹⁰⁰

II. Yāmuna was once explaining the stanza “Kaṇḍukoṇḍu en kaigaḷāra” of the *Tiruvāymozhi* (IV.7.8) which means: “O Lord wearing beautiful Tulasī garlands! Why don't you come to this world of ours so that we can see you, worship your holy feet with flowers, sing and dance in ecstasy?” It seems Yāmuna, by way of comparison, quoted the words of the hero Mādhava to his beloved Mālatī, from Bhavabhūti's *Mālatīmādhava* (V.27): “tvatpādapaṅkaja-parigraha-dhanyajanmā bhūyāsaṁ.” (“Let me render my birth fortunate by resorting to your lotus-feet”) and remarked: “No doubt the statement (of the hero Mādhava) is beautiful. But (unfortunately) we do not find it addressed to the One who really deserves it (God).”¹¹⁰¹

1100. See *Aitihya Nirvāha Ratnamālai*, p. 23:

“Ivaṇ taṇṇai avanukkākkuvan enṇavanru; karmam tagaiyavum kūḍum; ivaṇ svarūpam avaṇiṭṭa vazhakkākkakkūḍumō enru itilē kānum sandehikkavēṇḍuvadu.”

1101. *Ibid.*, p. 27 :

“Vārttai yazhagiyaḍu; vaguttaviṣayattilēyāgap petriloṁ”

III. Yāmuna was expounding the decad beginning with “Uṇṇum ōru paruḡ nīr tiṇṇum veṭṭilaiyum ellām Kaṇṇan..” of the *Tiruvāymozhi* (VI.7). The context is that the mother of the Nāyakī is firm that the girl has gone to Tirukkōḷūr all alone, asking the people about the road that leads to that place. We have a more or less similar situation described in the verse, “Kaḷvan kol...” of Tirumaṅgaiyālvār's *Periya Tirumozhi* (III.7). The difference between these two, however, is that while in Nammālvār's song, the Nāyakī is going all alone in search of her beloved, in Tirumaṅgaiyālvār's verse the Nāyakī and her beloved are both going out. The disciples of Yāmuna asked him as about whom one should be more concerned: for the lady who left all alone for Tirukkōḷūr, or for the lady who is in the company of her beloved. They felt that the former deserves more concern. But Yāmuna replied: “The condition of Parakāla Nāyakī (i.e., Tirumaṅgaiyālvār, the Bride) is more to be worried about because she is in the company of her beloved, and being mutually amorously involved, they may lose the path and ultimately may not reach their destination at all. In the case of Parāṅkuśa Nāyakī (i.e., Nammālvār, the Bride), however, there being nothing to divert her attention, she would certainly reach her destination. We need not be worried about her.”¹¹⁰²

IV. Explaining the Pāśuram “Pēr eyil sūzh Kaḷal..” of *Tiruvāymozhi* (VII. 3.7) wherein the Nāyakī expresses her desire to go to the Divyadeśa called *Ten Tiruppērai* (Tinneveli District). Yāmuna had occasion to quote the *Rāmāyaṇa* verse: “dīpo netrāturasyeva pratikūlāsi me dṛḍham” (*Yuddha*, 118.17). Here Rāma repudiates Sītā with harsh words: “Certainly your presence before me is as irritating as the flame of a lamp is to one who has an eye-disease.” Commenting on this simile, Yāmuna said: “The whole thing (repudiation of the spotless Sītā) is due to the defect in the eye (of Rāma), but not due to any defect in the flame of the lamp (Sītā's character).”¹¹⁰³

1102. See *Aitihya Nirvāha Ratnamālai*, p.41 :

“Iruvarāyp pōnavarkaḷāgaiyālē iruvarukkum aṇjavēṇum; taṇiyē pōnavāḷukkoru bhayamuṇḍō?”

1103. *Ibid.*, p.47 :

“Nētradoṣattāl vandadupōkki, dipadoṣattāl vandadanru.”

Let us also, in this context, show just two instances of Yāmuna's esteem for the Ālvārs. The following verse of his *Stotraratna* is actually based on a verse from Kulaśekhara Ālvār's *Perumāl Tirumozhi* :

“nirāsakasyāpi na tāvadutsahe
maheśa! hātum tava pāda-pankajam |
ruṣā nirasto 'pi śiśuḥ stanandhayo
na jātu mātuścaraṇau jihāsati || (v. 26)

Cf. “ari sinattāl iṇṇa tāt akarriḍinum
maṇṇavaḷdan aruḷ ninaiṇde azhum kuzhavi
aduve pōl irundēnē.” (V.1)

The following description of Ādiśeṣa as serving the Lord in several capacities — as His abode, couch, seat, sandals, dress, pillow, umbrella etc., found in the *Stotraratna* is almost a translation of a stanza of Poygai Ālvār :

“nivāsa-śayyāsana-pādukāṁśuko-
padhāna-varṣātapavāraṇādibhiḥ |
śarīrabhedais tava śeṣatām gataiḥ
yathocitam śeṣa itīryate janaiḥ || (v. 40)

Cf. “ceṇṇāl kuḍaiyām, irundāl siṅgādanamām
niṇṇāl maravaḍiyām, nilkaḍaluḷ eṇṇum

puṇaiyām, maṇiḷakkām, pūmpattām
pulkum aṇaiyām, tirumārkkaravu.” (*Tiruvandādi* I, song 53).

In the light of this it is clear that the religious fervour of the system which Yāmuna was propounding had its origin in the Tamil Veda while its philosophical soundness was founded in the Sanskrit Veda.

Before concluding this chapter we may note that Yāmuna was popular among the later rhetoricians also. The verses, “tavāmṛtasyandini pādapaṅkaje..” (v.27) and “abhūtapūrvam” (v. 25) of his *Stotraratna* are cited by Appaya Dikṣita (17th cent. A.D.) as instances of the Figures of Speech called Prativastūpamā and Sambhava respectively.

Now let us bring to a finale this chapter, after briefly recapitulating the outstanding contribution of Yāmuna to the Philosophy of the Śrīvaiṣṇavas. According to Rāmānuja, Yāmuna refuted three powerful rival schools, viz., Advaita of Śaṅkara and the Bhedābheda of Bhāskara and Yādavaprakāśa.¹¹⁰⁴

The chief tenet of the Viśiṣṭādvaita, (the “pradhāna-pratitantra-siddhānta”) viz., that the Brahman is One and that He is qualified by the sentient and insentient entities which form His modes,¹¹⁰⁵ from which this system derives its name, hinges upon the concept of “śarīra-śarīri-bhāva” between the world and the Lord, which we have traced out from the works of Yāmuna. This concept finds fuller expression and consummation in Rāmānuja's works. Another chief feature of the system, viz., that the *jīva* possesses knowledge as his inseparable and inborn attribute, technically called *Dharmabhūtajñāna* in later terminology, has its roots in Yāmuna's works. The concept of the self as identical with the entity called “Aham” (i.e., that it always possesses self-awareness), another cardinal tenet of this school, also goes back to Yāmuna. Rāmānuja's Theory of Error also appears to be derived from Yāmuna.

On the religious side, the value of Bhakti and Prapatti was stressed by Rāmānuja in accordance with the tradition handed over to him from Yāmuna. Scriptural sanction for idol-worship in temples, as established by Yāmuna in his *Āgamaprāmāṇya* helped Rāmānuja in his mission of reviving the concepts of Bhakti and Prapatti.

We may therefore conclude that Yāmuna was mainly responsible for providing a sound scholastic foundation for the system of thought later characterised as Viśiṣṭādvaita, and that the task of building it up and promoting it as a regular School came into the masterly hands of Rāmānuja.

1104. Cf. the introductory verse of the *Vedārthasaṅgraha* :
“param brahmaiva ajñam bhramaparigatam saṁsarati tat
paropādhyāliḍham vivaśam aśubhāsyā āspadamiti
śruti-nyāyāpetam jagati vitatam mohanamidam
tamo yenāpāstam sa hi vijayate yāmunamuniḥ”

1105. Cf. *Nyāyasiddhāntajana* I (p. 187) :
“aśeṣa-cid-acit-prakāram brahma ekameva tattvam; tatra prakāra-
prakāriṇoḥ prakārāpām ca mitho 'tyantabhedo 'pi viśiṣṭaikyādi-
vivakṣayā ekatvavyapadeśaḥ” etc.

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APPENDIX I

We furnish below passages of the *Nyāyatattva* of Nāthamuni, quoted or referred to by Vedānta Deśika in some of his works. For a detailed account of these passages with English translation, see Prof. R. Raṅganujachari, "Fragments from *Nyāyatattva*", *Prof. K.V. Rangaswami Ayyangar Commemoration Volume*, pp. 555-578.

1. असिद्धानैकान्तिकविरुद्धा हेत्वाभासाः ।
2. अज्ञातसन्दिग्धविपरीताः तिस्रोऽसिद्धयः ।
3. अप्रमाणमूलत्वं तूभयोरपि नास्ति, व्यभिचाराभावेनानधिगतार्थं प्रमाणमिति विशेषणस्यायुक्तत्वात् । प्रमिते तु प्रमित्यनुपपत्तिः कः दृष्टः ? स्मृतौ चेत्, प्रतिज्ञैव दृष्टः न्तस्स्यात् । ज्ञानान्तरे चेत् नानुजानामि ।
4. चक्षुषा श्रवणं सर्पाणामेवेति नियम्यते ।
5. अन्नस्य अतिसूक्ष्मपरिणाममिन्द्रियम्..... कर्मेन्द्रियाणामप्यन्नपरिणामत्वात् ।

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1. *Nyāyapariśuddhi* : p. 130
 2. *Ibid* : p. 132
 3. *Ibid* : p. 172, as from the 4th 'Adhikaraṇa'.
 4. *Nyāyasiddhāṅjana* : p. 194, as from 'Karaṇapāda, 8th Adhikaraṇa'.
 5. *Ibid* : as for 'Karaṇapāda, 7th Adhikaraṇa'.
 6. *Ibid* : pp. 194 and 199, as from 'Karaṇapāda, 8th Adhikaraṇa'.

6. नखदन्तकेशादिषु स्पर्शानुपलम्भश्च प्राणमान्द्यतारतम्यात् ।
7. हस्तेन गन्धोपलब्धिः गजानामेव ।
8. सर्पाः पादात् कर्मेन्द्रियादृते वक्षसा गच्छन्ति । तेषां गतिशक्तिरुरसि । तस्मादुरगास्ते, पन्नगाश्च ।
9. यथा वा मान्धालादीनामास्येन विण्मूत्रविसर्गः ।
10. संयोगविभागसंख्या कालः ।
11. तस्मादेकाश्रयक्रिया संख्या कालः ।
12. यथा सर्वे प्रत्ययाः कालोपश्लिष्टा एव हि दृश्यन्ते । तदिति देशकालविशिष्टतयैव स्मृतिरपि जायमाना प्रागपि कालानुभवं साधयति ।
13. ननु वायुभूरिणूनां संघातं करोति उच्यते । कर्तृकरणकर्माणीति त्रीणि कारणानि क्रियाविशिष्टानि । तेषामन्यतमाभावे क्रिया न युज्येत ।
14. अत्यन्तवेगितात्यन्तसौक्ष्म्यं निर्भरता तथा ।
स्वसत्ताकालभाव्याप्तिर्ज्ञाने लक्ष्मचतुष्टयम् ।
15. अनुभवादूरत्वं स्मृतिनिमित्तम् ।

7. *Nyāyasiddhāñjana* : p. 195, as from 'Karaṇapāda, 8th Adhikaraṇa'.

8. *Ibid.* p. 196, as from 'Karaṇapāda, 8th Adhikaraṇa'.

9. *Ibid.*

10. *Ibid.* p. 205, as from 'Samyogādhikaraṇa'.

11. *Ibid.* as from 'Pramāṭrpāda'.

12. *Ibid.* as from 'Pramāṭrpāda'.

13. *Ibid.* p. 232 as from 'Pramāṭrpāda' (*Cetanahartṛtvapratipādanaprakaraṇa*).

14. *Ibid.* p. 237, as from 'Prathmādhikaraṇa'.

15. *Nyāyasiddhāñjana* : p. 238. Deśika here refers to the *Ātmasiddhi*, p. 208, where this passage is quoted by Yāmuna, as from the first 'Adhikaraṇa'.

16. अधःपतनस्वभावात्म गुरुत्वम्; तदभावो लघुत्वम् ।
17. त्रिविधं गुरुत्वम् ----- ऊर्ध्वतिर्यग्धोभेदेन । वाय्वग्निजलानि तिर्यग्धूर्वाधोगुरूणि ।
18. विरलसंयोगप्रयुक्तस्पर्शो मृदुः । निर्विरलसंयोगप्रयुक्तस्पर्शः कठिनः ।
19. दुष्करवियोगस्वभावसंयोगस्पर्शत्वं पिच्छिलत्वम् ।
सुकरवियोगस्वभावसंयोगस्पर्शत्वं विश्लिष्टत्वम् ।
20. संयोगकालसामीप्यं हि वेगः ।
21. संयोगान्तर्भूता संख्या । समस्ततदात्मा संख्या ।
22. संख्यानन्तर्भूतं परिमाणम् दूरत्वं दैर्घ्यम्; सामीप्यं ह्रस्वत्वं, तिर्यग्दूरत्वं स्थौल्यम्, तिर्यक्सामीप्यं काश्यम्, स्वांशस्याग्रे स्वांशस्थितिरार्जवम् । स्वांशस्य स्वांशस्थितिर्वक्रता, एकदिक्स्थान्त्यावयवानां विरुद्धदिक्स्थान्त्यावयवदूरत्वसामीप्यसाम्यं वृत्तत्वम्; केवलविरुद्धदिगन्तांशानां दूरत्वसामीप्यसाम्यं चतुरश्रत्वम्. अनेकव्याप्तिर्महत्ता । तदभावो मन्दत्वम् । समस्ततदभावतदात्मा परिमाणम् ।
23. अतिरेकव्यतिरेकभेदेन द्विविधो भेदः ।

16. *Nyāyasiddhāñjana* : p. 256.

17. *Ibid.*

18. *Ibid.* p. 257, 'Prameyapāda, 7th Adhikaraṇa'.

19. *Ibid.* p. 258,

20. *Ibid.* 'Prameyapāda, 7th Adhikaraṇa'.

21. *Ibid.* p. 261, as from 'Prameyapāda, 7th Adhikaraṇa'.

22. *Ibid.* p. 262, as from 'Prameyapāda, 7th Adhikaraṇa'.

23. *Ibid.* p. 263, as from 'Prameyapāda, 7th Adhikaraṇa'.

24. ऐक्यं साकल्येन संयोगः । तदभावो भेदः ।
25. वियोगो न वक्तव्यः ।
26. अत्यन्तसामीप्यं संयोगः । दूरत्वं वियोगः ।
27. यदि गमनपचनादीनां क्षणिकत्वं ज्ञायेत, न हि ते क्षणिकाः, संयोगवियोगविशेषत्वात्तेषाम् ।
28. गमनं नाम देशात् देशान्तरप्राप्तिः ।
29. वयं तु क्रियायाः प्रत्यक्षत्वं ब्रूमः । तस्मात् देशात् देशान्तरप्राप्तिः लिङ्गमिति न मन्यामहे । अपि तु तदेव तदिति मन्यामहे, कल्पनालाघवात् ।
30. परस्य स्वोपदेशन्यायेन निश्चितार्थो व्यवहारो वादः ।
31. स्वपक्षप्रामाण्यप्रतिपक्षाप्रामाण्यनिश्चयार्थो व्यवहारो जल्पः । प्रतिपक्षाप्रामाण्यमात्रनिश्चयार्थो व्यवहारो वितण्डा ।
32. षष्ठी चेयं ख्यातिः यथार्थख्यातिः ।

24. *Ibid.* as from 'Prameyapāda, 7th Adhikaraṇa'.

25. *Ibid.*

26. *Ibid.*

27. *Ibid.* p. 264 1st Adhikaraṇa

28. *Ibid.* as from the 2nd Adhikaraṇa'.

29. *Ibid.* as from the 'Prameyapāda'.

30. *Nyāyapariśuddhi*, p. 109.

31. *Ibid.* p. 110

32. *Tattvamuktākālāpa*, 'Buddhisara', C. on śl. 13.

The following passages may also be compared :

33. यत्तु करणपादपञ्चमाधिकरणे नेत्रश्रोत्रादिशक्तीना-
मालोकशब्दाद्यात्मकत्वमुक्तं, यच्च तथैव ... इन्द्रियाणां भौतिकत्वं प्रतिपादितम् ।
34. दूरस्थग्रहणे तु चाक्षुषमहःप्रसरणात् सम्बन्धसिद्धिः । तच्च
करणपादद्वितीयाधिकरणे प्रपञ्चितम् । प्रतिबिम्बग्रहणे तु स्वच्छद्रव्यप्रतिहतस्य
नयनमहसः प्रतिघोतःप्रसरादिमूलकत्वं भ्रान्त्यधिकरणपूर्वपक्षेऽभिहितम् ।
35. नखदन्तरोमकिणादीनामपि मन्दप्राणाश्रयत्वं न्यायतत्त्वे
करणपादाष्टमाधिकरणे प्रपञ्चितम् ।
36. उक्तं हि (बुद्धेः) निरतिशयसूक्ष्मत्वं न्यायतत्त्वे ।
37. यन्नाथमुनिमिश्राद्यैः यथार्थख्यातिसाधनम् ।
तल्लोकबुद्ध्यनारोहात् वैभवं केचिदूचिरे ॥
38. तत्र धर्मभूतज्ञानस्य द्रव्यत्वं न्यायतत्त्वात्मसिद्धिभाष्यादिसिद्धमनुसरतां
तन्निष्ठस्मृत्याख्यविकारोत्पादकः संस्कारोऽपि तन्निष्ठः प्राप्तः, अन्तरङ्गत्वात्,
अबाधाच्च ।

33. *Nyāyasiddhāṅjana*, p. 194.

34. *Ibid.* p. 195.

35. *Ibid.* p. 199.

36. *Ibid.* p. 241.

37. *Nyāyapariśuddhi*, p. 92.

38. *Ibid.* p. 181.

39. संयोगत् विश्वसृष्टिः प्रकृतिपुरुषयोस्तादृशैः तद्विशेषैः
ब्रह्मादिस्तम्बनिष्ठः । जगति विषमता यन्त्रभेदादयश्च ।
आक्षाणामर्थयोगात् विविधमतिरबाद्यन्वयात् अङ्कुरादिः
शुद्धाशुद्धादियोगात् नियतमपि फलं न्यायतत्त्वेऽस्य घोषः ॥
40. द्रव्यं प्राग्बुद्धिरुक्ता परमिह विषयैः सङ्गमादिर्निरूप्यः ।
संयोगं भाष्यकाराः प्रथममकथयन् न्यायतत्त्वानुसारात् ॥
41. नाथैरुक्ता यथार्था विमतमतिरपि न्यायतत्त्वे ।
42. उक्तं खलु नाथमुनिभिः वेदान्तानुकूलं न्यायशास्त्रं न्यायतत्त्वाभिधानेन ।
तच्च परिगृहीतं यामुनाचार्यादिभिः ।

39. *Tattvamuktākalāpa*, 'Adraavyasara', śl. 55.

40. *Ibid.* śl. 59.

41. *Ibid.* 'Buddhisara' śl. 10.

42. *Ibid.* C. on śl. 56.

APPENDIX II

NĀMA-MAUKTIKA-MĀLĀ

नाम मौक्तिक माला

यत्पदाम्भोरुहध्यानविध्वस्ताशेषकल्मषः ।
वस्तुतामुपयातोऽहं यामुनेयं नमामि तम् ॥

१

श्रीनाममौक्तिकैर्माला यामुनार्येण निर्मिता ।
ऋषिशुक्तिसमुद्भूतैर्निर्दोषैः श्रुतिसागरे ॥

२

आराधनाय हरये जगदानन्ददायिने ।
श्रीनाथनायकपतिनारायणगुणान्विता ॥

३

सर्वकल्याणजननी जगन्मङ्गलवैभवा ।
मनीषिभिर्महाभागैः वैष्णवैः श्रियतामियम् ॥

४

श्रीमन्नारायणाद्रीश श्रमिन्नञ्जनशैलप ।
श्रीमद्वृषभशैलेन्द्र श्रीमत्सिंहनगाधिप ॥

५

श्रीशेषगोत्राभरण श्रीनिवासेति कीर्तये ।
अच्युतानन्तगोविन्द मुकुन्द गरुडध्वज ॥

६

जगदानन्दजनक जगज्जन्मादिकारण ।
नारायण जगन्नाथ शरणागतवत्सल ॥

७

सत्यसङ्कल्प सर्वज्ञ सत्यकाम सनातन ।
निस्सीमाभ्यधिक स्वरस्थ स्वे महिम्नि प्रतिष्ठित ॥

८

त्रिविक्रम त्रिलोकेश शङ्खचक्रगदाधर ।
रमानाथ रसानाथ नीळानाथ निरञ्जन ॥

९

नित्यनिर्दोषनिस्सीममहाविभव शाश्वत । त्रिगुणातीत षाड्गुण्यपरिपूर्ण परात्पर ॥	१०
पुरुषोत्तम मानाथ पुण्यश्रवणकीर्तन । निर्विकार निरातङ्क नित्यानन्द निरामय ॥	११
यज्ञेश यज्ञपुरुष पुण्डरीकाक्ष माधव । वासुदेव विभो विष्वक्सेन वैकुण्ठ वामन ॥	१२
नीलवर्णार्णवशय श्रीवल्लभ जगत्पते । ब्रह्मन्तगीतासंख्येयसन्मङ्गलगुणाकर ॥	१३
रमारमण राजीवदलचारुविलोचन । नित्ययौवनसौन्दर्यशीलदिव्यगुणार्णव ॥	१४
वेदवेद्य विशालाक्ष विश्वम्भर धरापते । दाशार्ह देवदेवेश दामोदर दयानिधे ॥	१५
धरणीधारकाधारनिलयाधोक्षजाव्यय । योगिध्येय जगद्वन्द्य जगत्स्वामिन् जनार्दन ॥	१६
नारसिंह ह्यग्रीव हरे पहलादवत्सल । लोकाधार पराधार आत्माधार धराधर ॥	१७
रथाङ्गपाणे सर्वेश सर्वलोकसमाश्रय । भूतभव्यभवन्नाथ वेङ्कटाचलनायक ॥	१८
कृष्ण विष्णो विशालाक्ष वैजयन्तीविराजित । क्षीरार्णवशयानन्त शरण्याश्रितवत्सल ॥	१९
सर्वात्मन् सर्वलोकेश सर्व सर्वात्मनायक । करुणाकर कालज्ञ सर्वलोकनियामक ॥	२०

मुञ्जीकेश हृषीकेश केशिमर्दन केशव । नरकान्तक काकुत्स्थ कालात्मन् कालपाचक ॥	२१
करीन्द्रवरदानन्द श्रीधर श्रीनिकेतन । निरवद्य परब्रह्मन् सर्वलोकपदाश्रय ॥	२२
नाथसेव्यपदाम्भोज वकुलाभरणाश्रय । रमारामाभिरामाङ्ग राम कृष्णेति कीर्तये ॥	२३
श्रीमद्वेङ्कटनाथमादिपुरुष पूर्ण परं शाश्वतं श्रीनाथं शरणागतार्तिहरणं नारायणं संश्रये । कृष्णं विष्णुमनन्तमच्युतमजं गोविन्दमिन्दीवर- शयामं नन्दकशङ्खचक्ररुचिरं ध्यायन् भजे कीर्तये ॥ २४	२४
येनैतत्पठ्यते नाम्नामष्टाविंशोत्तरं शतम् । अनिष्टपक्षक्षपणमिष्टावाप्तिरवाप्यते ॥	२५

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